Die Dividende der Demokratie: Politische Herrschaft und gesamtwirtschaftliche Produktivität

In social sciences exists a broad consensus about the impact of political institutions on economic development. There is dissent, however, about the influence of democratic order on economic performance. Based on arguments from economic institutionalism, this paper argues that democracy has a significant and positive impact on productivity growth. In contrast to autocratic order, democratic systems can be interpreted as a competition-friendly regulation of a natural monopoly, which results in comparatively high productivity gains. This hypothesis is tested for a sample of 81 countries for the 1975–2000 period. Different regression models provide empirical support for the assumption that increasing levels of democracy produce a productivity dividend.     

The Paradox of Integration: Habermas and the Unfinished Project of European Union

In a recent article Jürgen Habermas (1999) highlighted the potential for the European Union to act as a vehicle for the extension of democratic governance beyond the nation state, a project aimed at limiting the socially corrosive impact of globalisation. Yet this position appears paradoxical as the European Union itself exacerbates a major aspect of globalisation: the emasculation of national parliaments known as the 'democratic deficit'. This paradox can be understood by analysing the dynamics of post-war European integration through the lens of Habermasian social theory: EU evolution can lead either to the colonisation of the lifeworld by market and administrative subsystems (as with the democratic deficit), or to a process of lifeworld rationalisation conducive to pan-European solidarity and democracy. The latter of these tendencies could be encouraged through 'procedural democracy': this would institutionalise the conditions by which independent associations in European civil society, channelling their 'communicative power' through parliament, might reassert control over the two subsystems. In order to retain legitimacy, procedural EU democracy would have to link existing legislatures to the European Parliament, while citizenship would combine national and civic components. Hence the European Union would be more able than the nation-state to combine universal notions of justice with ethical pluralism.     

Economic Democracy: The Left's Big Idea for the Twenty-First Century?

While the notion that parts of the economy should be subject to democratic oversight is not particularly new, it is only recently that the term “economic democracy” has begun to emerge as a political label and a political project in its own right. Interest in economic democracy is at a historical high as more and more people search for a comprehensive alternative to neoliberal capitalism that is neither state socialism nor social democracy. In addition, the fact that mainstream concern with economic inequality is at a historical peak means that economic arrangements are on the political agenda in a way that they have not been for many years. The central argument of this article is that economic democracy has the potential to be the “big idea” of the left this century for two main reasons. First, although economic democracy is usually thought to be concerned solely with workplaces, in fact it has implications far beyond this. Indeed, economic democracy is best understood as a comprehensive critique of the economy and a corresponding encompassing vision of an alternative. This article thus aims to offer a sympathetic overview of the main facets of economic democracy—the attempt to democratize workplaces, finance, investment, and the market system—as a holistic and integrative project. Second, economic democracy offers an important method for challenging inequality. The expansion of democratic accountability through representation, and particularly the expansion of opportunity for direct participation in economic decision-making is a fundamentally important method of redressing the structural inequality that continues to be a defining dilemma of our societies.     

Democracy in crisis? The declining support for national democracy in European countries, 2007–2011

The Great Recession that started in 2007/2008 has been the worst economic downturn since the crisis of the 1930s in Europe. It led to a major sovereign debt crisis, which is arguably the biggest challenge for the European Union (EU) and its common currency. Not since the 1950s have advanced democracies experienced such a dramatic external imposition of austerity and structural reform policies through inter‐ or supranational organisations such as the EU and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or as implicitly requested by international financial markets. Did this massive interference with the room for maneuver of parliaments and governments in many countries erode support for national democracy in the crisis since 2007? Did citizens realise that their national democratic institutions were no longer able to effectively decide on major economic and social policies, on economic and welfare state institutions? And did they react by concluding that this constrained democracy no longer merited further support? These are the questions guiding this article, which compares 26 EU countries in 2007–2011 and re‐analyses 78 national surveys. Aggregate data from these surveys is analysed in a time‐series cross‐section design to examine changes in democratic support at the country level. The hypotheses also are tested at the individual level by estimating a series of cross‐classified multilevel logistic regression models. Support for national democracy – operationalised as satisfaction with the way democracy works and as trust in parliament – declined dramatically during the crisis. This was caused both by international organisations and markets interfering with national democratic procedures and by the deteriorating situation of the national economy as perceived by individual citizens.     

