THE CHANGING POLITICS OF THAILAND'S BUDDHIST ORDER

Thailand's monastic politics are in turmoil. No longer can the sangha be written off as a political force and viewed simply as a fount of legitimacy for the nation and the monarchy. The role played by a few hundred pro-Thaksin “redshirt” monks in the March to May 2010 mass demonstrations testified to growing unease within the rank-and-file monkhood, which is drawn from the same regions and segments of society as the redshirt movement more generally. But beyond these overt displays of dissatisfaction, the sangha faces a range of serious challenges. While long-standing tensions between the rival Thammayut and Mahanikai orders have apparently declined, a dearth of moral and administrative leadership has paralyzed the Thai monkhood and rendered it seemingly incapable of reforming itself. Competing power groups linked to secular politics are vying for influence within the Supreme Sangha Council, while there is no widely supported successor ready to replace the current supreme patriarch, himself nearly a hundred years old. In many respects, the political paralysis of the monkhood mirrors the wider crisis confronting the body politic of the Thai nation itself.     

Authoritarianism and UMNO's factional conflicts

Abstract

Do democratic political regimes facilitate more robust environmental and natural resource regulatory policies? Yes, in many cases. Using detailed cases of natural resource policy making in Thailand, however, we find that neither political parties nor civil society nor state institutions do well in representing diffuse interests, mediating among conflicting ones or defining compromises and securing their acceptance by most key players. Gains in environmental or natural resource policy making have not been dramatically more likely under democratic regimes than under “liberal authoritarian” ones with broad freedoms of speech and association. We argue that Thailand's democratic political system features weak linkages between groups in society and political parties, lacks alternative encompassing or brokering institutions in civil society, and that these features account for a tendency for political democracy to fail to deliver on its policy potential in Thailand.     

Reign-seeking and the Rise of the Unelected in Thailand

ABSTRACT

This article develops the concept of “reign-seeking” to capture the unprecedented collective action of the Thai professional and official elite prior to the 2014 military coup and the establishment of a military regime. It argues that this phenomenon reflects broad and deep political dynamics, for which the dominant scholarship on authoritarianism and Thai politics cannot adequately explain. The changing incentives of these supposedly non-partisan actors are interwoven with neo-liberal governance reform driven by a desire for depoliticisation and the minimisation of rent-seeking. This idea has been rationalised in Thailand since the promulgation of the 1997 Constitution resulting in the rise of technocratic and judicial bodies designed to discipline elected politicians and political parties. However, such institutional reconfigurations have consolidated the incentive for people considering themselves to be prospective candidates to “reign” in these organisations. As evident in the 2014 coup, these unconventional political actors – academics, doctors and civil society leaders – made collective efforts to topple the elected government in exchange for gaining selection into the wide range of unelected bodies. Governance reform in Thailand has hitherto reinforced the status quo, although the article further argues that reign-seekers should be seen as contingent, rather than consistent, authoritarians.     

Islam,radicalism, and violence in Southern Thailand: Berjihad di Patani and the 28 April 2004 attacks

Abstract

Violence in Thailand's deep South centers on Muslim unrest, which has been simmering since World War II. What was once a low-level secessionist insurgency has now developed into a full-scale conflict and violent campaign that has claimed hundreds of lives in the three southern border provinces. This amounts to the most serious political violence in recent Thai history. The main argument of this article is that the separatist struggle, which was initially based on a Malay national liberation struggle, has taken on undertones of a radical Islamist ideology, and the discourse of the separatist struggle has significantly shifted to that of radical Islamist politics by calling for a jihad against the Thai state, its local agents, and their Muslim allies. This shift is exemplified by a document entitled Berjihad di Patani, which appears to have helped inspire the violent incidents of 28 April 2004. To a large extent, what is happening in southern Thailand follows similar developments elsewhere, both at the regional level and in other parts of the Muslim world. Factors affecting the changing discourse and practice of the separatist politics are both external and internal: the failures of secularist development projects in the past decades, the influence of Islamic radicalism abroad, and the Islamic resurgence and fragmentation of religious establishment at home.     

