Negotiating Military Alliances: Legal Systems and Alliance Formation

Do domestic legal systems affect states' propensity to form military alliances? This article, building upon the existing research in international relations, adopts a socio-legal approach to understanding international treaty making. By focusing on the essence of international negotiations—communication between states' representatives—I argue that negotiating parties who share a common legal language have a common a priori understanding concerning concepts under discussion. Domestic laws operating within states impact the process of creation of international law embodied in treaties. Empirical analyses show that states with similar legal systems are more likely to form military alliances with one another. Additionally, domestic legal systems influence the way that states design their alliance commitments. In general, my findings suggest that the influence of domestic laws does not stop at “the water's edge.” It permeates the interstate borders and impacts the relations between states, especially the treaty negotiating and drafting process. International negotiators bring their legal backgrounds to the negotiating table, which influences both their willingness to sign treaties and the design of the resulting agreements.     

Hurdles to International Terrorist Alliances: Lessons From Al Qaeda's Experience

Despite the threat posed by international terrorist alliances, the conditions that foster and inhibit these relationships remain poorly understood. When seeking allies outside of their primary conflict and political market, groups struggle to forge credible commitments, particularly the requisite ‘shadows of the future’ and reputations conducive to cooperation, without third-party enforcers. Given their suspicious nature and strong in-group identities, terrorist groups sometimes balk at relinquishing independence for security. Alliances risk precipitating counterterrorism pressure, alienating constituents, and increasing the risk of betrayal. Even groups that enjoy alliance success, like Al Qaeda, experience these hurdles in their alliance. What helped to set Al Qaeda apart from most groups was its ability to navigate these obstacles, though some bedeviled its alliances efforts. This offers under-utilized opportunities for alliance disruption.     

Tau-b or Not Tau-b: Measuring the Similarity of Foreign Policy Positions

The pattern of alliances among states is commonly assumed to reflect theextent to which states have common or conflicting security interests. For the past twenty years, Kendall's τ b has been used to measure the similarity of nations' "portfolios" of alliance commitments. Widely employed indicators of systemic polarity, state utility, and state risk propensity all rely on τ b . We demonstrate that τ b is inappropriate for measuring the similarity of states' alliance policies. We develop an alternative measure of policy portfolio similarity, S , which avoids many of the problems associated with τ b , and we use data on alliances among European states to compare S to τ b . Finally, we identify several problems with inferring state interests from alliances alone, and we provide a method to overcome those problems using S in combination with data on alliances, trade, UN votes, diplomatic missions, and other types of state interaction. We demonstrate this by comparing the calculated similarity of foreign policy positions based solely on alliance data to that based on alliance data supplemented with UN voting data.     

Divided Priorities: Why and When Allies Differ Over Military Intervention

Abstract

Scholars have vigorously debated whether adversaries carefully scrutinize if states have, in the past, demonstrated toughness and whether adversaries base present and future crisis-bargaining behavior on this record. If they do—as a central strain of deterrence theory, and its contemporary defenders, maintain—hard-line policies, including limited military interventions, can bolster deterrence. We know much less about a second audience that is presumably attentive to demonstrations of resolve: allies. A common view, derived from the same logic, and which we call Hawkish Reassurance Theory, suggests that states should support and find reassuring their allies’ faraway military interventions. In contrast, we argue that such interventions call into doubt the intervener’s will and capacity to fulfill its core alliance commitments, undermine the credibility of the alliance, and threaten allies’ security in both the short and long run. Allies thus ultimately oppose powerful partners’ hawkish postures in distant conflicts, and they may even consequently explore routes to security beyond the alliance. To assess this argument, we examine the varied stances leading US allies took from the start of the US intervention in Vietnam through its end. Allied behavior was largely consistent with our expectations. We conclude that, if one reason to deploy force is to signal to allies that you will come to their aid when they call, states should not bother.     

