Urban Citizenship: Campaigns to Restore Immigrant Voting Rights in the US

International migration challenges traditional notions of citizenship as mobile citizens may retain or regain their right to vote in elections. This article examines the rebirth of noncitizen voting rights in US local elections during the past decades. While some campaigns provide voting rights only to authorized immigrants, other campaigns extend voting rights to all noncitizens regardless of their status. Some efforts have been led by immigrant rights organizations and other campaigns arose at the initiative of elected officials. Some measures have been passed—or were defeated—by a majority of voters in a jurisdiction (ballot proposal) while other measures have been passed—or were defeated—by elected representatives (as local statutes). Who spearheaded these campaigns for immigrant voting rights and why? What are key ingredients to the success or failure of these campaigns? What have been their impacts? Using qualitative and quantitative data gathered from field research and public records over the past decade, this article addresses these questions and their implications for advancing immigrant incorporation and democratic practice.     

Businessman Candidates

Why and when do businessmen run for public office rather than rely upon other means of influence? What are the implications of their participation for public policy? We show formally that “businessman candidacy” and public policy are jointly determined by the institutional environment. When institutions that hold elected officials accountable to voters are strong, businessmen receive little preferential treatment and are disinclined to run for office. When such institutions are weak, businessmen can subvert policy irrespective of whether they hold office, but they may run for office to avoid the cost of lobbying elected officials. Evidence from Russian gubernatorial elections supports the model's predictions. Businessman candidates emerge in regions with low media freedom and government transparency, institutions that raise the cost of reneging on campaign promises. Among regions with weaker institutions, professional politicians crowd out businessmen when the rents from office are especially large.     

Does microtargeting matter? Campaign contact strategies and young voters

In recent elections, campaigns have based their contact decisions on individual microtargeted propensity scores generated using “Big Data” rather than the more traditional geographic-based contacting. Shifts in campaign strategy have implications for who is contacted and ultimately who participates in elections. As campaigns focus more of their outreach towards individuals who the data indicate are more likely to turn out and more likely to vote for their candidate, some groups may be systematically excluded from contact. We investigate this using voter files and survey data from the 2012 US elections to compare who the Republicans identified for campaign contact using microtargeted propensity scores and who would have been identified for contact if they used a strictly geographic-based approach. Our findings suggest that young people are much less likely to be designated for contact when campaigns rely on microtargeted data than older individuals, the latter of whom are more likely to be contacted under both geographic and microtargeting strategies.     

Voter Learning in State Primary Elections

When voters learn about candidates' issue positions during election campaigns, does it affect how they vote? This basic question about voters remains unanswered in part because of a methodological obstacle: learning candidates' issue positions may influence not only voters' vote choice but also their issue positions. To surmount this obstacle, we attempt to answer this question by examining statewide primary elections, which are arguably less vulnerable to this reverse causation problem because they lack partisan cues and are of much lower salience than presidential elections. Using both existing polling data and our own panel Internet surveys, we find that voters learn about the ideologies of candidates during statewide primary campaigns and that this learning affects their voting decisions in senate and gubernatorial primaries. We fail to find similar results for down‐ballot primaries, raising questions about voters' ability to make informed judgments for these types of elections.     

Exploring the Basis of Declining Party Membership in Denmark: A Scandinavian Comparison*

Short-term changes in party membership figures have hypothetically been attributed to a connection between electoral success and membership effort. In the long-term, however, mass party organizations may be doomed to oudive themselves, since elections can be won by utilizing modern mass media techniques. Both assertions could more easily be falsified than confirmed in my study of Scandinavian party membership. After World War II. party membership in Scandinavia has steadily been increasing, except in Denmark where membership has continuously shrunk. Findings show that most rank-and-file party members are superfluous in electoral campaigns. But Die main function of party members is no longer campaigning. Instead, they are holding seats in a multitude of municipal councils, boards, and committees. This change is made possible mainly by two factors public party subsidies and the politicization of municipal elections. The causal link between these two factors is, however, not mechanical. Instead it depends on how many public subsidies are offered, the platforms of parties, and the number of seats needed in running the municipalities. In Denmark, public subsidies are unheard of and expensive public elections are held at least annually. Also, the number of supplied seats are few. Thus, if costs are high and rewards are few, then a membership decline is probable.     

Digital Election Observation: Regulatory Challenges around Legal Online Content

Between public debates about ‘hacking’ elections, so-called ‘fake news’ and online disinformation campaigns, it has become hard to imagine what free and fair elections in a digital environment could look like. This challenge is particularly pronounced for election observers who monitor free and fair elections. How should election observers fulfil this task when reliable data in online media campaigns are often not even available to media regulators? The following article provides a brief overview of existing challenges around online content regulation and how these apply to elections and election observation. It then considers where resources for digital electoral observation exist and how most effectively to build on these before, in conclusion, discussing next steps and potential opportunities to develop digital election observation further.     