Cracking Hegemony in Thailand: Gramsci,Bourdieu and the Dialectics of Rebellion

Gramsci's notion of “hegemony,” like Bourdieu's concept of “habitus,” seems designed to explain accommodation to existing social structures, rather than resistance. In this paper, however, I draw from the Prison Notebooks some arguments that contribute to a Gramscian understanding of how hegemony may break apart under the weight of the same uneven development processes central to hegemony. Drawing also from Bourdieu, I argue that the conceptions of “hegemony” and “habitus” inscribe the possibility of resistance within the embodied experience of accommodation to class rule. I then elaborate a dialectical, Gramscian-Bourdieusian account of the Red Shirt movement in Thailand, showing that the seeds for the destruction of royalist hegemony in Thailand have been sown in the embodied processes of accommodation to ruling class hegemony. The breadth and depth of challenges to this hegemony, moreover, are evident not only from the activities of the Red Shirt movement and regional discontent in Northern and Northeast Thailand but from the resistance of working class women to attempts to police their sexuality and limit their consumerism. The refusal of Thai elites to accept the breadth and depth of Thailand's dispositional transformation has legitimised – in their eyes – the brutal crackdown on Red Shirt protestors that resulted in the April-May 2010 massacres. Yet repression can only kill off political leaders and specific parties; it will not likely derail the growing resentment of ordinary Thais over elitist class rule.     

The Constitutionality of Australia's Compulsory Voting System

Electoral law has been the subject of several High Court decisions in recent years, and this jurisprudence, as well as some of the political science literature, is canvassed here. I argue that there are serious constitutional question marks over Australia's system of “compulsory voting”. There are two particular constitutional arguments against “compulsory voting”. Firstly it infringes the implied freedom of political communication which the High Court has recognised since 1992. Secondly, it is inconsistent with the right to vote recognised by the High Court as being implicit in s7 and s24 of the Constitution. On this basis citizens entitled to vote should have the freedom not to do so (as is the case in many other representative democracies in which voting is voluntary).     

The Terminal Crisis of the “Participatory Government” and the Election of Lee Myung Bak

This paper examines the election of Lee Myung Bak through the terminal crisis of the Roh Moo Hyun government that preceded it. I start with an analysis of the election of Lee Myung Bak and the electoral strategies of the liberal-progressive bloc in the December 2007 election and then move on to detail how these strategies shed light on tensions within Korean progressive politics since the transition to democracy in 1987. These tensions inform what I shall call the “terminal crisis” of Roh's “participatory government.” I argue that this crisis involves a problem of articulation within progressive politics between a politics of reunification and one grounded in egalitarian economic reform, including the lack of an alternative to the different forms of neo-liberalism embraced by both the Roh government and the conservative government of Lee Myung Bak. My hope is that thorough examination of these tensions that have informed the liberal-progressive bloc during the long decade since 1987 can spur reflection on the role of social movements in Korean democratisation and the dilemmas they face in crafting strategies for political and economic reform.     

Withdrawal symptoms: Social and cultural aspects of the October 6 coup

Abstract

Extract

In themselves, military coups are nothing new in modern (or ancient) Thai history. There have been at least eight successful, and many more unsuccessful, coups since the one that overthrew the absolute monarchy in 1932. It is therefore not altogether surprising that some Western journalists and academics have depicted the events of October 6 1976 as “typical” of Thai politics, and even as a certain “return to normalcy” after three years of unsuitable flirtation with democracy. In fact, however, October 6 marks a clear turning point in Thai history for at least two quite different reasons. First, most of the important leaders of the legal left-wing opposition of 1973–1976, rather than languishing in jail or in exile like their historical predecessors, have joined the increasingly bold and successful maquis. Second, the coup was not a sudden intra-elite coup de main, but rather was the culmination of a two-year-long right-wing campaign of public intimidation, assault and assassination best symbolized by the orchestrated mob violence of October 6 itself.     

Legacy of the past,promise of the future: Land reform,land grabbing,and land conversion in the Calabarzon

Abstract

Rather than viewing the recent violence in the Thai South largely as a product of long-standing historical and socioeconomic grievances, this article argues that the government of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra has played a crucial role in provoking conflict in the region. Early in his premiership, Thaksin decided that the South was controlled by forces of “network monarchy” loyal to the palace and to former prime minister Prem Tinsulanond. Thaksin sought to reorganize political and security arrangements in the deep South in order to gain personal control of the area, but in the process he upset a carefully negotiated social contract that had ensured relative peace for two decades. As the violence increased, royal displeasure — articulated mainly by members of the Privy Council — forced Thaksin to make certain concessions, notably the creation of a National Reconciliation Commission to propose solutions for the growing crisis. Network monarchy had struck back, albeit from a position of weakness. This analysis seeks to demonstrate that the southern violence is actually inextricable from wider developments in Thailand's national politics.     

