Medvedev's Russia and the Social Dimension

In recent years Russia has, thanks to the action of President Putin, witnessed a significant strengthening politically and economically. After years of crisis, this has finally ensured a condition of stability functional to the compromise that has arisen between the regime and society. The election of a new president, Medvedev, in March 2008, marks the beginning of a development phase that will be no less fraught with unknowns than the previous period and destined to create new challenges for the authorities, especially as concerns the social question, long kept on the margins of official policy. The operational plan for the social dimension envisaging a series of interventions aimed at solving the relative problems represents a commitment that could turn out to be crucial for the country's future.     

Russian national security concepts 1997 and 2000: A comparative analysis

After the collapse of the Soviet Union the newly independent Russia had to redefine its relations with the outside world. In order to establish new relationships with both new and traditional cooperation partners, the country's leadership had to define the main strategic objectives, identify the main interests and threats to Russia's security and propose new ways of coping with the challenges the vast country confronted. The first years of independence were marked by a power struggle between various parts of the political elite, which delayed the process of defining the country's strategic goals in the field of national security. In December 1997, the Concept of National Security of the Russian Federation was published, and in January 2000 a new version was made public. This brief article is a comparative study of the concepts of national security embodied in the two documents, focusing on Russia's relations with the outside world and use of nuclear deterrence as a means to solve security and status dilemmas.     

Towards a new aid paradigm: South Africa as African development partner

As the largest African economy and the leading African aid-provider, with plans to establish an aid agency, South Africa is often ranked among the developing world's ‘emerging donors’. However, the country's development cooperation commitments are smaller in scope, scale and ambition than the aid regimes of the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) or Gulf state donors. Given its limited resources and domestic socioeconomic challenges, South Africa prefers the role of ‘development partner’. In this role, South Africa's development cooperation in Africa has ranged from peacekeeping, electoral reform and post-conflict reconstruction to support for strengthening regional and continental institutions, implementing the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and improving bilateral political and economic relations through dialogue and cooperation. This article seeks to determine whether Pretoria's development cooperation offers an alternative perspective to the aid policies and practices of the traditional and large rising donors. We conclude that South Africa does not fit neatly the ‘donor’ category of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD's) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and neither is Pretoria's aid-spending typically ‘ODA’ (official development assistance). Instead, with its new aid agency, South Africa occupies a unique space in Africa's development cooperation landscape. With fewer aid resources, but a ‘comparative advantage’ in understanding Africa's security/governance/development nexus, South Africa can play an instrumental role in facilitating trilateral partnerships, especially in Southern Africa.     

Critical infrastructure protection and Russia's hybrid regime

The Russian policy on critical infrastructure protection was outlined in the early 2000s and has been consolidated in recent years as a part of the national security strategy. This policy is evolving against a background composed of an uneasy combination of factors: the degeneration of infrastructures critical for the country's economic and social development, and the de-legitimization of political institutions responsible for protecting ‘population’ and ‘territory’. The recent major catastrophes in Russia, the notorious forest fires in 2010 in particular, have become examples of political events that offer a point of reference for the current regime's failure to uphold its promises of ‘order and stability’.     

The Friendly Media Phenomenon: A Cross-National Analysis of Cross-Cutting Exposure

We hypothesize that in the real world, as opposed to the lab, the norm is for people to experience friendly media that favor their political predispositions when political favoritism is perceived at all. For this reason, media are generally limited in their ability to create cross-cutting exposure. We test this hypothesis using representative survey data drawn from 11 different countries with varying media systems. We further hypothesize that television will contribute more to cross-cutting exposure than newspapers. Finally, and most importantly, we test the hypothesis that the more the structure of a country's media system parallels that of its political parties, the more that country's population will be dominated by exposure to like-minded views via mass media. We find confirmation for all 3 of these hypotheses and discuss their implications for the role of mass media in providing exposure to cross-cutting political perspectives.     

