Explaining institutional Europeanisation in security and defence: the German administration under Schröder and Merkel

Abstract

Participating in EU crisis management operations has affected institutional actors on various levels. As the main deliverers of civilian and military resources to EU operations, national ministries and agencies have been particularly confronted with the need for administrative adaptation. A big member state like Germany is expected to make substantial contributions, but it also faces a rigid administration. This article uses a combined hypothesis of historical institutionalism and organisational learning to explain administrative Europeanisation in German government institutions involved in civilian and military crisis management deployments. The empirical data on the German administrative trajectories under Schröder and Merkel show an explanatory link between political learning and overcoming institutional path dependency.     

Networked Cooperation: How the European Union Mobilizes Peacekeeping Forces to Project Power Abroad

Abstract

How does the European Union (EU) recruit troops and police to serve in EU peacekeeping missions? This article suggests that pivotal EU member states and EU officials make strategic use of the social and institutional networks within which they are embedded to bargain reluctant states into providing these forces. These networks offer information on deployment preferences, facilitate side-payments and issue-linkages, and provide for credible commitments. EU operations are consequently not necessarily dependent on intra-EU preference convergence—as is often suggested in the existing literature. Rather, EU force recruitment hinges on highly proactive EU actors, which use social and institutional ties to negotiate fellow states into serving in an EU missions.     

EU member state participation in military operations: a configurational comparative analysis

Contrary to what the EU’s image as a civilian power suggests, the EU member states have had 50,000–100,000 troops deployed outside their home countries for most of the post-Cold-War period. Although the vast majority of these troops were active in operations with a strong European presence, the member states’ patterns of military engagement differ significantly. This study provides a systematic analysis of the member states’ contributions to military operations. More specifically, it examines which (combinations of) conditions consistently led to participation in EUFOR Congo, UNIFIL II, EUFOR Chad, the 2011 military intervention in Libya and the air strikes against the Islamic State. Methodologically, it builds on most different similar outcome/most similar different outcome and qualitative comparative analysis. The results of the analysis show that four conditions account for the bulk of the member states’ patterns of military engagements: military resources, competing deployments, UN peacekeeping tradition and regional trade.     

Differing member state approaches to the development of the EU Battlegroup Concept: implications for CSDP

Abstract

This article will analyse the challenges facing the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) through an evaluation of the impact that differing member state strategic cultures have on the EU Battlegroup Concept, highlighted through the examples of Germany and Poland. The concept was initiated to give the EU an increased rapid reaction capacity. However, as emphasised through the cases of Germany and Poland, divergences in EU member states' strategic cultures remain, including when, where and how force is used. When this is combined with the cost of plugging military capabilities' gaps, the political willingness to deploy a Battlegroup can be affected. Whilst the article highlights that the role that member states want to play within CSDP as well as international expectations can override constraining factors, the Battlegroups rely on a rotation system. As some member states are more willing to deploy the Battlegroups than others, the concept risks becoming a declaratory policy thus undermining CSDP.     

Russia and NATO expansion: The uneasy basis of the founding act

Much of the debate since the formation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy has focused on the political will, or lack thereof, as the principal obstacle to a successful European security policy. However, even if a cohesive will to develop a clear and operational foreign and security policy exists, the lack of military capabilities within the EU would make the implementation of that policy difficult, if not impossible, for the foreseeable future. The emerging political will to develop a CFSP needs to be paralleled by significant improvements in the force projection capabilities of the EU member states in order for a CFSP and future Common Defence Policy to be credible.     

Does European defence really matter? Fortunes and misfortunes of the Common Security and Defence Policy

This article examines how the defence component of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) has been revisited over the last few years. It argues that while the CSDP has grown predominantly as a security – rather than defence – policy, the latest developments that include the creation of a military headquarter, the launching of a Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the new role for the European Commission in defence funding, attest to an evolution towards a more central EU defence policy. In the meantime, the article points to some structural impediments to the materialisation of European defence. The momentum says little about the form and finality of military operations that EU states will have to conduct so as to give a meaning to defence in a European context. Moreover, persisting divergences in the EU member states’ respective strategic cultures and institutional preferences – notably vis-à-vis NATO – are likely to continue to constrain European defence self-assertion.     

The EU's security and the sea: defining a maritime security strategy

Abstract

This article comprehensively discusses the maritime dimension of the European Union's (EU's) security, which encompasses military and civilian aspects, intergovernmental and community components as well as institutional and geopolitical elements. First, the article provides a narrative of the development of the maritime element in the EU's security policy since the adoption of the European Security Strategy in 2003. By depicting the interrelations between the sea and the EU's security, the article shows that the maritime dimension of EU security is generally well established, but often obscured by the complicated institutional structure of the Union. Thereafter, the article emphasises the need to define an effective EU Maritime Security Strategy, which would provide a strategic framework for the Union's security-related activities regarding the sea that encompass maritime power projection, as well as maritime security and safety. Accordingly the article provides some recommendations concerning the definition of such a strategy and for appropriate constituting elements: the maritime-related risks and threats, the maritime strategic objectives, the means to implement the strategy, and the theatres of EU maritime operations.     

