Consociational Cradle of Federalism

Except for the time of its painful—consociational—birth,federalism in its theory and practice does not entail a rejectionof a majoritarian mode of decisionmaking. Differently at differenttimes on different issues decisional modes will most probablyvary along a continuum from consociationalism to majority rule.When the governing elites adopt consociational practices, withregard to some issues, such practices result from factors otherthan the federal nature of the system. Most of these factorswould lead to consociationalism in a unitary system as well.In contrast, consociationalism is bound to be the dominant decisionalmode in loose confederations, including those whose componentunits do not practice consociational or majoritarian democracyeither within their own confines or at the confederal summit.     

The politics of Belgium: Institutions and policy under bipolar and centrifugal federalism

This volume seeks to provide an integrated understanding of the Belgian political system through the prism of comparative politics. The transformation of the political system from a unitary into a federal system is used as a connecting theme linking the contributions. The volume is divided in two parts. The first part touches upon the sociological and institutional determinants of policy-making in Belgium, such as the dynamics of the Belgian federal system, the consociational features of the Belgian polity, the presence of a Belgian political culture (or of two distinct political cultures), the fragmentation of its party system and the role of political parties. The second part addresses policy performance and policy reform within the context of Belgian federalism, with a focus on divergence in policy performance and administrative practices, social security as a contentious federal policy area, policy failure and corruption and the impact of EU policies on the domestic federal order.     

Structure and Process in Federal and Consociational Arrangements

Daniel J. Elazar uses the concepts of structure and processto distinguish between federal and consociational arrangements.While the distinction is appropriate and useful, it does havelimitations, and in some respects may be slightly misleading.It is argued here that under certain circumstances, politicalstructures can play an important role in defining or promotingcon-sociational arrangements, even if such structures were originallythe result of social forces. An additional point made is thatin both federations and consociations, the relationship betweenstructure and process is essentially reciprocal. It is suggestedthat more attention be paid to the differences in the kindsof structures found in the two forms of governance and, in turn,how they might be linked to differences in process. At thisstage, it appears that consociations are much more confederalin form, which has certain consequences for the manner in whichconflict is both structured and resolved.     

And the peace goes on? Consociational democracy and Belgian politics in the twenty-first century

Belgium has long been considered a copybook example of consociational democracy. In this article we first explore the nature of this ‘old’ Belgian consociationalism. We conclude that consociational decision-making was not a permanent feature of the system, but rather a technique of decision-making at moments where deep conflicts severely threatened the stability or even survival of the political system. Next, we ask whether Belgium can still be labelled a consociational democracy today. If so, one must be aware of the fact that the societal segments are in the first place territorial. It is the federal construction that still displays the typical characteristics of consociational decision-making. However, its stability so far cannot be simply explained by referring to elite attitudes, but rather to institutional features making the absence of a negotiated compromise unattractive to all partners.     

Intergovernmental Structure and Fiscal Management Strategies: A Crossnational Analysis

Does intergovernmental structure have a systematic effect on the impacts of local governments' fiscal policy responses? Using empirical data from more than 800 local governments in five countries, the article concludes that intergovernmental structure is associated with the impact attributed to various fiscal management strategies. Such strategies have generally had greater impact in local governments in federal systems than those in unitary state systems. There are similarities between federal and unitary local governments regarding the fiscal management strategies that have least impact, and both types stress the importance of productivity gains via technology. But the differences in relative importance and level of impact are more striking than the similarities. In particular, fiscal management strategies involving the relations of the local government with other governments, such as obtaining intergovernmental revenue and shifting service provision to other governments, have greater impact in significantly more federal systems than in unitary state systems. These federal local governments also experience greater impacts from increasing user charges and raising local taxes. In contrast, local governments in unitary state systems place greater reliance on the more politically expeditious strategy of across–the–board expenditure reductions and on reductions of capital spending. These findings suggest that local governments in more decentralized systems have greater flexibility to manipulate relations with other governments in order to enhance their own fiscal situation. The data also suggest that the government's level of fiscal stress is not systematically associated with the level of impact from most fiscal management strategies, especially in the unitary state systems.     

