Soviet propaganda and the neutron bomb decision

Abstract

In July 1977, newly elected President Jimmy Carter suddenly found himself confronted with a difficult neutron bomb decision. With a narrow victory in Congress, pro neutron‐bomb forces had successfully presented the President with the authority to proceed with production. Unfortunately, as the months passed, Carter failed to move swiftly with production of the neutron warheads which many NATO alliance members saw as a much needed deterrent to the Warsaw PACT'S massive armor superiority.

Confronted with mounting international and domestic opposition to the neutron weapon, Jimmy Carter, in the fall of 1977, insisted that the NATO allies officially support American production of the warheads before the United States would produce it. Spurred on by Carter's indecision and by certain NATO members’ reluctance to officially support the weapon, the Soviet Union shifted its propaganda machine into high gear in a massive effort to sway international opinion against the weapon.

During the first few months of 1978, Western Europe saw a flood of protests against this so‐called “inhumane” weapon. Domestic communist and left‐wing socialist opposition to the neutron bomb precipitated a precarious right‐left split within many Western European socialist parties. Nowhere was this split more graphically illustrated than within the ruling West German Social Democratic Party (SPD). Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and his moderate technocrats basically favored the neutron bomb, but feared crippling left‐wing SPD opposition and possible defections if West Germany complied with American demands to break with over 30 years of U.S.‐West German nuclear precedent and agree officially to American production of a nuclear weapon, the neutron bomb.

Only after much American cajoling did the allies move toward official NATO support for production. Carter had failed to understand the disastrous political implications which left‐wing opposition had created within the NATO countries and refused to let Schmidt and other leaders off the hook. And then in an amazing move, after Schmidt and the NATO allies had risked political ruin to reach an agreement to support the neutron bomb, President Carter pulled the rug from under them on April 7,1978, when he indefinitely delayed a decision on the weapon.

With this decision, Carter had set a dangerous precedent by yielding to Soviet pressure and had missed an opportunity to win the favor of skeptical NATO allies and critics who asserted he was too weak and indecisive. But above all, Carter had unnecessarily alienated and angered NATO leaders like Schmidt who risked possible political ruin by supporting the neutron bomb.     

俄罗斯地缘空间形成与拓展的历史基础

空间是一个国家物质文明和精神文明的总和,是历史的积淀。俄罗斯"新欧亚主义"学派的代表人物、俄罗斯地缘政治学家亚历山大·杜金教授指出,空间是地缘政治学的一个基本概念,它不是数量范围,而是质量范畴。杜金进而认为,空间的结构往往决定历史的结构,首先是政治历史的结构。据此本文认为,俄罗斯空间形成与拓展的历史基础是东欧平原,俄罗斯的空间扩张始于欧洲,沙俄帝国时期的空间扩张转向远东。沙俄兴于扩张,也败于扩张。苏联时期继续进行空间扩张,俄罗斯独立后其地缘空间发生了新的变化。     

Ethnos,demos and democratization: A comparison of the Czech Republic,Hungary and Poland

With the collapse of European communism, Western observers and leaders fostered new expectations about the relative likelihood for post‐communist nations to ‘join the West’. The Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary were seen as least problematic candidates, sponsored especially by the German leadership. A troubling issue however is the emerging pattern of ethnos‐politics, identity politics based on blood ties, as opposed to demos‐politics, civic politics based on universal territorial citizenship. In the Czech Republic this ethnos‐politics appears most clearly as anti‐Romany racism and governmental discrimination. In Poland and Hungary, centre‐right parties have developed a politics of ethnic patriotism which labels opponents as traitors and foreign elements. In these nations, political liberalism has been too weak and often too opportunist to offer a viable demos‐politics as a counterweight. Instead, the ex‐communist successor parties in Poland and Hungary have re‐emerged as the mass base for a non‐nationalist demos‐politics. The West has yet to take seriously the new ethnos‐politics, prefering to give priority to economic and foreign‐policy compatibility. The admission of these nations into the European Union or North Atlantic Treaty Organization would give new legitimacy to ethnos within the West, and reinforce the ethnos‐politics of Austria's Haider and France's LePen.     

American security policy and NATO's future

NATO remains the United States’ principal instrument for shaping the security environment in Europe. It acts as a long‐run hedge against a possible resurrected Russian threat to the continent and to dampen the prospects for the renationalization of military and security policies in Europe. The United States faces formidable challenges to ensure the viability of NATO after the Cold War. Washington must be prepared to engage in a grand balancing act on several fronts to perpetuate the Alliance. It must support NATO enlargement to move the Alliance's geopolitical center eastward, but not to territory that would practically indefensible in the event of a resurgent Russia. Out‐of‐area operations will preoccupy Alliance attention in the near‐future, but too great an appetite for undertaking peacekeeping missions might over time substantially erode the Alliance's ability to deter or withstand the political and military pressure from a resurgent Russia or major power or coalition on the outlying areas of the Eurasian landmass.     