Human Rights Politics and Injustice: Transitional Justice in Argentina and South Africa

Transitional justice is about the recovery of the rule of lawand justice after mass violence. In the recent history of Argentinaand South Africa, human rights politics have played an importantrole in the transition from repression to democracy as a discourseof resistance to state repression and as a framework and methodologyfor the successor state to manage demands for justice and promotereconciliation. Post-transition, they have provided a standardfor the accountability of state institutions and evaluationof the democratic government's performance. In this article,we explore the roles of victims, survivors and relatives inthe expansion of human rights politics. We argue that victimsrepresent their suffering as embodied injustice and make theirvictim identity the focus of efforts to recover a moral contractbetween state and citizens. The expansion of human rights politicsto include social and economic rights is an expression of thelimits of transitional justice in recovering full citizenshipin the context of the neo-liberal democratic project in Argentinaand South Africa.     

Economic Crisis and Support for Democracy in Europe

The study of the impact of the economic crisis on attitudes toward democracy tends to be focused on satisfaction with specific democratic institutions. This article expands upon previous research to explore how the current economic crisis can affect core support for democracy as a regime. Based on European Social Survey data for the Eurozone countries, the findings are twofold. It is shown, firstly, that perceptions of the state of the economy have an impact both on satisfaction with and support for democracy, and, secondly, that citizens’ support for democracy is greater in bailed-out countries. In countries that have experienced intervention, the more critical citizens and those less satisfied with the outputs of democracy are the stronger advocates of democracy. The article argues that this is connected with the tendency of critical citizens in bailed-out countries to blame external agents for the economic situation while increasing the saliency of democratic rules as a reaction to the imposition of unpopular measures.     

Sustainable local democracy

To identify what is needed to sustain local democracy we need a model of democratic government and an idea of the kind of social and economic context that is supportive of democracy. Local democracy requires a combination of a liberal democratic model of local government and the prerequisites of democratic stability: economic development, equality, political culture and the development of civil society. However, a number of factors, non-local as well as local, may undermine local government and local democracy, especially centralization, economic decisions, external conflicts, dependency on civil servants, the dilution of elected representation, formalistic participation, skewed representation, class conflict and official attitudes. However, democratic local government can contribute to economic development, the reduction of inequality, a democratic political culture and the development of civil society, thereby strengthening local democracy.     

Global governance and communicative action: a study of democratic participation during planning for the Lyon–Turin rail link

Organisation–stakeholder engagement during planning of a high‐speed rail link between France and Italy is described and analysed in this paper. Conceptualising organisation–citizen engagement as a form of deliberative democracy, the study's theoretical framework draws upon literature from communication, social and political science. Following a review of governance for transnational organisation–stakeholder engagement, communication methods used by one transnational organisation, Lyon‐Turin Ferroviaire (LTF), to engage in ‘discursive legitimacy’ with affected parties, is studied. A qualitative case study approach examines whether LTF's engagement with stakeholders provides opportunities for democratic participation rather than creating a democratic deficit in the public sphere. Results point to a lack of mechanisms through which transnational policy makers can be held accountable‐leading in this case, to a legitimacy crisis for institutions involved, threatening their ability to justify the economic and transportation viability of the project. This article is of interest to academics in communication and social sciences, managers working in an international context and communication professionals. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Pragmatism and Radical Democracy

Abstract

This paper suggests that pragmatism makes a distinctive contribution to the theory and practice of radical democracy. It investigates the relation ship between the renewal of interest in pragmatism and the recent attempts to develop radical democratic alternatives to political liberalism. With particular reference to the contemporary critical social theory of Habermas and Honneth, the paper outlines key dimensions of the civic republican, deliberative democratic and reflexive cooperative reconstructions of John Dewey's conception of democracy. These reconstructions are shown to have explicated important pragmatist insights concerning public participation in civic associations, the discursive practices of deliberation, and the cooperative organization of the division of labour. However, it is argued that each of these reconstructions pre suppose some facet of the additional pragmatist understanding of the creativity of action and that the most distinctive contributions of pragmatism to radical democratic theory and practice derive from a notion of democracy as instituted and emergent meaning.     

