Exploring USAID's democracy promotion in Bosnia and Afghanistan: a ‘cookie-cutter approach’?

US democracy promotion is integral to the pursuit of the grand project of the American Mission. By promoting democracy America makes its role one of international engagement as opposed to one of isolation. The first part of this paper examines the political and cultural aspects of US democracy promotion in the post-Cold War era through the bi-polar framework of the case-specific versus one-size-fits-all. To better understand USAID's democracy promotion policy, the second part takes this framework and applies it to its political reform strategy in Bosnia under the Clinton administration from 1995 to 2000 and Afghanistan under the Bush administration from 2001 to 2008. This paper confirms that America's democracy promotion simultaneously employed both the case-specific and one-size-fits-all approaches. USAID programmes and projects did at times respond to local conditions but nevertheless appear to employ a blueprint design.     

Malaysia – towards a topology of an electoral one-party state

For the first time in 51 years of independence, Malaysia's ruling coalition Barisan Nasional (National Front, BN) under the weak leadership of Abdullah Badawi was denied its customary parliamentary two-third majority in the 2008 elections. The three major opposition parties, which formed the Pakatan Rakyat (The People's Alliance, PR) after the elections, increased the number of opposition-held state governments from one to five. The opposition had never held more than two state governments at any one time.1 Chin and Wong, ‘Malaysia's Electoral Upheaval’. Parts of this paper were used in a research project organized by the Malaysian Strategic Research Centre. View all notes For many practitioners and students of Malaysian politics, the 2008 poll means the birth of a long overdue ‘two-party system’, where two multi-ethnic coalitions contest for power and alternate in running the country. After all, two similar attempts to build a Malay-dominated second coalition to rival the ruling coalition dominated by the ethno-nationalist United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) were made in the 1990 and 1999 elections by former UMNO leaders who lost in their party in-fighting. Sadly, the coalitions built did not survive even the next elections. We argue that such optimism may be misplaced due to a failure to appreciate the ‘electoral one-party state’ nature of Malaysia.2 Wong and Norani, ‘Malaysia at 50’. View all notes Despite having held 13 national elections without failure, and having almost no incidence of in- or post-election violence, neither a military coup nor ‘people's power’, Malaysia has never been anywhere close to being a ‘consolidated democracy’, 52 years after joining what Huntington called the second wave of democratization.3 Huntington, The Third Wave. View all notes For Linz and Stepan, a consolidated democracy requires not only a government with de facto authority to generate policy and exclusive de jure power, but also that ‘this government comes to power that is the direct result of a free and popular vote’. In other words, democracy has to become ‘the only game in town’.4 Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition, 5. View all notes     

Informal institutions,forms of state and democracy: the Turkish deep state

Democratization studies have proven that the main difference between autocracy and democracy is, counter-intuitively, not the basic regime structure, but rather, the function and validity of democratic formal institutions defined as rules and norms.1 For the institutionalist turn in democratization studies, see O'Donnell, ‘Delegative Democracy’; O'Donnell, ‘Another Institutionalization’; O'Donnell, ‘Polyarchies’; Lauth, ‘Informal Institutions’; Merkel and Croissant, ‘Formale und informale Institutionen’; Weyland, ‘Limitations’; Helmke and Levitsky, Informal Institutions. View all notes In ‘defective democracies’,2 Merkel, ‘Embedded and Defective’. View all notes or in the grey zone between authoritarian regimes and consolidated democracies, formal institutions disguise specific informal institutions which are usually ‘the actual rules that are being followed’.3 O'Donnell, ‘Illusions About Consolidation’, 10. View all notes Moreover, scholars have investigated the issue of stateness: ‘without a state, no modern democracy is possible’.4 Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition, 17. View all notes This article sheds light on this grey zone, particularly, on the type of state whose coercive state apparatus is autonomous. Its autonomy results primarily from the interplay between formal and informal institutions in post-transitional settings where ‘perverse institutionalization’5 Valenzuela, ‘Democratic Consolidation’, 62. View all notes creates and fosters undemocratic informal rules and/or enshrines them as formal codes. If the military autonomy reaches a threshold ranging from high to very high, constitutional institutions become Janus-faced and can enforce a sui generis repertoire of undemocratic informal institutions. Thus, the state exerts formal and informal ‘domination’,6 Weber, Economy and Society. View all notes Herrschaft in a Weberian sense. This modality of dual domination is what I call ‘deep state’.     

