Medicaid Integrity Program; eligible entity and contracting requirements for the Medicaid Integrity audit program. Final rule

Section 1936 of the Social Security Act (the Act) (as added by section 6034 of the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA) established the Medicaid Integrity Program to promote the integrity of the Medicaid program by requiring CMS to enter into contracts with eligible entities to: (1) Review the actions of individuals or entities furnishing items or services (whether on a fee-for-service, risk, or other basis) for which payment may be made under an approved State plan and/or any waiver of such plan approved under section 1115 of the Act; (2) audit claims for payment of items or services furnished, or administrative services rendered, under a State plan; (3) identify overpayments to individuals or entities receiving Federal funds; and (4) educate providers of services, managed care entities, beneficiaries, and other individuals with respect to payment integrity and quality of care. This final rule will provide requirements for an eligible entity to enter into a contract under the Medicaid integrity audit program. The final rule will also establish the contracting requirements for eligible entities. The requirements will include procedures for identifying, evaluating, and resolving organizational conflicts of interest that are generally applicable to Federal acquisition and procurement; competitive procedures to be used; and procedures under which a contract may be renewed.     

The evolution of an innovation: variations in medicaid managed care program extensiveness

This article utilizes a theoretical framework of policy innovation, diffusion, and reinvention to investigate the evolving nature of Medicaid managed care programs over time. By estimating two separate models, one for primary care case management (PCCM) and a second for risk-based program enrollment, this study seeks to disentangle two different paths of learning (internal and external), investigate the potential effects of vertical diffusion of policy, and examine the impact of internal state characteristics on the extent of Medicaid managed care. With respect to diffusion and learning, the data reveal that earlier adopters implement more extensive programs. The data fail to reveal much internal learning, although there is evidence of some. External impacts are clear: managed care enrollments in neighboring states and changes in the federal waiver process affect states' decisions. Other policy choices are important: states with more generous Medicaid eligibility rules implement more extensive managed care programs. Complementing other studies of Medicaid, we find that politics and economics make a difference for the extent of managed care programs; unlike other Medicaid studies, we find no effect of race and ethnicity.     

State Medicaid managed care enrollment: understanding the political calculus that drives Medicaid managed care reforms

The objective of this article is to understand the political motivations underlying Medicaid managed care reforms by examining the determinants of enrollment of beneficiaries in managed care plans in the fifty states. To highlight the role of the model variables, including measures of the political environment, public interest, and special interests, a distinction is made between capitated and fee-for-service managed care enrollment. The results show that cost containment within the context of the Medicaid program is perceived as strongly favored by voters. Accordingly, the relative cost and tax price of providing Medicaid services are important factors in states' decision to enroll Medicaid beneficiaries in managed care plans, particularly capitated ones. The results also indicate a surprisingly significant influence by labor unions that generally oppose managed care enrollment for fears of lost jobs. The recipient population and provider groups also play an important role in shaping the Medicaid managed care landscape. The influence of variables measuring states' ability and willingness to pay and median voter preferences suggest that, within the context of Medicaid managed care enrollment, the public's interests are being served; however, the results also point toward inequities within the program and implications concerning financing arrangements between states and the federal government.     

Executive federalism and Medicaid demonstration waivers: implications for policy and democratic process

Executive federalism emphasizes collaboration between the executive branches at the national and state levels to transform grant programs through the implementation process. In this regard, Medicaid demonstration waivers loomed large during the presidencies of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush. This article documents and compares the volume and substance of section 1115 Medicaid waiver activity under the two presidencies. From the perspective of policy performance, Medicaid demonstration waivers provide modest support for the view that states serve as laboratories for policy learning in the health care arena. More broadly, the waivers have not yielded a major solution to the problem of the uninsured and are unlikely to do so. At the same time, they have not (as some have suggested) been a subterranean force for the erosion of Medicaid. To the contrary, these waivers have often enhanced health services for low-income people; above all, they have helped preserve Medicaid as an entitlement by undercutting support for those seeking to convert the program into a block grant. From the perspective of the democratic process, we find that Congress has been a more significant player in shaping waivers than the executive federalism model suggests. While the decision processes surrounding Medicaid waivers often fall short of democratic standards with respect to transparency and opportunities for public input, they still compare favorably to certain alternatives.     

Medicaid integrity program; limitation on contractor liability. Final rule

The Medicaid Integrity Program (the Program) provides that the Secretary promote the integrity of the Medicaid program by entering into contracts with contractors that will review the actions of individuals or entities furnishing items or services (whether fee-for-service, risk, or other basis) for which payment may be made under an approved State plan and/or any waiver of the plan approved under section 1115 of the Social Security Act; audit claims for payment of items or services furnished, or administrative services furnished, under a State plan; identify overpayments of individuals or entities receiving Federal funds; and educate providers of services, managed care entities, beneficiaries, and other individuals with respect to payment integrity and quality of care. This final rule will provide for limitations on a contractor's liability while performing these services under the Program. The final rule will, to the extent possible, employ the same or comparable standards and other substantive and procedural provisions as are contained in section 1157 (Limitation on Liability) of the Social Security Act.     

