Strategic Standardization in Europe: A Public Choice Perspective

In October 1990, the EC Commission presented a Green Paper in which it outlined a New Approach to European standardization. In particular, standardization was interpreted as a means of furthering the completion of the Internal Market. This paper discusses the impact of the modifications to the process of standard setting, as they have been proposed by the Commission, with respect to the incentives and goals of the major players in the European standardization game, i.e., national and European standardization bodies, industry and the EC Commission. Selected economic models of standardization are applied to investigate the policy impact of the New Approach.     

Competition Law and the WTO: Rethinking the Relationship

This essay identifies obstacles to the inclusion of a competitionlaw regime in the WTO and suggests changes that are likely tobe necessary if competition law is to become an effective partof the WTO. Two obstacles have impeded inclusion of competitionlaw in the WTO's legal regime and are likely to continue todo so. They are (i) a lack of confidence that the norms, practicesand procedures of the WTO rest on a robust conception of communityand (ii) uncertainty and concern about what form of competitionlaw might be included and what its role in the WTO would be.In order to reduce the first of these obstacles, the institutionsand members of the WTO will need to develop a conception ofcommunity that engenders widespread confidence in the WTO'sbasic modes of operation. Eliminating the second obstacle wouldrequire clarification of the kind of competition law that wouldbe acceptable within the WTO, and this, in turn, is likely torequire development of a form of competition law that is specificallydesigned for the WTO and that can elicit the long-term supportof all categories of members. The essay suggests that the competitionlaw issue is intricately interwoven with the future of the WTO.The changes that would be necessary to introduce and successfullyimplement competition law in the WTO are to a large extent thesame as those that the institution will need to make if it isto enrich its role as an institution.     

TIPPINS AND WITTMANN ASKED THE WRONG QUESTION:

Tippins and Wittmann (2005) provide an important analysis of the limitations of child custody evaluations, but they are wrong to propose that court-appointed evaluators should be precluded from making recommendations about best interests decisions. While some of the evidence of evaluators may fail to meet the high standard of reliability expected for "expert evidence," the role of court-appointed evaluators in child-related cases is not the same as the role of party-retained experts in other types of litigation, and the legal basis for their involvement in the family law dispute resolution process is very different. The family courts should not apply the "expert evidence" standard when deciding how to use the evidence of a court-appointed evaluator, but rather should use a more flexible standard that takes account of the family law context. If the Tippins and Wittmann proposal is adopted, it will have negative implications for the resolution of family law cases, including making settlements less common, thereby deleteriously affecting children.     

EC Competition Law and the Regulation of Passive Investments Among Competitors

Passive holdings and cross-investments among competing companiesare common phenomena in the modern marketplace. Yet under certainmarket conditions such investments may cause anticompetitiveeffects. This article explores the economic effects of passiveinvestments and their regulation under European competitionlaw. The article identifies a range of transactions that potentiallyaffect competition; however they remain unchallenged under currentregulation. Subsequently, the article explores the possibilityof applying the European Merger Regulation to these transactions.     

Sporting Justifications under EU Free Movement and Competition Law: The Case of the Football ‘Transfer System’

Governing bodies have significant autonomy in the organisation of professional sport in the EU, a situation now supported by Article 165 TFEU. However the post‐Lisbon competence for sport does not grant any exemption for practices that infringe fundamental freedoms or competition law; such infringements can only be justified where they are a proportionate response to an inherent need in that sport. The football ‘transfer system’ has been the subject of a series of EU law challenges, but continues to place obstacles in the way of the free movement of players between Member States and may restrict the ability of most clubs to compete for the elite players. Court of Arbitration for Sport decisions in transfer dispute cases have entrenched this situation, and recent evidence casts doubt on both the ability of the authorities to justify the current system and the 2001 decision by the European Commission to sign it off as being an acceptable balance between the rights of the stakeholders.     

Changing housing policy: women escaping domestic violence

Domestic violence has risen up the political agenda, as women's action has inspired changes in police, social work and legal practice. At the same time, one of the oldest pieces of legislation that protected women from violence - the Homeless Persons Act of 1977 - has been transmuted into the Housing Act of 1996. This legislation was introduced by a Conservative government, which was anxious to reduce the rights of homeless people to secure permanent accommodation, on the grounds that these rights gave incentives to pregnancy, lone parenthood and economic migrants. New Labour have softened the Housing Act to give more scope to local authorities to respond to homelessness. This article asks: What are the implications of changing homelessness rights under this legislation and subsequent regulations for women's ability to escape violent relationships and find long term solutions to the housing needs which domestic violence creates? How new is New Labour policy as expressed in housing regulations and its policy Green Paper?     