The Quad,AUKUS, and I2U2 formats: Major lessons from minilaterals

Over the past two decades, a trend has emerged where US partners and allies look outside of their bilateral relationship with the United States and pre-existing multilateral bodies to join ad-hoc networks. They are joining these networks to both obtain their own security goods and to provide regional public goods. Yet, these ad-hoc networks, or “minilaterals,” often include multiple US allies or shared partners of the United States. For example, the revived Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) includes Japan, India, Australia, and the United States, encompassing two separate US treaty alliances. Similarly, the tripartite pact AUKUS connects the US-UK transatlantic alliance relationship to the US-Australia alliance in the Indo-Pacific. The newest addition to this growing trend in minilateralism, the I2U2, which redefine the Middle East as West Asia by bringing together the United States, India, Israel, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), provides additional insight into the benefits of minilaterals as mechanisms for organizing interstate cooperation.     

联盟的起源：理性主义研究新进展

联盟作为具有战略意义的一种国家间关系,对其研究在国际关系理论中占据了一个十分重要的位置,也有助于学者们将具有普遍意义的国际关系理论运用于具体的国际关系研究。围绕着联盟的起源这一主题,理性主义国际关系理论提出了许多重要的见解。在最近的十多年来,这一主题的研究又与单极体系内的联盟现实相结合,提出和分析了如下方面的核心问题：联盟需要什么样的共同利益基础;制衡性的联盟为何没有出现;国际结构如何塑造大国的联盟选择;地理因素如何影响联盟的形成以及联盟起源的其他根源有哪些。理性主义国际关系理论的这些研究都具有一定的启发意义,但总的来看,现实主义范式的研究占据了主流地位,系统性的理论创新不够,并没有提出解释联盟起源的新的核心概念,即如果把联盟界定为一种明确、稳定的战略关系,而非仅仅是针对安全威胁的军事同盟的话,仅有结构现实主义和威胁平衡理论是不够的;联盟起源的理论研究仍然具有较为广阔的空间。建构一种更加普遍的、有强大解释力的利益关系概念,在此基础上推导出国家的联盟选择战略,将会有助于更加具体深入地了解联盟的起源。     

Time for a haircut: political regimes and sovereign debt restructurings

ABSTRACT

Conventional wisdom claims that reputation leads sovereign states to full debt repayment. However, defaults are recurrent, some debtor countries take a lot of time to end them, and some extract costly concessions from investors. This article argues that these differences are largely explained by the political regimes in the borrowing countries. While previous research examines whether democracies make more credible commitments, we analyze how democracies affect bargaining with foreign investors after a default occurs. Democracies, with their institutional checks, electoral uncertainty, greater transparency, and public deliberation, make swift decision-making harder, create incentives to pander and posture, and give leverage to minimize the win set of viable agreements. We test our theory on a comprehensive dataset of debt restructurings with private creditors in the period 1975–2017. The event history analysis indicates that democracies experience longer restructurings and the double-hurdle regression analysis shows that democracies obtain larger creditor losses. Further, there is interesting variation among democracies and autocracies. Our findings suggest that political regimes are crucial to explaining why cooperation fails in international debt markets.     

Mediation,Domestic Politics,and the Israeli-Syrian Negotiations, 1991–2000

This paper explains one of the central roles of alliance contracts, the prevention of undesirable military entanglement. The existing literature on alliances argues that entrapment is a major concern for potential and actual alliance partners, but it is difficult to point out clear cases of entrapment. I provide two answers to this puzzle: First, entrapment is a narrower concept than others have realized, and it is rarer than the literature suggests. Second, leaders anticipate entrapment and carefully design alliance agreements before and after states form alliances. I examine the second argument through case studies of us alliance agreements with South Korea, Japan, and Spain.     

Recouping after Coup-Proofing: Compromised Military Effectiveness and Strategic Substitution

In order to counter the threat of a coup, states often undertake a number of strategies to “coup-proof” their militaries, such as creating institutional redundancy, severely limiting interbranch communications, and basing promotions on loyalty rather than merit. As a result of such policies, however, the fighting effectiveness of these armed forces is degraded, and the marginal return on military investment is greatly reduced. We argue that leaders who have coup-proofed their militaries undertake several substitution policies in order to offset their military weakness when faced with external threats. These policies include pursuing chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons and forging alliances. We find support for these theoretical predictions in quantitative tests on data with global coverage between 1970 and 2001.     

Is the Enemy of My Enemy My Friend?

