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2.
Oleg Smirnov 《Public Choice》2009,141(3-4):277-290
A stylized model of three parties choosing an amendment agenda and voting over three policy alternatives is analyzed. The analysis yields a classification of five types of voters: random, sincere, strategic, risk-averse, and EUS (expected utility sophisticated) proposed by Enelow (J. Polit. 43:1062–1089, 1981). Laboratory experiments suggest that the choice of agendas can be partially explained by the sincere voting model (26% of voters) and strategic voting model (47% of voters), even when players’ preferences are common knowledge. Risk-aversion may explain choices of up to 56% of the voters. Finally, the EUS voting model explains up to 73% of the observed voting behavior.  相似文献   

3.
Joshy Easaw 《Public Choice》2010,145(1-2):253-264
The purpose of the present paper is to consider how voters form perceptions about macroeconomic policy competence by focusing on the role of recent macroeconomic news: Do their perceived views of good news matter as much as bad news when they form beliefs about the incumbent government’s competence in managing the macroeconomy, in particular, with regard to their ability to control inflation and unemployment? We find that ‘bad’ news about unemployment persists when households are forming their perceived competence, whereas “good” news does not. That is, voters tend to display pessimistic bias when forming perceptions about the incumbent government’s competence.  相似文献   

4.
Politicians bias public policies to favor particular election districts. According to the traditional common pool model, districts facing low tax shares should receive relatively large government projects. We suggest a swing-voter model where the number of voters on the ideological cut point, lack of party identification and number of district representatives per voter determine project sizes. We analyze the allocation of state road investments in Norway from 1973–1997 exploiting unique data on characteristics of voters, legislative representation and tax prices in 19 election districts. Geographical representation to parliament is biased, mostly due to an ancient constitution. Shares of swing voters and legislative over-representation lead to higher levels of road investments, while high levels of party identification reduce investments.  相似文献   

5.
John W. Patty 《Public Choice》2010,143(1-2):121-133
In this paper, I examine a simple procedure in the United States House of Representatives, approving the Journal, and its implications for legislative business. In this paper, I examine the hypothesis that such votes are more than simply pro forma motions or dilatory tactics by the minority party. Considering the 102nd–107th Congresses, I show that votes on the Journal’s approval are just as frequently requested by the majority party as by members of the minority party. Furthermore, I find that votes recorded on days on which a vote was also recorded on the House Journal were more likely to be close and more likely to be party-line votes than those recorded on other days.  相似文献   

6.
Avner Greif 《Public Choice》2009,141(3-4):273-275
Rowley’s (Public Choice 140:275–285, 2009) claim that I have “expropriated” (p. 276) intellectual property rights from Professor Landa by insufficiently citing her works is vacuous. It failed, among other faults, to recognize the substantive distinction between the lines of research pursued by Professor Landa and myself. Her analysis of trust is preferences-based while my analysis is beliefs-based. We talk about similar issues but what we say is very different.  相似文献   

7.
Niklas Potrafke 《Public Choice》2010,143(1-2):135-155
This paper examines how government ideology has influenced deregulation of product markets in OECD countries. I analyze a dataset of non-manufacturing regulation indicators covering energy, transport and communication industries in 21 OECD countries over the 1980–2003 period and employ two different indices of government ideology. The results suggest that government ideology has had a strong influence on the deregulation process: market-oriented governments promoted the deregulation of the energy, transport and communication industries. This finding identifies remarkable differences between leftist and rightwing governments concerning the role of government in the economy and basic elements of political order.  相似文献   

8.
This article reviews Bob Tollison’s conjoined contributions to the scholarly literature in the closely related fields of economic history and history of economic thought, underscoring his integration of public choice and interest-group analysis into the historian’s purview. It identifies the overarching themes of his research and summarizes the major findings of his key publications.  相似文献   

9.
This paper highlights important lessons gained from the research program of Elinor Ostrom, and demonstrates the close connection between public choice and the work on collective management of the commons for which Lin was honored by the Nobel Prize committee. Although our primary focus is on Lin’s research on self-governance and the “commons,” an overarching goal is to capture the intellectual journey of participants in the Ostrom Workshop, who continue to be guided by the inspiring examples set by Lin and Vincent Ostrom.  相似文献   

10.
I explore the microfoundations of Gordon Tullock’s contributions to political economy and argue that his approach is consistent with the “invisible hand” theorizing of Adam Smith. While Smith (and Hayek) are celebrated for their emphasis on the “bright-side” of spontaneous social cooperation, Tullock emphasized the “dark-side” of social processes when the incentives are perverse and information is distorted. By explicating the microfoundations of Tullock’s rendering of Smithian political economy this paper will set the stage for a reassessment of Tullock as a spontaneous order theorist.  相似文献   

11.
We consider a situation in which two groups contest group-specific public goods. Each member of the group may have a different valuation of the prize. Our model can be interpreted as the contestants’ cost of lobbying efforts being non-linear, or the returns to their efforts being decreasing. We show that the level of free-riding depends on the return of the investment. We consider the situation under which one group initiates a contest to which different individuals and/or groups can be added. The question we pose is what is the optimal structure of additional groups?  相似文献   

12.
In a wage bargaining model, a stronger earnings relationship of unemployment benefits may reduce wages. Therefore, the benefit structure significantly influences profits and trade union utility, raising the question as to how the benefit structure is determined in the political process. We consider a government that chooses the earnings relationship in order to maximize its political support. Our model predicts a strong earnings relationship under right-wing governments and a weak relationship when unions are influential. Using panel data for 19 OECD countries, we find support for these theoretical predictions. Moreover, we show that the earnings relationship varies negatively with openness.  相似文献   