COMPARING ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE

Among the many important changes wrought by Regulation 1/2003are the decentralization of responsibility for enforcing EUcompetition law from Brussels to Member States and the creationof the European Competition Network to encourage coordinationand information-sharing among the 26 competition authoritiesin the EU. This article contrasts Europe's new system of competitionenforcement under Regulation 1/2003 with that of the UnitedStates. I focus upon two of the more significant features ofthe U.S. system: the dual legislative and enforcement authorityof the States and the Federal Government, and private enforcement.The Commission is presently evaluating measures to facilitateprivate enforcement and is set to release a Green Paper on thattopic later this year. I highlight a few characteristics thathave made private enforcement such a significant component ofthe U.S. antitrust regime, in some ways and at some times providingtoo much incentive for plaintiffs, at the expense of neutralor procompetitive business activity.     

Telecommunications terminal equipment: EEC commission opens the market

The 12 Member States of the European Economic Community (EEC) are legally obliged by the Treaty of Rome, as amended by the Single European Act, to abolish all of the remaining physical, technical and fiscal barriers between them by 31 December 1992. The Single European Act, which sets the 1992 deadline, defines the envisaged internal market as “an area without internal frontiers”.The creation of a common European market for telecommunications services and equipment is both an essential prerequisite and an important part of the “internal market”.In its Green Paper on the Development of the Common Market for Telecommunications Services and Equipment — “the Green Paper”¹⁾) — and a follow-up Communication²⁾, the Commission of the European Communities (“the Commission”) has set forth its main policy proposals in the telecommunications field. Implementation of these policy proposals by means of Community law directives is progressing rapidly, in particular with respect to terminal equipment. On 16 May 1988, the Commission issued a“Commission Directive on Competition in the Markets in Telecommunications Terminal Equipment” — “Terminal Equipment Directive” —³⁾ based on its regulatory powers under Art. 90(3) of the Treaty of Rome (“EEC Treaty”).This article explores the regulatory scope of the Terminal Equipment Directive which has recently been challenged by the French government before the European Court of Justice.     

COMMERCIAL AGENCY AGREEMENTS, VERTICAL RESTRAINTS, AND THE LIMITS OF ARTICLE 81(1) EC: BETWEEN HIERARCHIES AND NETWORKS

Commercial agency agreements benefit from a specific competitionlaw regime with regards to the application of Article 81 ofthe Treaty of the European Communities (hereinafter Article81). Although they may contain clauses that can produce anticompetitiveeffects, such as minimum price fixing, these are generally foundoutside the scope of Article 81 paragraph 1 [hereinafter Article81(1)]. In comparison, if a franchise or selective distributionagreement contains resale price maintenance clauses, Article81(1) may apply. The existence of a distinct competition lawregime for commercial agency agreements constitutes a paradox,as from an allocative efficiency perspective it makes no senseto distinguish between the two situations. By adopting a new-institutionaleconomics perspective, this study will provide a justificationfor this specific competition law regime. The agency agreementsexception will be considered as a specific form of the singleentity defense that operates in situations of hierarchy. Othervertical restraints are mainly organizational mechanisms usedin situations of network forms of organization. The distinctionestablished between these agreements could thus be theoreticallydefended. More generally, the comparative institutional analysisof vertical restraints will provide a useful insight to delimitthe boundaries of Article 81(1).     

The European Court of Justice and the Annulment of the Tobacco Advertisement Directive: Friend of National Sovereignty or Foe of Public Health?

In Case C-376/98 Germany v Council the European Court of Justice annulled a Directive which banned the advertisement and sponsorship of tobacco. The judgment sanctions regulatory policy-making at the national rather than the Community level. The paper examines the legal basis of the annulment, its effect on economic efficiency and the implied role of the Court in the formulation of public policy in Europe. Within the institutional limits of the judicial power to determine policy, the Court focused on whether or not disparate national laws restrict free movement and distort competition and affirmed the primacy of the nation state to regulate economic activity.     

COMPLEMENTARITY AND COOPERATIVE JUSTICE AHEAD OF THEIR TIME? THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION,FACT-FINDING AND EVIDENCE

Today, many international criminal lawyers claim that the future of international law is domestic. The example of the United Nations War Crimes Commission (UNWCC) shows that this might not only be the future, but also the past. This article analyzes the practice of the Commission (1943–1948), with a particular emphasis on facts, evidence and interaction with domestic authorities. It argues that the UNWCC marked an early counter-model to the idea of military justice that prevailed in many World War II accountability initiatives, and an alternative to the centralized and situation-specific enforcement model under the umbrella of United Nations (UN) peace maintenance. The Commission represents a cooperative approach to justice and sovereignty that has got lost in the course of the second half of the twentieth century. In the mid-1940s, attention shifted quickly, and perhaps too early from the UNWCC itself to the idea of centralized enforcement under the umbrella of an International Criminal Court. The work of the Commission foreshadows many core dilemmas of contemporary international justice, including debates over independent investigative authority, proprio motu powers, the labelling and origin of core crimes (e.g. aggression, crimes against humanity), the treatment of group criminality (e.g. attribution of conduct) and evidentiary standards in proceedings. Similar structures are gradually re-emerging in the context of regional integration (e.g. ‘mutual trust’ under the European Area of Freedom, Security and Justice) or the operationalization of complementarity under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). But in terms of cooperation between major powers and use of international expertise and advice in criminal proceedings, international criminal justice is still in search of a modern UNWCC 2.0.     