Crafting radical opposition or reproducing homonormativity? Consociationalism and LGBT rights activism in Lebanon

There is little research on the struggles surrounding gay rights in divided societies emerging from intrastate conflict and characterized by consociational power sharing, which allocates rights to the main ethnic groups. While consociational arrangements – predicated on a minority rights regime – theoretically open up constitutional space for LGBT rights, they often negate such possibilities by empowering ethnic hardliners opposed to sexual minorities. This article explores how Lebanese LGBT activists conceptualize rights and craft mobilization tactics and strategies. I focus on an “identity dilemma” faced by Lebanese activists: to create a public identity for rights demands or to elide such a process. While the former strategy seeks openings in the power sharing structure, the latter aims for a radical form of resistance against the sectarianism of consociationalism. Activists pursuing the latter strategy, moreover, see consociationalism as encouraging an LGBT mobilization that reproduces the sectarian system and is complicit with homonormativity.     

European "Federalism" and its Encroachments on National Institutions

The European Union is a supranational governance organizationthat is more federal than unitary but which, instead of a constitutionallyestablished balance of powers, exhibits a dynamic confusionof powers. This institutional structure has not only servedto subordinate member-states' institutional structures, whetherfederal or unitary, and to alter their traditional balance ofpowers, it has also served to reduce national governmental autonomyin the name of a shared supranational authority, diminish nationalcontrol over subnational units, and undermine democratic legitimacyat both the national and EU levels. It has had a differentialeffect on member states, with a greater disruptive impact onunitary states, such as France and Britain, than on federalstates, such as Germany.     

Federal Government Leasing: Costs, Incentives, and Effects

This article examines the lease or borrow decision from the perspective of the United States federal government as the lessee. It argues that there are several sources of friction in the leasing market that will make leasing more costly than buying for the federal government. Nevertheless, the budget process contains powerful incentives for federal government agencies to lease even though leasing is the most costly alternative.     

Vertical Competition in the Spanish National Health System (NHS)

In unitary states, competitive decentralisation structures can take place by increasing the visibility of politically accountable jurisdictions in certain policy responsibilities such as health care. Drawing from the Spanish decentralisation process we examine the mechanisms (and determinants) of vertical competition in the development of health policies in the Spanish National Health System. The Spanish example provides qualitative evidence of vertical competition that assimilates government outcomes of unitary states to that of federal structures. The Spanish experience indicates that the specific vertical competition mechanisms in place until 2002 are likely to be responsible for significant policy innovation and welfare state development.     

Australian Public Policy, Federalism, and Intergovernmental Relations: The Federal Factor

Public policy is the overt activity of governing and what governmentshave as their primary purpose. This is so whether the politicalsystem is unitary or federal. There are many more elements thatcomplicate policymaking in a federal system. In particular,constitutional, financial, and political issues intrude becauseof the necessary interdependence of otherwise independent andautonomous national and subnational components. This articleaddresses this complexity of joint action through use of theideas about federalism, the structure of governing institutions,and the processes of policymaking. The extent to which an outcomedepends on the mixture of independence and interdependence isconceptualized as degrees of the federal factor. Linking thisconcept to particular policy arenas may provide a better understandingof federal systems than explanation from centralization or decentralizationor dependence or independence.     

A Reassessment of Federalism as a Degree of Decentralization

The central argument in this article is that it is wrong toconceive of federalism as simply a degree of decentralization.Decentralization can only be applied meaningfully to federalismin matters that belong to the central government. Even then,unlike unitary decentralization, which is entirely at the discretionof the central government, federal decentralization is bothmandatory and guaranteed. Much more than this, however, thekey to distinguishing federal systems from nonfederal systems,which also have "degrees of decentralization," lies in the conceptof noncentralization by which is meant that matters belongingto the states cannot ordinarily be centralized unilaterally.It is this noncentralization, which opposes decentralization(because decentralization presupposes centralization), thatmakes federalism a highly distinct form of "decentralization."     

