Reintegration and the relevance of social relations: the case of Lebanon

The DDR process that took place in Lebanon after the internal wars (1975–89), based on the Ta'if Accord (1989), was not co-ordinated by any international organisation. This paper assesses the reintegration of a number of combatants of one of the militias, the Lebanese Forces, placing particular emphasis on the context in which it unfolded. A programme of reintegration into the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) was proposed to the ex-combatants, but because of the high number on one side and because of the situation within the LAF itself (a pluri-religious organisation under reorganisation) this programme had little effect on the process. Instead the majority of the ex-combatants came to rely on their family and network established within the militia for their social and economic reintegration. This study finds that there has been little rupture between life as combatants and life as civilians. Three contextual factors were particularly important: the small size of the country, the rhythm of the war where periods of combat alternated with periods of calm, and the close contact combatants managed to keep with their family, work, schools and universities. A key lesson for DDR processes more generally stems from the study: DDR initiatives are likely to be most effective when they work alongside and augment indigenous positive social processes contributing to reintegration.     

A re-conceptualisation of ex-combatant reintegration: ‘social reintegration’ approach

The social reintegration of former combatants is the most important aspect of the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process, but there is a paucity of literature providing a clear understanding of its challenges and what it actually constitutes, and, more importantly, how it could be planned and implemented in peace-building environments. In order to respond to the lack of theory, the paper will use the desistance theory which outlines assistance models for ex-offenders' re-entry into society and addresses the question of how social reintegration can be perceived and structured effectively in the overall DDR operational landscape. The proposed approach is presented through a matrix of relationships between the elements of ‘emphasis on the combatant’ and ‘emphasis on the community’ in terms of ‘low’ and ‘high’ levels, resulting in the four main models for community re-entry: ‘self-demobilisation’, ‘reinsertion’, ‘community-located reintegration’ and ‘social reintegration’. Having explored what they constitute in the practice of DDR in the second part of the analysis section, the social reintegration approach, which is structured over the dimensions of ‘family and community’, ‘sustainable employment’ and ‘civic responsibilities’, will be elaborated in the final part.     

A future disarmament,demobilisation and reintegration process in Sudan: lessons learned from Ethiopia,Mozambique and Uganda

The conflict that broke out in Sudan on the eve of its independence from Britain in 1956 has devastated the country, retarded developmental progress, drained human resources and damaged the social fabric of the entire nation. However, the Protocol of Machakos which was signed by the Government of the Republic of the Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Sudan People's Liberation Army on 20 July 2002, states the commitment of the parties to a negotiated, peaceful and comprehensive resolution to the conflict within the unity of the country. With peace now in sight, the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants is essential to avoid the mistakes made in 1972. It is crucial to build a new future for the generations that have suffered so much in five decades of war. This paper examines the challenges that might confront DDR in post-conflict Sudan. It draws on past experience following the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement between the regime of President Gaffar Mohammed Nimeiri and the Anya-nya rebels, and on the experiences of countries that have gone through similar situations, such as Ethiopia, Mozambique and Uganda.     

Revisiting DDR in Liberia: exploring the power,agency and interests of local and international actors in the ‘making’ and ‘unmaking’ of combatants

The understanding that disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes are essential in helping to prevent war recurrence in post-conflict situations is at the heart of current international aid practice and the academic literature on peacekeeping and stabilisation. However DDR programmes are often launched on the basis of untested assumptions. This article considers the DDR programme in Liberia and analyses the complex relationship between the programmatic efforts to disarm and reintegrate combatants and the programme's actual effects. If we are to understand how DDR works as a tool of post-conflict governance, it is essential to explore the mechanisms of authority and power at stake. The focus is therefore not on whether combatants were successfully disarmed and reintegrated, but rather on exploring unfolding processes and the field of forces within which DDR programmes are implemented. It critically assesses the ideas of disarmament and reintegration and the basic assumptions behind current DDR policy through an analysis of the Liberian case, emphasising the agency and interests of local and international actors in the ‘making’ and ‘unmaking’ of combatants.     