The terrorist organizations that have posed the greatest threat to international security are those with allies. Terrorist groups at the core of alliance networks, particularly the Islamic State and al Qaeda, define the threat today, as they are able to accrue and disperse the benefits of their alliances—including greater lethality, longevity, and resilience—to their partners. While the consequences of these alliances are clear, their causes remain poorly understood, especially with respect to why terrorist alliances cluster around a small number of organizations. I propose that groups ally with the organization at the core of a network to address organizational deficits. In addition, the prospective partners must have both complementary needs and the ability to link their ideologies and frames to build a shared identity. Finally, groups must overcome their inherent suspicions and build trust to ally. These three mechanisms lead to alliance formation, but they also offer numerous avenues for disruption.     

从属侧施压:同盟强化还是同盟瓦解?——“进攻性楔子战略”成败的政治条件及其类型化研究

在研究同盟分化的议程中,关于“楔子战略”的类型化研究很多,但是关于不同类型“楔子战略”背后差异化的因果机制及其传导过程的研究却很少。“从属侧施压”是“进攻性楔子战略”的一个重要组成部分,它特指利用危机向特定类型敌对联盟中的次要盟友进行安全施压,进而促成敌对联盟内部关系紧张直至瓦解的一种同盟分化手段。通过对“从属侧施压”这一微观同盟理论各要素间共变关系的研究发现,大国间“现有权势对比”“权力变动趋势”和“权力盈亏态势判定”是决定“从属侧施压”战略实施效果的三个核心变量。同盟主导国在“实力较强”且“趋势焦虑”情势下介入盟友危机的意愿最强,反之则最弱。对于“实力较强但趋势占优”和“实力较弱且趋势焦虑”两种不确定情况,借助于“前景理论”对同盟主导国“权力盈亏态势”进行辅助判别,则具有较强的解释力。该理论的提出,不仅对现有“进攻性楔子战略”具体实施条件、时机把握与策略选择有着较强的现实指导意义,也有助于战略实施方避免因条件与时机误判而促成事与愿违的敌对同盟强化。     

Norms Are What States Make of Them: The Political Psychology of Norm Violation

I examine why states violate norms they embrace as members of international society. The rationalist answer, that norms are violated whenever they conflict with interests, is underspecified and empirically challenged. Constructivists cannot address violations well from their structural, sociological perspective. I argue from political psychology that violations stem from the motivated biases of actors who face a moral dilemma between personal desires and social constraints. These biases compel leaders to interpret norms and situations in a manner that justifies violation as socially acceptable. The ability to do so depends on the norm and the situation. The more parameters a norm possesses, and the more ambiguous those parameters are, the easier it is for actors to interpret them favorably to justify violation. Oftentimes norms are what states make of them. If the situation is plausible for states to claim exemption, they violate; otherwise they are constrained. The U.S. invasion of Panama illustrates these dynamics.     

Are Monetary Unions Inevitable?

With the rapid growth of cross-border competition among currencies, informed observers predict that the new monetary unions are virtually inevitable in many parts of the world. In fact, predictions of such alliances are misleading and almost certainly wrong. Monetary unions necessarily imply a measure of collective action in the issue and management of money. An alliance requires allies—other states with similar preferences and a disposition to act cooperatively. A survey of proposed monetary unions shows that willing partners among sovereign states are just not all that plentiful. Conceivably some governments could be attracted to less demanding forms of monetary alliance, depending on bargaining context. But prospects for many full new monetary unions are dim at best.     

中国与日本:同盟行为的比较分析

近代以来,中日两国由于同盟结构和文化因素不同而产生迥异的同盟行为.两个同盟都是由两个拥有各自主权但却彼此不平等的参与者组成,这样的同盟也是非对称和分层级的.这两个国家都很少有真正的同盟,从防务领域到政治经济领域,他们各自曾经拥有的同盟都承载着过于沉重的期望.     

Inter-Rebel Alliances in the Shadow of Foreign Sponsors

From the Patriotic Front struggle against the minority rule in Rhodesia to the seven-party mujaheddin alliance in Afghanistan, inter-rebel alliances make the armed opposition more resilient and successful in the face of government repression. Why then do some rebel groups cooperate with each other while others do not? Drawing on the principal-agent theory, I argue that the presence of foreign sponsors is likely to encourage alliance formation in civil wars especially when two rebel outfits share a state sponsor. Shared sponsors may demand cooperation between their agents and credibly threaten to punish them for non-compliance. They may also insist on the establishment of umbrella institutions to improve their monitoring and sanctioning capacity, and to increase the legitimacy of their agents. I test this argument using the UCDP Actor dataset with new data on alliances between rebel groups. I find strong evidence that shared sponsors increase the probability of inter-rebel alliance.     

