The Flypaper Effect: Evidence from India

The flypaper effect refers to the phenomenon whereby expenditure stimulus from unconditional grants exceeds that from an equivalent increase in income. The flypaper effect has been described as "money sticks where it hits." The present study empirically tests the flypaper effect for the Indian economy. The study also tests the asymmetry hypothesis that looks at the impact of retrenchment in grants. Results obtained in the present study show the flypaper effect to be vindicated. We find that both capital and revenue expenditures receive a greater stimulus from grants than would an increase in income. Results show that in the prereform period both revenue and capital expenditures are maintained during periods of grant cuts. However, in the postreform period it is only expenditures on revenue accounts that are maintained in periods of grant reduction. We also find that during periods of grant reduction, state governments maintain their expenditure programs by raising their own tax revenue. This suggests that grants from the center have had a disincentive effect and could be a reason that state governments have not exploited their tax potential to the fullest. By bringing to the fore the disincentive effect of grants we wish to emphasize the urgency of taking a closer look at restructuring and redesigning our system of intergovernmental transfers.     

Campaign resources and electoral success: Evidence from the 2002 French parliamentary elections

We examine the factors that improve the candidates’ likelihood of winning an election by drawing on information from campaign resources used by candidates running in the 2002 French parliamentary election. The main effects that we wish to analyze are the candidates’ gender, political affiliation and possible incumbency. We find that the contributions the candidates received and their political affiliations determine their acceding to the second round of the elections. But surprisingly once they make it to the second round, the contributions cease to be relevant; only the candidates’ gender, incumbency and the actual spending rather than the contribution levels matter.     

Collaborative Behavior and the Performance of Government Agencies

ABSTRACT

While collaboration among individuals, work groups, and organizations is central for understanding the performance of public agencies, most studies have focused on collaboration between organizations or sectors. We develop a model that focuses on two types of collaborative behavior: between persons (both horizontal and vertical) and between work units. We empirically test our hypotheses using data on work collaboration and perceptions of public agency performance from the United States federal government. We introduce a method for estimating the impact of different types of collaborative behavior that also accounts for nonlinear effects and a dependent variable that takes ordered values. We find that intra-organizational collaborative behavior has a large impact on organizational performance and that horizontal collaborative behavior between workers has the greatest impact among the specific types.     

On the looting of nations

We develop a dynamic discrete choice model of an unchecked ruler making decisions regarding the development of a resource rich country. Resources serve as collateral and facilitate the acquisition of loans. The ruler chooses either to stay in power while facing the risk of being ousted, or loot the country??s riches by liquefying the resources through lending. We show that unstructured lending from international credit markets can create incentives to loot the country; and an enhanced likelihood of looting causes greater political instability, and diminishes growth. Using a treatment effects model, we find evidence that supports our predictions.     

DYNAMIC SCORING OF TAX REFORMS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

In this paper, we present the first dynamic scoring exercise linking a microsimulation and a dynamic general equilibrium model for Europe. We illustrate our novel methodology analyzing hypothetical reforms of the social insurance contributions system in Belgium. Our approach takes into account the feedback effects resulting from adjustments and behavioral responses in the labor market and the economy‐wide reaction to the tax policy changes essential for a comprehensive evaluation of the reforms. We find that the self‐financing effect of a reduction in employers’ social insurance contribution is substantially larger than that of a comparable reduction in employees’ social insurance contributions.     

Diffusion models over the life cycle of an innovation: A bottom-up and top-down synthesis approach

The diffusion models tend to be tested individually in isolation and remain the same over time for the studied innovations in the literature. Moreover, there is growing interest to learn from other countries in our current age of globalization. Therefore, this paper chooses the innovation of public resources trading platforms in China to fulfill above literature gaps. We have examined key events and the issuances of related laws and regulations by Chinese governments. Our contributions are twofold: (a) Our analysis and results show that the diffusion models evolve over the different stages of a life cycle of an innovation, contrasting to the literature results that diffusion models remain the same for their studied innovations. Due to major diverse characteristics among different adopter categories over a life cycle of an innovation, we argue that it is appropriate and necessary to apply different diffusion models on different adopter categories, which is missing in the current literature. (b) We find a first bottom-up and then top-down synthesis approach as an effective, efficient diffusion process for both fitting local needs (i.e., effective) and adopting innovations rapidly nationwide (i.e., efficient).     

