Pride and prejudice: Comparative corruption research and the British case

In recent years, comparative corruption analysis has been fuelled by the growth of international survey data on related perceptions. Taking issue with the typological vein of such analysis, this article questions both the treatment of perceptions indices and the validity and pertinence of variables used to explain them. It is argued that perceptions are conflated with practice, whilst explanatory variables appear ungrounded in empirical reality. These limitations serve to reinforce expectations that corruption is a menace to be associated primarily with societies of the global periphery. Drawing on the supposedly paradigmatic case of Britain, the article suggests that the problem of bias in comparative scholarship is compounded by three factors: the failure of comparative and domestic-focused literatures to engage with one another in sufficient depth; the relative lack of qualitative research into corruption within core Western states; and the neglect of power in the study of perceptions and practices at comparative and domestic-focused levels of analysis.     

Filling the gap of formal institutions: the effects of Guanxi network on corruption in reform-era China

Corruption exists around the world and throughout the human history, but societies undergoing rapid modernization and institutional transition tend to be more susceptible to this problem. This article analyzes the corruption-facilitating roles of guanxi network under transition. It argues that when deficient political and economic institutions hamper the effective flow of information and resources and when fast structural changes generate uncertainty, people can resort to guanxi network, an informal institution, to overcome these difficulties and advance their private interests. Using empirical evidence from reform-era China, this article demonstrates how the communication, exchange, and normative functions of guanxi network enhance the opportunities, means, and incentives for public officials to engage in corruption, especially transactional corruption through particularistic ties.     

A framework for the analysis of corruption

The article sets out a framework within which the problem of corruption may be analysed in any specific country. It does not seek to establish the importance of such activity in a general sense, or seek to propose particular economic policy or institutional programmes that should be pursued in order to reduce the impact on the development process. Rather, the objective is to provide a structure for two distinct areas of analysis. Firstly, it considers the investigation of the determinants of corruption, emphasising the environment in which corruption evolves — whether shaped by international, national or specific institutional factors — and the manner in which the different parties to corruption interact and organise themselves in conducting these activities. Secondly, the article focusses on the importance of corruption for economic development by considering the different forms of corruption and the characteristics of these forms that are most critical for economic activity. Here, the distortions that are introduced into on-going economic activity are identified, together with the manner in which these distortions redirect activity in sub-optimal directions. In addition, the nature of the uncertainty attaching to these differing forms of corruption is considered, and especially the degree to which a form may be considered anarchic or structured in character: the former reflecting a system of intense uncertainty, and the latter one of less uncertainty — perhaps, only minimal uncertainty — as a predictable and stable set of relationships between parties is established. Finally, the article reviews the empirical work that has been undertaken in this field. This article, therefore, seeks to identify how detailed case study analysis, focussed on individual countries — and, indeed, on specific institutions or sectors within those countries — could valuably complement these existing studies, and provide a framework for those seeking to design policy that is appropriate to any individual circumstance. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Japan,Korea, the Philippines,China: four syndromes of corruption

Both generalizations about “Asian corruption”, and claims about greater or lesser amounts of corruption, tend to overlook the many variations existing among and within Asian societies, and among the corruption problems they experience. I suggest that deeper influences in social, political and economic development, and contrasting institutional settings, create four distinctive syndromes of corruption, each with its own set of implications for relationships between wealth and power. Japan is an example of “influence markets” in which private interests buy or rent influence over relatively specific policy outcomes within a strong state. Korea is a case of “elite cartels”, in which collusion and corrupt incentives enable several kinds of elites to cooperate in governing, enriching themselves, and resisting rising political competition. The Philippines is marked by “oligarchs and clans”, with powerful families and their entourages plundering a weak state in a climate of uncertainty and insecurity. China experiences “official mogul” corruption, in which officials abuse state power with impunity, although that process is becoming increasingly fragmented. The four syndromes may help us understand why corruption and rapid growth have coexisted in some, but not all, Asian states for long periods of time, and may also help us understand why some of those states will adapt to new global realities only with some difficulty. They also show how “consensus”-driven reforms emanating from the west may not only be ineffective, but may actually make matters worse.     