A distributional theory of economic democracy

In the twentieth century, while political democracy triumphed economic democracy failed both as an idea and in practice. A case for reviving the idea of economic democracy is made in terms of protecting political democracy. Economic democracy has conventionally been understood as a matter of bringing economic power under the control of collective political power. The idea is here reformulated as a matter of redistributing economic power between persons, of giving people a share in economic power directly rather than through elected representatives. Political democracy is assumed, which is to say that political power is under the control of the middle class. The question then is under what conditions the middle class might want and think it could use political power to redistribute economic power. The conclusions are that there is in advanced capitalist democracies considerable scope for the redistribution of economic power between the rich and the middle class. As for the empowerment of the poor, however, anti-poverty policies beyond the containment of poverty are unlikely to emerge today in countries where that did not happen under earlier historical conditions.     

The role of actors and institutions: The difficulties of democratic survival in Mali and Niger

Mali and Niger, two neighbouring countries in Francophone West Africa, offer a good opportunity for identifying key factors favouring the survival of a young democracy. While democracy has so far survived, just about, in Mali, it ended in Niger with a coup d'état in January 1996. Given comparable levels of poor economic development and similar troubled modern political histories, economic and societal preconditions do not provide clues to the different experiences of the two countries. Instead, the answer must be sought in the institutional choices made and in the interaction between key players during the democratic transition. An electoral system with proportional representation resulted in political instability in Niger, while a majoritarian system ensured a stable political majority in Mali. Political crisis in Niamey provided an opportunity for the army to retake power. While the military had been alienated from the Nigerien national conference, it had participated actively in and supervised the Malian conference. Mali and Niger provide tentative lessons for other ‘late democratizers’.     

Boxing and Politics in Slovakia: 'Meciarism' Roots,Theory, Practice

This article argues that 'Meciarism' represented an inevitable phase on Slovakia's way towards democracy and a market economy - it was the 'Slovak must'. 'Meciarism' as a distinct phase of development was determined by the fact that state-building and democratic transition took place at the same time and were fostered by peculiar traditional features of Slovak political culture. The first substantive section of the article introduces the theory and practice of 'Meciarism'. The attempt to clarify core features and their ideological roots is illustrated by a selection of examples that depict the reality of 'Meciarist rule' and the coalition government's political style. The second section investigates the political environment on the civic level, which was favourable to the emergence of 'Meciarism', and argues that 'civic incompetence' was the main reason for Prime Minister Meciar's political success. Finally, the third section explores the historic origins of 'Meciarism'. It shows how distinctive historical conditions and constellations shaped Slovak society's political culture to such an extent that 'Meciarism' was an inevitable feature of the first years of national independence.     

Prompting democratic transitions from abroad: International donors and multi‐partyism in Tanzania

It is generally accepted that the international donor community influences the politics of recipient states. In particular, donor calls for political liberalization are seen to have had, and continue to have, effects upon democratization in countries dependent upon international economic assistance. Such democratic contingency tied to aid suggests that the continuation of aid flows, and possibly an increase in aid transfer sums, occurs in response to political liberalization. It also implies the threat of decreases in, or even cessation of, foreign aid should the recipient state fail to implement political reform. This research assesses the role that the donor community plays in recipient states’ transition to democracy, focusing on Tanzania as a case study. Tanzania, a major recipient of foreign aid, underwent fundamental political reform in 1992. This study combines analysis of fluctuations in bilateral aid flows to Tanzania with interpretations of the causal role played by donor pressure from the perspectives of representatives of the donor community as well as from members of Tanzania's political elite. These perspectives are derived from original interviews conducted by the author. The findings indicate no correlation between fluctuations in aid transfers and Tanzania's implementation of multi‐party democracy. Rather, it was the perception among the Tanzanian leadership of a direct linkage between donor aid disbursements and political liberalization that prompted the political transition.     