It Runs in the Family

What motivates citizens to run for office? Recent work has shown that early life parental socialization is strongly associated with a desire to run for office. However, parents not only shape their children’s political environment, they also pass along their genes to those same children. A growing area of research has shown that individual differences in a wide range of political behaviors and attitudes are linked to genetic differences. As a result, genetic factors may confound the observed political similarities among parents and their children. This study analyzes Swedish register data containing information on all nominated and elected candidates in the ten parliamentary, county council, and municipal elections from 1982 to 2014 for a large sample of adoptees and their adoptive and biological parents. By studying the similarity in political ambition within both adoptive and biological families, our research design allows us to disentangle so-called “pre-birth” factors, such as genes and pre-natal environment, and “post-birth” factors like parental socialization. We find that the likelihood of standing as a political candidate is twice as high if one’s parent has been a candidate. We also find that the effects of pre-birth and post-birth factors are approximately equal in size. In addition, we test a number of potential pre- and post-birth transmission mechanisms. First, disconfirming our expectations, the pre-birth effects do not seem to be mediated by cognitive ability or leadership skills. Second, consistent with a role modeling mechanism, we find evidence of a strong transmission in candidacy status between rearing mothers and their daughters.     

Education finance reform: A dynamic perspective

We use a dynamic Tiebout model to analyze the consequences of moving from a pure local system of education finance to a pure state system of finance in which each student receives the same resources. While much of the education finance literature focuses on the static or immediate effects of such a change, our analysis also examines the dynamic effects. Numerical simulations for a calibrated version of our model indicate that these dynamic effects are very important. Comparing steady states, we find that aggregate welfare increases on the order of 10 percent following the switch to a state system. The key to this welfare gain is that a local system yields inefficiently low investment in human capital of children from low-income families.     

Beyond Negativity: The Effects of Incivility on the Electorate

There is much concern among pundits and political observers that incivility undermines our electoral process. Yet we have little evidence that actually documents whether incivility has such pernicious effects. This article seeks to advance our understanding of the influence of incivility on the electorate. We argue that three dimensions are central to understanding both the perceptions and effects of different types of campaign messages: tone (negative versus positive); civility (civil versus uncivil); and focus (issue versus trait-based message content). Using an experimental manipulation on a large national sample that examines these three dimensions, we find that uncivil attacks in campaigns do not appear to be as worrisome as its detractors fear. While uncivil messages in general—and uncivil trait-based messages in particular—are usually seen by the public as being less fair, less informative, and less important than both their civil negative and positive counterparts, they are no more likely to lead to detrimental effects among the public. In fact, incivility appears to have some modest positive consequences for the political engagement of the electorate. These findings are important, since attacks and counterattacks will continue to shape the American political landscape.     

Public housing,health, and health behaviors: Is there a connection?

This paper explores the relationship between public housing, health outcomes, and health behaviors among low-income housing residents. While public housing can be a dangerous and unhealthy environment in which to live, the subsidized rent may free up resources for nutritious food and health care. In addition, public housing may be of higher quality than the available alternatives, it may provide easier access to health clinics willing to serve the poor, and it may link residents to social support networks, which can improve mental health and the ability to access higher-quality grocery stores. To test whether there is a "back-door" health benefit to the public housing program, we analyze data from the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study. We minimize the effects of selection into public housing with controls and instrumental variables estimation and find that the results are somewhat sensitive to the instrumental variable used, and thus, we conclude that we are unable to detect a robust health benefit from public housing for our measures of health. However, we do find some evidence that public housing residency has mixed effects on domestic violence, increases obesity, and worsens mothers' overall health status.     

Politically valued resources and preferred outcomes: Does the political context matter?

Previous research has concluded that ownership of economic resources that are politically valued leads to preferential outcomes during interactions with government officials. However, how the political context, and specifically the roles of the government actors involved, influences the relationship between political valued resources (PVRs) and desired outcomes has to date been relatively unexplored. In our paper, we argue that in interactions with elected legislators, PVRs are much more likely to lead to preferential outcomes. Conversely, due to the lack of power these resources have with bureaucrats in charge of regulatory enforcement, PVRs are less likely to lead to preferential outcomes. We provide some support for our arguments by looking for shifting patterns of effects in outcome variables that typically fall under the jurisdiction of each political role type. We find that large firms, export firms, and technology firms largely report having favorable influence over laws and regulations due to lobbying and increased foreign ownership, while also spending more days in inspections and more managerial time dealing with regulations.     

Institutions and savings in developing and emerging economies

Domestic savings are an important prerequisite for capital formation and growth. In this paper we analyze a new channel through which institutions influence aggregate savings and economic development. Whereas research in the field of savings decisions concentrates largely on the level of the individual, the literature on institutions and growth as well as on aggregate savings formation focuses on the aggregate, national level. First, we develop a framework that brings together both lines of reasoning, arguing that institutions may influence the individual savings decision as well as national savings in aggregate. This potential for institutional quality to influence economic performance has been neglected so far. Second, we build upon the empirical literature on aggregate savings formation and provide results supporting our hypothesis that better economic institutions drive aggregate savings formation upwards. By contrast, we do not find such effects in the case of the political environment. Our findings are robust when checked against a number of changes in explanatory variables, estimation methods and the treatment of instruments.     