The Effects of Majority State Ownership of Significant Economic Sectors on Corruption: A Cross-Regional Comparison

Given both corruption's and bureaucratic inefficiency's importance for development and good governance, understanding their causes is paramount. This paper argues that majority state ownership of most the most important economic sectors of a country results in higher levels of corruption and inefficiency. When political and managerial elites both own and manage the country's most important economic resources, they have greater incentives for corrupt or inefficient behavior. These elites use national resources at their disposal more for short-term personal and political goals than for long-term economic ones. This paper tests this hypothesis on a relatively underused, but often cited, data set from the 1980s. Using a cross-national, regression analysis, this paper finds that the best predictors a country's level of corruption or bureaucratic inefficiency are these: majority state ownership of significant economic sectors, levels of GDP per capita, levels of government spending, and levels of democracy. Other factors, such as common law heritage, percent of population that is Protestant, federalism, economic freedoms, or mineral/ oil exporting, were not consistent, significant predictors of either bureaucratic inefficiency or corruption. We also argue that Tobit may be the best estimation procedure for these data.     

Frameworks for Arab-Israeli Negotiations–What Difference Do They Make?

Conclusion It is unfortunate that procedural controversies about the appropriate forum for negotiations often delay substantive talks on how to accommodate conflicting interests. But historical experience indicates that the participants believe the forum to be important. If and when a decision to renew negotiations is reached, the choice of the forum and the shaping of its structure will not be determined by its effectiveness as a vehicle for conflict resolution, but by the political calculus of bargaining power, and side effects, that such a forum would entail.International negotiations are aimed at conflict resolution. But they cannot be divorced from competitive power politics. The disputes about fora for negotiations are not about choosing an effective structure for making peace, but about seizing the high ground for the diplomatic battles ahead. Saadia Touval is Professor of Political Science at Tel Aviv University in Israel. During the 1986–87 academic year, he is Visiting Professor of Political Science at Brown University in Providence, R.I. and Visiting Scholar at Harvard University's Centers for International Affairs and for Middle Eastern Studies. His recent publications includeThe Peace Brokers (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982, and (with I.W. Zartman),International Mediation in Theory and Practice (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985).An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Middle East Seminar of the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University in March 1986. The support of the Center in preparing this article for publication is gratefully acknowledged.     

Islamic radicalisation and violent extremism in Nigeria

This article examines the issues underlining Islamic radicalisation and violence in Nigeria, a phenomenon whose latest manifestation through the activities of the Jamā'atu Ahlis Sunnah Lādda'awatih wal-Jihad (widely known as Boko Haram), has attracted considerable concern. It traces the evolution of the phenomenon and identifies the key issues that have explained its pattern of expression. The paper advances three main arguments: first, that Islamic radicalisation and its link to violence in Nigeria is, contrary to the often-held opinion, a phenomenon that transcends socio-economic deprivation and the mutual suspicion that underlines inter-group relations in the country, but also extends to a string of external considerations that intertwine with religion and identity in Nigeria; second, that there are aspects of the country's historical past, including the link with colonialism, that explain aspects of Islamic radicalisation and violence; and third, that greater clarity will come into the understanding of the Boko Haram phenomenon when considered against the background of the country's radicalisation history.     

Pursuing Security in Cyberspace: Strategic and Organizational Challenges

This article argues that the United States government should be acting rapidly to decrease the risks the country is running in cyberspace. While the private sector has a critical part to play in enhancing the country's cybersecurity posture, the government also has a necessary role. It is on the government's role that this article focuses. The article begins by discussing the characteristics of cyberspace. Next, the challenge of cybersecurity is explored through a risk management model that addresses, in turn, threats, vulnerabilities, and potential consequences. Finally, the article lays out some of the characteristics of an effective government response, which help to illuminate a few of the strategic and organizational challenges that will have to be overcome to improve the country's security in the cyber realm.     

Russia as a ‘virtual great power’: Implications for its declining role in European and Eurasian security

Instead of analyzing just some recent developments of Russia's domestic, foreign and security policies, this article focuses in particular on mid‐ and long‐term strategic trends and the consequences of Russia's decline for European and Eurasian Security. It argues that Russia is still in a long‐term socio‐economic decline and it is unrealistic to expect that Moscow will regain its former status as a Great Power or even Superpower in the mid‐term future even of its economy and military power improve rapidly and substantially. Against this background, two other powers of the Eurasian landmass, the EU and China will surpass Russia in international standing and secure great power status in the coming decades with far‐reaching consequences for the international system and Russia's security as well as for its role in Europe and Central as well a East Asia. In this light, the article analyzes strategic trends in domestic, foreign and security policies, including the impact of often overlooked factors such as demographic trends and the health crisis, of decentralization, regionalization and fragmentation within the Russian Federation, the future of Russia's military reform policies (including Russia's draft military doctrine of October 1999 and its nuclear illusions) and their implications for Russia's future foreign and security policies.     