‘Ryk,ryker, Rykie’: A first exploration of the journalistic contribution of a journalist extraordinaire

Abstract

This article will, as a first exploration, attempt to put some aspects of the Afrikaans journalist Rykie van Reenen into perspective with the aim of understanding her contribution to South African journalism and the extent of her oeuvre. Van Reenen was referred to as 'undoubtedly the most outstanding Afrikaans journalist of the [twentieth] century' (Giliomee 2003, 564). In the Afrikaans rewritten version of this book, it is qualified with the word 'waarskynlik' – (probably) (Giliomee 2004, 470). Although her journalism, according to sources, contributed in a significant way to the eventual political change from an Afrikaner Nationalist-governed country to a democracy, very little is known about the journalist. This initial recording of van Reenen's oeuvre is part of a more extensive study of this journalist who has set a standard in South African Afrikaans journalism in terms of subject matter and writing style. This article can thus also be regarded as a contribution in a small way to a more complete South African media historiography, which, in general, lacks significant scholarly attention.     

Is Belarus a demagogical democracy?

The article analyses the meaning and the forms that contemporary democracy may take, especially in application to the new regimes in Eastern Europe. The evaluation of developing polities always poses a difficulty, as one never knows whether an existent form of government is the final one that a state aims to achieve, or whether it is simply an interim effort to survive transition. Furthermore, there may be as many forms of democracy as there are different states, and the currently prevailing liberal form of democracy may not necessarily be the only or the best means to form a sustainable government. From this perspective, contemporary Belarus provides an insightful study of a regime that may be labelled as 'authoritarian', but in this article is arguably viewed as a 'demagogical democracy' following Aristotle's conceptualisation of a democratic state. I wish to acknowledge the invaluable support of INTAS (99-00245) and the British Academy (SG-31102 and PDF/2001/174), without which the project on which my quotations are based would not have been possible.     

War and Democratization: Lessons from the Portuguese Experience

The literature on democracy suggests that new democracies should have difficulty emerging during war or in the aftermath of armed struggle, yet Portugal's current democracy emerged simultaneously with the end of the nation's unsuccessful war in Africa. This article addresses the reasons and argues that democracy triumphed not simply in spite of the war but also, in part, because of it. The costs and geography of the war itself, the capacity and rootedness of the state that waged the war, the political culture of the regime's military officers, and the war-related timing of Portugal's first elections all helped prevent the emergence of an anti-democratic coalition and contributed to ensuring a successful transition to democracy. The article ends with three ideas that merit closer examination: that different sorts of wars leave different legacies for democracy; that wars that leave state bureaucracies intact or stronger are more likely to be followed by lasting democracy than those which do not; and, finally, that the ideologies of military elites are pivotal to the outcome of post-war democratic transitions.     

Unfinished business: the Catholic Church,communism, and democratization

Although history has shown us that the church plays a role in the political liberalization of non-democratic countries, the nature of the church's role and how it participates in politics has yet to be fully revealed. By revisiting the Polish Church's historic role in the collapse of communism, I argue that we have overestimated the church's effect on political liberalization in that case, which has led us to neglect or be prematurely disappointed in its role in the remaining communist countries such as in Cuba. Drawing from the Polish case, I conclude that the church's moral, self-limiting, and transnational character needs to be recognized and incorporated into a general theory of democratization. It is this aspect of the church that has helped it to remain active within remaining communist societies, and provide the moral support that is an integral part of political liberalization processes.     

Editors' Note

Examining the relationship between regime type and defense effort provides evidence for reformulating theories of democratic peace. Consistent with liberal theories, regime type has substantively and statistically significant effects. In times of peace, democracies bear lower defense burdens than other states and keep proportionately fewer soldiers under arms. During times of war, however, democracies try harder and exert greater defense effort than non-democracies. Contrary to the results of some recent studies, all other things being equal, the arsenal of democracy appears to out-gun its opponents when it counts. Examining three components of democracy separately indicates that a largely overlooked factor, political competition, tends to drive these outcomes. Executive constraints are also associated with increased defense effort during war. But there is little evidence that wide participation or large winning coalitions have the predicted effects on defense effort. The results point to the flexible quality of defense effort in democracies, which is theoretically and empirically accounted for by the competitive political environment rather than institutional factors favored by existing theories.     

Mauritania: Political Parties,Neo-patrimonialism and Democracy

This article takes issue with those analyses of ‘developmental democracy’ which treat popular participation as a clamorous inconvenience to be managed in the interests of economic efficiency. Instead it asks what follows from prioritizing participation both as a defining feature of democracy, and as an integral part of what is meant by development.

