行政规制的有效性分析

成本因素是影响制度变迁的核心因素。在行政规制的每一个行政程序中都包含了大量的交易费用，加什和哈恩做过出色的估算。行政规制作为一种制度安排，其效益首先表现为制度效率，这包括规制本身的效率：规制本身的运行所需成本及其所带来的效益（成本是否最低）和规制对社会经济发展的影响。文章通过对规制政策影响的分析，表明规制的效益可能是正的也可能是负的。行政规制的巨大成本和规制改革所带来的效益刺激，也反映在政府和市场主体在规制制度的选择上形成各自的预期。     

地方政府环境规制悖论的成因及其治理

改革开放以来,我国的经济发展带来了诸多环境问题,环境规制作为社会性规制的主要内容日益受到学界和政府部门的关注。地方政府环境规制悖论意指地方政府面临发展经济和环境规制之间的目标冲突和行为困境,它不同于规制俘获理论中的规制者被俘获,是规制者在更为严重意义上的主动就范。地方政府环境规制悖论的外在表现为:环境问题引发的突发事件增多,地方政府间环境规制"竞争到底"现象,"环境保护"异化为"污染保护"。而形成地方政府环境规制悖论的内在成因是:地方政府经济增长目标的凸显,环境规制机构职能的混杂,环境问题的隐性外部性。治理地方政府环境规制悖论的机制是:优化地方政府目标转化的制度环境,完善地方政府环境规制的法律法规,多样化环境规制政策的综合实施,明晰地方环境规制机构的职能边界,强化地方政府环境规制的协同治理。     

政府激励性规制理论述评

激励性规制是目前政府规制中的重要工具,它能够有效实现规模经济和竞争活力的兼容。价格上限规制和特许投标等激励性规制方式的应用已取得了较好的效果。从理论基础上看,它是委托代理理论和权变管理理论的体现,并符合行为学中的激励理论。我国在应用上要完善激励性规制应用的制度基础,要强调公众的参与,灵活应用激励性规制的具体方式。     

论政府社会性规制职能的完善

政府社会性规制是一种政治行为,它是以保障全体公民的安全、健康、卫生和防止公害、保护环境而对社会经济主体各种特定行为进行规范和限制的政府干预。在中国,构建社会主义和谐社会要求政府转变以GDP为中心,片面追求经济增长的速度,把注意力转移到解决国民健康、环境保护、社会公平等基本问题上。这些内容都属于政府社会性规制职能的范畴。当前我国日益加剧的环境污染问题,禁而不止的煤矿矿难问题,层出不穷的假酒、假药和有毒食品问题的存在,反映了我国政府社会性规制职能的缺失和社会性规制能力的不足,不利于社会主义和谐社会的建设。因此,适应建构社会主义和谐社会的需要,必须健全政府社会性规制的法律体系,合理选择和使用各类规制政策工具,强化健康、安全、环境规制和通过制度创新规制规制者,从而完善我国政府的社会性规制职能。     

政府规制的政治经济学分析——基于经济行政法的考察

经济行政法是法律层面重要的政府规制工具之一。我国经济行政法律制度在理念、体制及运行方式等方面仍有待改进。对经济行政法的考察既有利于政府规制公益和私益平衡下的正义诉求,也有助于经济行政法制变迁方向的导引。政府规制过程中经济行政法的政治一经济属性表明：以市场需求为导向,放松管制,实现经济行政法的制度变迁,是平衡公共利益与私人利益的路径选择。     

"政治-经济周期"理论梳理与初步思考

"政治-经济周期"理论关注的是政策周期性波动对经济波动产生的影响.由于存在认识过程、前提假设、理论平台的不同,我国"政治-经济周期"理论与西方国家的政治周期理论存在区别.通过对"政治-经济周期"理论的梳理,政策已经被纳入到影响经济波动的重要变量之中,政策与制度是经济波动的重要变量政策是一种制度安排,经济政策是经济波动的内生变量,政府可以制定政策、法规、条例来约束市场行为.     

论规制失灵及政府规制能力的提升

政府规制是行政机关依据有关的法规,对微观经济主体的市场行为所进行的直接控制、约束或规范,其基本诉求是修正市场机制的先天性缺陷。规制失灵是政府规制未能达成预期目的,引致经济绩效与社会福利的净损失,包括规制制定失灵和规制执行失灵。原因主要有社会性规制匮乏与经济性规制过度并存;规制执行机构缺乏独立性,规制执行存在运动式的惯性,被规制者俘获规制者;规制规制者制度的粗陋性等。探讨规制失灵的对策,提升政府规制水平,有利于增强政府驾驭市场经济的能力和构建和谐社会的能力。     