Point of Departure: A Reassessment of Charles de Gaulle and the Paris Summit of May 1960

This article argues that the Franco–American antagonism of the 1960s, which culminated with France's partial withdrawal from NATO in 1966, stems from French president Charles de Gaulle's decision in the aftermath of the failed May 1960 Paris Summit to radically redirect French foreign policy away from its post-World War Two Atlantic orientation to a more European one. By linking the failed summit to de Gaulle's new perception of the Cold War, this article moves de Gaulle scholarship away from interpretations of his foreign policy as the product of anti-Americanism or an anachronistic vision of French power to an understanding rooted in his recognition that the changing dynamics of the Cold War required the Western Europeans to reduce their military dependence on the United States. Since American leaders would never willingly relinquish their dominant position in European security affairs, de Gaulle's new design almost ensured a rising Franco–American tension.     

Summit diplomacy of the seventeenth century: William III and Peter I in Utrecht and London, 1697–98

This article evaluates the meetings of the Russian Tsar Peter I and the English King William III in 1697–98 as the high point of Russia's 18‐month Great Embassy to western Europe. The emphasis is on the diplomatic aspects of Anglo‐Russian summits as well as on their results for international relations and diplomacy in Europe with particular focus on dramatic changes in Russia's attitude to international cooperation. Reform of Russian diplomatic machinery, enacted by Peter I as a follow‐up of his European journey, were as well to a great degree motivated by his personal contacts with William III and his English and Dutch diplomatic advisors. Based on British and Russian archival sources, the article attempts to prove that Anglo‐Russian summitry, and, in the first place, the rendezvous in Utrecht (1 September 1697, old style), signified Russia's intention to acquiesce to the raison d'etat principle in international relations and in practical diplomatic behaviour, thus abandoning religious and political prejudices that had kept Russians on the periphery of European diplomacy.     

Naming the Nation: A Critical Analysis of Names in Polish Political Discourse

This article offers a critical discursive analysis of proper names used in Polish political discourse, focusing on six addresses to the nation made by prominent public figures of the Polish political scene?the president, prime minister, and the primate of the Catholic Church. The names used in the speeches did not function merely as means of referring to places or persons. The speakers used them to construct an ideologically preferred reality. Those used by the president of Poland ''embellished'' the Communist past of the country and showed his political (post-Communist) option as a viable proposal for Poland. The speeches made by the primate of Poland created a politically uncontroversial image of the country, with the head of the Catholic Church positioned as a moral authority. Finally, the visible absence of names in the prime minister's speech represented the etatistic view of Poland.     

Through the Looking Glass: The Helsinki Final Act and the 1976 Election for President

The controversy surrounding the 1975 Helsinki Final Act made it an enduring issue in the 1976 campaign, and the political backlash against President Gerald R. Ford damaged his electoral chances. Ford's signature of the agreement, his continuation of détente, and his foreign policy more broadly may not have been decisive issues in his contests with Ronald Reagan and then Jimmy Carter, but they certainly were prominent throughout the election. Examining the influence of the Final Act on Ford's election campaign illuminates the extent to which a number of candidates sought to use popular opposition to the agreement to their advantage. Furthermore, it reveals how the 1976 presidential candidates, and Ford in particular, struggled to address growing questions about détente, human rights, and morality in foreign policy. Ford's failure to defend his signature of the Final Act adequately raised concerns about his foreign policy and personal leadership with the electorate.     

Eroding Democracy: Federal Intervention in Russia's Gubernatorial Elections

Under some conditions, electoral politics may undermine democratization, even when the elections themselves adequately meet the usual standards. To illustrate this point, the article examines the dynamics of gubernatorial elections held in the 89 regions that comprise the Russian Federation during the first term of President Vladimir Putin. The analysis considers whether pressure from the federal executive and strategic changes in election timing influenced the results of these elections. The study contends that Putin's experience with gubernatorial elections led him to question their value and, ultimately, to eliminate them. Meanwhile, several of Russia's governors sent clear signals that they did not value free and fair elections. Since governors presiding over Russia's poorest regions were also the ones most likely to be insulated from public accountability, voters saw little value in defending the institution of gubernatorial elections. This helps explain the lack of public outcry following Putin's decision.     