Securitization and Desecuritization: Female Soldiers and the Reconstruction of Women in Post-Conflict Sierra Leone

This article focuses on the construction of “soldier” and “victim” by post-conflict programs in Sierra Leone. Focusing on the absence of individual testimonies and interviews that inform representations of women and girls post-conflict, this article demonstrates that the ideal of the female war victim has limited the ways in which female combatants are addressed by disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs in Sierra Leone. It is argued that titles given to female soldiers such as “females associated with the war,” “dependents,” or “camp followers” reveal the reluctance of reintegration agencies to identify females who participated in war as soldiers. In addition, I argue that men and masculinity are securitized post-conflict while women—even when they act in highly securitized roles such as soldiers—are desecuritized and, in effect, de-emphasized in post-conflict policy making. The impact of this categorization has been that the reintegration process for men has been securitized, or emphasized as an essential element of the transition from war to peace. In contrast, the reintegration process for females has been deemed a social concern and has been moralized as a return to normal.     

The way back in: Reintegrating illegal armed groups in Colombia then and now

Back in the early 1990s, Colombia reintegrated five left-wing guerrilla groups. Whether as groups or individuals, these guerrillas found space for legitimate political participation at the local and national levels. Society accepted them and they embraced democracy and contributed to the strengthening of liberal political ideas and human rights norms in the country. Fifteen years later Colombia is once again attempting to reintegrate ex-combatants, 33,000 from the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, the so-called ‘paramilitary’—a right-wing force that sought to fight guerrillas—and about 11,000 ‘individually demobilised’ combatants of FARC, ELN and AUC who have since 2002 deserted their group. This time, however, the task of transforming illegal armed groups into legitimate political entities is proving to be harder. In particular, the reintegration of the paramilitary has elicited wide criticism from Colombians and the international community. Why are things different today? By examining and comparing the processes of political reintegration of the M-19 and the paramilitary this article will argue that there are at least four critical factors that either allow or bar former combatants from becoming legitimate players with a capacity for political interlocution: the international and domestic political and normative contexts; the nature and behaviour of the illegal armed group (how much power they command, to what extent groups use war for personal profit and whether they commit egregious crimes); the terms of the peace negotiation; and the practical dimensions of exercising political interlocution.     

The challenge of DDR in Northern Uganda: The Lord's Resistance Army

Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) rebels have been fighting in northern Uganda for the past two decades in conflict which has devastated the region. The group is notorious for abducting children and young people. Over 20,000 have been taken since the war began and turned into soldiers and rebel ‘wives’. This is the context of Uganda's informal disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programme. Rather than being an organised process set up to help consolidate peace at the end of war, it has largely been a necessary response to a flow of escaping former abductees, taking place within an on-going conflict. In 2006, the government of South Sudan began mediating peace talks between the LRA and the Ugandan government. Although the talks have yet to deliver, they have focused attention on managing an end to the conflict, including a formal programme of DDR to deal with those rebels remaining in the bush.

Based on primary research – undertaken in Gulu, Kitgum, Kira and Apac Districts of northern Uganda in August and September 2005 and March 2006 – this paper lays out the problems that have marred earlier attempts to reintegrate former LRA combatants – and looks at the challenges that lie ahead.     

Vocational training of former Kosovo Liberation Army combatants: for what purpose and end?

Since July 1999, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), at the request of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the Kosovo Force (KFOR), has undertaken the implementation of the Information Counselling and Referral Service (ICRS) which aimed to provide support mechanisms for demobilised Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) combatants in their return to post-conflict society. This paper explores the vocational training aspect of the reintegration strategy in Kosovo. It presents an outline of demographic and socio-economic characteristics of former KLA combatants. Having explored the former combatants' perspectives on vocational training courses, the analysis is carried out through a human resource perspective with a specific reference to identification and taxonomy of skills, and policy application for effective utilisation of human resources. Finally, the paper concludes with a set of lessons learnt from the vocational training experience of former combatants in Kosovo.     