Introduction: Understanding Thailand’s Politics

ABSTRACT

Thailand’s politics from the mid-2000s has seen considerable conflict and contestation, with seven prime ministers, two military coups, and scores of deaths from political violence. This article, as well as introducing the eight articles in the Special Issue, examines various aspects of this tumultuous period and the authoritarian turn in Thai politics. It does this by examining some of the theoretical and conceptual analysis of Thailand's politics and critiquing the basic assumptions underlying the modernisation and hybrid regimes perspectives that have tended to dominate debates on democratisation. While the concepts of bureaucratic polity and network monarchy shed light on important political actors in Thailand, they have not grappled with the persistence of authoritarianism. In theoretical terms, the article suggests that it is necessary to understand historically specific capitalist development as well as the social underpinnings that establish authoritarian trajectories and reinforce the tenacity of authoritarianism.     

Is It Race,Class, or Gender? The Sources of Perceived Discrimination in Brazil

Observers have long noted Brazil's distinctive racial politics: the coexistence of relatively integrated race relations and a national ideology of “racial democracy” with deep social inequalities along color lines. Those defending a vision of a nonracist Brazil attribute such inequalities to mechanisms perpetuating class distinctions. This article examines how members of disadvantaged groups perceive their disadvantage and what determines self‐reports of discriminatory experiences, using 2010 AmericasBarometer data. About a third of respondents reported experiencing discrimination. Consistent with Brazilian national myths, respondents were much more likely to report discrimination due to their class than to their race. Nonetheless, the respondent's skin color, as coded by the interviewer, was a strong determinant of reporting class as well as race and gender discrimination. Race is more strongly associated with perceived “class” discrimination than is household wealth, education, or region of residence; female gender intensifies the association between color and discrimination.     

The Electoral Poetics of James Scullin's Campaign against Alfred Deakin, 1906: Anticipating “Fusion”

In the 1906 federal election James Scullin, then an unknown grocer, challenged the sitting Prime Minister, Alfred Deakin, for his seat of Ballaarat. This article examines this important event in Scullin's under‐researched life story to consider the “electoral poetics” of electioneering in the early federation. Scullin's challenge to Deakin prefigured the defining realignment of Australian politics to come, the “Fusion” of 1909, and is indicative of Labor's new self‐conceptualisation as a potential government with a mission to fundamentally restructure Australian democracy. This article explores Scullin's work as an expositor of this mission, and its significance for his political life.     

Hegemony and the politics of culture and identity in Thailand

Abstract

This article argues that the establishment of the Ministry of Culture in Thailand needs to be understood in a broadly historical perspective that relates to the role of culture in hegemonic strategies of the state. It presents an overview of broadly defined culture policy in Thailand from the 1930s before moving to a more detailed discussion of the period from the 1980s to the present. The principle contention, developed in the second half of the article, is that the current policies of Thailand's Ministry of Culture, and its role in hegemonic identity production, can only be understood by taking account of the variety of factors that shaped the Ministry's emergence. These factors include the influence of international development agencies, strategies of appropriation by the Thai state, and the role of progressive forces within Thailand that seek political and cultural reform. The circumstances under which the Ministry was formed have made it a site of contestation between conservative royalist-nationalist perspectives on Thai national identity and progressive localist and international understandings of Thai national identity.     

“Tongpan”: An important event in Thai cinema

Abstract

Films being made in Asian countries are now beginning to express an Asian reality. This is happening in a small way, but it is happening. The scale of the movement to break away from Hollywood and Bombay-type extravaganzas, and from films as a kind of “celluloid LSD,” is still small, constrained as it is by film-makers and sellers out to make quick profits. One little ripple that has recently emerged from the stagnant waters of Asia's film world is called “Tongpan.” The work of a group of creative amateurs, “Tongpan” is not the result of a commercial venture, and is not a professionally-made film in the conventional sense. It is also not a film in the style of what has come to be known as the “New Wave Cinema,” for “Tongpan” is not an art film to be “museumed” for wealthy connoisseurs. But precisely for all these reasons it is important that a film called “Tongpan” has been made. Indeed an important event has occurred in Thai Cinema. Important because it shows what is happening to the Thai people in the name of ‘development’ and captures for posterity the tensions and strains of an important period in Thailand's recent history.     

