Summit diplomacy of the seventeenth century: William III and Peter I in Utrecht and London, 1697–98

This article evaluates the meetings of the Russian Tsar Peter I and the English King William III in 1697–98 as the high point of Russia's 18‐month Great Embassy to western Europe. The emphasis is on the diplomatic aspects of Anglo‐Russian summits as well as on their results for international relations and diplomacy in Europe with particular focus on dramatic changes in Russia's attitude to international cooperation. Reform of Russian diplomatic machinery, enacted by Peter I as a follow‐up of his European journey, were as well to a great degree motivated by his personal contacts with William III and his English and Dutch diplomatic advisors. Based on British and Russian archival sources, the article attempts to prove that Anglo‐Russian summitry, and, in the first place, the rendezvous in Utrecht (1 September 1697, old style), signified Russia's intention to acquiesce to the raison d'etat principle in international relations and in practical diplomatic behaviour, thus abandoning religious and political prejudices that had kept Russians on the periphery of European diplomacy.     

The 2008 Russian–Georgian war via the lens of Offensive Realism

Abstract

The Russian intervention in Georgia's breakaway republic of South Ossetia in August 2008, Moscow's first-ever use of military force against a sovereign state in the post-cold war period, deserves a theoretical explanation. By following the tenets of Offensive Realism, this article will argue that the US–Russian competition in the South Caucasus is the main cause of the 2008 Russian–Georgian war. During the 1990s, the USA passed the buck to Turkey to contain Russian influence in the South Caucasus. In the early to mid-2000s, however, the Russian–Turkish relations were improved so rapidly that the USA opted, through NATO expansion, to step in as an offshore balancer. Following Bush administration's decision to support the Georgian candidacy for NATO membership and Georgia's ill-fated attempt to seize South Ossetia, Moscow went to war to re-establish hegemony in the South Caucasus. In this way, as the theory of Offensive Realism claims, the Kremlin believes that Russian state will enhance its chances of survival in the anarchical international system.     

Aleksandr Dugin and the ideology of national revival: Geopolitics,Eurasianism and the conservative revolution

This article examines the emergence of Aleksandr Dugin as the leader of the Eurasian Movement and later Party in Russia. For much of the 1990s Dugin was a prominent intellectual among the Russian nationalist‐communist opposition, moving from the position of ideologue of a fringe political party ‐ Edvard Limonov's National Bolsheviks — to advisor to the communist speaker of the State Duma, Gennadiy Seleznev. Dugin's ideology combined an anti‐Western interpretation of geopolitics with mysticism, Aryanism, conspirology, authoritarian statism and Eurasianism. Dugin's expanding set of Internet sites became an ideological empire of a virtual society. In 1999, in the aftermath of the NATO intervention in Yugoslavia, Dugin saw an opportunity to move from the marginal opposition to the ideologue of the post‐Yeltsin president. In this capacity, Dugin and his Eurasian Movement emerged as prominent supporters of Vladimir Putin, whom Dugin identified as the embodiment of the ‘Eurasian capitalist’ model of statist development. Dugin developed a close working relationship with Gleb Pavlovsky, a spin doctor for Putin's Kremlin. In the aftermath of 11 September and Putin's move towards supporting the United States in the war on terrorism, Dugin has continued his nominal support for the president, even as he has criticized his pro‐Western policies as anti‐Eurasian and a threat to Russian interests.     

The OSCE and ethnic conflicts in Estonia,Georgia, and Tajikstan: A search for sustainable peace and its limits

This article analyzes some of the experiences of the OSCE in Estonia, Georgia, and Tajikistan. Conflicts in these three countries followed the demise of the Soviet Union and had basic aspects in common: actual and potential border claims; the presence of a large number of national minorities whose ethnicity is shared with neighbouring kin‐ethnic states; as well as conflicting claims of national self‐determination and territorial integrity. By comparing and contrasting these cases, this article discusses the implications of the OSCE's approach and its limits in the context of the former Soviet Union, and offers some policy recommendations for the future OSCE's activities in this region. The central arguments are as follows: the OSCE has played a significant role in building a sustainable peace in the former Soviet Union where few European institutions have attempted to intervene; and that while being heavily influenced by Russian policies, the OSCE's activities in the CIS were not simple reflections of Russian interests.     

