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<正> 《联合国宪章》以下称"宪章")的人权条款从字面上看似乎并不复杂,但围绕着这些条款的解释,国际上存在着严重分歧。主要的一个分歧就是:宪章的人权条款是否为联合国会员国创设了一种法律义务。本文将从理论上对这个问题作一探讨。一、两种对立的观点关于这个问题,国际法学界有两种完全对立的观点。第一种观点否定宪章的人权条款为 相似文献
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先发制人军事行动原則上应被禁止。但在极端情况下采取预先性自卫,已在国际上得到越来越多的响应,其可能的法律依据是联合国会员国或联合国机构对联合国宪章的解释实践。预防性军事行动由于明显缺乏国际法律依据,且这种对自卫权的扩大解释没有被国际社会绝大多数成员所接受,故仍应予以严禁。求助于联合国安理会应对国际恐怖威胁仍是一种最为可取的做法,为此各会员国有必要在武力使用的具体标准和程序问题上尽可能达成共识。 相似文献
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一《联合国宪章》是联合国的基本法律文件,由一个序言和19章共110条组成,《国际法院规约》是《宪章》的组成部分。它规定了联合国组织的宗旨和原则,组织结构,职权范围和活动程序,是联合国一切活动的法律依据。而由于联合国成员国的广泛性和普遍性,该《宪章》的世界性就不言而喻了,在某种程度上说,该《宪章》具有约束作为联合国会员国的185个国家在联合国的活动的法律效力。不仅如此,由于《宪章》所确立的基本原则,特别是其中规定的(l)所有会员国主权平等;(2)所有会员国都应善意履行宪章规定的义务;(3)各会员国… 相似文献
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美国未经联合国安理会授权对伊拉克的单边主义战争,可以说开了一个可怕的先例,也可以说它严重破坏了国际法的基本原则。 一、单边主义战争对国家主权平等原则的破坏 所谓主权是指一个国家对内管理国家事务、对外进行国际交往的最高权力。《联合国宪章》第2条第1款明确规定:“本组织系基于各会员国主权平等之原则。”《联合国宪章》把主权平等原则放在首位,足见其重要性。按照1970年10月联大通过的《国际法原则宣言》的解释,国家主权平等原 相似文献
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联合国安理会授权使用武力问题探究 总被引:5,自引:0,他引:5
《联合国宪章》禁止威胁或使用武力,同时规定了安理会执行行动和会员国自卫权两项例外。1990-1991年海湾战争期间,安理会678号决议又提出了“授权”使用武力的问题。这是在联合国框架下以武力恢复国际和平与安全的一种新的可能性或范式。本文通过对宪章有关条款及实践的分析认为:授权使用武力是安理会为恢复国际和平与安全而建议采取的行动,联合国会员国根据安理会的这种建议自愿决定是否动用武力,会员国在安理会授权下动用武力一般属于单独或集体自卫性质;但这种使用武力不仅要受一般国际法有关条件的限制,还要受授权的军事目的的限制,安理会不仅可以授权使用武力,也可以通过决议要求停止一切武力行动包括自卫;安理会在控制一切武力方面享有最终决定权。本文还对“9.11”事件后美国对阿富汗动用武力的问题做了简要分析,并提出了一些问题。 相似文献
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维持国际和平与安全,和平解决国际争端是联合国的首要宗旨,①为实现这一宗旨,《联合国宪章》规定了比较完整的“解决争端”体制,宪章的许多重要条款,均与此有关,内容极为广泛。特别是宪章第六、七两章对此作了专门具体规定。而联合国的“预防行动”则是人们对联合国预防和消除国际争端程序的简称,其具体内容体现在1988年12月5日联合国大会未经表决而核可的《关于预防和消除可能威胁国际和平与安全的争端和局势以及关于联合国在该领域的作用的宣言》(以下简称《宣言》)中。② 相似文献
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论《联合国宪章》的解释方法问题 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
以适当的方法对《联合国宪章》做出正确的解释 ,是妥善施行《宪章》的重要前提。本文从理论和实践两个层面 ,深入论析了《宪章》的五种解释方法 ,即文义解释、系统解释、目的解释、历史解释和惯例解释 ,指出五种方法各有利弊长短 ,在选择具体解释方法时 ,应采取“善意解释”的态度 ,所作的解释应有利于实现联合国的宗旨及原则 相似文献
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《联合国宪章》对安理会与国际法院的职责作出了明确规定,由于两个机构在组成与性质方面的差异,在处理共同管辖的国际争端时,两个机构的解决方式有时存在分歧,而且安理会决议与国际法院裁判对《联合国宪章》条文的解释也存在矛盾。因此,在《联合国宪章》的框架内重新构建安理会与国际法院的关系,有迫切的需要。在产生共同管辖时,国际法院应当适当照顾安理会决议的意见,同时,为制约安理会日益扩大的权力,应当肯定国际法院对安理会决议的司法审查权。 相似文献
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This article addresses legal problems posed by Security CouncilResolution 1757 of 30 May 2007, establishing the Special Tribunalfor Lebanon (STL). After describing the historicalbackground of the resolution (section 1) and the plan to establishthe STL as a treaty-based institution (section 2), the paperturns to an analysis of Resolution 1757 (section 3). The authorquestions whether the Council intended to bring the Lebanon-UNagreement into force as an international treaty, and holds thatthe UN Charter does not give the Council a power to unilaterallyimpose on a member state an obligation in the form of a treaty.The author argues that in Resolution 1757 the Council did notsubstitute a Chapter VII decision for the missing ratificationof the agreement by Lebanon, but instead established the STLby making the provisions of the agreement negotiated with Lebanonan integral part of a Chapter VII resolution. Section 4 thenquestions whether the Council was entitled to procure Lebanon'sconsent to be bound by a treaty by threatening unilaterallyto put those provisions into effect through a Chapter VII resolution.After discussing certain rules of the law of treaties concerningthe coercion of a state, the author concludes that it is notthat law but the UN Charter itself that prohibits the Councilfrom exerting pressure on a member state in order to make thatstate ratify a treaty. 相似文献