Policing Medicaid and Medicare managed care: the role of courts and administrative agencies

The much-publicized 2000 case of Frew v. Gilbert, in which a federal judge castigated the State of Texas for deficiencies in its Medicaid program, brought renewed attention to the issue of regulating the quality of care in Medicaid and Medicare HMOs. Frew and other recent cases highlight both the promise and the pitfalls of relying on courts to correct deficiencies in public managed care programs. This article argues that while litigation over inadequacies in Medicare and Medicaid managed care can serve an important signaling function in alerting agencies and legislatures about the need for reform, the role of the courts in policing public managed care is circumscribed by several constraints. Barriers to class action litigation and differences in the institutional capacities of courts and administrative agencies mean that litigation is best viewed as a supplement, not an alternative, to a renewed commitment to strong quality monitoring on the part of Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services and state Medicaid agencies.     

The stages of managed care regulation: developing better rules

The managed care industry is at a crossroads. Belief in the ability of market forces alone to create an environment fostering quality health care at lower cost is eroding. Regulators across the country are confronted with a growing consumer backlash against managed care. As a result, states have passed managed care reform legislation at unprecedented rates. In doing so, states are confronted with a patchwork of federal intervention and preemption. We examine the stages of these recent state and federal developments and evaluate them in terms of the traditional objectives of a reasonably functioning health care system: quality care, access, and cost containment.     

Modernizing Medicaid eligibility criteria for children with significant disabilities: moving from a disabling to an enabling paradigm

Children with significant disabilities may qualify for Medicaid benefits, regardless of household income, if their state elects to offer the Tax Equity Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA) option. However, a significant number of children with serious medical problems presently are being denied eligibility for, or terminated from, this Medicaid program. This Article describes the ways in which the existing health insurance system inadequately meets the needs of children with significant disabilities, recounts the history and development of the TEFRA Medicaid coverage option, and analyzes the eligibility criteria used by the various states. It proceeds to consider how disability should be legally defined in the health care context and proposes reforms to modernize the eligibility standards so that these benefits can be more effectively, efficiently, and fairly allocated. To accomplish this goal, the federal statute and regulation that define disability, as well as corresponding state laws, must be reformed so that the law can keep pace with advances in modern medical science, and people with disabilities are not, in effect, penalized for receiving currently accepted preventative care that maintains health but will never cure the underlying disease.     

Medicaid program; review and approval process for Section 1115 demonstrations. Final rule

This final rule will implement provisions of section 10201(i) of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 that set forth transparency and public notice procedures for experimental, pilot, and demonstration projects approved under section 1115 of the Social Security Act relating to Medicaid and the Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP). This final rule will increase the degree to which information about Medicaid and CHIP demonstration applications and approved demonstration projects is publicly available and promote greater transparency in the review and approval of demonstrations. It will also codify existing statutory requirements pertaining to seeking advice from Indian health care providers and urban Indian organizations for section 1115 demonstration projects, and for the first time impose as regulatory requirements tribal consultation standards that were previously only published as guidance documents.     

The politics of discretionary Medicaid spending, 1980-1993

Why do some states choose to spend more than four times as much as others to provide health care to the disadvantaged? Political scientists who have traditionally explored this question by analyzing trends in overall Medicaid expenditures lumped states' discretionary spending in with other money that states are mandated to spend. Analyses of total expenditures found that socioeconomic factors drove spending but that party control of state legislatures made no difference in health policy making. By isolating discretionary state Medicaid expenditures from total spending figures, I reexamine the influences of political as well as economic and demographic factors. The often-doubted importance of party control becomes clear. This study investigates spending patterns in the discretionary portions of state Medicaid programs in forty-six states from 1980 to 1993 and analyzes both incremental program changes and absolute differences in state spending. To discover how greatly the researcher's choice of dependent variables can affect results, optional spending is separated from total spending levels and the variation is modeled in both. Focusing not on the spending that the federal government requires of state officials but on the policies that state officials actually choose allows a balanced exploration of both political and economic effects on welfare expenditures. This research also provides new insights about which forces will shape policy decisions if more and more control of the public health care system is devolved to the states.     