THE PROCESS OF DEMILITARIZATION AND THE REVERSIBILITY OF THE PEACE PROCESS IN NORTHERN IRELAND

The process of militarization has permeated Northern Ireland society both overtly and in more subtle and pervasive ways. Since the Good Friday Agreement in 1998, reductions in state military personnel and infrastructure have been made and several acts of paramilitary decommissioning of weapons carried out. However, the political culture and discourse remains combative and bifurcated as the democratic institutions and processes struggle to achieve viability. Support for the Agreement has faltered as the raised expectations of improvements in quality of life, particularly in communities worst affected by the Troubles, have not been met. Vacuums such as the rolelessness amongst former combatants and gaps in policing have contributed to internecine conflict. As in South Africa, there has been a transition from political to criminal violence in local communities. A formal process of demobilization, demilitarization and reintegration of former paramilitary actors, combined with training in political skills would resolve some of these issues and ensure the irreversibility of the peace process itself.     

Stability in Syria: What Would it Take to Make it Happen?

The Syrian Civil War has taken a devastating toll on the country's civilian infrastructure and population. Tackling the legacy of the conflict and restoring a measure of stability will constitute a monumental and generational challenge. The article addresses the “day after” in Syria by mapping out the main issues that a future post-conflict recovery, reconstruction, and reconciliation process would need to address in order to attain some level of stability and to be sustainable. It then describes and analyzes one of the most complex challenges of a future post-war transition, namely the need to reign in the proliferation of non-state armed groups and to ensure a process of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants, including those hailing from the jihadi camp. Finally, the article briefly addresses the role that local actors can play in beginning to build stability.The views expressed here are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect her employer's position. This article is part of a special project conducted by the Foreign Policy Research Institute, titled: “After the Caliphate: Reassessing the Jihadi Threat and Stabilizing the Fertile Crescent,” which includes a book, a thematic issue of Orbis: FPRI's Journal of World Affairs (Summer 2018), and a series of podcasts. Each element of the project can be found here: https://www.fpri.org/research/after-the-caliphate-project/.     

Why “I” became a combatant: A study of memoirs written by Nepali Maoist combatants

This article analyzes combatants’ accounts of their engagement with the Communist Party of Nepal, Maoist—CPN (M). We use Self-Categorization Theory (SCT) as a framework and thematic analysis as a method to examine how social relationships and contextual factors contributed to political party identification during the ten-year-long Maoist insurgency in Nepal. Based on the study of autobiographical narratives written by Nepali Maoist combatants, we demonstrate that a) key social and political experiences cumulatively evoked feeling positively inclined to partisan attachment; b) CPN (M) party ideology, which was presented as a cure-all to socio-political difficulties, actuated the predisposed people’s partisan alignment; c) families were largely unsupportive of their members’ intention to take part in the war; and when they participated, the family responded with antagonism; and d) party ideologues of the CPN (M), who met the partisan-leaning individuals as close friends, accelerated and sustained their friends’ motivation to become involved in the armed conflict. Together the findings culminate in a view that engagement with CPN (M) during the insurgency occurred despite resistance from family and increased exponentially because of societal and political experiences, the strong appeal of party ideology, and social network dynamics.     

Reintegration and localised conflict: security impacts beyond influencing spoilers

This article investigates the effectiveness of combatant reintegration through a case study of two security-oriented programmes held in Poso, Indonesia from 2007 to 2008. Each programme aimed to prevent further attacks by addressing perceived economic difficulties experienced by youths whose main skill was perpetrating violence. The effect of such reintegration programmes on potential spoilers has typically been conceptualised in terms of programme influences on former combatants themselves. But in a localised conflict context where many combatants may have held jobs while perpetrating violence, the paper finds that the clearest contribution to sustaining peace of reintegration programming was its effect on police capacity to manage security. Police increased their levels of contact with combatants through reintegration and other informal incentives, then leveraged this contact to gather information after security incidents and to detect potential security disturbances. This pattern of achieving security outcomes through police contact with perpetrators of violence owes its conceptual lineage to the counter-terrorism strategy of the Indonesian police. The case highlights the potential for greater exchange between the fields of combatant reintegration and counter-terrorism disengagement.     

