Diplomatic Rivalries and Cultural One-upmanship: New Zealand’s Long Quest to Become More Pacific than Australia

Abstract

New Zealand’s governmental and non-governmental agencies, academic commentators and media have long framed the country as uniquely and favourably positioned on cultural grounds to be a strategic diplomatic actor in the South Pacific. Justifications for the framing stem from two linked complexes: the history of New Zealand’s colonial and post-colonial involvement in a number of Polynesian territories in the Pacific; and the related history of relations between settlers and indigenes in New Zealand itself. These different strands of the argument have increasingly been brought together by the growth in numbers of New Zealand-born and domiciled Pacific Islanders. They, along with Maori, have been recruited into the diplomatic service and overtly contribute to the use of Polynesian encounter rituals in New Zealand’s diplomatic outreach. Such histories are used to justify New Zealand’s role in the Pacific in its relations with other external powers, especially in diplomatic jostling with Australia. The claims to special insight and cultural capital are subjected to critical scrutiny.     

Japan’s Diplomacy towards Member Countries of Pacific Islands Forum: Significance of Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting (PALM)

As an island country in the Pacific region, it is natural for Japan to have diplomatic relationships with neighboring island countries. By the early 1970s, Japan started to provide Official Development Assistance (ODA) to two individual island countries in the Pacific region, and, in the mid-1980s, when most of the island countries had achieved independence, Japan’s diplomacy expanded to additional countries. In 1985 then Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone made an official visit to two of the island countries, and, in 1987, official policy expressing support for the Pacific island countries’ independence, regional cooperation, political stability, economic development, and people-to-people exchange was issued. In October 1997, the “Japan-SPF Summit Meeting” with participants of leaders from Japan and 14 South Pacific Forum member island countries/regions and government representatives of Australia and New Zealand was held in Tokyo. The 8^th Pacific Islands Leaders meeting held in May 2018 is symbolic of Japan’s diplomacy toward the Pacific Islands Forum member countries. This article is the author’s personal observation of Japan’s diplomacy toward Pacific Islands Forum member countries and the significance of Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting.     

Pacific Regionalism and the Polynesian Leaders Group

ABSTRACT

In November 2011, the Polynesian Leaders Group (PLG) was formed. The inclusion of Samoa, Tonga and French Polynesia gives it enough political muscle to have some influence on Pacific regionalism, but exactly what this will be is uncertain. Notably, it was formed during a tense period for regionalism; Australia’s and New Zealand’s disproportionate influence in the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) and Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat was increasingly being called into question, while Fiji was crowned the chair of the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) even though it was then expelled from the PIF. To date, the PLG’s most notable work has been done in relation to climate change, while it also promises to address decolonisation, both of which are pressing issues on the regional agenda. These might be issue-areas where the PLG will make its mark. Another might be in counterbalancing the increasing regional influence of the MSG, which over the past 10 years has been willing to act independently of the PIF and its traditional benefactors: Australia and New Zealand. An examination of when and why the PLG was formed, how its membership is determined, and its position on key regional issues might provide answers about its regional implications.     

Australia,New Zealand and the Pacific Islands Forum: a critical review

The relationship between the Pacific islands and the region’s ‘bigger brothers’ – Australia and New Zealand – is often seen in two-dimensional terms with the latter appearing to act in concert and in terms characterised by underlying neo-colonial attitudes and a determination to dominate the regional agenda. Given that both are former colonial powers with considerable political and economic resources and are the major aid donors in the region as well as being members of the powerful geopolitical entity known as ‘the West’, it is not difficult to sustain an image of neo-colonial dominance. But to do so also requires casting Pacific island countries in a certain role, not only lacking agency but also cohering around a common identity and set of interests. This article examines key aspects of regional relations as played out through the region’s premier organisation, the Pacific Islands Forum, and assesses the extent to which a simple political divide between Australia and New Zealand on the one hand, and the island states on the other, can be maintained.     

The United States and South Pacific regionalism: Participation or subversion?

Abstract

Increasing political awareness in the Pacific island nations during the 1970s led them to adopt foreign and domestic policies that the metropolitan nations considered detrimental to their interests in the Pacific. The South Pacific Forum (SPF) stood at the center of much of the decision making. For the United States in particular it became imperative that it check the SPF's decision-making process. This led the United States to seek avenues through which it could effectively influence the decisions of the South Pacific's regional organizations. Such attempts were intended primarily to undermine the sovereignty and independence of the South Pacific Forum and affiliated regional organizations. This article discusses the rationale for and processes through which the United States has been trying to manipulate South Pacific regional institutions into serving its interests in the region.     