Freedom of Expression in South Korea

South Korea is widely considered a consolidated democracy, but there is growing evidence that freedom of expression in South Korea has lagged behind that of comparable Asian countries and that it has deteriorated since 2008. Freedom House downgraded South Korea’s “freedom of the press” status from “free” to “partly free” in 2010 and other international reports also raised concerns on the status of freedom of expression in the country. We identify five problems that have contributed to the deterioration in South Korea’s rankings with respect to civil liberties: abuse of criminal defamation, the rules governing election campaigns, national security limitations on free speech, restrictions related to the internet and partisan use of state power to control the media. We close by considering possible explanations of the phenomenon, ranging from more distant cultural factors and the influence of the Japanese legal systems through the enduring impact of the Cold War. However, the main problems appear political. Governments on both the political right and left have placed limits on freedom of expression in order to contain political opposition, and constitutional, legal and political checks have proven insufficient to stop them.     

Local democracy in a hybrid state: pluralism and protest in Volzhskiy,Russia

The standard narrative of Russia's “authoritarian backsliding” fails to grapple with the tremendous variation in subnational politics that emerged over the past two decades. This article offers a case study of the industrial city of Volzhskiy, which, although once a stalwart supporter of the Communist Party (KPRF), has evolved into a highly pluralistic system with democratic municipal institutions. Drawing upon analysis of local publications, protest data, and interviews with local politicians, this article traces the interplay of formal institutions and informal political processes in Volzhskiy's local-level transition to democracy. Volzhskiy's pluralism and local democratic outcome can largely be explained by (1) the emergence of a more diverse set of economic and political interests and constituencies, and (2) a KPRF organization that was strong and provided robust competition that created the conditions for cooperation among the competitors to form fair and open local political institutions, which fostered the city's pluralism.     

An internal history of the communist party of Thailand

This is a translation of a history of the Communist Party of Thailand, written by a leading party member in 1978. The Thai original was published for the first time in early 2003. The document begins with a background analysis of Thai society, then traces the party's history from the 1920s, and ends with the “lessons” learnt. The document is especially detailed on the party's adoption and adaptation of the Maoist strategy of rural armed struggle.     

Misreading Mao: On Class and Class Struggle

It has been argued frequently that Mao Zedong's thought is a significant departure from classical Marxism. This break, usually dated from the mid-1950s, supposedly occurred in two areas. First, the primacy of the economic characteristic of orthodox Marxism was replaced by a “voluntarism,” which emphasised politics and consciousness. Secondly, whereas classes are defined in economic terms in the classical Marxist tradition, Mao defined them by reference to political behaviour and ideological viewpoint. This definition derives from the primacy Mao is said to have accorded to the superstructure. This article rejects the second of these interpretations and argues that a fundamental continuity exists between Mao's post-1955 propositions on classes and class struggle and those advanced by orthodox Marxism. In conformity with classical Marxism, Mao conceived of classes as economic categories. Further, both Mao and classical Marxism saw classes as active participants in class struggle in the superstructure called into being by the contradiction between the forces and relations of production. Finally, Mao shared with orthodox Marxism the idea that economic classes are represented in the superstructure by a range of political agencies and ideological forms.     

Pakistan: Crisis of a Frontline State

For more than 50 years, Pakistan has functioned as imperialism's “frontline state.” The military has remained the country's dominant political player and the basic precepts of bourgeois democracy remain conspicuous by their absence. Since the military coup in October 1999, the configuration of power in Pakistan has become subject to serious internal contradictions, in large part because of the “war on terror” and the loss of public prestige of the military. These contradictions have intensified in the wake of a lawyer-led street movement sparked by the military top brass' dismissal of the country's chief justice in March 2007. Since then the country's most well-known politician, Benazir Bhutto, has been assassinated and her Pakistan People's Party has swept to power in general elections held in February 2008. However, the crisis of the frontline state has not ebbed, and the oligarchic system of power remains subject to rupture.