‘Death is painful so it is better to be holding a gun’: the socio-ecologically situated dis/rearmament decisions of formerly abducted persons in northern Uganda

In northern Uganda, children and youth once abducted by the notorious Lord's Resistance Army now live in internally displaced persons camps, facing challenging social, economic and security conditions. Within this context, former combatants state they would prefer to rearm than face a ‘painful’ and inevitable death. Drawing on qualitative interviews and focus group discussions with over 300 former combatants, we apply a socio-ecological lens to determine the push/pull factors that influence their decision to rearm or disarm. A lack of personal security, levels of stigmatisation and poor economic and educational opportunities are among the highest push factors toward rearmament. These findings point to a broad range of causes and actors responsible for child and youth militarisation and call for more holistic DDR approaches.     

Does a more participatory approach to reintegrating ex-combatants lead to better outcomes? Evidence from Sierra Leone and Liberia

Programmes for the disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants are intended to support the peace process in which they are embedded. Yet their outcomes are not always clear. Calls for a more holistic approach with greater local ownership have often been made, but can be difficult to implement. This study of DDR in Sierra Leone and Liberia applies the concept of ‘participation’, which means genuinely involving intended beneficiaries in the process. It is based on semi-structured interviews with a range of stakeholders, and a survey and focus group discussions with ex-combatants. There is little indication of a participatory approach: ex-combatants reported serious problems with information, consultation and input into decision-making. However, where greater participation is seen, there are statistically significant associations with better outcomes in terms of work, economic status and community relations. The data illustrate how post-war social capital can be built up—or undermined—by the degree to which reintegration processes were participatory. Participation, social capital and loss of faith in the process are seen to be significant in the way DDR can contribute to the wider peace process.     

Gangster,ideologue, martyr: the posthumous reinvention of Teungku Badruddin and the nature of the Free Aceh Movement

This paper, which is based upon the author's experiences in Aceh from 2006 to 2010, illustrates the dangers inherent in disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) policies that allow for the transfer of reintegration assets through ex-insurgent command structures. The manipulation of such transfers in Aceh, Indonesia, led to the creation of a new insurgent group, the Pasukan Peudeung, from the ‘splintering’ corpus of the Free Aceh Movement. The author argues that Aceh's DDR process, while widely heralded as a success, was inherently flawed in its execution and contained within it numerous discrete, and violent, failures; the emergence of the Pasukan Peudeung was emblematic of this. GAM's conflict-era economic activities, encompassing illegal forms of extraction and other rent-seeking behaviours, did not end with the conflict: they simply evolved, as did Pasukan Peudeung. Further, GAM was and remains in its current iterations a criminal network; its members constantly reinterpret their ideologies to suit their actions and interests, usually in reaction to crimes committed by members.     

A Counterterrorism Strategy for the Obama Administration

This article assesses the scope and nature of the current terrorist threat to the United States and suggests a strategy to counter it. Al-Qaeda continues to pose the most serious terrorist threat to the U.S. today. If the September 11, 2001 attacks have taught us anything, it is that al-Qaeda is most dangerous when it has a sanctuary or safe haven from which to plan and plot attacks. Al-Qaeda has acquired such a sanctuary in Pakistan's Federal Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and its North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and surrounding environs. Accordingly, the highest priority for the new American presidential administration must be to refocus our—and our allies'—attention on Afghanistan and Pakistan, where al-Qaeda began to collapse after 2001, but has now re-grouped. This will entail understanding that al-Qaeda and its local militant jihadi allies cannot be defeated by military means alone. Success will require a dual strategy of systematically destroying and weakening enemy capabilities—that is, continuing to kill and capture al-Qaeda commanders and operatives—along with breaking the cycle of terrorist recruitment among radicalized “bunches of guys” as well as more effectively countering al-Qaeda's effective information operations. The U.S. thus requires a strategy that harnesses the overwhelming kinetic force of the American military as part of a comprehensive vision to transform other, non-kinetic instruments of national power in order to deal more effectively with irregular and unconventional threats. This article first discusses the scope and details of the terrorist threat today and then proposes a counterterrorism strategy for the new presidential administration. It focuses first on creating a micro approach to address the deteriorating situation in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. It then considers the requirements of a broader macro strategy to counter terrorism and insurgency.     