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In the framework of the fight against international terrorismthe UN Security Council (SC) has adopted targeted sanctionsagainst individuals and corporate entities. Furthermore, ithas imposed on states a number of obligations of a general nature.The implementation of all these measures some of whichbear on sensitive aspects of criminal law and procedure is left to the Member States. This article attempts to providean overview of national implementation practices, based on thenational reports submitted by states pursuant to the relevantSC resolutions. Besides the many difficulties encountered bystates in implementing SC resolutions, the encroachment of anti-terrormeasures on human rights is a cause for concern. The currentattitude of the SC, which has integrated human rights considerationsinto the security concerns that inspire its action under ChapterVII of the Charter, should enhance the perception of legitimacyof its anti-terror policy and, arguably, improve the effectivenessof its measures. 相似文献
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The scope of the collective security system established underthe United Nations Charter has expanded significantly sincethe end of the cold war to cover new fields. An increasing linkagebetween maintenance of peace and economic reconstruction haslead the United Nations to play an unprecedented role withinthe economic realm, be it by the widening of the range of measuresadopted by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charterwith economic consequences or through the direct managementof economies in post-conflict situations as part of a globalstrategy to restore peace in war-torn territories. This evolutionhas brought to light the limits of the existing UN collectivesecurity system as a framework to deal with economic issues.It is submitted that the derogatory logic underArticle 103 of the Charter and under WTO law through its exceptionclauses is no longer sufficient to review and assess the UNaction in the economic sphere. The promotion and integrationof a broader set of principles and rules of international economiclaw such as principles of fair competition, non-discrimination,or transparency, would help enhance the legitimacy of actionsof the UN Security Council. Moreover, this article argues thattaking into account international economic law would contributeto achieve UN goals in post conflict situations by paving theway for a stable and safe economic environment in a long-termperspective. The recently established Peacebuilding Commissionmay contribute to develop a coherent and integrated legal approachin this area. 相似文献
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This article is partly a reply to Professor Hans Köchler,who argues that the total absence of a balance of power hasbecome the fundamental predicament of the United Nations Organizationin the 21st century. He locates that problem in the veto powerof the permanent five members, saying that it creates an irreconcilablenormative contradiction with the doctrine of sovereign equality.On the contrary, this article takes a historical view and arguesthat the Framers of the United Nations (UN) Charter clearlysaw the greater opportunity which greater power brings to oilthe wheels of the machinery which they built. Choosing betweena Security Council that could act unchecked and therefore decisivelyand one which evinces a separation of powers in its design,the Framers opted for the latter. The veto separates power.Finally, Professor Köchler argues that the UN has beenmarginalized in recent events. This article argues that hisunderlying assumption, that the shift in the global power balanceof 1945 to the current unipolar imbalance of power automaticallycontroverts the power balance envisioned in the Charter, isnot wholly borne out. The Charter was not simply meant to reflectthe actual patterns of global power outside the organizationbut was intended to foster an enduring understanding of theneed to maintain a specific power balance. By putting the vetoin several hands, the Framers have required the permanent fivemembers to continuously negotiate and seek agreement among themselves.It is this which, in large part, explains observable attemptsby even would-be transgressors today to bring their action withinthe framework of Charter legality. 相似文献