New Nationalism in Australia and New Zealand: The Construction of National Identities by Two Labo(u)r Governments in the Early 1970s

During the 1970s the Whitlam government in Australia and the Kirk government in New Zealand each adopted a policy of new nationalism in an attempt to come to terms with a rapidly changing and increasingly decolonised world marked by the decline of Britain as an economic and military force in the world. In each case this new nationalism prioritised local and national identities over a larger pan‐British identity. Both governments were more inward‐looking and yet also more engaged with the Asia‐Pacific region than their predecessors. They promoted their own national distinctiveness and independence, while also forging closer relationships with each other and the wider region. Both embraced a new understanding of their geographic position and repudiated the idea that Australia and New Zealand were European nations on the edge of Asia. The nationalisms they promoted were remarkably similar, yet there are important differences that reflect their different ethnic makeup and geographic position.     

Australia’s 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper: Deconstruction and Critique

The 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper identifies major themes and recommends preferred strategies in Australia’s engagement with the world. These themes and strategies relate to geopolitics, economics and the ‘new international agenda’; there is also a more specific focus on Australia’s Pacific island neighbours and Timor-Leste. There is a strong emphasis on perceived Australian national interests throughout the document. The geopolitical discussion is primarily ‘realist’; economically the document is pro-globalisation; the discussion of the ‘new international agenda’ involves an Australian-oriented pragmatism; there is an assertion of Australian leadership in the South Pacific. With some minor criticism, Labor has accepted the general direction advocated in the White Paper. The document is thus indicative of the likely future direction of Australian foreign policy. Lack of US response indicates declining US engagement with Australia and the Asia-Pacific or Indo-Pacific region. China, as the other major power highly significant for Australia, has been low-key in its criticisms.     

A review essay

Abstract

When Kiyoshi Kojima first articulated the concept of a Pacific Free Trade Area in 1966, he anticipated that the removal of tariffs among the developed nations of the Pacific could encourage economic growth among the less developed nations of the Pacific Basin if the developed countries made certain structural adjustments. He particularly recommended that the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan import more primary materials from the developing countries of Asia and Latin America rather than from each other, and that the developed countries lower any restrictions on the import of light manufactured goods from the developing nations.     

Communist China’s entry into the Korean hostilities and a U.S. proposal for a collective security arrangement in the Pacific offshore island chain

In late 1950, against the background of communist China’s full entry into the Korean War, the U.S. government put forward a Pacific Ocean Pact, which would comprise the United States, Japan, the Philippines, if possible Indonesia, Australia, and New Zealand. This article, after tracing China’s intervention in the Korean War, discusses U.S. policy planning on the proposal for a Pacific Pact, and examines the precise objectives of the proposal. It is argued that the American proposal for a Pacific offshore island chain pact was basically intended to enhance U.S. security interests in Northeast Asia, particularly Japan. The Pacific Pact proposal therefore contained a scheme for committing formally substantial U.S. armed forces to the defense of the Pacific Ocean; the revitalization of Japanese power; and the welding of the resources of strength of Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines to the defense of Japan.     

China in Pacific Regional Politics

Abstract

Foreign aid from China to the island countries of the Pacific has grown rapidly over the last few decades and an expanding body of literature has examined various aspects of what this means for politics in the region generally. This article focuses on China’s impact on Pacific regional politics partly from the perspective of identity politics. It suggests that China has substantially increased its engagement with the Pacific island states by making use of its own identity as a South–South development partner in contrast to traditional (mainly Western) donors in the region. Unlike most traditional donors, however, China’s diplomacy and engagement are based largely on bilateralism, and this is likely to continue for the foreseeable future. This approach could continue to limit its impact on Pacific regionalism, regardless of how it projects its image.     