The analysis is developed in two parts. The first contrasts the narratives of popular and of liberal democracy, showing how they come to different conclusions about participation and its role in development. But it also argues there are potential complementarities. These were obscured when socialist ‘people's democracies’ were (misleadingly) seen as popular alternatives to liberal democracy. Since the end of the cold war, however, the focus has been on democratizing liberal democracy, to ensure it is responsive to the needs of citizens, as active participants in development and not just targets of state policy, rather than on whole system alternatives.

The second part reviews the experience of popular democratic experiments in Tanzania and Nicaragua, which sought to extend participation beyond the confines of representative democracy, and to link it to participatory development. It might be read as a requiem for their apparent failure. But their vicissitudes also raise broader questions: about the contradictions between popular participation and ‘people's democracy'as a system of rule; concerning the structures and procedures (elections, political parties, civil society bodies, mass organizations and so on) through which participation is organised; and about the problems of harmonizing participatory development with the management of complex national economies.     

Transnationalizing democracy promotion: The role of Western political foundations and think‐tanks

Promoting democracy has developed into a common activity performed by a variety of actors in the post‐cold war world. While it is states and international institutions that receive most of the attention devoted to this increasingly important issue‐area, other non‐state actors also engage in democracy promotion. This article examines the activities of two such actors: political foundations ‐ quasi‐governmental organizations established in a number of advanced states ‐ and think‐tanks ‐ private institutions traditionally engaged in research and policy advocacy. It argues that the role and impact of these actors deepen the transnationalization of democracy promotion, which has important consequences for the international politics of democratization and international relations more generally.     

The three worlds of post-communism: revisiting deep and proximate explanations

Since the upheavals of 1989–1991, the post-communist countries have embarked upon three distinct political trajectories: a path leading to democracy in the Western part of the setting, a path leading to autocracy in the Eastern part of the setting, and an intermediate path – both in geographical and political terms – leading to ‘defective’ democracy. This article seeks to explain the emergence of these three worlds of post-communism. Using typological theory as the principal methodological tool, we revisit Herbert Kitschelt's distinction between deep (structural) and proximate (actor-centred) explanations. The empirical results show that the post-communist setting is characterized by striking regularities in the form of clustering in the explanandum as well as the explanans. The orderings of referents on both the deep and the proximate attributes show a remarkable co-variation with the political pathways of post-communism – and with each other. The presence of such systematic empirical regularities lends support to two conclusions. First, both kinds of explanations elucidate the present variation in post-communist political regime types. Second, the variation on the deep factors largely explains the variation on the proximate factors. Kitschelt's general plea to dig deeper is thus supported, and the explanatory quest turns into a challenge of theoretical integration.     

Youths in the interface of development and security

This article interrogates the link between youth, security and development in Africa and argues that the central determinant in the link is ‘governance’, especially as this implies the ability of the state to harness the productive potential of youths and to meet their demands on a number of issues. The article also asserts that the reality of a youth bulge in many African countries presents challenges (as opposed to crises), as much as opportunities for national socio-economic transformation. Besides, youths in many developing countries have been the victims of developmental experiments often tele-guided by international financial and development agencies. In its conclusion, the articles argues that efforts to address the challenges posed by youths must move from platitudinous wish-list into formulation of coherent policy agenda that is consistent with the socio-economic and political realities of individual countries; in which youths themselves active agents; and one which must be incorporated into the wider governance framework of nation-states.

The issue of youth and violent conflict concerns more than youth, it is a reflection of society in crisis and hence of development itself. If a society's values, norms, customs, practices, structures and institutions are under threat and such changes in turn threaten the development of its children into youth and then adults, then that society cannot sustain itself.1 ?1. UNDP, Youth and Violent Conflict, p.12. View all notes

The state … the economy… are predicated on notions of adulthood; they all require the participation of adults in order to function. If youth are unable to fully make this transition to the minimal conditions of adulthood, then such structures are unsustainable and will either fracture or mutate in unforeseen ways. An understanding of the intersections between youth, violent conflict and society is a way of re-examining development and developing societies. Youth, those who engage in violence and especially those who do not, are located at the junctures between development, security, peace and conflict.2 ?2. UNDP, Youth and Violent Conflict, p.13. View all notes     