Hayekian Political Economy and the Limits of Deliberative Democracy

Inspired by Habermasian critiques of liberalism, supporters of deliberative democracy seek an extension of social democratic institutions to further a reinvigorated communicative rationality against the 'atomism' of market processes. This paper offers a critique of deliberative democratic theory from a Hayekian perspective. For Hayek, the case against the social democratic state rests with the superior capacity of markets to extend communicative rationality beyond the realm of verbal discourse.     

Trust Your Compatriots, but Count Your Change: The Roles of Trust, Mistrust and Distrust in Democracy

Although trust is clearly central to human relations of all kinds, it is less clear whether there is a role for trust in democratic politics. In this article, I argue that trust is central to democratic institutions as well as to democratic political participation, and that arguments which make distrust the central element of democracy fail. First, I argue for the centrality of trust to the democratic process. The voluntary compliance that is central to democracies relies on trust, along two dimensions: citizens must trust their legislators to have the national interest in mind and citizens must trust each other to abide by democratically established laws. Second, I refute arguments that place distrust at the centre of democratic institutions. I argue, instead, that citizens must be vigilant with respect to their legislators and fellow citizens; that is, they must be willing to ensure that the institutions are working fairly and that people continue to abide by shared regulations. This vigilance – which is reflected both in a set of institutions as well as an active citizenry – is motivated by an attitude termed 'mistrust'. Mistrust is a cautious attitude that propels citizens to maintain a watchful eye on the political and social happenings within their communities. Moreover, mistrust depends on trust: we trust fellow citizens to monitor for abuses of our own rights and privileges just as we monitor for abuses of their rights and privileges. Finally, I argue that distrust is inimical to democracy. We are, consequently, right to worry about widespread reports of trust's decline. Just as distrust is harmful to human relations of all kinds, and just as trust is central to positive human relations of all kinds, so is distrust inimical to democracy and trust central to its flourishing.     

Globalisation,liberal theory and the spatiality of governance in Sub‐Saharan Africa

The debate over development and democracy is a highly charged one, because the two concepts are open to such divergent interpretation. In recent years, while academics were discovering globalisation, the major international financial institutions have been championing a particular version of the democracy‐development debate centred upon the notion of governance. They contend that democratisation and institutional reforms must occur before or alongside economic development. This article argues that their vision of governance is highly normative and simplifies reality for ideological purposes. This revolves around a particular reading of liberal political economy which sees political institutions as neutral arbiters and civil society as a space of freedom for plural voices. These formulations are implicitly spatial since they see political space as divided neatly into the international, national and local and thereby ignore the multiple power flows between these sites. The article concludes by trying to reformulate some of these concerns around the idea of the developmental state and progressive democracy.     

Higher Education and Democratic Public Life

ABSTRACT

It is time to reclaim the egalitarian democratic purposes of public universities. Public universities and colleges play a crucial political and public role in a democratic society. Yet much of the higher education literature looks at higher education through an economic framework. This paper argues that a healthy and broadly accessible higher education system serves the democratic public interest in a democratic polity such as the United States. It concludes by arguing that public universities could serve the public interest more effectively with an expansive view of who the “public” is and of their role as anchor institutions for democracy.     

Democratic Governance: Systems and Radical Perspectives

How might we think about democratic governance? This paper distinguishes between system governance and radical democracy. System governance borrows the language of radical democracy while missing its spirit. It advocates increased participation through networks because new institutionalists suggest networks are an efficient means of service delivery. It advocates increased consultation to build consensus because communitarians suggest consensus is needed for effective political institutions. System governance is, then, a top‐down discourse based on the alleged expertise of social scientists. Radical democrats concentrate instead on the self‐government of citizens. Instead of the incorporation of established groups in networks, they promote a pluralism within which aspects of governance are handed over to associations in civil society. And instead of consultation prior to decision making, they promote a dialogue in which citizens play an active role in making and implementing public policy.     