Europe under occupation: the European diplomatic community of practice in the Jerusalem area

ABSTRACT

This article shows how the existence of a community of European practitioners in the Jerusalem area gives substance to the European stance on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. The often-stated European Union (EU) support for a two-state solution could appear meaningless in the absence of peace negotiations. However, European diplomats (i.e. diplomats of EU member states and EU officials) in the East Jerusalem–Ramallah area are committed to specific practices of political resistance to Israeli occupation and recognition of Palestinian institutions. These practices have led not only to a specific political geography of diplomacy, but also to a community of practice, composed of European diplomats and based on their daily experience of resisting occupation and bestowing recognition. It is this group of officials who represent and actively “do” Europe’s position and under occupation.     

The ESDP and Civilian Rapid Reaction: Adding Value is Harder than Expected

Abstract

This article takes issue with the prevailing view that the ESDP capacity building process is easier and has been more successful in the civilian than in the military field. It argues that civilian capacity building is harder than military capacity building, demonstrates that the European Union's (EU's) civilian rapid reaction capacity is considerably smaller and less integrated than is generally assumed and that the capacity goals set for 2008 are unattainable. Yet another major EU expectations–capability gap has been created and there is now a real danger that this gap will seriously damage the EU's reputation as the global leader in civilian rapid reaction crisis management.     

The European External Action Service,Counterterrorism and the Imperative of Coherence

ABSTRACT

The European External Action Service (EEAS), specifically mandated with enhancing coherence between the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and non-CFSP bodies on the one hand, and the European Union and member states on the other hand, has the potential to increase CFSP’s contribution to the fight against terrorism and diminish the boundaries between CFSP and other policies. Several of the EEAS’ cooperation and coordination duties, as well as the inclusive composition of the Service, allow for a more coherent approach to counterterrorism policymaking. In practice, coherence is unfolding in diplomatic cooperation with third countries and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions, as CFSP and Justice and Home Affairs actors seem to build on one another’s strengths. The picture is more nuanced in the area of intelligence, where the activities of the EU intelligence centre, transferred from the Council of the European Union to the EEAS, are conditional upon member states’ willingness to exchange information. Ultimately, current efforts towards coherence remain subject to a somewhat paradoxical two-speed process: one that encourages the meshing together of institutional actors and policy cultures, while deferring access to justice to national law, thereby yielding a system of protection of individuals à géométrie variable.     

Fit for what? Towards explaining Battlegroup inaction

Abstract

The thrust of this paper concerns the case of the European Battlegroup (BG) non-deployment in late 2008, when the United Nations requested European military support for the United Nations Organisation Mission peacekeeping force in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The argument is built on the fact that when, in official documents, the EU approaches the European security and ESDP/CSDP's military crisis management policy and interventions, it makes strong references to the United Nations and the UN Charter Chapter VII's mandate of restoring international peace and security. Such references make it seem that supporting the UN when it deals with threats and crises is a primary concern of the EU and the member states. These allusions lead to the main contention of this paper, that there is much ambivalence in these indications. The paper develops its argument from one key hypothesis; namely, that the non-deployment of a European BG in the DRC, at the end of 2008, constitutes a useful case study for detecting a number of ambiguities of the EU in respect of its declarations in the official documents establishing the European military crisis management intervention structure.     

A view from the policy community: a new strategic narrative for Europe?

ABSTRACT

Reflecting on the results presented in articles in this special issue, European leaders should take greater account of external perceptions in crafting the European Union's strategic narrative and guiding its actions. Failure to do so has impaired external policies like the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the European Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership. Leaders emerging from the Arab uprisings perceived the EU as complicit with their countries’ former anciens régimes and Russian leaders see EU support for democracy and the market economy in former Soviet states as duplicitous and instrusive. Awareness of such perceptions should be filtered into EU decision-making, without validating views that European officials and diplomats consider misleading.     

EU-Turkey Trade: A Case of Deep Integration

The EU’s self-definition as an integrating civilian, democratic and legal space of political norms and economic regulation, without any significant military power structure, profoundly affects the conception of its neighbourhood policies. It tries to promote with its neighbours what it has achieved itself at home. While the EU has one explicit neighbourhood policy, there are no less than 13 concentric circles of graduated neighbourhood relationships surrounding its territory, with a continuous blurring of categories between them. The EU can be described as engaging in a policy of Eurocentric normativism. But does trying to make neighbours ‘become like us’ amount to an effective strategy? There is widespread agreement that although the enlargement process for accession of new member states has proved impressively transformative, the official ENP, sometimes called ‘enlargement-lite’, has not. Nevertheless, while the conditionality mechanism has proved weak in the absence of the accession incentive, the alternative of Europeanisation by socialisation might still work gradually in the longer term in the outer neighbourhood.     

Cyber insecurity as a national threat: overreaction from Germany,France and the UK?

