基于资本特征的银行公司治理分析

银行的资本特征决定了资本利益相关者的存在.因此,银行公司治理的目标不仅要保护投资者的利益,还要关注债权人、外部市场、监管者等利益相关者的利益诉求.银行资本结构的特殊性、资本与资产风险的匹配、严格的资本监管和多重的资本约束关系等对银行公司治理机制产生重要影响.建立健全的银行公司治理机制,应以内部治理机制为核心,既要加强董事会和经营层的决策和监督机制,更要重视完善内部风险管理和激励约束机制,并要使资本监管在银行公司治理中发挥重要作用.     

构建中国多元化公司治理结构新模式

<正>公司治理,事关公司诚信有序的管理与运营;事关公司内外多方主体利益的保障与维护;事关资本市场的监管与完善;事关公司在国内外市场中的竞争能力。而公司治理结构,则为一切公司治理机制的设定与运行的基础与框架,乃公司治理课题下的核心问题与焦点所在。     

资本市场开放对公司治理的影响

本文从融资和并购两个方面分析了资本市场开放对公司治理的影响。中国资本市场的开放将会给我国公司治理带来积极的影响,包括:股权的多元化,信息披露制度的完善和监管制度的完善。     

资本市场开放对公司治理的影响

本文从融资和并购两个方面分析了资本市场开放对公司治理的影响。文中认为中国资本市场的开放将会给我国公司治理带来积极的影响,包括:股权的多元化,信息披露制度的完善和监管制度的完善。     

两大法系公司治理模式的比较分析与我国公司治理立法模式的选择

一、两大法系国家公司治理模式的特点 1．英美市场导向型公司治理模式特点 英美国家公司治理模式的机制特点：（1）企业融资以股权为主，债权为辅，资产负债率较低。较之德日而言，美国的证券市场相对较发达，并在企业融资中起到重要作用，企业资产主要来源于股权。（2）市场导向型治理机制侧重于资本市场和经理市场的外部约束。与公司资本结构的股权资本为主和股权高度分散化相适应，美国的公司治理更加注重通过外部控制实现对企业的经营者的治理。     

公司法改革中的公司设立制度

目前．中国正在对现行公司法进行较全面的修改。这是根据市场经济发展需要完善商事立法的一个重大举措。目前正在讨论中的公司法修改草案．反映了中国公司法改革的如下基本路向：改善公司设立制度，鼓励社会投资；完善公司法人治理结构，保障股东和债权人合法权益；规范上市公司治理和公司融资，发展资本市场；完善公司合并、分立和清算制度，便利产权流动。其中，公司设立制度的改革与中国的市场开放密切相关，是值得海内外投资者关注的问题。     

金融创新视域下的公司治理——公司法制结构性变革的一个前瞻性分析

金融创新的日新月异使金融法和公司法出现了交错,并给公司法制的结构性变革描绘了全新的图景:在公司融资方面,证券市场将成为重要的资本来源地,直接融资取得主导地位;在股权结构方面,机构投资者将异军突起,不但成为资本市场的稳定力量,而且促使股权结构趋于合理;在投资者保护方面,混合金融商品将给投资者利益保护添加难度,金融商品的风险隔离机制与投资者的诉讼救济机制将得到完善;在公司监管方面,金融商品的统合规制将是大势所趋;公司主体方面,对冲基金、私募基金等规制与监管将会成为焦点。在金融创新滚滚洪流的不断冲击之下,中国公司法制同样需要放弃对公司人情伦理、自我治理机制及自我实现型公司法的一厢情愿式的迷恋,构建起内外有效监控的现代公司治理模式。     

论公司治理对内部资本市场的影响

本文通过对国内外公司治理研究文献的述评,着重分析公司治理与内部资本市场的关系,公司治理对内部资本市场效率会产生怎样的影响。     

论我国公司治理机制的完善

公司作为市场运行中不可缺少的角色,已成为中国经济社会发展的重要动力,成为中国参与世界市场竞争的核心载体.因此完善的公司治理机制不仅是公司增强竞争力的制度保障,而且也是现代市场经济发展和证券市场良好的运行的基础,本文针对我国目前公司治理中存在的问题,提出了完善公司治理的一些建议.     

