论规制失灵及政府规制能力的提升

政府规制是行政机关依据有关的法规,对微观经济主体的市场行为所进行的直接控制、约束或规范,其基本诉求是修正市场机制的先天性缺陷。规制失灵是政府规制未能达成预期目的,引致经济绩效与社会福利的净损失,包括规制制定失灵和规制执行失灵。原因主要有社会性规制匮乏与经济性规制过度并存;规制执行机构缺乏独立性,规制执行存在运动式的惯性,被规制者俘获规制者;规制规制者制度的粗陋性等。探讨规制失灵的对策,提升政府规制水平,有利于增强政府驾驭市场经济的能力和构建和谐社会的能力。     

制度变迁与医疗服务组织:一个研究述评

在中西方学者的文献中,关于制度变迁与医疗服务组织间关系的研究一般基于"制度结构"与"制度过程"的二元划分。前者聚焦于制度的规制性要素,重视制度设计和结构对组织的外部影响,更强调结果评估和工具性考量,这种研究取向广泛地体现于早期和主流的文献中;后者将视野转向规范性和文化认知性的制度要素,不只是将制度当成外生变量,也将其视作一种内生性过程,对组织的行动、组织间的互动和相依关系、行动者对制度的影响等实施了更多的观照,这类研究虽在中国学者的文献中并不多见,但20世纪后期以来已经成为一种趋势。总的来说,两类研究的转变既与学者们不同的学科背景和研究旨趣有关,也与各国医疗服务组织所处的社会环境的变迁深刻相连,并顺应了组织理论研究从理性系统范式迈向自然系统、开放系统范式的趋势。对于中国的研究者而言,需甄别西方式的分析工具,从本土的经验出发,深入考察医疗服务组织的实践,进而寻求一种适当的解释逻辑。     

西方国家的规制影响评价及其对我国的启示

以美国为代表的西方国家是实行规制影响评价最早的国家之一,经过一百多年的规制改革,到今天已经拥有了一套比较完善的规制影响评价体系.西方国家规制影响评价对我国规制改革的一些启示是:转变思想观念,尽早建立适合我国国情的机制影响评估制度;制定和完善相应的法律法规,确定规制影响评价的法律地位;建立独立的规划影响评价机构;培训规制者,让公众广泛地参与规制影响评价过程.     

行政规制的有效性分析

成本因素是影响制度变迁的核心因素。在行政规制的每一个行政程序中都包含了大量的交易费用，加什和哈恩做过出色的估算。行政规制作为一种制度安排，其效益首先表现为制度效率，这包括规制本身的效率：规制本身的运行所需成本及其所带来的效益（成本是否最低）和规制对社会经济发展的影响。文章通过对规制政策影响的分析，表明规制的效益可能是正的也可能是负的。行政规制的巨大成本和规制改革所带来的效益刺激，也反映在政府和市场主体在规制制度的选择上形成各自的预期。     

我国环境规制主体制度优化的几点建议

本文以独特的视角，对我国环境规制主体制度优化问题，提出了增强对环境规制者的制度约束与激励、优化规制方式与手段的改革建议。     

以行动者为中心的制度主义——基于转型政治体系的思考

基于对西方新制度主义政治学"制度中心观"普适性的反思和对低制度化政治体系的经验体认,试图建立一种适合分析低制度化转型政治体系的"以行动者为中心的新制度主义".为此,从行动者所掌握的政治资源、行动能力、利益和价值偏好等角度,把政治行动者分为精英(政治精英、经济精英和文化精英)和政治弱势群体,主要讨论了政治精英的特征及其内外部关系,及政治弱势群体的特征.从行动者的角度,分析初始制度的三种选择模式、制度的重要性与自主性、制度绩效、制度变迁与转型、观念与制度之间的关系等问题,认为制度的初始性选择取决于相关的不同行动者之间的博弈,最初的制度选择模式具有强烈的路径"锁定"作用,但这种作用是通过既得利益者的强制手段来维持的;不同制度的重要与否对不同的行动者来说是不一样的;制度的自主性来自其维持的行动者的政治资源与行动能力;制度绩效的评价不仅体现在它带来的绩效增长,而且还关系到绩效在不同行动者之间的分配公平与否,制度的变迁与转型实际上是行动者之间利益的调整与重新分配.     

中美政府规制改革动因之比较

规制改革是20世纪70年代以来全球性的政府改革运动,但是各国政府规制改革的动因却不尽一致。美国政府规制改革的动因主要在于过度规制本身的弊端、公共舆论对过度规制的怀疑引发的政府信任危机、信息技术革命的推动和解决被规制企业内部低效率问题的要求;而中国政府规制改革的动因主要在于建立社会主义市场经济体制的客观要求、加入WTO的压力、国有企业发展的困境和民主政治建设发展的需要,二者存在市场经济的发展程度不同、政府介入企业的深度不同、改革的技术基础不同和制度文化环境不同等差别,因此中国在借鉴美国规制改革的经验时必须谨慎地批判吸收。     