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Vojtech Belling 《European Law Journal》2012,18(2):251-268
This analysis explores in detail various aspects of the possible legal impact of ‘British’ Protocol No 30 (the so‐called opt‐out from the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights). On the basis of a legal appraisal, it concludes that the Protocol is not in any way to be understood as a substantial derogation from the standard of protection of fundamental rights in the EU or as an ‘opt‐out’ from the Charter in a substantial sense. Nevertheless, its significance is definitely not to be underestimated. Its adoption as a source of primary law enshrines a legally binding interpretation of the Charter and, in particular, an interpretation of its horizontal provisions. In Article 1(2) and Article 2, the Protocol in fact confirms that the application of the Charter cannot lead to a change in the existing competencies framework. These provisions are of a declaratory nature and apply to all Member States. In Article 1(1), the Protocol is of a constitutive nature since it rules out an extensive interpretation of what can be considered national legal acts adopted in the implementation of EU law only for those States signed up to the Protocol. This specifically means that if, in the future, as part of the application of the Charter, the Court of Justice of the EU (ECJ) has a tendency to subsume a certain area of national legislation under the ‘implementation of Union law’ outside the field of implementing standards, in the spirit of the Ellinki Radiophonia Tileorassi judgment (and subsequently allow their reviewability with respect to their conformity with the Charter), such action would be admissible only for those Member States that have not acceded to the Protocol. However, the Protocol cannot exclude the continued application of the general principles of law instead of the positively constituted fundamental rights in the Charter by the ECJ. 相似文献
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Wojciech Sadurski 《European Law Journal》2002,8(3):340-362
Current debates about the contents, status, and the future role of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights should have a stronger 'enlargement dimension': the constitutionalisation of Europe (with the Charter as its key element) and the EU enlargement should be seen as two interrelated (and, possibly, mutually supportive) phenomena rather than as two separate challenges which must be approached one at a time. There are two main aspects to this relationship. First, the Charter may be seen as a yardstick by which the human rights credentials of the candidate states will be tested. Second (the central focus of this article), one may ask whether the candidate states, once involved in the debate about the constitutional future of Europe, will bring any constitutional insights which may affect the articulation of Charter rights. It is argued, against the background of candidate states' recent experience of constitution-making, that these insights should be embraced rather than feared, and that the current member states should resist a temptation of adopting a paternalistic approach towards the candidate states as participants in the European constitutional debate. 相似文献