公司表决权例外排除制度研究

公司表决权例外排除制度包括股东表决权例外排除制度和董事表决权例外排除制度,是指当股东(大)会(董事会)表决的决议事项与某一或某些股东(董事)存在特别利害关系时,这些股东(董事)或其代理人不能以其所持表决权参与表决的一种法律制度。作为矫正失衡的股东利益关系,防止控制股股东、公司“内部人”滥用资本多数决和控制权,完善公司法人治理结构,激活股东(大)会制度、董事会制度的一种表决权行使机制,与表决权限制制度不同,公司表决权例外排除制度有其独特的价值取向和行使规则。我国公司法对此一制度予以借鉴和移植,将对完善公司内部治理结构,保护中小股东利益,促进公司经营的稳定,甚至对推动我国资本市场的理性运作等均具有重要的理论与实践指导意义。     

交易制度改革语境下协议转让功能及其构造

协议转让是以意思自治为本质之资本市场重要证券交易制度,其具有制度生成功能、完善公司治理功能、社会资源整合和配置优化功能、全球化和市场化背景下的经济品质提升和制度发展促进功能.由于我国证券法制的局限和国家政策因素影响,协议转让规则体系存在很大局限性,制度供给不足,违反了平等性要求,法律规定不足和市场机制缺陷交织.这都制约着协议转让功能的发挥.未来要以金融市场化为基础,贯彻利益平衡原则和效率原则,建立符合中国国情和国际法治要求的协议转让制度.     

公司治理中职工参与制度探析

公司治理中的职工参与是我国建立现代企业制度的一个重要课题。在传统的公司治理理论中，股东是公司唯一的统治，公司的目标定位是股东利益的最大化。而职工参与作为现代公司治理结构的特点之一，在我国有着更为重要的现实意义。管理参与作为职工参与的方式之一，是社会主义市场经济的应有之义，我们不能听任其随着国有经济成分的下降而弱化；股权参与作为职工参与的所有权根据，是保障职工地位的更有效的制度保证，更有推行的迫切需要。     

职代会的定位与功能重塑

职代会制度是我国颇具特色的一项职工参与制度。随着市场经济体制的建立以及企业治理制度的变革，职代会的地位和作用发生了变化，需要重新审视职代会的正当性。目前，有关职工参与的各种理论从不同角度论证了职代会的正当性，职代会对完善公司治理、加强公司监督、维护公司利益也具有积极作用。我国应通过完善职代会设立规则、职权设置，使传统的职代会与市场经济体制下的现代公司治理机制相契合，让职代会成为职工与企业协商沟通的主要平台，在新的体制环境下发挥协商和监督等功能。     

Constitutionalising the Market,Marketising the Constitution,and to Tell the Difference: On the Horizontal Application of the Free Movement Provisions in EU Law

Ever since the Court's judgment in Walrave, there has been a concerted effort in caselaw and doctrine to limit the horizontal direct effect of free movement provisions to exceptional circumstances. This article suggests that this effort has always been incoherent, and is simply untenable after Viking and Laval. The implications are far reaching, especially in the sphere of the free movement of capital and corporate governance where the Court is well on its way of imposing a model of shareholder primacy on European company law. Full direct horizontal effect will also have important repercussions for private law and its ability to resolve conflicts between economic freedoms and fundamental rights. Given the nature of the free movement provisions, their horizontal effect will sometimes lead to a constitutionalised market and sometimes to a marketised constitution, without there being any principled way of distinguishing between the two. In that light, horizontal direct effect is very unlikely to enhance the effectiveness of internal market law—whichever model of the social market economy it is thought to embody—and is best abandoned.     

Corporate governance of Chinese state-controlled listed companies: Evidence from the exit of Chinese domestic venture capital

The existing literature on the corporate governance of Chinese state-controlled listed companies (SCLCs) focuses more on agency costs. There is inadequate attention being paid to its adaptive efficiency through the standard of venture capital (VC). This paper tries to fill this gap on the basis of the evidence from the exit of Chinese domestic VCs. The existing research has proved that the availability of stock market as an exit is essential for the vitality of a country’s VC industry. Unfortunately, with the institutional barriers imposed by the control-based model of the SCLCs, the exit ways of Chinese domestic VCs via stock market are still uneven. The implication from this study is that adaptive efficiency and agency costs are equally important factors which ought to be considered when any reform proposals for the corporate governance of the SCLCs are put forward. While either of the two factors is neglected in this process, the overall efficiency is to be jeopardized.     