Habermas,market‐friendly human rights,and the revisibility of economic globalization

This article examines the impacts, on citizenship rights, democratic practice and public policy, of the constitution‐like regimes for the protection of investor rights embedded within contemporary international investment treaties. It argues that a central objective of these investment treaties is to remove specific governmental functions from the stock of policy instruments available to national governments and to democratic polities. Drawing upon Habermas' discourse‐theoretic approach to law and democracy, the article argues that national states have the room to deviate, if not withdraw from the current configuration of economic rights advanced and enforced through international investment treaties. A robust proceduralist approach to rights and democracy would subject these agreements to critical democratic practice and open space to revise and roll back some of the rules and institutions associated with economic globalization.     

The Political Economy of Transition in Post-Socialist Systems: The Case of the Baltic States

The nature of the failed socialist systems calls for a transition which is as comprehensive in its objectives as were the systems themselves before they failed. Hence, the transition to democracy in the post-socialist systems cannot be treated as separate from the transition to a market economy and national independence. The critical part of the transition is the economic reforms inasmuch as the institutions of the planned economy are the major power base for the conservative elites. To be successful, the economic transition must be able - in both the short and the long term - to command political support, to achieve social acceptance of the distributional consequences involved and to be compatible with democratic institutions. Analysis reveals that in the case of the Baltic states widespread support for the transition to a market economy can be detected and that the democratically elected governments have so far been fairly active in establishing a legal framework for transition, but appear unable to implement the necessary stabilization policy. The reforms have produced strong social protests, and the governments have been under pressure to maintain social guarantees during the period of transition. The non-Baltic minorities in particular defend previous social privileges and are distressed by their uncertain status after independence. The ultimate outcome of political and economic transition in the Baltic states, therefore, remains in doubt.     

Digital Politics in Western Democracies: A Comparative Study

Satisfaction with democracy is driven by the two mechanisms that affect citizens’ income: the market and the state. When people consider that the levels of economic growth and redistribution are sufficient, they are more satisfied with the performance of democratic institutions. This relationship is moderated by personal income: since low-income citizens are more sensitive to changes in personal economic circumstances than high-income citizens, they give more weight to economic perceptions and opinions about redistribution. In this paper evidence is found of this conditional relationship in survey data from 16 established democracies. The results offer a rich characterisation of the state and market-based mechanisms that affect satisfaction with democracy.     

THE DECAY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY

Liberal democracy is decaying because its values have been carried to excess or are obsolete for effectively addressing society's contemporary challenges. The loss of American military, technological, and economic hegemony—through the rise of competitors and increased interdependence—has threatened the nation's sense of ideological superiority, social coherence, and purpose. The prospects for a democratic renewal will require first, an enabling crisis that calls into question the existing social order, particularly capitalism, and the liberal values on which it is legitimated. Second, a broad-based popular movement would have to emerge that supports a redirection in the value structure, social relationships, and the public policy agenda. The essay concludes with concrete recommendations for reforming political institutions and new policies that would move us along such a path.     

The conscience of a fugitive: sheldon wolin and the prospects for radical democracy

Amidst increasing and seemingly intransigent inequalities, unresponsive institutions, and illegible patterns of social change, political theorists are increasingly faced with questions about the viability of democracy in the contemporary age. One of the most prominent voices within this conversation has been that of Sheldon Wolin. Wolin has famously argued that democracy is a ‘fugitive’ experience with an inherently temporary character. Critics have pounced on this concept, rejecting it as an admission of defeat or despair that is at odds with the formation of democratic counter-power. In this article, I push back against this view of fugitive democracy. I do so by contextualizing the idea within Wolin’s broader democratic theory, and especially his idea of the ‘multiple civic self’, in order to give a more coherent form to a conception of citizenship often concealed by the attention given to the supposedly momentary nature of democracy. This all too common misreading of fugitive democracy has significant stakes, because it shapes not only how we approach Wolin’s impact as a political theorist, but also how we approach practices of democratic citizenship and how we think about political theory and political science’s relationship to those practices.