Envisaging the Post-Brexit Landscape: An Articulation of the Likely Changes to the EU–UK Competition Policy Relationship

In the light of the outcome of the 23rd June 2016 UK referendum to leave the European Union and the May government’s consequent approach to Brexit, this paper explores the likely changes that these will bring to a key EU–UK relationship, the competition policy relationship. It is suggested that changes are likely not only in public enforcement and private actions but also in the need for a new competition cooperation architecture between the EU and the UK. In order to appreciate how the competition relationship is likely to change after Brexit, an understanding of the current architecture in respect of the said areas is necessary and thus outlined early in the paper. Thereafter, it is argued that, post the implementation period, as the UK will no longer come under the direct jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice or indeed be a member of the Single European Market, a considerable loosening or separation of the strands that shape the current EU–UK competition relationship will occur. This unwinding of the currently intertwined EU and UK competition regimes will affect both public enforcement and private actions, thereby opening up the possibility of further regulatory divergence, unless consciously checked. Moreover, as the separation will see the Commission’s jurisdictional remit no longer include the UK, the domain will become the sole regulatory concern of UK institutions, particularly the Competition and Markets Authority. This will lead to dual regulatory capture, often of significant and complex antitrust and merger cases, given the overlapping nature of EU and UK markets. Clearly, this necessitates the UK regulator having the appropriate staffing to vet such cases, as it moves from essentially a regional player to one on a par with the Commission and regulators in the USA and China. In fact, the dual capture of such cases reinforces the importance of effective cooperation between the EU and UK regulators. However, given that the current competition cooperation relationship will end at the conclusion of the implementation period, the paper articulates a likely new EU–UK competition cooperation architecture, reflecting the fact that the UK would be outside the EU, but still enabling close, effective cooperation. Of course, and echoing the EU, it is also in the UK’s interest to agree similar competition cooperation bilaterals with key non-EU regulators. Yet, because this will take time, and because cooperation can indeed fail, the UK, like the EU, must ensure its competition instruments have the necessary extra-territorial reach.     

A review of telecom markets in the EU: What did the European Commission learn or not from the past?

The EU telecom regulation relies on a market-by-market sunset approach. In order to facilitate the market review of national regulatory authorities, the European Commission has offered two successive sets of recommended markets susceptible to ex ante regulation. The inclusion or exclusion of a recommended telecom market is analyzed on its competition conditions across the EU. Beginning in 2014 the European Commission published the draft third Market Recommendation. This article aims to give a critical evaluation of those recommended markets by surveying the competition situations on every telecom market in the EU Member States. It observes that while the drafted Third Recommendation makes a reasonable assessment for most telecom markets, it may not have appropriately addressed markets such as retail fixed access, wholesale call origination, wholesale fixed and mobile call termination, wholesale high-quality access, and wholesale broadcasting transmission.     

Health and Efficiency: Community Law and National Health Systems in the Light of Müller-Fauré

In Müller-Fauré the Court of Justice has made clear that restricting patients to receiving medical services from their domestic health systems is often contrary to EC Treaty rules on the free movement of services, particularly where the treatment is not in-patient. The patient should generally be able to go abroad for treatment at the expense of their national health authority. This has structural and financial repercussions for health care systems in several Member States, including the United Kingdom, whose systems are premised upon captive patients. It also has broader implications for welfare harmonisation and provision in the European Union. Exceptions are possible, where the implications for the national health system would be very serious, but Müller-Fauré indicates that the Court will not allow national courts or authorities to rely on these too freely.     

Settlement Agreements: The European Perspective

Key points. This note provides a brief consideration of pasttreatment of settlement agreements in Europe and a considerationof the underlying rationale for scrutinizing such agreementsunder EC competition law. It suggests that a reason for lessfocus by the authorities in Europe than in the US is the generalinterest of the parties in keeping the details of such agreementsconfidential, combined with a lack of any obligation to notifythe authorities. Practical significance. Companies should be reminded of thepossible application of the EC rules to patent settlement agreementsat a time when the Commission has shown a renewed willingnessto review conduct relating to IP and when national authoritiessuch as the OFT have reiterated a willingness to get to gripswith conduct that delays generic entry.     