The EU and Ukraine: Rhetorical Entrapment?

Recently there has been a trend towards the development of two rival sets of alliances in Eurasia: in effect, one Western‐oriented alignment led by the United States and Turkey, including Israel, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. On the other hand, a group of states resisting American and Turkish influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia is developing, led by Russia and Iran, including Syria and Armenia. One of the most important questions for the development of these alignments is their expansion into Central Asia; in this context Uzbekistan's role is crucial. Uzbekistan is the only Central Asian state to pursue a proactive and independent foreign policy, as exemplified in its relations with both its neighbors and great powers. Tashkent has developed close military and security relations with NATO and for a time seemed to hedge its bets on US support, but has lately shown signs of turning back toward increasing security cooperation with Russia and China. Given the strategic value of Uzbekistan and its role as a regional player in its own right, the future course of the country's policies is of great importance to the security of Eurasia.     

Assessing Russia's cards: three petty games in Central Asia

Moscow's growing influence in Central Asia stems from the evolution of the region's five states in close correspondence with Vladimir Putin's semi‐authoritarian model. Absent adequate resources and consistent policies, however, Russia must engage in complicated manoeuvring in order to advance its interests. The result is not overt geopolitical competition with the West—often defined by the tired notion of the ‘Great Game’—but rather a series of at least three separate intrigues, or ‘petty games’.     

Russia's Attempts to Undermine Democracy in the West: Effects and Causes

By exploiting pre-existing divisions in Western societies and attempting to sway elections toward candidates palatable to the Kremlin, the Russian Federation has had some success in eroding social cohesion and confidence in the institutions of democracy. But pulling the West down has not improved Russia's position in the world. Russia today is less well-regarded, less prosperous, and less secure than it was before it began its campaign of sowing disorder. Since the Kremlin sees its actions as justified responses to the West's alleged attempts to undermine Russia, this is a price it is willing to pay. Rather than trying to convince Russia to cease its malign activities, Western societies need to look inward. We need to eliminate the societal divisions that Russia exploits rather than try to convince Russia not to exploit them, denying it fertile ground on which to scatter its seeds of disinformation and propaganda. Only then will we solve the “Russia problem.”     

Questioning Thomas Pogge's Proposals to Eradicate Global Poverty

Moral cosmopolitanism has often been criticised for being too demanding and not offering a viable solution to the problem of extreme global poverty. Thomas Pogge has responded to both these concerns by arguing that it is possible to eradicate most global poverty through relatively light international-level actions. Pogge's proposals can be divided into two broad categories: financial transfers to the poor and international institutional reforms (which include changing the rules of global trade and restricting the ability of undemocratic governments to borrow internationally or sell off their country's natural resources). However, Pogge's proposed international-level actions are unlikely to eradicate global poverty as he has underestimated the tenacity of poverty-causing local practices. More specifically, this article will question the workability of Pogge's plans against the backdrop of sub-Saharan Africa. Confronted with a gap between what Pogge's proposed international-level reforms are able to accomplish and what they aim to accomplish, the final part of the paper considers Pogge's three options (or some combination of them): one, settle for a more modest reduction of global poverty; two, expect greater endeavour from the poor and their governments; or (and) three, demand a deeper involvement and sacrifice from citizens of well-off countries.     

Russia-North Korea Economic Ties: Is There More Than Meets the Eye?

Russia's relations with North Korea are often ignored in the West. The conventional view is that Russia's role with respect to the North is purely political and diplomatic, predicated on Russia's permanent membership in the UN Security Council. Often overlooked is the fact that Russia maintains a range of economic links with the DPRK. Taken together, they constitute quite a substantial leverage that Russia can exercise over North Korea, when and if it chooses to do so. The paper aims to investigate the economic dimension of the Russia-North Korea relationship. The article also examines North Korea's domestic economic situation, mostly drawing upon Russian expert assessments.     