A Comparative Analysis of Political Communication Systems and Voter Turnout

This article explores how political communication institutions affect cross-national differences in voter turnout in democratic elections. It demonstrates how the structure and means of conveying political messages—gauged by media systems, access to paid political television advertising, and campaign finance laws—explain variations in turnout across 74 countries. Relying on a "mobilization" perspective, I argue that institutional settings that reduce information costs for voters will increase turnout. The major empirical findings are twofold. First, campaign finance systems that allow more money (and electioneering communication) to enter election campaigns are associated with higher levels of voter turnout. Second, broadcasting systems and access to paid political television advertising explain cross-national variation in turnout, but their effects are more complex than initially expected. While public broadcasting clearly promotes higher levels of turnout, it also modifies the effect of paid advertising access on turnout.     

Cycles in senatorial voting behavior: implications for the optimal frequency of elections

The effect that the length of electoral periods has on the behavior of elected officials is examined. The hypothesis is that the longer the period between elections the less responsible or the more independent representatives will behave relative to the desires of their polity. The hypothesis is tested by examining the behavior of U.S. Senators. It is found that their independence follows a cyclical behavior which conforms to the electoral period. As a result it is by no means clear that decreasing the frequency of elections reduces the cost of elections. The effect of this independence cost on the optimal frequency of elections is discussed.     

The Influence of News Media on Political Elites: Investigating Strategic Responsiveness in Congress

News media play a central role in democratic politics, yet we know little about how media affect the behavior of policy makers. To understand the conditions under which news media influence political elites, we advance a theory of strategic responsiveness, which contends that elected representatives are more likely to heed their constituents' preferences when voters are attentive. Accordingly, news media's influence on legislative behavior should be most apparent near elections and dependent on the partisan composition of the constituency. We capitalize on the incremental rollout of the conservative Fox News Channel in the late 1990s to evaluate our theoretical predictions. Fox News caused both Republicans and Democrats in Congress to increase support for the Republican Party position on divisive votes, but only in the waning months of the election cycle and among those members who represent districts with a sizable portion of Republican voters.     

Negative campaigns,interpersonal trust,and prosocial behavior: The mediating effect of democratic experience

Previous studies of negative election campaigns have not addressed the possible effects of campaign environments on interpersonal trust and prosocial behavior between voters. We provide the first evidence of these effects through an incentivized lab experiment conducted among student subjects in Egypt in 2014 and in the United States in between 2016 and 2018. This comparison allows us to tease out the mediating effect of subjects’ prior experience with competitive elections. In our Egypt experiment, trust in other voters significantly decreased (by 15%) when voters were primed with a negative personality campaign as compared to a neutral baseline. Interpersonal trust also decreased in negative policy campaigns (by 8%). Among US subjects however, such effects do not materialize. Our explanation of these divergent outcomes is that the priming effect of negative election campaigns on interpersonal trust takes place when the experience of competitive elections is still quite new.     

When is buying votes wrong?

In modern liberal democracies, offering individual voters in political elections money for their votes is wrong and illegal; offering groups of voters particular benefits in exchange for their votes is constitutionally protected. Voters do not sell their votes; instead, voters assign their votes to legislative representatives who sell or trade for them.Examining the role of coalition costs in political and corporate elections, we argue that these rules protect voters from themselves, from being compelled to approve proposals that leave them individually worse off. Simultaneously, these rules allow voters to seek particular benefits through collective organization and legislative representation.     

The Changing Nature … and Costs … of Election Administration

Changes during the last decade have significantly altered the nature of election administration and driven up its costs. Interviews with practitioner representatives from the elections community reveal a number of issues that continue to influence this field. Expense data from two counties illustrate how policy changes affect election costs. Scheduled ending of federal funding threatens a “perfect storm” in election finance that may undermine hard‐won advances from 2000 to 2010. Possible cost reduction measures as well as critical challenges facing election administration are forecast for 2010 and the years ahead.     

Democracy for all: restoring immigrant voting rights in the US

This paper examines the politics of noncitizen voting in the United States. It is not widely known that noncitizens currently vote in local elections in Maryland and in Chicago; nor that over the past decade campaigns to expand the franchise to noncitizens have been launched in at least a dozen other jurisdictions from coast to coast. These practices have their roots in another little known fact: for most of the country's history—from the founding until the 1920s—noncitizens voted in 22 states and federal territories in local, state and even federal elections, and also held public office such as alderman, coroner, and school board member. This paper presents arguments for (and against) noncitizen voting rights, and examines contemporary political organizations and actors who fought for and won (or lost) campaigns to reinstate noncitizen voting. The paper explores the politics of recent campaigns that successfully reestablished noncitizen voting, that are currently underway, and other campaigns that failed. The paper argues that an expansion of immigrant voting rights could boost possibilities for working‐class electoral coalitions and progressive politics.     