Democratic transitions and forms of corruption

Any transition to democracy has implications for corruption. This papertakes a contextual and procesual approach to the analysis ofdemocratisation and corruption. It disaggregates some variables wherebydemocratisation can provide the context for the development of corruptionand crime. This paper does not argue democratisation causescorruption and crime. Nor does it argue democratisation does not providethe social space for the reduction of corruption and crime. This paperconcentrates on the areas in which democratisation provides an oftencomplex environment for the development of corruption and crime.     

Corruption and the crisis of the post-communist state

Corruption, or at least its reporting, appears to be increasing everywhere. But there is still too little comparative analysis of its nature and role in post-communist systems. This is understandable, given their newness. But it is now possible and desirable to compare corruption in such systems with corruption elsewhere. This article makes some initial comparative observations, and argues that the significance of post-communist corruption reaches far beyond the post-communist countries themselves. These states are compared briefly with other kinds of transitional states, and found to be different in a number of important ways. Finally, the author asks whether or not the apparent growth of corruption is leading to a seventh version of the crisis of the state. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Legacies of a culture of inequality: The Janus face of crime in post-communist countries

This paper explores the role of the specific structure and culture of inequality of the communist and post-communist countries in the simultaneouswave of elite crime and violent crime in Central and East Europe. Under thelayer of homogeneity, which had been imposed on the region by ethnic cleansingduring and after World War II and by the continuous policies of communistregimes, a substructure and subculture of inequality emerged, which becamedominant during the transition phase. Among the consequences of the ``hour-glass' society (Rose) and feudalization of society are closely knit networks at the top and the bottom of society, clientelism as a pattern of linking them, and non-egalitarian and collectivist value patterns. This specific cluster combines factors that contribute to both high-level corruption and violence. Pathways of development during the transition periodindicate a bi-partition of the ``geography of crime' in the region. The relative ``success stories' of Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic withboth declining rates of corruption and lethal violent crime (homicide) are in stark contrast to many of the successor states of the Soviet Union. It is argued that strong institutions based on civil rights and the rule of law areimportant factors responsible for this difference.     

Internal strategies against corruption: Guidelines for preventing and combating corruption in police authorities

While corruption is not an entirely new phenomenon in Germany, the number of cases suggests that proactive measures should be taken to strengthen prevention and detection. This article proposes a number of measures which, used separately and in combination, aid prevention and detection. It then proposes a wider management approach to dealing with corruption which ranges from general to specific strategies and actions that are intended to prevent corruption, to design out the circumstances in which it may occur and to provide means of detecting areas of risk and vulnerability. The article particularly focuses on police organisations but has applied relevance to all public sector organisations. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

New avenues in the study of political corruption

This article argues that the 1990s have witnessed a sea change in the study of political corruption, especially in political science. It explores the reasons for the relative neglect of corruption by political science in the past, and suggests that a process is underway whereby the study of corruption is becoming more integrated into the mainstream of the discipline. It explores the paradox of the co-existence of unresolved disputes about the definition of corruption with a consensus on the severity of the problem, suggesting that corruption remains a worthwhile object of investigation. Finally, it summarises how the contributions to this special issue light possible new avenues in the study of the phenomenon. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Minimising corruption: Applying lessons from the crime prevention literature

This article explores how the criminology literature, particularly the literature on crime prevention, might supplement current efforts to minimise corruption. It seeks to identify and apply approaches to offenders and offending to the problem of minimising corruption. In summary, this article demonstrates that the crime prevention literature does have a number of applications for those interested in minimising corruption. In general terms, this literature advocates, amongst other things, taking an informed approach to corruption minimisation by developing an understanding of the process of engaging in corrupt conduct. Exploring the offender's perspective and considering different types of corruption separately are two strategies suggested to facilitate understanding the factors which underlie corrupt conduct. In this way those seeking to minimise corruption would be better placed to identify how and where to intervene to optimise the likelihood of prevention and hence be able to tailor prevention techniques to individual types of corruption. Six specific lessons from the crime prevention literature and their applications are illustrated in this article. This current article is intended to promote discussion of potential strategies for combating corruption by the growing numbers of people interested in this challenge. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Dealing with corruption: the next steps