From East to West,and back again: Economic reform and Ukrainian Foreign Policy

In this article we argue that when Former Soviet Union (FSU) leaders can obtain Western economic resources, then their foreign policy will more often be independent of Russia. The principal factor we examine with respect to securing Western economic assistance concerns the willingness of leaders to implement economic reform, an enabling condition that allows leaders to adopt policies more independent from Russia. In contrast, if leaders cannot secure Western economic resources because of a lack of reform, they are more likely to adopt a pro‐Russian orientation. In the case of Ukrainian foreign policy throughout the past decade, we contend that there are three distinct phases. These include the initial anti‐Russian policy of the early 1990s that proved unsuccessful because of a lack of reform, the more moderate Russian orientation in the middle of the decade when moderate reform was implemented, and a stronger pro‐Russian orientation by the end of the decade as reform slowed.     

Russia as a ‘virtual great power’: Implications for its declining role in European and Eurasian security

Instead of analyzing just some recent developments of Russia's domestic, foreign and security policies, this article focuses in particular on mid‐ and long‐term strategic trends and the consequences of Russia's decline for European and Eurasian Security. It argues that Russia is still in a long‐term socio‐economic decline and it is unrealistic to expect that Moscow will regain its former status as a Great Power or even Superpower in the mid‐term future even of its economy and military power improve rapidly and substantially. Against this background, two other powers of the Eurasian landmass, the EU and China will surpass Russia in international standing and secure great power status in the coming decades with far‐reaching consequences for the international system and Russia's security as well as for its role in Europe and Central as well a East Asia. In this light, the article analyzes strategic trends in domestic, foreign and security policies, including the impact of often overlooked factors such as demographic trends and the health crisis, of decentralization, regionalization and fragmentation within the Russian Federation, the future of Russia's military reform policies (including Russia's draft military doctrine of October 1999 and its nuclear illusions) and their implications for Russia's future foreign and security policies.     

Political Liberalization in Bin Ali's Tunisia: Façade Democracy

In considering political liberalization in post-Bourguiba Tunisia since 1987, it is hard to argue the case for the reforms initiated by his successor, President Bin Ali, without noticing their limitations and even contradictions. In a world characterized by increasing democratization, the Tunisian example seems to buck the global trend, despite several noteworthy achievements - periodic elections, licensed political parties, sustained economic growth and stability. To a considerable extent the analysis of Bin Ali's 'façade democracy' here confirms this assessment, owing especially to the exclusionary and corporatist character of the democracy. Bin Ali's much hailed 'era of change' may well be not much different from the regime of his predecessor. Like Bourguiba, Bin Ali continues to exclude Islamists and other potentially formidable opposition from more secular forces from political participation and contestation. Similarly, the start of a presidential campaign by the ruling party to amend the constitution, in 2001, to enable Bin Ali to remain president beyond his constitutionally mandated second and last term which ends in 2004, gives a strong sense of déjà vu: Bourguiba's presidency-for-life.     

Is Unilateralism Always Bad? Negotiation Lessons from Israel's “Unilateral” Gaza Withdrawal

Using the 2005 unilateral Israeli withdrawal from Gaza as a case study, this article exposes an apparent paradox: circumstances may exist in which an outcome that serves the interests of parties to a conflict cannot be achieved through bilateral negotiation but can be achieved by unilateral action. Although the withdrawal was seen at the time as serving the interests of both the Israeli government and the Palestinians, we argue that the same result could not have been achieved through bilateral negotiations. “Behind‐the‐table” internal conflicts on each side would have made it impossible for the leaders to agree on the scope of these negotiations. Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's success in implementing his Gaza withdrawal was attributable in significant measure to his ability to maintain ambiguity about his long‐run plans for the West Bank. Only by focusing attention on Gaza was he able to build the necessary coalition to implement the controversial move. The Palestinian leaders, on the other hand, could never have agreed to come to the table to negotiate about Gaza alone — they would have insisted that the scope of any negotiations address a broad range of final status issues. In this article, we identify some of the lessons that the Gaza example teaches regarding the utility and limits of unilateralism as well as the benefits and potential costs of employing ambiguity as a strategy to help accomplish a controversial move. Finally, we also explore the aftermath of the withdrawal and its many missed opportunities for improving the outcome. We suggest that, even when acting unilaterally, leaders should carefully consider the probable impact of their actions on the internal conflicts of their adversaries.     

Re‐evaluating US strategic priorities in the Caspian Region: balancing energy resource initiatives with terrorism containment

In the aftermath of September 11, US strategy has shifted in the Central Asian region from protecting the sovereignty of the southern post‐Soviet states to ensuring their stability in light of the dual impacts of energy development and the rising threat of Islamic terrorism. Although US–Russian cooperation has made strides, particularly concerning Russian acquiescence toward US and NATO military engagement in the region, geostrategic rivalry and conflicting economic goals have hindered a joint approach to initiatives regarding the region's energy development. While both agree on the goal of maximising Russian and Caspian gas and petroleum exports, US policy is increasingly prioritising Central Asian energy prosperity as a key factor in the region's ability to contain terrorism. Development of the region's energy resources has therefore become a critical US security concern. Yet, by failing to engage with Russia in a meaningful cooperation that could encourage Moscow to diversify its own energy export prospects, competition between the two powers is likely to reduce, rather than improve, the effectiveness of either in offering the Central Asian states the kind of support they need to strengthen their domestic profiles or withstand the incursion of terrorism.     