地方政府环境规制悖论的成因及其治理

改革开放以来,我国的经济发展带来了诸多环境问题,环境规制作为社会性规制的主要内容日益受到学界和政府部门的关注。地方政府环境规制悖论意指地方政府面临发展经济和环境规制之间的目标冲突和行为困境,它不同于规制俘获理论中的规制者被俘获,是规制者在更为严重意义上的主动就范。地方政府环境规制悖论的外在表现为:环境问题引发的突发事件增多,地方政府间环境规制"竞争到底"现象,"环境保护"异化为"污染保护"。而形成地方政府环境规制悖论的内在成因是:地方政府经济增长目标的凸显,环境规制机构职能的混杂,环境问题的隐性外部性。治理地方政府环境规制悖论的机制是:优化地方政府目标转化的制度环境,完善地方政府环境规制的法律法规,多样化环境规制政策的综合实施,明晰地方环境规制机构的职能边界,强化地方政府环境规制的协同治理。     

“委托-代理”问题由经济规制向法经济规制的演绎——以Rogersv Hill一案为例

现代企业制度的两权分立产生了"委托-代理"关系,由于委托人与代理人的效用函数不一致,导致了两者的利益冲突。经济学从效率角度出发对此进行规制,手段包括完全信息、内部控制、报酬激励等,但实际效果并不理想。20世纪50年代,在美国兴起的法经济学,将经济学的理论方法运用于法律制度分析,为"委托-代理"问题从经济学规制向法经济学规制的演绎提供了思路。     

社会合作规制的运作机理与行政法治回应

社会合作规制的兴起不仅是合作治理理论的逻辑推演,而且也为我国社会管理创新的社会实践所验证,理应成为我国规制模式的发展方向.多中心的规制主体、协同合作的规制行为、复合多样的规制责任以及合作高效的规制救济机制等构成了社会合作规制的运作机理.社会合作规制的运作,内在需要行政法治的保障.为此,我国行政法需要从行政法的国家与社会理论的发展、行政法制度根基的重构以及行政法原则和制度的创新等方面进行能动的法治回应.     

混合型监管：政策工具视野下的中国药品安全监管

在当代中国,社会性监管正在被越来越多地运用到公共卫生、生产安全和环境保护等公共治理过程.以药品安全监管为个案,结合西方社会性监管的有关理论,从建章立制、设立标准、建立奖惩机制以及优化执行系统四个政策工具角度,对当代中国药品安全监管的政策过程进行分析,结果表明,由于受到社会治理模式转型的影响,中国药品安全监管模式可以被界定为"混合型监管".一方面,中国的药品安全监管政策在形式上已经具有了一些现代监管型政府的特点,例如建章立制、设立标准,并综合运用经济、法律和行政等手段;另一方面,却在许多方面仍然带有许多前监管型政府特征,而这些特征大都是计划经济时代的产物.虽然监管型政府正在逐渐取代全能型政府而成为未来中国政府可能的治理模式,但是从政策分析的角度来看,监管型政府的建设在中国并不是一蹴而就的.建设一个高效的现代监管型政府,仍然是市场经济时代下中国国家政权建设过程中的重要目标.     

企业政治行为对管制动态均衡的隐蔽性影响

随着现代管制理论和管制实践的不断发展,研究管制均衡的动态性变化和企业影响管制均衡的隐蔽性行为,对于提高政府管制政策的合理性有着十分重要的意义.因为这些隐蔽性行为处在合法性的边缘或是范围以内,在实践中也越来越多地被企业所运用.从管制过程中的三个利益相关者--消费者、企业和政府之间的现实关系、各自追求不同的目标和相互作用入手,运用Stigle-Peltzman的管制均衡模型研究了政府管制机制从初始设计到现实执行结果之间的演变轨迹,并在此基础上通过对该模型进一步的推理分析和案例研究得出结论,企业运用政治行为对管制动态均衡进行隐蔽性影响,使其向有利于自身的方向发生动态的偏离,从而获取超额利润的机制和作用方式.主要有:利用管制政策的相对静态性,通过隐蔽信息产生管制错位;削弱消费者的影响力,改变政府边际效用替代率.进一步阐述了管制错位和政府失灵的经济学机理,对现有的管制理论和企业政治行为理论进行了拓展,这对提高经济转型时期的我国政府管制政策的合理性具有积极的意义.     

Testing responsive regulation in regulatory enforcement

The policy ideals of responsive regulation have been developed on the basis of substantial empirical evidence. The overall formulation of responsive regulation theory itself, however, has rarely been empirically tested. This article sets out the theoretical concept of responsive regulation in the context of business regulation enforcement and discusses how we might operationalize and empirically measure it. We develop two alternative theoretical interpretations of responsive regulatory enforcement: “tit for tat” responsive regulation and “restorative justice” responsive regulation. We then measure business firms' perceptions of the reactions and counter‐reactions of a regulatory enforcement agency throughout the investigation and enforcement process. We find little evidence of tit for tat responsiveness actually occurring in practice. To the extent that tit for tat responsiveness does exist, we find a small amount of evidence that it has the hypothesized effects on behavior but not on attitudes. We find clearer evidence of restorative justice responsiveness having the hypothesized effects on attitudes but not on behavior.     