Towards a framework for local democracy in a war‐torn society: The lessons of selected foreign assistance programmes in El Salvador

This article examines several bilateral and multilateral programmes that were designed to forward El Salvador's transition from a war‐torn society to a democratic polity. Both procedural and substantive democratic strengthening measures were pursued by external donors within the national framework for reconstruction, and independently through larger Central American initiatives. Because links between development and democracy are not clearly understood this article questions the implicit assumption accepted by foreign donors that democracy will be a by‐product of development assistance. To illustrate this point, state‐level procedural reforms and local level reconstruction and reconciliation interventions are assessed. Particular attention is paid to the Development Programme for Refugees, Displaced and Repatriated in Central America (PRODERE) which is compared with two other local level interventions. In a comparative setting, PRODERE highlights the potential of development assistance to open a hitherto exclusionary political arena and add substance to procedural democratic reforms. The article concludes that development interventions that fail to simultaneously address the causes as well as consequences of war‐torn societies cannot claim to alter the balance of power. Hence, they cannot be considered as development assistance that is supportive of transition to democracy.     

Power-sharing and political party engineering in conflict-prone societies: the Indonesian experiment in Aceh

Establishing legitimate political leadership through non-violent means is an essential step in the rebuilding of post-conflict societies. For this reason the successful holding of democratic elections is often seen as the crowning achievement of the peace process. In recent years, however, it has become clear that elections do not always guarantee the peace, and may in fact, make societies more dangerous.1 ?1. Collier Collier, Paul. 2009. Wars, Guns and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places, New York: Harper Collins.  [Google Scholar], Wars, Guns and Votes; Brancati, Peace by Design. View all notes This has prompted political scientists to look more closely at other dimensions of the transition from violent conflict to democratic politics, including the role of political parties. Political parties play an essential role in all democracies, but their importance is magnified in conflict-prone societies. While some scholars have argued that political parties may help to consolidate peace by forming coalitions between groups formerly in conflict, more recent research suggests that such parties may also entrench social cleavages, especially if party formation is based along former conflict fault lines. This article considers these arguments in the case of Aceh, Indonesia, where an historic peace agreement allowed former Acehnese rebels to form their own political party—one based along both ethnic and former conflict lines.     

Disquieting growth: urban space in Kawashima Yūzō's film Suzaki Paradise Red Light

This article examines how Japanese postwar cinematic texts manifest and comment upon contemporary political and economic events, and considers the usefulness of cinema for a more complete historical understanding of the period. In particular, it argues for the significance of fūzoku eiga, or ‘films of customs and manners’ by analyzing a representative text of that genre, Kawashima Yūzō's 1956 film Suzaki Paradise Red Light. Although Kawashima's film has been treated as an apolitical melodrama, a close textual analysis reveals it to be a counter-narrative to the success story of postwar economic recovery and growth that the Japanese state sought to promote. Key to this analysis is an examination of the urban space of the Suzaki neighborhood in Tokyo, as depicted in the film. Kawashima's tour of Suzaki addresses the issues of the economic stagnation within the metropolis, uneven development, and the liminal space of muen, or ‘no ties,’ which offers a brief refuge from an increasingly disciplined everyday life.     

Development and political legitimacy: the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan

Development's policies are based on a set of premises: state‐building, state of law, democratisation, accountability and privatisation. The idea is that the Western concept of democracy could be implemented through the development of a ‘civil society’ of the building from scratch of new institutions. Such a model works when there is political will from the local political authorities and the society to adopt such a model (as was the case in Poland and Hungary after the collapse of the Soviet Union). But in any case a policy of development should be based on political legitimacy. In Iraq, as well as Afghanistan, political legitimacy means abiding with nationalism, Islam and local political culture (often based on clan‐ism and networks). In Iraq, the US policy has deliberately ignored the issue of legitimacy. In Afghanistan, because the US intervention was not part of a great design, it relied more on local constraints and thus has been more effective, or at least, less disruptive. The issue is not opposing a Western model of democracy to a national authoritarian political culture, but to root democracy into the local political culture. If not the policy of strengthening civil society, through political and military pressure as well as NGO's, has a disruptive effect and may lead to a conservative, nationalist and religious backlash.