政府规制失灵与对策研究

政府规制是政府部门依据有关法规直接对微观经济活动进行规范、约束和限制的行为。它是政府对市场失灵最通常的回应,其目的是通过采取规制手段来解决市场失灵现象。但理论和实践证明,政府并不是全知全能、完美无缺的,它也会由于自己的缺陷而产生失误,即"政府失灵"。我国目前正处于经济转型时期,与一般市场经济国家相比,我国现阶段的政府规制失灵现象除了具有一般意义上的表现与原因之外,更有其特殊的背景与根源。随着中国加入WTO,随着社会的全面、协调、可持续发展问题日益引起人们的关注,随着从"经济建设型政府"向"公共服务型政府"转变日益成为全社会的共识,我国的政府规制改革面临着重大的机遇与挑战。本文借鉴西方国家规制改革的实践,并结合经济转型时期中国的特定背景,认为:解决中国政府的规制失灵问题,不能只是简单的放松规制,而是需要确立争强化对规制者的规制,从而实现良好规制。     

横向垄断协议的反垄断规制政策

禁止垄断协议是各国《反垄断法》的重点内容,已成为世界各国《反垄断法》的三大支柱内容之一。从分析横向垄断协议的概念入手,借鉴美国、欧共体等国外对横向垄断协议规制政策及实践,针对我国横向垄断协议规制政策的现状,提出了完善我国横向垄断协议规制制度的建议,为维护公平的市场竞争秩序有着很重要的意义。     

经合组织的规制改革政策及其对我国的启示

规制改革是经合组织国家政府改革的重要组成部分。本通过对经合组织规制改革献的研究，介绍了经合组织对政府规制概念的界定和分类、对规制改革的理解和推动改革的政策建议，并分析了对我国政府改革的借鉴性意义。     

Sanction Power, Jurisdiction, and Economic Policy-making: Explaining Contemporary Telecommunications Policy in Japan

Variation in policy-making is an important analytical issue in public policy analysis, but it has not been extensively discussed in the literature on Japanese politics and political economy. Focusing on the interaction between state and societal actors, this article presents a causal argument to account for variation in Japanese economic policy-making. It is argued that variation in policy-making patterns is determined by the strength of a bureaucracy's sanction power and the exclusivity of its jurisdiction. This argument is elaborated through analysis of four related cases of Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT) policy-making: the privatization process of Nippon Telegraph and Telephone (NTT), the regulation of telecommunications after NTT privatization, the promotion of advanced telecommunications, and the reorganization of NTT. The causal framework is also applied to contemporary Ministry of International Trade and Industry economic policy-making to highlight the argument's preliminary applicability to Japanese policy-making. This analysis of Japanese policy-making lays a base for further analysis of variation in policy-making in general.     

The politics of regulatory enforcement and compliance: Theorizing and operationalizing political influences

There is broad consensus in the literature on regulatory enforcement and compliance that politics matters. However, there is little scholarly convergence on what politics is or rigorous theorization and empirical testing of how politics matters. Many enforcement and compliance studies omit political variables altogether. Among those that address political influences on regulatory outcomes, politics has been defined in myriad ways and, too often, left undefined. Even when political constructs are explicitly operationalized, the mechanisms by which they influence regulatory outcomes are thinly hypothesized or simply ignored. If politics is truly as important to enforcement and compliance outcomes as everyone in the field seems to agree, regulatory scholarship must make a more sustained and systematic effort to understand their relationship, because overlooking this connection risks missing what is actually driving regulatory outcomes. This article examines how the construct of “politics” has been conceptualized in regulatory theory and analyzes how it has been operationalized in empirical studies of regulatory enforcement and compliance outcomes. It brings together scholarship across disciplines that rarely speak but have much to say to one another on this subject in order to constitute a field around the politics of regulation. The goal is to sharpen theoretical and empirical understandings of when and how regulation works by better accounting for the role politics plays in its enforcement.     

Who opposes labor regulation? Explaining variation in employers’ opinions

Competing accounts of the effect of globalization on labor politics agree that firms influence regulations, but make contrasting predictions for which firms are most likely to oppose regulations. Using survey data from employers in 19,000 manufacturing firms in 82 developing countries, we examine the determinants of employers’ opinions toward labor regulation. In contrast to the predictions of optimistic theories of globalization, we find that (i) firms that export are more likely to have negative opinions toward labor regulation than those that sell domestically, and (ii) firms that receive foreign direct investment have similar views as firms that rely only on domestic capital. Further, we show that systematic differences in employers’ opinions depend on the intensity of the competitive pressures they face and their use of skilled workers. In doing so, we provide an empirically grounded account of the heterogeneous opinions of key actors in economic policymaking in developing countries.     