13.
The policy networks model recently has become a more frequent analytical tool of EU policy analysts. In a recent article, Hussein Kassim offers a sceptical view about its applicability to the EU. Kassim fails to make explicit the key variables — or internal characteristics of policy networks ‐ which help to explain policy outcomes. However, his own analysis echoes many of the assumptions of the model: that policy networks are rife in the EU because they facilitate informal bargaining amid fluid policy processes, that networks provide order amid extreme institutional complexity and frequent change, and that the hard work involved in identifying EU policy networks is worth the effort. The policy networks model requires further testing and refinement at the EU level, but it remains the most analytically powerful approach on offer.  相似文献   

14.
Dong-Hun Kim 《Public Choice》2010,143(1-2):49-65
This article examines the factors that lead governments to open up their public procurement markets to international competition with a particular emphasis on the effect of intra-industry trade. Contrary to the conventional notion that intra-industry trade entails less political pressure for protectionism than inter-industry trade, I argue that such notion does not prevail in the case of discriminatory public procurement. Firms in a market with a high degree of intra-industry trade are more likely to resist the removal of discrimination than would firms in a market with a high degree of inter-industry trade. Empirically, I find support for the argument both at sub-national and cross-national settings.  相似文献   

15.
England's rulers, merchants, and organized labor in the early modern period (from the 16th to the 18th centuries) were all actively using what today we would call propaganda. Each group appreciated the need to get popular opinion on its side, or at the least to convince other groups it was in the public interest to act in a particular way. This study focuses on the use of xenophobic narratives by these actors in order to further their political, economic, or cultural objectives. The targets were economic rivals including the Dutch, but most particularly ethnic and religious outgroups, including Roman Catholics, Muslims, and Jews. Although there were public relations win-wins for anyone who was able successfully to demonize foreigners, racist and xenophobic propaganda was often more pernicious than the tellers realized, in many cases extending its influence over several generations. In addition, it is clear that many narratives failed to engage with public opinion, for reasons that were not always clear to the groups responsible for them.  相似文献   

16.
Niklas Potrafke 《Public Choice》2009,140(1-2):105-124
This paper evaluates empirically how, in the course of globalization, partisan politics affected social expenditures in a panel of OECD countries. I introduce an updated indicator of government ideology and investigate its interaction with the KOF index of globalization. Two basic results emerge: First, at times when globalization proceeded at an average pace, partisan politics had no effect on social expenditures, but leftist governments increased social expenditures when globalization was proceeding rapidly. Second, policies differed in the 1980s and 1990s: Leftist governments pursued expansionary policies in the 1980s. Yet partisan politics disappeared in the 1990s, but not because of globalization.  相似文献   

17.
Andrew Leigh 《Public Choice》2008,137(1-2):279-299
Which electorates receive targeted funding, and does targeted funding swing votes? To answer these questions, I analyze four discretionary programs funded by the Australian federal government during the 2001–2004 election cycle. Controlling for relevant demographic characteristics of the electorate, those electorates held by the governing coalition received a larger share of discretionary funding, and a larger number of program grants. Among government seats, funding does not appear to have been directed towards those that were more marginal. More discretionary funding—particularly on road-building—was associated with a larger swing towards the government in the 2004 election.  相似文献   

18.
I examine a sequential bargaining situation in which agents contest the right to propose an allocation. The contest can either take place at a pre-bargaining stage, yielding “persistent recognition” to propose, or recur throughout the bargaining, yielding “transitory recognition”. Equilibrium analysis reveals that surplus is distributed more unequally under persistent recognition; social cost is higher under persistent recognition if and only if it attracts a sufficient number of “active” bargainers; and individual’s incentive to propose under transitory recognition may actually increase in the number of agents, while this incentive always diminishes under persistent recognition.  相似文献   

19.
With the 30th anniversary of the policy advisory systems concept on the horizon, it is an appropriate time to reflect further on the concept’s utility, particularly in helping to understand the dynamics of system change and their implications for policy-making. This article provides diachronic analysis of the policy advisory systems in the classic Anglo-Saxon ‘Westminster’ family (Canada, UK, Australia, New Zealand). Analysis focuses on five advisory units: the public service and central agencies, partisan ministerial advisers, external consultants, commissions of inquiry, and select special advisory bodies. The principle research aim is to compare these cases to shed light on advisory system dynamics through identification and analysis of shared and country-specific patterns of PAS change. We argue that the leading dynamics of politicization and externalization often used to characterize how advisory systems change masks idiosyncratic country patterns. We argue that differences in the tempo, intensity, and sequencing of advisory unit (de)institutionalization are clear in these cases and that attention to these dimensions of advisory system change add precision to understanding the organization, operation, and evolution of these systems.  相似文献   

20.
The riskiness of state employee pension plan portfolios varies across states. We investigate whether this variation is related to how public employees and taxpayers share actuarial surpluses of pension accounts. We focus on two determinants of a plan’s asset mix: the relative influence of public employees to taxpayers; and whether a surplus-sharing contract is specified. Our theoretical model demonstrates that the effect of public employee influence on the asset mix is ambiguous. Our empirical results corroborate this complex theoretical result. In our theoretical and empirical analyses, if a surplus sharing rule is specified, plans adopt a more aggressive investment allocation.  相似文献   

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