The Enduring Effects of Competitive Elections

Research on U.S. congressional elections has placed great emphasis on the role of competitiveness, which is associated with high levels of campaign spending, media coverage, and interest group and party involvement. Competitive campaigns have been found to increase citizens' participation, engagement and learning. However, little is known about whether the effects of competitive campaigns have enduring consequences for citizens' attitudes and behavior. Analyzing a survey of citizens conducted one year after the 2006 congressional elections that includes an oversample of respondents from competitive House races, we examine whether exposure to a competitive House campaign affects voters' political knowledge and political interest as well as their consumption of political news. We find that competitive elections have positive effects that endure for at least a year beyond the campaign season, reinforcing the idea that political competition plays a robust role in American representative democracy.     

Campaign civility under preferential and plurality voting

We present reasons to expect that campaigns are less negative under preferential voting. We then examine if preferential voting systems affect how people perceive the conduct of elections. This paper reports results from surveys designed to measure voters‘ perceptions of candidates’ campaigns, comparing places with plurality elections to those that used preferential voting rules. Our surveys of voters indicate that people in cities using preferential voting were significantly more satisfied with the conduct of local campaigns than people in similar cities with plurality elections. People in cities with preferential voting were also less likely to view campaigns as negative, and less likely to respond that candidates were frequently criticizing each other. Results are consistent across a series of robustness checks.     

Late-deciding voters in presidential elections

This article examines the behavior of voters who decide on their presidential candidate preferences within the final two weeks of the presidential campaigns. Relying on data from American National Election Studies (ANES) for elections, between 1972 and 1988, we demonstrate that late deciders are different from other voters in a variety of respects. They are less involved politically and far less predictable in their behavior than other voters. More significantly, we find that the candidate preferences of late deciders are not determined by the conventional political forces that motivate other voters. Rather, the choices that late deciders make appear to be nearly random in character. The implications of these findings for the analysis of electorates are discussed.     

Do parties respond strategically to opinion polls? Evidence from campaign statements

This article investigates how parties respond to polling results on the campaign trail. I argue that parties use pre-election polls as mobilization and fine-tuning devices. Opinion surveys that exceed expectations can be exploited to mobilize the party base. Disappointing polls, in turn, are publicly downplayed and criticized. However, this information can be used to refine campaign strategies. Parties underperforming in the polls have incentives to emphasize their own policy positions and to attack other parties. These arguments are supported by evidence from 2140 campaign statements by Portuguese party leaders over two elections, combined with polling results. The findings suggest that parties carefully adjust their campaign rhetoric in response to public opinion signals. The study contributes to research on elite behavior and political representation. Moreover, it shows how research on campaign effects can benefit from a closer attention to the supply-side of campaigns.     

Public campaign financing and the rise of radical-right parties

While public campaign financing is often thought of as a way to “level the playing field” of elections, I argue that such policies may have unintended second-order consequences. Namely, that increasing the degree to which public funding drives political campaigns disproportionately aids radical-right parties. This is a counter-intuitive result, as public financing of elections has recently become an important issue for those on the political left as a method to restore power to the majority. Rather, it seems to aid not only those on the right, but those on the political fringe. Through a cross-national analysis of 328 lower-house elections in 20 advanced democracies, I demonstrate that public financing serves to significantly increase vote-share of the radical-right.     

Endogenous Credible Commitment and Party Competition over Redistribution under Alternative Electoral Institutions

Political parties competing in elections for the power to set public policy face the problem of making credible their policy promises to voters. I argue that this commitment problem crucially shapes party competition over redistribution. The model I develop shows that under majoritarian electoral rules, parties' efforts to achieve endogenous commitment to policies preferred by the middle class lead to different behavior and outcomes than suggested by existing theories, which either assume commitment or rule out endogenous commitment. Thus, left parties can have incentives to respond to rising income inequality by moving to the right in majoritarian systems but not under proportional representation. The model also generates new insights about the anti‐left electoral bias often attributed to majoritarian electoral rules, and the strategic use of parliamentary candidates as a commitment device. I find evidence for key implications of this logic using panel data on party positions in 16 parliamentary democracies.     

Voting by proxy

I introduce voting by proxy for constructing and operating legislatures, and then compare it to direct representation, plurality, and single transferable vote (STV), which voting by proxy most closely resembles. When each voter uses voting by proxy to select his proxy among given legislators and elections are costless, voting by proxy maximizes the legislature's representation of the voting population. When each voter uses preferential voting by proxy, selecting a proxy during the vote count as well as a proxy in the legislature, and some ancillary rules are followed, I find that voting by proxy dominates STV and offers favorable tradeoffs against plurality. It improves representation and constituent service; eliminates gerrymandering; improves voter turnout; ranks the legislature's representatives by the proxies they hold rather than seniority; creates tighter representative-constituent links that lead to better informed voters, reducing the influence of special interests; and eliminates primary and runoff elections. Extra costs associated with its relative complexity or better representation can be made small.