Toward a Regulatory Budget

A regulatory budget would require the federal government to treat compliance costs incurred by the private sector as if they were incurred by the government, without requiring the government to actually assume those costs. For example, EPA could be given a regulatory compliance budget of say $80 billion in FY98. A regulatory budget would provoke an annual debate in Congress on the size of EPA's or OSHA's budget. Such a debate would force the proponents to weigh the benefits and costs of various regulatory programs, something now lacking in the political process.
Interest in a regulatory budget reflects the slight gains in the quality of regulatory decision making resulting from mandatory regulatory review. It is now apparent that better information about the costs, benefits, and distributional consequences of regulation will not automatically improve regulatory decision making-although it would not hurt.     

Diversity,federalism and the nineteenth-century liberals

This paper provides an argument in favour of federal institutional design on the basis that it is more congenial to the preservation and promotion of normatively desirable societal diversity than its unitary alternative. Seeking inspiration in the work of three of the most influential liberal thinkers of the nineteenth century: John Stuart Mill; Alexis de Tocqueville; and Lord Acton, I construct a novel case for federalism that focuses on the inherent benefits of a dual/multi-layered governmental structure. Section one argues for the value of diversity, stating that it can both improve the authenticity of individually exercised autonomy, and improve the quality of individually espoused moral views. Section two considers the potential dangers posed by the unitary state to the flourishing of diversity through the centralisation of key institutions. Section three shows how the federal model sidesteps these pitfalls, and offers a more auspicious environment for the cultivation and enjoyment of diversity.     

Federalism and Interest Group Cohesion: A Comparison of Two Peak Business Groups in Australia

The stock opinion among students of interest groups has, untilrecently, posited that groups in countries with a federal systemof government are less cohesive and more prone to disunity thaninterest groups in unitary states. This article addresses thisrelationship bet ween federalism and weak group cohesion inan attempt to explain the contrasting patterns of cohesion intwo peak Australian business groups, each a confederation instructure. The literature on federalism and group cohesion givesinsufficient attention to the divisive impact of three factors:party go vernment, size and wealth inequalities among a group'sconstituent units, and a group's decision and payoff rules.The literature also gives insufficient attention to the determinantsof group secession. It is the contention of the article thatconflicts over the fairness of a federated organization's rules,particularly when the large, wealthy units find themselves outvotedby the small, poor units, can be sufficient to provoke the aggrievedunits to secede.     

Federalization with a Constitutional Guarantee to Secession: Controversies,Paradoxes and Imponderables in Ethiopia

Ethiopia's federal design has a number of anomalies interesting for comparative federalism. The explicit right to secede provided to member states has become, however, real political dynamite in the country. This article deals with this right, its constitutionalization, its constitutional and ideological underpinnings, and its practical impacts on federal construction in the country for the last two decades. It challenges the political expediency views on its constitutionalization and argues that the inclusion of the right in the federal constitution is motivated by ideological reasons. By having a look at the powers member states are provided by this ‘generous' constitution, it reveals its staggering paradoxes. As far as the practical impacts of the right are concerned, the hefty controversy the constitutionalization of the right has continued creating in the country, the article argues, is a significant federal nuisance.     

The Limits to Coercive Consociationalism in Northern Ireland

The merits of consociation as a means of solving the Northern Ireland conflict are presented through contrasting it with other ways of stabilizing highly divided political systems. Why voluntary consociation has been unsuccessful in Northern Ireland and unfortunately is likely to remain so is explained. The signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA) must be understood against the background of the failure of previous consociational experiments. The AIA partly represented a shift in British strategy from voluntary to coercive consociationalism. The prospects for this coercive consociational strategy and variants on it are evaluated.     