Australia and the Secretive Exploitation of the Chatham Islands to 1842

The European discovery of the Chatham Islands in 1791 resulted in significant consequences for its indigenous Moriori people. The colonial Australian influence on the Chathams has received little scholarly attention. This article argues that the young colonies of New South Wales and Van Diemen’s Land led the exploitation of the archipelago before its annexation to New Zealand in 1842. The Chathams became a secretive outpost of the colonial economy, especially the sealing trade. Colonial careering transformed the islands: environmental destruction accompanied economic exploitation, with deleterious results for the Moriori. When two Māori iwi (tribes) from New Zealand’s North Island invaded in 1835, Moriori struggled to respond as a consequence of the colonial encounter. Mobility and technology gained from the Australian colonies enabled and influenced the invasion itself, and derogatory colonial stereotypes about Aboriginal peoples informed the genocide that ensued. Hence this article writes the Chathams into Australian history and Australia into Chathams history, showing that discussions of the early colonial economy, environment, and genocide must consider the wider South Pacific context in conjunction with events internal to the colonies.     

Fiji’s Foreign Relations: Retrospect and Prospect

Abstract

Of all the island states of the Southwest Pacific, Fiji’s foreign relations have been the most fraught since the advent of independence in the region, due largely to a succession of coups d'état. These have invariably precipitated adverse responses from major partners and aid donors, notably Australia, New Zealand, the United States and the European Union. The last coup in 2006 also unsettled relations in Fiji’s more immediate region, especially among some of its smaller Polynesian neighbours, contributing to Fiji’s unprecedented suspension from the Pacific Islands Forum. This article reviews Fiji’s foreign relations from the time of independence in 1970 through the period of successive coups to the 2014 elections. It also examines Bainimarama’s strategies in extending foreign relations in the broader international sphere as well as issues surrounding the ‘normalisation’ of relations with its traditional partners.     

Anxious Neighbour: Australian Opposition to Japanese Labour in New Caledonia, 1945 to 1960

In the late 1940s and the 1950s, in the context of the White Australia policy and strong anti‐Japanese sentiment, Australia mounted a successful diplomatic campaign against the use of Japanese contract labour in New Caledonia. Australia also campaigned, but with only partial success, against the use of Japanese labour in the nearby New Hebrides. These initiatives further illustrate Australia's traditional assertiveness, when it saw its interests threatened, in the South Pacific. Blocking the use of Japanese labour probably contributed, as Alan Ward has argued, to increased permanent migration to New Caledonia from the other French South Pacific territories and France, shifting the population and voting balance against the indigenous Melanesian nationalist movement which later emerged. But Ward overstates his case: immigration of this kind would have happened anyway, especially from resource‐poor and over‐populated Wallis and Futuna. In its campaign on the Japanese labour issue Australia profited from its strong relationship with France, which resulted from comradeship in the two world wars, and from the lack of contentious bilateral issues.     

Peacekeeping from Oceania: Perspectives from Australia,New Zealand and Fiji

Abstract

This article gives an overview of the involvement of Australia, New Zealand and Fiji in peacekeeping operations with attention to motives, experience and ‘lessons learnt’. Australia and New Zealand have been strongly influenced by regional considerations and an understanding of good international citizenship. Fiji’s contribution has been determined less by regional considerations and more by its position as a small developing country whose peacekeeping activities bring economic benefits, although it could be argued that by providing a basis for extending military forces they have contributed indirectly to political instability. Police contributions have been increasingly important to Australia and New Zealand and they have advocated a stronger role for police in other situations around the world.     

A Divided Family: Race,the Commonwealth and Brexit

Abstract

The Commonwealth has long been conceptualised as ‘a family of nations’ in a reflection of the size, diversity and shared values of the organisation. As the discussion in post-Brexit Britain engages with questions of race and immigration, it is important to consider the role the Commonwealth played in the referendum campaigns. The combination of the Leave campaign’s promises to reinforce ties with ‘kith and kin’ in Commonwealth countries with the xenophobia that defined the campaign prompts the question what exactly does the Commonwealth mean in modern Britain? The EU referendum revealed two Commonwealths—one reflecting the backgrounds of Britain’s ethnic minorities, and one centred on the three majority white nations of Australia, New Zealand and Canada. This article will offer an investigation of these conflicting visions of the Commonwealth in the referendum, as well as the voting motivations of Commonwealth nationals and British citizens of Commonwealth descent.     