#Democracy: social media use and democratic legitimacy in Central and Eastern Europe

Since 1989, many of the former communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) have made the dramatic change from communist regimes to democratic nations that are integrated in the European sphere. While these sweeping changes have given rise to a successful transition to democracy unlike any the world has ever seen, there remain issues with governance as well as citizen support for the regime. While other studies have shown that mass media can influence a person's attitudes and opinions in the region, none has explored what effect social media can have on orientations toward democracy in the region. In the following paper, I build several hypotheses based on previous studies of media effects and democratic survival. I then employ survey data to empirically test whether social media increases support for democracy. The study finds that not only does using social media increase support for democracy, but also simple usage rather than information seeking provides more consistent effects on a person's support for democracy in CEE.     

Russia as a ‘virtual great power’: Implications for its declining role in European and Eurasian security

Instead of analyzing just some recent developments of Russia's domestic, foreign and security policies, this article focuses in particular on mid‐ and long‐term strategic trends and the consequences of Russia's decline for European and Eurasian Security. It argues that Russia is still in a long‐term socio‐economic decline and it is unrealistic to expect that Moscow will regain its former status as a Great Power or even Superpower in the mid‐term future even of its economy and military power improve rapidly and substantially. Against this background, two other powers of the Eurasian landmass, the EU and China will surpass Russia in international standing and secure great power status in the coming decades with far‐reaching consequences for the international system and Russia's security as well as for its role in Europe and Central as well a East Asia. In this light, the article analyzes strategic trends in domestic, foreign and security policies, including the impact of often overlooked factors such as demographic trends and the health crisis, of decentralization, regionalization and fragmentation within the Russian Federation, the future of Russia's military reform policies (including Russia's draft military doctrine of October 1999 and its nuclear illusions) and their implications for Russia's future foreign and security policies.     

Is the Russian federation becoming more democratic? Moscow‐regional relations and the development of the post‐Soviet Russian State

This article addresses the condition of Russian democracy by focusing on the developing political relations between the central government and regional governments. A situation of profound ambivalence and ambiguity has evolved since ratification of the Russian Federation Constitution in December 1993. Regional governments have found it possible to gain a degree of political autonomy uncharacteristic of Russia's long historical experience, yet increasingly in line with global trends toward decentralization of governmental authority. Two political patterns in the current Russian Federation are explored, both of them promising broad and enduring significance. First, the political ambiguity of relations between the national government and regional authorities may provide the context in which divided government serves to enable democracy, despite the appearance of authoritarian rule in many regions themselves. Second, the nature of the interaction between the centre and regional authorities may be breaking new ground, in terms of flexible solutions to intra‐state relations among different levels of government. Because certain aspects of centre‐regional relations in the Russian Federation replicate comparable issues elsewhere (particularly regarding the ethnic‐territorial dimension of politics), the Federation's approaches and solutions to this aspect of state‐formation could suggest useful lessons for other parts of the world.     

Exporting democracy: German political foundations in Central‐East Europe

In the liberal political tradition, representative government, civil society and some form of market are widely regarded as indispensable ingredients of democracy. The first two are essentially ‘home grown’, embedded in the enduring, albeit not immutable, political culture of a given society if they are to have substance as well as form. None the less, western democracies have been actively engaged in transplanting organizations to bolster civil society, along with political institutions, constitutions, and legal codes to Central‐East Europe (CEE) since 1989 as part of their democratization assistance.

This article examines if, and how, external assistance can intervene constructively to promote the development of democracy. A brief discussion of western assumptions about post‐communist society in CEE is followed by a review of the roles assigned to culture and institutions in the transition literature which undergird these assumptions. The comparative cultural advantages of the United States and Germany ‐ the two primary western actors in the region ‐ are outlined, coupled with a more detailed examination of German political foundation engagement in CEE.

The German political foundations were selected to anchor the study empirically because in terms of method and strategy, resources and level of engagement, they do everything right according to studies critical of western democratization assistance. In addition, their home political culture is very similar to that of the host societies in CEE. In short, their operational conditions present a best case scenario.