公司股东抽逃出资的法律制裁及完善

随着我国社会主义市场经济的不断发展．作为市场经济重要参与主体之一的公司也在其中发挥着重要作用。公司资本是公司财产的重要组成部分,是公司具有法人人格最基础的物质基础,是维护公司对外交易安全、股东、债权人以及公司等合法权益的重要保证。对公司而言．股东出资是公司成立和存续的物质基础,是公司资本形成的最基本途径。然而,股东抽逃出资是公司治理中较为普遍的现象。本文在对股东抽逃出资内涵界定的基础上,对其法律制裁措施的不足、成因以及出路做以探讨,以期为完善股东抽逃出资的法律制裁措施提供参考。     

Ownership structure, regulation and the market for corporate control in the EU banking sector

This paper analyzes the efficiency of shareholder control and hostile takeovers as corporate governance mechanisms in the EU banking sector against the background of the existing corporate governance regulations and different ownership structures of banks in the EU. The results indicate the there is trade-off in EU corporate governance regulation between better investor protection and a higher efficiency of the market for corporate control. The main problem is differences in the ownership structure of banks in the EU banking sector. This implies that EU corporate governance regulations should be customized to the specific ownership structure of banks and not toward harmonising national regulations.     

'New Governance' in European Corporate Law Regulation as Transnational Legal Pluralism

The present transformation of European corporate governance regulation mirrors the challenges that have been facing the EU's continuously evolving polity, marked by tensions between centralised integration programmes, on the one hand, and Member State's embedded capitalisms, path-dependencies and rent-seeking, on the other. As longstanding concerns with remaining obstacles to more mobility for workers, services, business entities and capital in recent years are aligned with post-Lisbon commitments to creating the world's leading competitive market, European corporate governance regulation (ECGR) has become exposed to and implicated in a set of highly dynamic regulatory experiments. In this context, 'New Governance' offers itself as both a tentative label and immodest proposal for a more responsive and innovative approach to European law making. The following article assesses the recently emerging regulatory forms in ECGR as illustrations of far-reaching transformations in market governance. The arguable parallels between the EU's regulatory transformation in response to growing legitimacy concerns and the recurring question about whose interests a business corporation is intended to serve, provide the framework for an exploration of current regulatory trajectories in European corporate law that can most adequately be understood as a telling example of transnational legal pluralism.     

Recent developments in German corporate governance

This paper provides an overview of the German corporate governance system. We review the governance role of large shareholders, creditors, the product market and the supervisory board. We also discuss the importance of mergers and acquisitions, the market in block trades, and the lack of a hostile takeover market. Given that Germany is often referred to as a bank-based economy, we pay particular attention to the role of the universal banks (Hausbanken). We show that the German system is characterised by a market for partial corporate control, large shareholders and bank/creditor monitoring, a two-tier (management and supervisory) board with co-determination between shareholders and employees on the supervisory board, a disciplinary product–market, and corporate governance regulation largely based on EU directives but with deep roots in the German codes and legal doctrine. Another important feature of the German system is its corporate governance efficiency criterion which is focused on the maximisation of stakeholder value rather than shareholder value. However, the German corporate governance system has experienced many important changes over the last decade. First, the relationship between ownership or control concentration and profitability has changed over time. Second, the pay-for-performance relation is influenced by large shareholder control: in firms with controlling blockholders and when a universal bank is simultaneously an equity- and debtholder, the pay-for-performance relation is lower than in widely held firms or blockholder-controlled firms. Third, since 1995 several major regulatory initiatives (including voluntary codes) have increased transparency and accountability.     

盲目照搬还是尊重国情——对当前《公司法》修改中几个问题的反思

With respect to the current amendments to the Company Law, a balance shall be reached between the freedom and compulsion. In the current legal environment of China, it is improper for corporate legislation to adopt the authorized or eclectic capital system, and adequate amendments shall be made to the existing statutory capital system. The independent director regime conflicts with the current corporate governance structure. On the contrary, the enhancement of the legal status of the board of supervisors and the expansion of its authority are the ongoing direction in the reform of the supervisory mechanism in the corporate governance structure of China. The amendments to the Company Law shall separate the corporate legislation and the ruling of state-owned enterprises reform, hence enabling the corporate law back to the nature of private law and neutrality. The Company Law shall be amended to provide for one-person companies and eliminate wholly state-owned companies.