Punctuated Equilibrium and Agenda‐Setting: Bringing Parties Back in: Policy Change after the Dutroux Crisis in Belgium

The article analyzes how focusing events affect the public and political agenda and translate into policy change. Empirically, the study focuses on the policy changes initiated by paedophile Marc Dutroux's arrest in 1996 in Belgium. Theoretically, the article tests whether Baumgartner and Jones's (1993 ) U.S. punctuated equilibrium approach applies to a most different system case, Belgium being a consociational democracy and a partitocracy. Their approach turns out to be useful to explain this “critical case”: Policy change happens when “policy images” and “policy venues” shift. Yet, the Dutroux case shows also that political parties, as key actors in the Belgian policy process, should be integrated more explicitly in the punctuated equilibrium theory. Finally, the article argues that the quantitative analysis of longitudinal data sets on several agendas should be supplemented with qualitative case study evidence (e.g., interviews with key decision makers) to unravel the complex case of issue attention and policy change.     

碎裂型政府架构下的行政事务管理——以美国湿地管理机制为例

在政府管理过程中,跨部门、跨层级复杂行政关系的协调一直是难以解决的重大问题,多头管理往往导致具体事务管理上的困境.美国政府向来以权力分散、碎裂著称,在具体行政事务上也经常出现"九龙治水"的多头管理局面,但是美国行政机构的效率之高也是有目共睹的.因此,美国碎裂型政府架构如何运作、如何将不利条件转化为行政管理的驱动力就成为研究的热点.以美国湿地管理与保护机制为例,分析在具体行政事务管理中的政府行为;结合联邦主义理论、府际关系理论及府际管理理论,解释美国碎裂型政府方面的优势,构筑了分析模型.在这个分析模型中,环境保护署和陆军工程兵团等核心管理部门的清晰权限、相互之间的合作与制衡直接决定着湿地事务管理的绩效,而联邦的三权分立、各州及地方政府、权力及资源权属状况、社会利益团体等多方面因素构成了核心管理部门的外部环境;外部环境限定了核心管理部门的行动范围,也赋予它们必要的资源和权力.因此在湿地管理方面,美国围绕着若干重要的联邦机构,联合其它相关联邦机构及各州、地方政府,再吸收社会组织和个人的建设性参与,形成了一套法网严密、执法适度、资助得力、公民积极配合的高效管理机制.     

Why Federalism Does Not Always Take Shape: the Cases of Italy and Nepal

Federalism has been discussed as a potential system of governance in many countries, but in some it has failed to take shape. This has been the case in Nepal and, to a certain extent, in Italy. In fact, in Italy the federal option was rejected at the time of Risorgimento, and constitutional reforms in the 2000s never transformed the country into a federation as desired by political actors such as the Northern League despite some decentralization. In Nepal, the 2007 interim constitution specified that the country would be federal, but the first Constituent Assembly elected to write a new constitution was unable to produce a federal map acceptable to the major political parties and the second is wrestling with the same issue. In both cases, federal structuring was attacked by political actors who argued that it could promote disunity, undermine solidarity, and possibly lead to disintegration. This article argues that the idea of federalism held by prominent political actors as promoting division and conflict played strongly against its implementation.     

Equity in Federal Contracting: Examining the Link between Minority Representation and Federal Procurement Decisions

The federal government increasingly relies on nongovernmental organizations for procuring goods and services. This long‐term trend presents a significant challenge for administrators because it risks the egalitarian values of democracy by further distancing administrative action from direct, participative, democratic oversight. The authors put forward a theory of representative bureaucracy as a way to reconcile democracy with the reality of the contemporary policy process in which unelected officials are the principal decision makers. The theory is tested in the domain of federal procurement, specifically within the contract award decisions of 60 federal agencies over three years. The authors argue that increased minority representation in leadership positions results in an increased proportion of federal contracts awarded to small minority‐owned firms.