The 1997 White Paper from the British Government's Department for International Development (DFID) was specific in identifying the role of governance now being addressed by international and national donors: “improving governance can ... improve the lives of poor people directly. It is also essential for creating the environment for faster economic growth. Both aspects can be compromised by corruption, which all governments must address. In developing countries it is the poor who bear proportionally the heaviest cost“ (DFID, 1997, p. 30). Dealing with corruption is thus a priority both in terms of who it most affects and in terms of which objectives of governance — including participatory and responsive government and economic growth — it constrains. Although it has long held a specialist academic interest, corruption has become the subject of growing practitioner attention which means that the focus on corruption is beginning to move significantly from theory to practice and the practical. While there is substance to the belief that fire-engines cannot be designed without a thorough understanding of the fire they are intended to put out, there is also a sense in which the pervasiveness and tenacity of the current fires of corruption are such that action rather than refining theories and processes is what is now required. To paraphrase an analogy made by a senior British civil servant about the general issue of identifying policy — that corruption “is rather like the elephant — you recognise it when you see it but cannot easily define it” (quoted in Hill, 1997, p. 6) — is also to suggest that, while theorising may help draw up longer-term approaches to dealing with corruption, there is enough information and experience to develop best practice proposals for more immediate implementation and for developmental strategies that link to the longer-term approaches. This article addresses some of the issues of this agenda which seeks to develop, for those actively involved in anti-corruption initiatives, frameworks within which to consider realisable and cost-effective shorter-term anti-corruption strategies. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

A principal-agent model of corruption

One of the new avenues in the study of political corruption is that of neo-institutional economics, of which the principal-agent theory is a part. In this article a principal-agent model of corruption is presented, in which there are two principals (one of which is corrupting), and one agent (who is corrupted). The behaviour of these principals and agent is analysed in terms of the costs and benefits associated with different actions. The model is applied to political corruption in representative democracies, showing that, contrary to common belief, the use of principal-agent models is not limited to bureaucratic corruption. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Laws without teeth: An overview of the problems associated with corruption in Ukraine

This paper presents an overview of the current problems of corruption in Ukraine. It provides an example of specific corruption practices in the country and describes the general provisions related to the fight against corruption in Ukraine. The paper presents preliminary results of a pilot study of corruption in Ukraine to examine the impact of corruption on thefinancial markets. We support the proposition of Claessens, Djankov, andKlingebiel (2000) that the development of financial institutions and the improvement of financial market services in a nation can be viewed as indicators of the effectiveness of the economic, political, and legal reforms and the dedication of the government to these reforms. The paper ends with a discussion of the role of the international community in the fight against corruption in Ukraine.     

Governmental corruption in Africa: Sierra Leone as a case study

This paper examines the definition and context of official corruption in the emerging African nation of Sierra Leone. Historical, legal and sociological studies of the development of Sierra Leone and corruption within that nation are reviewed, as well as the content of official ljudicial inquiries into administrative corruption. These investigations and studies are supplemented with data from the primary author's experiences as a prosecutor and judge in Sierra Leone. Predisposing factors which facilitate corruption are identified and a variety of policies aimed at reform are discussed. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Some models of academic corruption

The paper notes that while much work has been done in the past on corruption in government and business, relatively little attention has been devoted to corruption in academic institutions. The principal forms of academic corruption are plagiarism and various forms of cheating, research fraud and financial fraud. Two simple mathematical models are proposed for exploring the motivations for (1) plagiarism, which is essentially a solitary crime, and (2) bribery. The responsiveness of the demand for the first of these, and the demand for and supply of the second to changes in underlying parameters are explored.     

The politics of conceptualizing corruption in reform China

It is significant to examine Chinese debates over corruption for several reasons. These debates confirm certain universal aspects of corruption that have been emphasized in the Western social science literature. They also suggest unique features of corruption that are useful for understanding the issue in the Chinese context. They further reveal how the conceptualization of corruption is politicized in the Chinese discourse,giving insight to the alignment of political and intellectual forces on the issue. Finally, Chinese analyses have heuristic values for general discussions of political corruption. This paper surveys Chinese debates over the definitions, sources, and consequences of corruption from the late 1980's to the late 1990's.     