“Super” Debates within the Antipodes? Explaining Differing New Zealand and Australian Retirement Policies in the late Twentieth Century

As others have shown, for much of the twentieth century, “although to different degrees in different periods and to different degrees in the two countries”, New Zealand and Australia shared a peculiar approach to social protection internationally. In particular, Francis Castles has published widely on the Antipodean “wage earners’ welfare state”. He has also shown, however, that New Zealand and Australia took quite dissimilar paths in refurbishing each welfare state in the last two decades of the twentieth century, significantly over superannuation. Most commentators attribute the distinction to dominant political personalities. New Zealand's Robert Muldoon's “election bribe” in 1975, meant a compulsory paid‐work based superannuation system, akin to the one Australia came to develop, was replaced by a universal pension scheme. Australia's Paul Keating implemented the compulsory Australian superannuation scheme in 1992 confirming the trajectory begun in the 1970s. In this paper I put the spotlight on the 1970s corporatism and Australasian industrial cultures to explain the varying New Zealand and Australian superannuation pathways. Such an approach emphasizes multilayered historicity, agency and contingency outside leadership‐driven models. It points to variance and its limits rather than convergence, despite, and because of, common origins and welfare foundations.     

“Great and Powerful Friends of Yesteryear”: Australia's Dilemma with “East of Suez”, 1967–71

Great Britain's decision to withdraw its forces from Southeast Asia by the mid-1970s created uncertainty for those living in the region. The potential loss of British presence led Australia to attempt to discourage Britain from leaving, while also recsognising recognising the decision as an opportunity to re-evaluate Australia's strategic outlook in Southeast Asia and the Pacific. Scholars have treated Asia and the Pacific as two regions with distinct experiences related to withdrawal. Some address changing Anglo-Australian relations but include little, or no, mention of the Pacific territories. Others, writing about the Pacific, focused more the individual paths taken by each island than on connecting the larger process of decolonisation in the Pacific to the one in Asia. This article pairs Australia's Strategic Basis of Defence papers with documentary evidence across multiple departments in Canberra to understand how British withdrawal from east of Suez connected Australian concerns about security in Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands. By connecting the two areas through Australian interests, the withdrawal from east of Suez can be understood as a catalyst for Australia's pursuit of a distinctive role within its neighbourhood.     

Australia and Brexit: Déjà Vu All Over Again?

Abstract

Recalling the debate about Britain’s applications to join the European Economic Community in the 1960s, Australians are now reacting to and assessing the implications of the Brexit vote for Australia. However, the contemporary situation is very different from that which prevailed in the 1960s. The article assesses Australian commentary and reactions to Brexit before and after the vote. Taking account of the various possible versions of Brexit, there is an assessment of the range of economic and political-strategic implications for Australia. Whatever the final form of Brexit, Australia will need to foster close relationships with both the UK and the post-Brexit European Union. In relation to immigration policy in a post-Brexit UK, Australia’s immigration system does not necessarily provide the ‘answer’; Australia’s relationship with New Zealand through the agreement on Closer Economic Relations might be relevant to Brexit in at least some respects as another model for how economic integration might develop in a regional context. If Brexit was at least in part a populist right-wing reaction to globalisation and neoliberalism, parallels in Australia can also be seen, such as Pauline Hanson’s One Nation; other parallels in Australia relating to Brexit include issues relating to political prudence and the manner of constitutional change.     

Shifting Interests: Whitlam,Britain and French Nuclear Tests in the South Pacific

This article focuses on the interaction between the Australian and British governments during the early 1970s over French nuclear testing in the South Pacific. It examines the considerations behind the Australian government's approach to Britain, and Britain's response to initiatives from Australia. Through the presentation of a case study demonstrating how Australia's Pacific interests and Britain's European concerns inevitably led to different perspectives, I argue that the policies of both countries were primarily determined by their consideration of regional geopolitical interests, rather than the lingering links of Empire.     

Australia and the Developing World under the Abbott Coalition Government

The Abbott Coalition government, elected to office in Australia in September 2013, has not had a major focus on the developing world. Nevertheless, in terms of substance this government has been engaged with a number of issues that relate to, or have implications for, the developing world. At a general level these issues concern development cooperation, refugees and asylum seekers, and climate change. At a regional level Australia has had particular concerns relating to Indonesia and the Pacific island countries; there has also been some focus on India and Indian Ocean regionalism. Beyond Australia’s immediate region there has been engagement in some issues relating to Southwest Asia and the Middle East, and Africa. The government’s approach to issues concerning the developing world reflects its pragmatism based on a perception of Australian interests and an identification with the countries of the developed world as led by the United States.