Buying National: Democracy,Public Procurement,and International Trade

Many studies show that democracy promotes freer trade. However, because they typically focus on “at-the-border” barriers such as tariffs, we know little about democracy’s effects on “behind-the-border” barriers such as discrimination in government procurement. We address this question by asking how democracy affects governments’ incentives to discriminate against foreigners when buying goods and services. We argue that “buy national” policies have unclear costs and are harder to attack than policies that visibly interfere with consumers’ ability to buy foreign goods. This makes such provisions more attractive than tariffs to democratic leaders seeking reelection. We thus hypothesize that democracy leads to lower tariffs but to greater discrimination in public procurement. We support this hypothesis with an analysis of procurement and imports in 138 countries from 1990 to 2008. Our results imply that a full understanding of the democracy–trade policy relationship requires attention to increasingly prominent behind-the-border barriers to trade.     

Small enough to fail: the structural irrelevance of the small state as cause of its elimination and proliferation since Westphalia

Since the Peace of Westphalia, few great powers have “died”, while the “death rate” and proliferation of small states has been dramatic at times. What causes these fluctuations? In this paper, I claim that the dominant reason for the extinction, emergence and proliferation of the small state over the last three and a half centuries is to be found at the system level. Ultimately, small state survival is determined by the particular set-up of the state system. I advance this argument from the perspective of international relations theory, integrating the relevant scholarship of the English School and realism, especially structural realism. The latter’s systemic perspective provides the basis for arguing that small states are structurally irrelevant. It is this feature of the small state, its irrelevance with regard to the power-based structure of the state system, which has caused the small state to “struggle for existence” in the past, and which has allowed small states to proliferate during the bipolar Cold War.     

Satisfaction,Alternatives, Investments,and the Microfoundations of Audience Cost Models

In this paper, we suggest that the Investment Model of Commitment, developed in social psychology, offers a solution to an important microfoundational issue in audience cost theory. Audience cost models are useful for thinking about the foreign policy behaviors of democratic and nondemocratic states. However, they often assume that citizens reliably penalize leaders who break their foreign policy promises even though the empirical record suggests this is not always the case. We argue that public commitment to foreign policy assets and relationships is a precondition for the application of audience costs. Using the UN and NATO as case studies, we hypothesize that the commitments people develop to international organizations emerge as a function of (1) their satisfaction with the performance of the organization, (2) the investments in those organizations, and (3) an assessment of the alternatives to these associations. Correlational and experimental tests of the model confirm that the strongest individual-level commitments arise when people are highly satisfied with the performance of specific institutions, believe that much has been invested in support of them, and perceive that the alternatives to particular institutions are poor. Implications for the development of audience cost theory are discussed.     

Opposites Do Not Attract: The Impact of Domestic Institutions, Power, and Prior Commitments on Alignment Choices

States that choose to involve themselves in an ongoing dispute do so by choosing to align with or against one of the original disputants. What factors lead states to prefer to help one side over the other? We consider the effect of the disputants' power, political and economic institutional similarities between each disputant and the aligning state, and formal alliance commitments between each disputant and the aligning state on these alignment choices. We evaluate these expectations empirically by examining the alignment choices of states that joined with one side or another in a Militarized Interstate Dispute during the period of 1816 to 1986. The results indicate that regardless of regime type, institutional similarities matter to the aligning state's decision. We also find that power concerns matter only to autocracies; democracies do not seem to base their alignment choices on the power of the sides in the dispute. Finally, the evidence indicates that the alignment choices of democracies cannot be anticipated by their prior alliance commitments, although the alignment choices of autocracies can. These results suggest interesting implications for research on the democratic peace, the determinants of threat in the international system, and the impact of selection effects. The consistent empirical evidence that institutional similarity affects alignment decisions also increases our confidence that future investigations of institutional similarity generally, rather than an exclusive focus on joint democracy, will prove fruitful.