None the less, the study shows that in some of their highest priority, politically motivated projects, the foundations have not made much of an impression on the CEE landscape. New parties and labour unions they supported have failed or are terminally ill. Many new non‐governmental organizations have been set up but their sustainability is open to question. Projecting donor preferences onto CEE is integral to the problem. The greatest risk is to fabricate the appearance of deep‐rooted democracy by focusing on form at the expense of content. The proliferation of parties and nongovernmental organizations per se tells us little about their ability to integrate the public actively and constructively into the new systems.     

The Soviet Union and Churchill's appeals for high‐level talks, 1953–54: New evidence from the Russian archives

New evidence from the Russian archives offers proof that Winston Churchill's calls for top‐level talks, 1953–54, were greeted with mistrust and scepticism by Moscow. Soviet policy makers realized that Churchill was weak, entirely dependent on American policy and unable to act as mediator between East and West. They were also sceptical as to whether any real progress could be made during an Anglo‐Soviet summit meeting and, instead, pressed for four‐power talks at Foreign Minister level. Finally, the Soviet records shed light on the impact of the power struggle within the Kremlin on its responses to Churchill's initiative, with Vyacheslav Molotov preventing Georgi Malenkov from meeting the British Prime Minister.     

Russia and the OSCE: From High Hopes to Disillusionment

The subject of this article is the changing balance between Russia's positive and negative interests in the Conference on/Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE/OSCE) as these have evolved in relation to Western policies on the OSCE and European security relations in general. Parallel to the decline of positive Russian interests in the CSCE/OSCE, an increase in negative attitudes can be observed, most of which concern the OSCE's activities in post-Soviet countries. While the Soviet Union was traditionally a reliable supporter of the CSCE, the Russian Federation, which initially pursued the same policy, has lost most of its sense of ownership in the OSCE. This change in Russian attitudes is critical for the Organisation's future, for an OSCE without active Russian participation would lose much of its raison d'être.     

‘Walking the tightrope’: The Kosovo conflict and Russia in European security, 1998–August 1999

This article argues that Russia has pursued a policy of inclusive multipolarity towards European security after Primakov's appointment as Foreign Minister in 1996. This policy focused on three dimensions to constrain NATO and ensure a Russian voice in Europe. First, ties with NATO; second, the pursuit of OSCE reform and a European ‘Security Charter'; third, the primacy of the UN Security Council in international affairs. NATO actions in the Kosovo crisis deeply undermined all dimensions of this policy. However, inclusive multipolarity was not discarded by the Russian leadership. The tortuous path of Russian accommodation after May 1999 highlighted Russian attempts to reinstate this policy and restore a Russian voice in European security affairs — with limited success. This article examines the evolution of Russian shifts in this crisis until Vladimir Putin's appointment as Prime Minister in August 1999.     

Solitude in Europe for the communists

The Russian government sincerely believes that Assad’s removal from power would trigger the expansion of jihadism and instability in the Caucasus and southern Russia. Moscow is deeply concerned about the rise of Islamists in the Middle East, including Qatar and Saudi Arabia's efforts to support the most radical factions in Syria. At the same time, the obvious absence of the ideological background behind current Russian-Syrian relations makes them a trade item. Thus, official guarantees that the jihadists will not export their revolution elsewhere accompanied by promises to preserve some Russian economic positions in post-Assad Syria will probably create the necessary ground for the emergence of a compromise stance on Syria (including the issue of foreign intervention).     

Re‐evaluating US strategic priorities in the Caspian Region: balancing energy resource initiatives with terrorism containment

In the aftermath of September 11, US strategy has shifted in the Central Asian region from protecting the sovereignty of the southern post‐Soviet states to ensuring their stability in light of the dual impacts of energy development and the rising threat of Islamic terrorism. Although US–Russian cooperation has made strides, particularly concerning Russian acquiescence toward US and NATO military engagement in the region, geostrategic rivalry and conflicting economic goals have hindered a joint approach to initiatives regarding the region's energy development. While both agree on the goal of maximising Russian and Caspian gas and petroleum exports, US policy is increasingly prioritising Central Asian energy prosperity as a key factor in the region's ability to contain terrorism. Development of the region's energy resources has therefore become a critical US security concern. Yet, by failing to engage with Russia in a meaningful cooperation that could encourage Moscow to diversify its own energy export prospects, competition between the two powers is likely to reduce, rather than improve, the effectiveness of either in offering the Central Asian states the kind of support they need to strengthen their domestic profiles or withstand the incursion of terrorism.     