“梅普组合”及普京治国方略的连续性

俄罗斯新当选总统梅德韦杰夫于2008年5月7日宣誓就职。他与前任总统普京关系密切，是普京把他扶上了总统宝座。梅德韦杰夫提名普京为总理并获得通过，“梅普组合”正式成立。梅德韦杰夫的治国理念与普京具有一致性。中俄两国关系是高度信赖的关系，是保障世界稳定的重要因素。中俄两国关系的发展不需要过渡期，可以保持持续稳定的发展。     

The Future Foretold: Lyndon Baines Johnson’s Congressional Support for Israel

Lyndon B. Johnson became a senator the year of Israel’s creation: 1948. Moral, political, and strategic considerations guided Johnson’s outspoken support for Israel from an early point in his political career. This analysis reveals that Johnson’s advocacy of Israel whilst a senator foreshadowed his policy as president of championing the Israeli-American military-strategic alliance. Beginning with his time in Congress, Johnson had many Jewish American friends supporting the establishment of a Jewish state and, due to the importance of Jewish-American backing of the Democratic Party, Johnson supported Israel for significant political reasons. From a moral and strategic perspective starting in the 1950s, Johnson believed that Israel served as a humanitarian refuge for Jews in the aftermath of the Holocaust and, as a liberal democracy, was well suited to oppose the expansion of Soviet influence and communism in the Cold War Middle East. For these reasons, Johnson supported the initiation of American aid to Israel in the early 1950s, which would presage decisions to arm Israel with the first American tanks and fighter jets as president. As a senator, Johnson staunchly opposed President Dwight Eisenhower’s threat to impose sanctions against Israel if it did not withdraw from Egyptian territories occupied in the 1956 Suez crisis. Johnson’s stance on Suez – that Israel deserved greater security guarantees prior to withdrawal – would starkly parallel his policy following the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.     

Rhetoric and ethics: looking at the marks of our reading/speaking in society

ABSTRACT

This article follows aspects of the current debate on racism as embodied in the AIDS-HIV controversy. It discusses President Thabo Mbeki's AIDS letter to world leaders in terms of the religious reality it invokes and his reaction to opposition at home regarding his stance on the link between AIDS and HIV. His handling of opposition is analysed in terms of Emmanuel Levinas's concept of the Other and J Hillis Miller's concept of the law of the text. The article concludes that the debate on racism is still stifled by essentialist thinking on both sides of the racial spectrum, making it very difficult to transcend the situation.     

Assessing Russia's cards: three petty games in Central Asia

Moscow's growing influence in Central Asia stems from the evolution of the region's five states in close correspondence with Vladimir Putin's semi‐authoritarian model. Absent adequate resources and consistent policies, however, Russia must engage in complicated manoeuvring in order to advance its interests. The result is not overt geopolitical competition with the West—often defined by the tired notion of the ‘Great Game’—but rather a series of at least three separate intrigues, or ‘petty games’.     

Parties,Party Systems and Democracy in the European Union

Since the late 1980s, research on political Islam has been much in vogue in Europe and the US. This phenomenon is typically viewed as an expression of religion rather than of politics. Precisely because of the assumed “religious” underpinnings of political Islam, most Western attempts to engage with Islamists often remain trapped in an attempt to test their “democratic credentials”. By focussing on what Islamists think about democracy, many studies have ignored the political, social and economic contexts in which Islamists operate. Accounting for the political underpinning of Islamist movements can both help understand their political evolution and open up fruitful avenues for comparative analysis. For this reason, attention is turned to Europe to seek best practices of external engagement with domestic opposition movements in authoritarian contexts, such as Western engagement with opposition actors in Franco's Spain, Kuchma's Ukraine and Shevardnadze's Georgia.     

A new turn to authoritarian Rule in Russia?

Many observers have pointed to the increasingly authoritarian nature of President Putin's regime in Russia. This apparent turn away from democracy has generally been attributed either to Russian political culture or to the security background of Putin himself and many of those he has brought to office. However, analysis of the democratization literature suggests that the sources of Russia's authoritarianism may lie in the nature of the initial transition from Soviet rule, and in particular the way in which elites were able to act with significant independence from civil society forces because of the weakness of such forces. This weakness enabled successive elites led by Mikhail Gorbachev, Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin to construct a political system in which popularly based involvement and participation were severely restricted. In this sense, Putin is merely building on what went before, not changing the regime's basic trajectory.