Engaging disengagement: The political reintegration of Sierra Leone's Revolutionary United Front

The conflict between the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and the Sierra Leonean government represents a highly instructive study for reintegration projects. Far from being a conventional political insurgency readily lending itself to peaceful political transformation, the RUF possessed within the ranks of its young and brutalised recruits a fundamental rejection of Sierra Leone's political structures. As such, Sierra Leone presented a unique challenge for reintegration efforts, requiring not only the immediate reconciliation of ex-combatants with victims and civil society, but also the long-term political incorporation of a group of youths defined by their very disengagement from and distrust of the political system. This article argues that the Sierra Leone experience demonstrates that successful political reintegration does not simply amount to political participation per se, but rather requires specific forms of political participation, which reinforce the primacy of peaceful political interaction over and above other means for affecting change. In this regard, this article concludes that despite progress in many key areas, former fighters of the RUF have yet to be fully politically reintegrated.     

The political consequences of reintegration programmes in current peace-building: a framework for analysis

This article demonstrates how democracy and peace-building can interlink at the micro-level, as demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) programmes feed into democratisation via their rarely studied political impact among individual ex-combatants. Using the reintegration experiences of ex-combatants in Liberia and the literature on policy feedback, this article demonstrates the varying impacts of current peace-building on the politics of ex-combatants, and develops a framework to analyse this relationship further in other cases. This theoretical framework offers a tool to grapple with and make sense of the political consequences of DDR, thereby clarifying how reintegration programmes structure and condition the ex-combatants' continued political voice. In particular, it is suggested that reintegration programmes influence the politics of ex-combatants either through resources obtained in the programmes, enabling access to politics in a different way, or through their institutional design and procedural traits, offering cognitive cues that either emphasise democratic norms or promote conflict in politics at large.     

Does the sequence of land reform and political reform matter? Evidence from state-building in Afghanistan

Property insecurity is associated with terrorism, insurgency and economic underdevelopment. For this reason, land reform is often implemented alongside political reform in post-conflict settings. In contrast, this article argues that political reform should be sequenced prior to land reform during state-building. Evidence from Afghanistan shows how land redistribution, legal titling, decentralisation of state-owned land and provision of legal services to resolve land disputes are unlikely to alleviate political violence or facilitate economic development without establishing or substantially improving political capacity, political constraints and inclusive political institutions at the local level. These findings suggest the importance of sequence in the process of land reform and political reform. More generally, political reform is a prerequisite for land reform to reduce violence and improve development prospects in post-conflict settings.     

A sub-national approach to state-building and security: the role of municipal institutions in Colombia's DDR process

The Mayoral Offices of the two most important cities in Colombia— Bogotá and Medellín—played a key role in implementing the national policy of DDR that took place under the Presidency of Alvaro Uribe. Both Mayors developed municipal policies to provide services to ex-combatants from paramilitary and guerrilla groups. The analysis of these policies contributes to the understanding of the role that municipal authorities play in underpinning and redefining national policies of security and reintegration of ex-combatants. The dichotomy between military security and human security presents a theoretical framework to study how national and sub-national authorities interact on the basis of their different security needs. Municipal authorities had to address three main challenges in the reintegration of ex-combatants: first, the consequences of a sudden increase in population and the subsequent pressure on security and coexistence; second, the resistance from the recipient communities and having to achieve a balance in the services provided to victims and demobilised; third, how to establish effective collaboration between municipal and national authorities. The DDR was nationally built, but it was consolidated at the sub-national level.