Pegram v. Herdrich: On peritonitis, preemption, and the elusive goal of managed care accountability

Managed care presents the paradox of organizations having real power over people's lives without there being clear or consistent means of ensuring accountability. In Pegram v. Herdrich, the United States Supreme Court struggled with whether "fiduciary duties" under the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) could be used to counterbalance the incentives that HMOs have to deny necessary care. Given press coverage of the case, however, it was easy to get the impression that the managed care industry itself was on trial in Pegram. This report examines the political and legal forces underlying the dispute and analyzes the Supreme Court's unanimous rejection of the notion of federally imposed duties for HMOs. In the absence of ERISA fiduciary obligations, attention must now shift to developments in state tort law, the scope of federal ERISA preemption, and the prospect of legislative reform. The report concludes with an exploration of how the elusive goal of managed care accountability might be pursued in the wake of Pegram.     

Medicaid myths: trends in Medicaid expenditures and the prospects for reform

Medicaid expenditures, which had reached more than +32 billion by 1981, have grown substantially throughout the program's history. As a result, the conventional wisdom is that Medicaid expenditures represent a significant public-policy problem. Using other measures, however, it can be shown that the program is much less of a problem than it appears to be. By 1981, spending for Medicaid represented only 12.7 percent of total state spending and had contributed only 14.2 percent to the overall growth in state expenditures since 1965. Moreover, considering only the funds which states raise from in-state sources, the median share of state budgets accounted for by Medicaid was just 5.6 percent, and only 7 states spent as much as 9 percent of their own money on the program. These figures suggest that the marginal reductions in Medicaid expenditures which would result from typical program changes are likely to be so small that rational state officials might be unwilling to incur the political opposition of powerful provider groups or the resistance of large state bureaucracies by proposing substantial reforms. The major exceptions are the few states with very large programs where even small proportional savings would amount to millions of dollars. We conclude that, given its present federal-state form and the current distribution of expenditures, it is unlikely that major reforms will be enacted because the stakes are too small for most states and the federal interest is too diffused.     

Enrolling children in public insurance: SCHIP, Medicaid, and state implementation

The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 established federal grants to the states to create the State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP). This presented the states with a number of implementation choices concerning administrative models for the new programs, as well as choices about eligibility standards, enrollment simplification, crowd-out, and cost sharing requirements. At the same time, the states were also implementing welfare reform. We describe the most important of these implementation choices, and using data from the Current Population Survey, we estimate the impacts of state policy on enrollment in this multiprogram environment. The results indicate that SCHIP programs that are administered as Medicaid expansions are more successful than either separate SCHIP plans or combination programs in enrolling children. States that remove asset tests and implement presumptive eligibility and self-declaration of income have higher enrollment levels. Continuous eligibility and adoption of mail-in applications have no effect on overall enrollment. Waiting periods and premiums reduce enrollment. Stringent welfare reform reduces children's enrollment, despite federal policy that was intended to protect children from the consequences of welfare reform. The negative impacts of a number of these policy reforms substantially reduce enrollment, potentially offsetting the more favorable impacts of other policy choices. We estimate that if all states adopted the policy options that facilitate program use, enrollment for children with family incomes less than 200 percent of the poverty line could be raised from the current rate of 42 percent to 58 percent.     

Inching toward incrementalism: federalism, devolution, and health policy in the United States and the United Kingdom

In the United States, the recently enacted Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 envisions a significant increase in federal oversight over the nation's health care system. At the same time, however, the legislation requires the states to play key roles in every aspect of the reform agenda (such as expanding Medicaid programs, creating insurance exchanges, and working with providers on delivery system reforms). The complicated intergovernmental partnerships that govern the nation's fragmented and decentralized system are likely to continue, albeit with greater federal oversight and control. But what about intergovernmental relations in the United Kingdom? What impact did the formal devolution of power in 1999 to Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland have on health policy in those nations, and in the United Kingdom more generally? Has devolution begun a political process in which health policy in the United Kingdom will, over time, become increasingly decentralized and fragmented, or will this "state of unions" retain its long-standing reputation as perhaps the most centralized of the European nations? In this article, we explore the federalist and intergovernmental implications of recent reforms in the United States and the United Kingdom, and we put forward the argument that political fragmentation (long-standing in the United States and just emerging in the United Kingdom) produces new intergovernmental partnerships that, in turn, produce incremental growth in overall government involvement in the health care arena. This is the impact of what can be called catalytic federalism.     

Medical liability and health care reform

We examine the impact of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) on medical liability and the controversy over whether federal medical reform including a damages cap could make a useful contribution to health care reform. By providing guaranteed access to health care insurance at community rates, the ACA could reduce the problem of under-compensation resulting from damages caps. However, it may also exacerbate the problem of under-claiming in the malpractice system, thereby reducing incentives to invest in loss prevention activities. Shifting losses from liability insurers to health insurers could further undermine the already weak deterrent effect of the medical liability system. Republicans in Congress and physician groups both pushed for the adoption of a federal damages cap as part of health care reform. Physician support for damages caps could be explained by concerns about the insurance cycle and the consequent instability of the market. Our own study presented here suggests that there is greater insurance market stability in states with caps on non-economic damages. Republicans in Congress argued that the enactment of damages caps would reduce aggregate health care costs. The Congressional Budget Office included savings from reduced health care utilization in its estimates of cost savings that would result from the enactment of a federal damages cap. But notwithstanding recent opinions offered by the CBO, it is not clear that caps will significantly reduce health care costs or that any savings will be passed on to consumers. The ACA included funding for state level demonstration projects for promising reforms such as offer and disclosure and health courts, but at this time the benefits of these reforms are also uncertain. There is a need for further studies on these issues.     