The ideological component of Senate voting: Different principles or different principals?

Evidence exists on both sides of the question of whether or not legislator-specific, ideologically-driven shirking of constituent interest occurs. In this paper, we use a well-known model of such shirking by senators as our point of departure and add measures of inter-state constituent interests, the role of campaign contributions and, hence, the importance of whether or not senators are up for reelection. We find some evidence that the model provides a stronger explanation for senators up for reelection than for those who are not and that campaign contributions help determine voting decisions by these legislators. Finally, accounting for inter-state constituent interests, shirking is not a significant variable in the voting decisions of senators facing reelection. Thus, it appears that the reelection interests of some senators have been mistaken for ideologically-driven shirking.     

X-efficiency and technical efficiency

This paper examines the relationship between campaign contributions from savings and loan and finance industry PACs and membership on the House Banking Committee. The distinguishing features of this paper are that we focus on campaign contributions at an industry level, and we use regression analysis to determine whether membership on the House Banking Committee, the committee with oversight responsibility for the savings and loan industry, influences the level of contributions received by an individual legislator. We find that members of the House Banking Committee do receive significantly greater contributions from the savings and loan and finance PACs than do other members of Congress and that being chairman of the House Banking Committee also pays a dividend.     

Animal ethics and the political

Some of the most important contributions to animal ethics over the past decade or so have come from political, as opposed to moral, philosophers. As such, some have argued that there been a ‘political turn’ in the field. If there has been such a turn, it needs to be shown that there is something which unites these contributions, and which sets them apart from previous work. We find that some of the features which have been claimed to be shared commitments of the turn are contested by key theorists working in the field. We also find that the originality of the turn can be exaggerated, with many of their ideas found in more traditional animal ethics. Nonetheless, we identify one unifying and distinctive feature of these contributions: the focus on justice; and specifically, the exploration of how political institutions, structures and processes might be transformed so as to secure justice for both human and nonhuman animals.     

The Personal Vote and the Efficacy of Education Spending

In this article we explore the ways in which incentives to cultivate a personal vote affect the efficiency of education spending in developing democracies. We argue that where the electoral system provides incentives for political particularism, resources are allocated less efficiently and the effect of increased spending on literacy is diminished. We test our hypotheses using data on education spending and performance in over 40 developing democracies since 1980. We find that though personal vote systems spend just as much on education as party vote systems, particularism in personal vote systems dampens the marginal effect of increased education spending on illiteracy and at its highest levels, incentives to cultivate a personal vote completely undermine the positive effects of increased education spending on literacy.     

The Time to Give: PAC Motivations and Electoral Timing

There has been much discussion about how members of Congressdesire money early in the campaign season. However, theoreticalmodels of how contributions are allocated during the electoralcycle have been lacking. Our analysis attempts to remedy thisgap by providing and testing a model which specifies how theprocess of bargaining between members of Congress and organizedinterests produces the pattern of donations observed over thecourse of the electoral cycle. Most notably, our results suggestthat strategic incumbents can receive money early in the campaignif they desire but that they are generally unwilling to paythe price of lower aggregate fundraising and greater provisionof access. These findings buttress earlier empirical findingsthat question the instrumental value of early money. In addition,our results highlight that contribution choices are fundamentallyinfluenced by short-term factors, especially electoral conditions,that do not lend themselves to the routinized behavior necessaryfor contributors to invest in incumbents for long-run payoffs.     

Type of education and voter turnout – Evidence from a register-based panel

The relationship between education length and voter turnout has been one of the most studied in the political participation literature in recent decades. However, few studies focus on education type, and most of the existing research on this topic relies on cross-sectional data. In the current study, we utilize a large register-based panel dataset to investigate the effect of education type. We find no effects of education type when investigating overall types of education, but we find substantial effects when examining a specific type of education program with a particularly high civic content.     

Corporate lobbying and political contributions and their effects on tax avoidance

This study looks at the impact of U.S. lobbying and political contributions on taxes avoided by U.S. publicly traded corporations. Previous research provides mixed conclusions about the effects when examined separately. Looking at political contributions and lobbying contributions simultaneously displays the larger picture. I find that lobbying expenditures and political contributions both lead to lower future taxes, but those political contributions are more effective in reducing taxes paid from what would be expected given the federal statutory rate. This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it provides empirical evidence on the positive effects of lobbying contributions and political contributions on taxes avoided. Second, the results of this study are particularly useful for future research following the U.S. Citizens United ruling that affects corporate lobbying and political contributions. Third, differing from previous research, I build a simultaneous equation model to jointly determine the link among lobbying contributions, political contributions, and taxes avoided addressing the endogeneity issues of those relationships. These insights can help firms, policy makers, and public affairs researchers understand the connection between contributions and tax avoidance.