Contribution of the regions to Russian security policy

Andrey Makarychev is Professor of International Relations at the Nizhny Novgorod Linguistic University in Russia.¹ His areas of expertise are security studies, regionalism and federalism and international relations theory. In 2001–02, Andrey was a guest scholar at the Zurich-based Centre for Security Studies and Conflict Research and the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute.     

Under-development in practice: Nigeria and the enduring problem of corruption

Nigeria's abundant natural resource endowments should earn the country's bragging rights as the “Giant of Africa”. Instead, 52 years of corrupt practices among the often recycled ruling elites in post-independence Nigeria have crippled this giant and turned what should be one of the country's strongest assets – its vast oil wealth – into a curse. This article critically examines the concerns for corruption as an enduring obstacle to Nigeria's development writ large. After providing a historical trajectory of corrupt practices in Nigeria from the mid-1980s to the present, it discusses some of the recent corruption scandals in the country, in particular the issues surrounding the US$6.8 billion that was drained from Nigeria between 2009 and 2012 in the fuel subsidy scam. The conclusion makes a case for the reworking of a pervasive system in Nigeria that “pardons” corruption and “recycles” corrupt rulers.     

Responding to radical populism: Chavismo in Venezuela

What are the effective ways of responding to populists, especially radical populists in government? The pessimistic answer provided by Chavismo is that little can be done; most of the negative impact of highly populist movements cannot be avoided in the short to medium term. The reasons lie not only in Venezuela's unique oil-based economy, but in the country's previous failures of democratic governance, a condition shared by many developing countries. Such failures make it likely that radical populists will receive broad popular support. This does not suggest that international actors cannot play a useful role in responding to populism. But the most viable democratic strategy is a long-term one emphasizing patient efforts by domestic opponents to reorganize themselves into programmatic, pluralist options for the future.     

Military professionalism in post‐communist Hungary and Poland: An analysis and assessment

Abstract

This article discusses Russian perceptions of and attitudes toward the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Russia has historically disliked and mistrusted NATO, seeing it as the primary threat to its international aspirations; in practice Russia pursues a dual policy. Its harsh condemnation of NATO has not stopped it from cooperating in selected areas of mutual interest. The most important among them is support for NATO's military operations in Afghanistan. The recent rejuvenation of relations between the west and Moscow is known as the strategic ‘reset’, meaning a return to diplomatic contacts and limited cooperation regardless of disagreements over the invasion of Georgia and Moscow's other recent international transgressions. The reset in NATO–Russia relations has only tactical significance, however. Cooperation will take place on a limited basis, but a genuine reset in mutual relations must wait for a reset in Russia's political and strategic priorities.     

THE PROOF IS IN THE PUDDING: (RE)CONSIDERING THE EXCELLENCE OF ACTIVISM IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN MINING INDUSTRY

ABSTRACT

One of the greatest changes organisations in South Africa experienced through the country's democratisation is the introduction of ‘legitimate’ activism in organisational settings. Organisational communication literature – specifically as manifest in the excellence theory – compounded this through views on the potentially positive impact activism could have on organisations by ‘pushing’ them beyond equilibrium to a state of dynamic equilibrium – mediated through strategic and effectual communication. This view, however, is somewhat fouled by occurrences such as those at Marikana, and concomitant strikes in the country's platinum industry, which have held the economy ‘captive’ in various ways. Organisations – especially the mining industry – need to ask ‘How much activism is too much activism?’ and organisational communication practitioners need to introspectively consider whether this theoretical contribution should not perhaps have come with greater guidance in terms of the chary (if not restrained) implementation of this potentially positive, yet almost insidiously dangerous, communicative feature. this article aims to explore activism in the mining industry of South Africa, specifically from the vantage points of industry heads, as it concerns the changed communicative landscape in this industry post-marikana. to this end, the article will report on seven qualitative, semi- structured interviews – along with existing literature on the topic – as it offers up six considerations in applying the aspect of excellence and ‘positive activism’ within organisations in South Africa's mining industry.