Abstract

This article analyses the development of the European Union (EU) as a global actor in the area of climate security. Building on this, it explicitly draws on constructivist concepts such as norm entrepreneurship and epistemic communities. To this end, it adopts the framework of epistemic communities, as developed by Peter Haas, in order to suggest that there is a group of EU officials, EU member states and think-tank activists, who drive the climate security agenda of the EU. Thus, it examines the precise actors involved in this EU epistemic community for climate security. This group promotes a reason for action at the global level, resulting in the attempt to diffuse this norm: climate change has consequences for international security; thus, it requires the development of appropriate policies and capabilities within the EU and globally. This article suggests that the epistemic community on climate security has been effective at diffusing this norm at both levels, albeit with differences.     

The technological gap: Proposals and documents

ABSTRACT

The gap between discourse and practice which has so far prevented the EU and China from implementing the ambitious security agenda developed within the framework of their strategic partnership is caused by two main sets of impeding factors: practical, stemming from existing policies, and normative, deriving from fundamental divergences regarding the nature of an actor’s role in the international arena. Moreover, obstacles to EU-China security cooperation also stem from and are magnified at the EU member states level. Key member states lack normative and practical synergy in their understanding of security policy and the role the EU and China play in it, thus severely complicating any attempt at bridging the discourse/practice gap.     

Who wants to pay more? The European Union's military operations and the dispute over financial burden sharing

In 2014, the European Union (EU) launched the sixth review of the Athena mechanism that finances the common costs of military operations launched in the framework of its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). In the run up to the review, there were expectations that it would improve financial burden sharing in CSDP operations by expanding common funding for them. However, these hopes were disappointed; the review became a diplomatic tug of war between France, the strongest supporter of expanded common funding, and the UK, its strongest opponent. In the end, France agreed to the UK's terms to ensure that the existing level of common funding would not decrease. This article analyses the Athena review from a neoclassical realist perspective. It argues that the review's outcome was due to the imbalance of influence among EU member states and the diverging preferences of their Foreign Policy Executives (FPEs). These factors caused the Athena review to remain in the hands of a small group of member states that had diverging utility expectations and ideological preferences. Thus, the article shows that a surprisingly intense burden-sharing dispute has emerged within CSDP.     

Transgovernmental networks and rationalist outputs? The partial social construction of EU foreign policy

ABSTRACT

The European Union (EU) foreign policy has gone beyond intergovernmentalism. It is largely formulated by (Brussels-based) national officials, in a process characterised by a high number of cooperative practices, diffuse sentiments of group loyalty and possibly argumentative procedures. Yet, in many cases, the most likely output of this process reflects the lowest common denominator of states’ positions or the preferences of the biggest states. The article intends to investigate this puzzle. In the first part, it corroborates its existence by using answers from an original database of 138 questionnaires and 37 interviews with EU negotiators. Next, it argues that cooperative practices remain often subordinated to nationally oriented ways of doing things. Consequentialist practices perform an anchoring function, in that they define the parameters around which (social) practices operate. The last section looks more closely at the sites of and meanings attached to EU foreign policy-making. By discussing national diplomats’ conspicuous leeway in Brussels, it also argues that negotiating practices are performed through a mix of partial agency and persistence of national dispositions. On the whole, changing practices is difficult, even in dense and largely autonomous settings such as EU foreign policy. The social construction of EU foreign policy occurs only to a partial extent.     

UK policy coordination during the 1990–91 intergovernmental conference

Despite the importance of European Union negotiations, the majority of scholarly attention has not been directed towards the means by which policy is coordinated in member states. This article addresses one aspect of this gap by focusing upon the structures which existed for UK policy making during the 1990–91 IGC negotiations. Particular emphasis is attached to the key role of officials, who often proved crucial to the extraction of compromises at the European level, and the manner by which policy was constrained by the inability of the Prime Minister to dominate Cabinet.     

Maritime security in the Black Sea: can regional solutions work?1

The development of a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has been seen by some as key to giving the EU greater international influence, by others as a threat to the EU's strengths as a civilian power. This article finds that, as of 2002, the EU's new military dimension could not be conceived as a fundamental threat to its civilian power acquis. Concerns have justifiably been raised over the possible diversion of resources into the military sphere, the emergence of a less transparent policy‐making culture and ESDP's effect on the way the EU is perceived from outside. However, force levels have remained limited and most policymakers see the new EU Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) as an instrument for complementing civilian elements of crisis management. This article measures ESDP more specifically against the substantive approaches towards security challenges that the EU has elaborated. It argues that European strategies suffer most notably from political‐level conceptual weaknesses that cut across both civilian and military domains and that the incipient ESDP has yet to address.     

Deploying EU military crisis management operations: a collective action perspective

This article will work towards a multi-level collective action approach for understanding the deployment of Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) military operations. It is multi-level because it uses three levels of analysis: firstly, the international level, where events that create threats to certain values catalyze the process leading to the deployment of an operation; secondly, the national level, where EU governments formulate their national preferences towards prospective deployments based on utility expectations; and thirdly, the EU level, where EU member states negotiate and seek compromises to accommodate their different national preferences. The strength of the model will be demonstrated through empirical case studies on the deployment processes of EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina and EU NAVFOR Atalanta off the coast of Somalia. The article will also provide an overview of the existing theoretical literature on the deployment of CSDP military operations.