The politics of regulatory enforcement and compliance: Theorizing and operationalizing political influences

There is broad consensus in the literature on regulatory enforcement and compliance that politics matters. However, there is little scholarly convergence on what politics is or rigorous theorization and empirical testing of how politics matters. Many enforcement and compliance studies omit political variables altogether. Among those that address political influences on regulatory outcomes, politics has been defined in myriad ways and, too often, left undefined. Even when political constructs are explicitly operationalized, the mechanisms by which they influence regulatory outcomes are thinly hypothesized or simply ignored. If politics is truly as important to enforcement and compliance outcomes as everyone in the field seems to agree, regulatory scholarship must make a more sustained and systematic effort to understand their relationship, because overlooking this connection risks missing what is actually driving regulatory outcomes. This article examines how the construct of “politics” has been conceptualized in regulatory theory and analyzes how it has been operationalized in empirical studies of regulatory enforcement and compliance outcomes. It brings together scholarship across disciplines that rarely speak but have much to say to one another on this subject in order to constitute a field around the politics of regulation. The goal is to sharpen theoretical and empirical understandings of when and how regulation works by better accounting for the role politics plays in its enforcement.     

Co‐enforcing Labor standards: the unique contributions of state and worker organizations in Argentina and the United States

Labor inspection is a central response to the tremendous gap between formal regulations and outcomes for workers throughout the world. Scholarly and policy debates on labor regulation have focused on improving the targeting of enforcement, changing strategies of street‐level agents, and creating private alternatives to state regulation. This paper argues that these proposals, while important, fail to systematically incorporate the potential contributions of worker organizations and, as a result, overlook opportunities for co‐enforcing labor standards, a key element of labor inspection. By contrast, we develop a framework to analyze the relationships between worker organizations and state regulators that underpin co‐enforcement. We ground this framework empirically in comparative cases, set in Argentina and the United States, presenting two cases of co‐enforcement in highly different institutional contexts. In so doing, we seek to illuminate key attributes of labor inspection and guide attempts to enhance enforcement by forging partnerships between regulators and worker organizations.     

A comparative analysis of Inspector responses to complaints about psychosocial and physical hazards

Work Health and Safety Inspectors are at the forefront of efforts to protect workers from harm from psychosocial hazards, yet the application of regulatory theory to their practice has been limited. Drawing on models of responsive regulation and strategic enforcement, we analyze extensive (N = 46,348) complaint and incident notification data from an Australian Work Health and Safety Inspectorate, to compare Inspectors' responses to psychosocial versus non-psychosocial hazards. We found psychosocial hazards were less likely to be actioned than non-psychosocial hazards. When they were actioned, psychosocial hazards saw more Inspector activity, but fewer enforcement notices than non-psychosocial hazards. These findings are inconsistent with the version of responsive regulation espoused by the regulator. Our theoretical conclusion is that Weil's strategic enforcement approach is likely to offer greater possibilities for guiding future resource allocation.     

Regulatory Competition and Environmental Enforcement: Is There a Race to the Bottom?

This article examines several of the key hypotheses suggested by the race to the bottom theory in environmental regulation. The research studies annual state-level enforcement of federal air, water, and hazardous waste pollution control regulation, covering the period from 1985 to 2000. Specifically, the study estimates a series of strategic interaction models to examine whether a state's environmental regulatory behavior is influenced by the regulatory behavior of the states with which it competes for economic investment. While there is clear evidence of strategic interaction in state environmental regulatory behavior, states do not respond in the asymmetric manner suggested by the race to the bottom theory.     

Responsive regulation at the Dutch Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority: An empirical assessment of assumptions underlying the theory

Responsive regulation usually boils down to the assumption that enforcers should not shift to coercing before it has become clear that persuading does not work. This presupposes that it is possible to determine what the correct enforcement style is, that enforcers can apply the most suitable style, and that enforcers control the negative unintended consequences of their conduct. We have studied the applicability of these presuppositions at the Dutch Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority by way of observations, interviews, and a survey. The applicability of all three presuppositions has proven problematic; enforcement agents apply different styles in comparable cases; they are impeded in applying the most appropriate style; and they do not control the perverse consequences of their conduct because regulatees tend to perceive it as more coercive than intended by inspectors. Our findings are not unique to this inspectorate and hence raise questions about the applicability of the theory of responsive regulation.     

Gorillas in the closet? Public and private actors in the enforcement of transnational private regulation

This paper examines to what extent the background presence of state regulatory capacity – at times referred to as the “regulatory gorilla in the closet” – is a necessary precondition for the effective enforcement of transnational private regulation. By drawing on regulatory regimes in the areas of advertising and food safety, it identifies conditions under which (the potential of) public regulatory intervention can bolster the capacity of private actors to enforce transnational private regulation. These involve the overlap between norms, objectives, and interests of public and private regulation; the institutional design of regulatory enforcement; compliance with due process standards; and information management and data sharing. The paper argues that while public intervention remains important for the effective enforcement of transnational private regulation, governmental actors – both national and international – should create the necessary preconditions to strengthen private regulatory enforcement, as it can also enhance their own regulatory capacity, in particular, in transnational contexts.