The economic analysis of antitrust consents

Henry G. Manne, our friend, Mentor, and colleague, was a pioneer in the economic analysis of law. By consistently challenging the notion that existing institutions were well understood, he expanded the domain of economics to new and fertile ground. In that spirit, our goal in this article is to bring out of the shadows an institution that has thus far evaded the light of economic analysis: antitrust consents. In our view, competition authorities around the world should be asking themselves what ratio of litigation to settlement is optimal for their agency. Over the last 35 years, the United States Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice have shifted dramatically toward greater reliance upon consent decrees than upon litigation to resolve antitrust disputes. As an aid to national competition agencies considering the desirability of adopting a similar approach, we focus upon the importance of economic analysis in evaluating movement along the continuum from a law enforcement model to a regulatory model of agency behavior. We draw upon the U.S. experience to substantiate our claim that the costs associated with a shift toward the regulatory model, including the potential distortion in the development of substantive antitrust doctrine, may be under-appreciated and discernable only in the long run. We acknowledge that consent decrees can and should be an important tool in an antitrust agency’s toolkit for resolving antitrust disputes. We contend, however, that a full economic analysis of reliance primarily upon consent decrees is necessary to inform each competition agency’s strategic decision about the optimal mix of law enforcement and regulatory techniques.     

Evidentiary Issues in the ICJ's Genocide Judgment

Despite the commitment by the International Court of Justice(ICJ or the Court) in clarifying underlying methods and guidelinesof its approach to fact-finding and evidence, it can be doubtedwhether the judgment delivered in the Bosnia and Herzegovinav. Serbia case genuinely marked a decisive step towards a moretransparent and reliable methodology for evidentiary matters.Behind the formula of ‘fully conclusive evidence’,when dealing with Articles II and III of the Genocide Conventionthe Court adopted for all practical purposes a typical criminallaw ‘beyond any reasonable doubt’ standard of proof.By this choice the Court upheld in substance the argument putforward by Serbia that even if the questions of state responsibilityfor acts of genocide are not excluded by the scope of the Convention,they must nevertheless be judged by the same parameters of individualcriminal responsibility. In reaching its conclusions the Courtrelied heavily on the jurisprudence of the ICTY, both as regardsthe ascertainment of facts and their legal qualification. Itremains to be seen whether in future cases the Court will beable to adopt a similar criminal court posture, and whetherit will be similarly prepared to rely on the findings of otherinternational tribunals such as the International Criminal Court,which is not established by the Security Council.     

The Landed Estates Court,Ireland

The Landed Estates Court was the successor to the Incumbered Estates Commission, which had been established in the hope of providing a solution to the problems in Ireland which arose from the ownership and occupation of land. Initially controversial, the Commission had proved in the long run successful. The Landed Estates Court continued the work of the Commission, but unlike its predecessor was established as a permanent tribunal. This article aims to explain how the Court came into being, to consider the work it carried out, and to afford some understanding of the judges who sat in the Court and the issues with which they had to contend.     

THE ATTEMPTED MERGER BETWEEN GENERAL ELECTRIC AND HONEYWELL: A CASE STUDY OF TRANSATLANTIC CONFLICT

The thwarted merger of General Electric and Honeywell standsout, so far, as the only merger between US companies to be derailedsolely by the European anti-trust authorities, while being clearedby the US Department of Justice (DoJ) and 11 other jurisdictions.In this paper, the authors examine the European Commission'sdecision, and the theories underlying it and compare the Commission'sapproach with that followed by the DoJ. They observe that theCommission and the DoJ had a different assessment of broadlysimilar facts, and attempt to understand the source of the divergence.The authors find that (1) the horizontal effects identifiedby the European Commission rely on a particular perspectiveof market definition, which is debatable (and leaves some questionsunanswered); (2) the anticompetitive effects in the bundlingand Archimedean leveraging theories are not sufficiently robustthat they could be presumed (Accordingly, their likelihood shouldbe supported by strong evidence, but the evidence presentedby the Commission was far from compelling); (3) the deal mayhave involved significant efficiencies that were overlooked.These observations raise the suspicion that the Commission'sdecision may have been affected by bureaucratic capture, suchthat civil servants did not follow the mandate that had beenassigned to them. We find that the procedure enforced at thetime was vulnerable to capture and that the Commission had anincorrect perception of the standard of review that the Courtwould apply to its decision in the context of an appeal. Theaccountability to which the Commission felt subject was thusbiased downwards and enlarged the scope for capture. In addition,some (admittedly casual) evidence regarding the actual unfoldingof the procedure, as well as subsequent reforms of process andprocedure undertaken by the Commission, would support the viewthat significant problems arose in this area.