Holding back the tide: policies to preserve and reconstruct health insurance coverage in Maryland

Over the past decade, state officials have pursued a variety of strategies to protect and expand health insurance coverage for their residents. This article examines the course of action in Maryland, where new initiatives were shaped around the state's unique hospital payment system and its reimbursement of uncompensated care, an evolving Medicaid and children's health program, and regulation of the small group health insurance market. Several important patterns emerge from the Maryland experience. First, even the most incremental initiatives--programs intended to aid a few thousand beneficiaries--bring into play the very issues that hamper comprehensive reforms: who is deserving of mutual aid and what is the proper role of government versus private entities in administering that aid. In Maryland, these issues generate conflict not only between Democrats and Republicans but also urban and rural interests. Second, all of the important reforms of the past decade were undertaken primarily in reaction to federal policy initiatives. Contrary to rhetoric lauding states as the "laboratories of democracy," the political impetus for reform and basic policy options emerge from interaction between federal and state debates. Third, even with budget surpluses and Democrats in control of the governorship and legislature, Maryland did not move aggressively toward universal health insurance. Now, with a much weaker economy and a new, Republican governor, the primary challenge will be to prevent further erosion of insurance coverage. The Maryland experience reiterates that each step toward greater health security, no matter how small, is a major technical and political challenge and that it will be difficult if not impossible to rely on states to secure coverage for all Americans in the foreseeable future.     

Physicians' decisions to limit Medicaid participation: determinants and policy implications

Although most primary care physicians participate in state Medicaid programs, they may accept all Medicaid patients, or they may choose to limit their participation. This decision allows physicians to adjust their Medicaid caseloads to a desired level, and it has important implications for the access of low-income patients to health care. Surveys of pediatricians in 1978 and 1983 indicate that the proportion of pediatricians limiting their Medicaid participation increased significantly from 26 percent to 35 percent (p less than .001). In addition, in both 1978 and 1983, limited participants saw significantly fewer Medicaid patients than full participants. This paper describes a number of strategies available to federal and state policymakers for fostering full Medicaid participation. Multivariate analyses indicate that increasing reimbursement levels is an important strategy for encouraging full Medicaid participation. In addition, full participants will increase their Medicaid caseloads in response to a variety of Medicaid policy incentives, while limited participants are found to respond to fewer policy incentives. The authors conclude that caution will be needed to ensure that health care cost-containment strategies such as capitation or selective contracting do not inadvertently discourage participation among both full and limited Medicaid participants.     

Medicaid program; cost limit for providers operated by units of government and provisions to ensure the integrity of federal-state financial partnership. Final rule with comment period

This regulation clarifies that entities involved in the financing of the non-Federal share of Medicaid payments must be a unit of government; clarifies the documentation required to support a Medicaid certified public expenditure; limits Medicaid reimbursement for health care providers that are operated by units of government to an amount that does not exceed the health care provider's cost of providing services to Medicaid individuals; requires all health care providers to receive and retain the full amount of total computable payments for services furnished under the approved Medicaid State plan; and makes conforming changes to provisions governing the State Child Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) to make the same requirements applicable, with the exception of the cost limit on reimbursement. The Medicaid cost limit provision of this regulation does not apply to: Stand-alone SCHIP program payments made to governmentally-operated health care providers; Indian Health Service (IHS) facilities and tribal 638 facilities that are paid at the all-inclusive IHS rate; Medicaid Managed Care Organizations (MCOs), Prepaid Inpatient Health Plans (PIHPs), and Prepaid Ambulatory Health Plans (PAHPs); Federally Qualified Health Centers (FQHCs) and Rural Health Clinics (RHCs). Moreover, disproportionate share hospital (DSH) payments and payments authorized under Section 701(d) and Section 705 of the Benefits Improvement Protection Act of 2000 are not subject to the newly established Medicaid cost limit for governmentally-operated health care providers. Except as noted above, all Medicaid payments and SCHIP payments made under the authority of the State plan and under waiver and demonstration authorities, as well as associated State Medicaid and SCHIP financing arrangements, are subject to all provisions of this regulation. Finally, this regulation solicits comments from the public on issues related to the definition of the Unit of Government.