American security policy and NATO's future

NATO remains the United States’ principal instrument for shaping the security environment in Europe. It acts as a long‐run hedge against a possible resurrected Russian threat to the continent and to dampen the prospects for the renationalization of military and security policies in Europe. The United States faces formidable challenges to ensure the viability of NATO after the Cold War. Washington must be prepared to engage in a grand balancing act on several fronts to perpetuate the Alliance. It must support NATO enlargement to move the Alliance's geopolitical center eastward, but not to territory that would practically indefensible in the event of a resurgent Russia. Out‐of‐area operations will preoccupy Alliance attention in the near‐future, but too great an appetite for undertaking peacekeeping missions might over time substantially erode the Alliance's ability to deter or withstand the political and military pressure from a resurgent Russia or major power or coalition on the outlying areas of the Eurasian landmass.     

俄罗斯地缘空间形成与拓展的历史基础

空间是一个国家物质文明和精神文明的总和,是历史的积淀。俄罗斯"新欧亚主义"学派的代表人物、俄罗斯地缘政治学家亚历山大·杜金教授指出,空间是地缘政治学的一个基本概念,它不是数量范围,而是质量范畴。杜金进而认为,空间的结构往往决定历史的结构,首先是政治历史的结构。据此本文认为,俄罗斯空间形成与拓展的历史基础是东欧平原,俄罗斯的空间扩张始于欧洲,沙俄帝国时期的空间扩张转向远东。沙俄兴于扩张,也败于扩张。苏联时期继续进行空间扩张,俄罗斯独立后其地缘空间发生了新的变化。     

Central Asian Regional Security Complex: The Impact of Russian and US Policies

This paper aims to reveal the impact made by the Russian and US policies on the Central Asian regional security complex (RSC) in the 1990s and 2000s. It traces the evolution of post-Soviet Central Asia from a proto-complex to a fully fledged RSC, analysing major security trends and discovering the consolidation of the RSC's boundary, polarity and social construction. The analysis has not shown much divergence in the way US and Russian policies have influenced the Central Asian RSC. It is argued that Moscow and Washington have made a significant impact on the consolidation of the RSC's boundaries, with the effects of US and Russian policies on its polarity and social construction being rather limited.     

俄罗斯电子图书馆的建设与发展

俄罗斯的电子图书馆建设早在20世纪90年代就被批准列入联邦专项计划，属于国家级的信息资源建设工程，得到俄联邦政府的全力支持。俄罗斯电子图书馆的建设与发展促进了相关行业群体的形成，进一步推动了跨地区、跨学科、跨部门的读者之间思想、经验的广泛交流，从而大大加快了俄罗斯政府主导的文化与文明建设的完善与扩展。     

Does Russia need a general staff?

The institutional arrangements and mechanisms for preventing and managing conflicts will determine the future of European security and the balance of power in a wider Europe. Russian policy and Russia‐NATO relations are anaylsed within the context of the ongoing changes at Russia's southern periphery. The embryos of three distinct security systems are developing ‐ a Russia‐led, a NATO‐led and one led by the international community. The article suggests that instability in the southern periphery in the future will require security cooperation and a joint approach by Russia and NATO countries.     

Russia's Artificial Intelligence Strategy: The Role of State-Owned Firms

In 2017, Russian President Vladimir Putin declared that whichever country becomes the leader in artificial intelligence (AI) “will become the ruler of the world.” Yet Russia lags competitors like China and the United States substantially in AI capabilities. What is Russia's strategy for boosting development of AI technologies, and what role do groups within the Russian elite play in shaping this strategy? Russia's AI development strategy is unique in that it is led not by the government, nor by the private sector, but by state-owned firms. The government's distrust of Russia's largest tech firm, Yandex, has sidelined the company from national AI planning. Meanwhile, Russia's defense conglomerate Rostec publicly appears to focus less on artificial intelligence than on other high-tech priorities. As a result, Russia's AI development has been left to a state-owned bank, Sberbank, which has taken the lead in devising plans for government-backed investment in AI.