Combatting institutional corruption: The policy-centered approach

How can institutional corruption be combatted? While recent years have seen a growth in anti-corruption literature, examples of countries rooting out systemic corruption remain few. The lack of success stories has sparked an academic debate about the theoretical foundations of anti-corruption frameworks: primarily between proponents of the principal-agent framework and those seeing systemic corruption as the result of collective-action problems. Through an analysis of current principal-agent and collective action anti-corruption literature, this article adds two additional arguments to the debate: (a) the need to specify what one talks about when talking about systemic corruption and (b) the necessity to move beyond the principal-agent versus collective action frameworks dichotomy towards a policy-centered approach for how to combat institutional corruption. Having outlined how institutional corruption can be seen as one type of systemic corruption, this article shows how a policy-centered approach such as strengthening the appearance standard through an independent public commission can address theoretical mechanisms emphasized in each anti-corruption framework–thus arguing that the frameworks complement rather than rival each other. The article ends by arguing for an anti-corruption discourse acknowledging that a multifaceted problem such as corruption requires multiple frameworks rather than attempts for silver-bullet explanations.

     

Why voters do not throw the rascals out?— A conceptual framework for analysing electoral punishment of corruption

One of the intriguing phenomena in democracy is the fact that politicians involved in, accused of or condemned for corruption in a court of law get re-elected by their constituents. In some cases, corruption does not seem to negatively affect the development of political careers. In this introductory article, we try to develop a multidimensional framework for analysing electoral punishment of corruption. First, we will look into various studies on electoral punishment and highlight their advancements and shortcomings. Then, we will propose a more dynamic account of electoral punishment of corruption that takes into account individual as well as macro level explanations. Finally, we will disaggregate these two analytical dimensions into various explanatory factors.     

Political structure,legislative process,and corruption: comparing Taiwan and South Korea

Taiwan and South Korea have the same constitutional system, approximate economic scale, and similar cultural backgrounds, yet they differ in degree of corruption. What political structures and legislative processes cause this outcome is the major question posed in this paper. The political structure in South Korea is a centralization-of-power model, while that in Taiwan is a separation-of-powers model. This paper proposes that Taiwan and South Korea have different types of corruption and different political structures, and the legislative process in South Korea is more compromising than that in Taiwan. These factors contribute to greater corruption in South Korea than in Taiwan. This study clarifies how particular institutional dynamics reduce or enhance the prospects for democratic governance and help to better understand how political structure and legislative process channel different types of corruption into different degrees of corruption. Studies on the relationship between constitutional structure and corruption have concluded that parliamentarism can help reduce corruption more than presidentialism. This thesis argues that a country with centralized power tends to be less corrupt than a country with separation of powers. If this argument and the rationale behind it hold true for countries with both parliamentary and presidential systems, we can expect that semi-presidential countries with a centralized system are less corrupt than those with a decentralized system, all else being equal. However, by comparing these two semi-presidential countries, we find that South Korea, with its centralized model, was more corrupt than Taiwan, with its decentralized model. This comparative case study provides a counterargument to the conventional wisdom of constitutional structure and governance.     

Dictatorship,democracy and corruption in Chile

The study of corruption in Chile suffers from the lack of a pre-existing body of academic research on which to draw for historical or contemporary analysis. This situation may be partially explained by several factors. Firstly, academic research tends to be reactive rather than proactive, in the sense that issues rarely become researched until they are either topical, or perceived to be problematic and significant. The configuration of historical circumstances in Chile has meant that corruption has been perceived to be considerably less widespread and less overt than in other parts of Latin America. For reasons which will be examined below, Chile is quite clearly not in the same league as Brazil, México or Venezuela in terms of corruption in the political system, and therefore the body of existing research has tended to focus on those cases where corruption is evident and more easily observable. Secondly, the lack of research material may also be partially explained by the nature of corruption in Chile. It undoubtably exists, but it has been characteristically low-key, assuming its own particular characteristics which have become known as corrupción a la chilena. Low-intensity corruption is undoubtedly more difficult to categorise, define and measure in comparison with flagrant abuses by individuals, sectors of society or ruling parties, and this may also be a contributory factor. A third factor may be that such low-intensity activities may become such an integral part of the political culture that they become accepted ways of the business of politics and therefore fail to even raise objections from public opinion. Only when the political environment changes do these issues become perceived as unacceptable. However, what is beyond dispute is that corruption has and does exist in Chile but it is influenced by the political culture of a particular period and by the political and social context.