Two spheres of regulation: Balancing social and economic goals

Independent regulatory authorities hold comprehensive policy mandates that cover both economic and social goals. They take on various roles in market regulation, competition policy, consumer protection, and labor inspection. This article questions whether policymakers are driven by different rationales when delegating the realization of social, as opposed to economic goals, and analyzes how regulators accommodate their various roles in practice. The conceptual framework links the literature on delegation and organizational models. Comparative analysis of postal policy in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom covers a serious area of potential conflict between social and economic regulation. Variation in delegation points to the relevance of instrumental considerations, but also to the politics of institutional arrangements. Variation in regulatory practice shows that organizational models make a difference in accommodating conflict. The article makes a strong case that social and economic regulation need to be addressed as two distinct, yet interacting spheres. © 2017 John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd     

POLITICS AND REGULATION: THE PUBLIC CHOICE APPROACH

Abstract: Government regulation of the economy has been the subject of criticism both on the grounds of efficiency and equity. Traditional economic theories explaining regulation may be deficient insofar as they assume a benevolent welfare maximizing government, intervening only to correct "market failures". Political theories of interest group influence (for example pluralist, capture, Marxist theories) provide some more realistic insights into regulation, but fail to yield rigorous, testable propositions. The theory of public choice applies the rigour of economic analysis to political behaviour and suggests some useful approaches to the explanation of regulation, focusing on the public goods problem of organizing large groups of actors for collective action and on the role of the political entrepreneur in mobilizing large numbers of voters. The public choice approach may also be useful in suggesting strategies for deregulation in some key areas of the Australian economy currently under scrutiny (for example banking, airlines, telecommunications).     

Why and how does the regulation of emerging technologies occur? Explaining the adoption of the EU General Data Protection Regulation using the multiple streams framework

Why and how the regulation of emerging technologies occurs is not clear in the literature. In this study, we adapt the multiple streams framework – often used for explaining agenda-setting and policy adoption – to examine the phenomenon. We hypothesize how technological change affects policy-making and identify conditions under which the streams can be (de-)coupled. We trace the formulation of the General Data Protection Regulation to show that the regulation occupied the legislative agenda when a policy window was exploited through policy entrepreneurship to frame technological change as a problem for data privacy and legislative harmonization within the European Union. Although constituencies interested in promoting internet technologies made every effort to stall the regulation, various actors, activities, and events helped the streams remain coupled, eventually leading to its adoption. We conclude that the alignment of problem, policy, politics, and technology – through policy entrepreneurship – influences the timing and design of technology regulation.     

Politicians,regulators, and regulatory governance: The neglected sides of the story

We offer a series of reflective insights about the state and direction of studies related to the politics of regulation. Notably we argue that the field is characterized by persisting divisions between Americanists and Europeanists. Largely focused on the actions taken by political principals, the former regularly report a substantial politicization of regulatory behavior. Reflecting on recent developments in US politics however, we show that political influence could be overestimated in the United States. Symmetrically, this same influence could be underestimated by Europeanists, who for now have largely focused on regulators and agencies. This is notably suggested by a discussion of recent development in European politics, as revealed by contributions systematically measuring agency politicization in Western European democracies. On this basis, we identify some promising research questions and agendas for future studies on the politics of regulation.     

An overview: A new era of tax enforcement – from “big stick” to responsive regulation

Recent developments in regulation and tax administration in Australia inspired this article on tax compliance and responsive regulation. This article analyzes the economics of crime and compliance as the dominant approach to tax enforcement of the past three and a half decades. It evaluates the key advantages and disadvantages of the economic approach as well as its application to tax. The article then explores responsive regulation as an alternative method that draws on the economic paradigm but also supplements this approach with other theories, particularly those involving identity, conflict escalation, and procedural justice. Building on this analysis and a case study of Australian investors in mass marketed tax schemes, the article suggests that the broader, more balanced, and closely tailored method of regulating responsively may enable regulators to draw on the advantages of the economic model while alleviating some of its drawbacks. Responsive regulation may therefore constitute a superior method for regulating compliance.     

关于墨子经济思想的哲学思考

墨于是公元前五世纪未中国最具独创精神的思想家，他出于对贫苦大众的深切关怀，一生都在为改善小生产者和劳动者的物质生活、为提高他们的社会政治地位而斗争。而他的思想就是在这些社会实践中形成的。在社会生产实践中他提出了关于生产、消费、财富、管理等方面的经济理论，而在这些经济思想中又渗透着丰富的哲学内涵，本文从其生产观中运用的生产力与生产关系的矛盾论、消费观中运用的资源合理配置论，财富论中运用的生产需求与供给之间平衡性与不平衡性矛盾论、以及管理论中运用的改革与科学管理作用论等理论入手，分析墨子经济思想中的哲学元素．挖掘墨子经济哲学思想对当今社会政治经济发展，有着重要的启示意义。     

“三权分立”与“政行二分”中的“行政”概念辨析

从“三权分立”到“政治行政二分”中，都提及了“行政”一词，在日常学习研究中，人们会质疑隶属于两大思想下的这一概念是否包含了相同的含义，若相同，它们有什麽联系呢？若不同，两思想各自对于“行政”一词的内涵又是如何定义的呢？本文试图从这两大思想产生的历史背景及理论内容封“行政”的概念作出新的辨析，剖析西方政治思想和行政学研究的发展路径。