从权利到工具:失效专利管理研究

失效专利是法律效力的丧失而非价值的丧失,通过价值评估及专利挖掘后完全可以将失去法律保护的这项权利转化为有力的工具,对失效专利进行事后管理可挖掘其剩余价值,促进产业进步。本文从失效专利的概念界定、失效原因及管理的必要性三方面出发,系统梳理和总结了学界关于失效专利管理的相关研究文献。研究发现,失效专利的管理主要围绕专利价值评估、专利申请与审查制度等因素展开。但当前研究在界定失效专利的定义及范围上并不统一,未形成明确的专利价值评估体系,也缺乏针对其管理的必要性分析。鉴于此,对失效专利进行管理需遵从以下路径:首先要厘清失效专利的定义并分析其失效原因,其次要总结失效专利管理的必要性及专利失效规律,最后从失效专利原权利人、相关市场企业以及政府部门等多主体视角出发提出管理对策,使失效专利管理秩序化、科学化。     

Exploring the Patent Explosion

This paper looks more closely at the sources of patent growth in the United States since 1984. It confirms that the increase is largely due to U.S. patenters, with an earlier surge in Asia, and some increase in Europe. Growth has taken place in all technologies, but not in all industries, being concentrated in the electrical, electronics, computing, and scientific instruments industries. It then examines whether these patents are valued by the market. We know from survey evidence that patents in these industries are not usually considered important for appropriability, but are sometimes considered necessary to secure financing for entering the industry. I compare the market value of patents held by entrant firms to those held by incumbents (controlling for R&D). Using data on publicly traded firms 1980--1989, I find that in industries based on electrical and mechanical technologies the market value of entrants' patents is positive in the post-1984 period (after the patenting surge), but not before, when patents were relatively unimportant in these industries. Also, the value of patent rights in complex product industries (where each product relies on many patents held by a number of other firms) is much higher for entrants than incumbents in the post-1984 period. For discrete product industries (where each product relies on only a few patents, and where the importance of patents for appropriability has traditionally been higher), there is no difference between incumbents and entrants.     

Patent-Secret Mix in Complex Product Firms

Different protection mechanisms may be employed at the sametime when an innovation is comprised of separately protectablecomponents. If patents and trade secrets can be mixed in protectingsingle innovations, a strengthening in patent breadth may inducea lower level of patenting, as innovators are more prone torely on secrecy.     

The contract theory of patents

Two distinct theories of patents, the “reward theory” and the “contract theory,” are customarily adopted by the courts to justify the patent system. The reward theory maintains that the function of the patent system is to remunerate successful innovators so as to encourage R&D effort. In contrast, the contract theory holds that the function of the patent system is to promote the diffusion of innovative knowledge. Assuming that in the absence of patent protection innovators would rely on trade secrecy, it views patents as a contract between innovators and society whereby a property right is granted in exchange for disclosure.This paper develops an economic analysis of the contract theory of patents. To disentangle the disclosure from the reward motive for granting patents, we assume that the innovation process is entirely serendipitous, so that R&D effort is not a concern. Our main finding is that the disclosure motive alone suffices to justify the grant of patents. The optimal patent duration should strike a balance between the incentive to induce disclosure and the aim of limiting the monopoly distortion induced by patents.     

Does strong patent protection facilitate international technology transfer? Some evidence from licensing contracts of Japanese firms

This paper examines how patent protection in a technology recipient country affects international technology transfer. A theory suggests that the effect of stronger patent protection on technology transfer is negative if the binding constraint is the imitation profitability and positive if it is the incentive for the licensor to undertake technology transfer. We evaluate these implications by examining the variations of the structure of licensing contracts across countries, based on a newly collected database of licensing contracts by Japanese firms. Our major findings are the following. First, the incidence of know-how licensing, either in the pure or in the bundled form, relative to that of pure patent licensing, declines significantly with the level of foreign patent protection. This indicates a limited role of patents for facilitating know-how licensing. Secondly, the probability and the strength of ownership control by a licensor declines with the level of patent protection, indicating a positive effect of stronger patent protection in expanding the scope of the recipients of technology transfer.

人工智能技术对专利制度的挑战与应对

人工智能在专利发明创造领域参与程度逐渐深化,对现行的专利法带来诸多挑战。一是人工智能算法的可专利主题。因人工智能算法看似与传统的数学算法一致而被视为“智力活动的规则和方法”,尽管存有争议,但从专利法促进新技术发展和“与时俱进”的时代使命出发给予其专利保护是较为务实的做法。二是人工智能时代的专利审查标准。针对传统专利性判断标准已在人工智能时代失灵,适当调整“专利三性”,确立适合于人工智能专利的“新三性”标准。三是人工智能生成发明权利主体的界定。在人为因素仍作用的弱人工智能时代,可以基于专利法中“二元主体结构”,承认人工智能作为发明人的资格,同时将专利权赋予人工智能开发者或管理者。四是人工智能专利侵权认定。在人工智能专利侵权责任承担主体上采取动态区分规则:区分人工智能不同的发展阶段;区分不同阶段人类介入因素的作用;区分不同阶段不同主体对侵权结果的作用等。     

重大突发公共卫生危机下的药品专利强制许可——现实需要、伦理因应与法律安排

新型冠状病毒肺炎于2019年底在我国爆发并迅速扩散,引发了全国性的重大突发公共卫生危机。为实现特效专利药品的充分供给,实施药品专利强制许可是最为高效的选择,不仅可以消解药品专利市场运营中所固有的“反公有地”悲剧,同时也可以有效规避药品专利国际合作中技术劫持与贸易倾轧。对于以人为本的主体性原则和与人为善的有益性原则两项伦理准则的遵循,保证了药品专利强制许可实施的伦理正义;而对于药品专利强制许可申请主体扩展和药品专利强制许可补偿标准细化两项法律完善举措的采取,则使我国药品专利强制许可机制克服了自身缺陷,能够在实践中有序运行,为重大突发公共卫生危机的化解提供制度支撑。     

The transfer of public science to patented technology: A case study in agricultural science

One of the most difficult challenges in technology transfer is to measure the movement of knowledge from basic scientific research to industrial technology. This paper will report on a study of the linkage between science supported by the Agricultural Research Service (ARS) and patented technology. This study traced the citations from U.S. patents issued in 1987–88 and 1993–94 to scientific research papers linked to the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). The number of patent citations to ARS papers, and to other USDA-supported papers has increased fourfold over the six-year period. A distinct difference also exists between the patent-cited ARS papers and patent-cited extramural USDA-supported papers: ARS papers are in more agriculturally related journals, while the extramural papers were in more basic and biomedical journals. USDA-supported papers were overwhelmingly cited by U.S.-invented patents (in a patent system in which half the patents are foreign-invented). In the primary field of ARS papers (Biology), they are cited much more often by patents than Biology papers from any other publishing organization. Since the publishing organizations and support sources of all the papers cited in these patents have now been identified, we can study the transfer of scientific results to patented technology by institution, by agency, or by any other category of patent or paper holder. The authors thank the Agricultural Research Service of the U.S. Department of Agricultural, especially Dr. Richard Parry, for this paper' use of the study performed for them by CHI Research, Inc. (Grant number 59-0790-6-054)     

Patents impediment or expedient to technology transfer

This paper examines the role that patents play in transferring technology. The history of our patent system and the requirements for patentability are reviewed. The option of keeping an invention as a trade secret rather than applying for a patent is presented. The paper also discusses the rationale behind the government’s change in its policy which permits exclusive licensing of public-owned patents. The author concludes that patents are not a barrier but a significant help in promoting technology transfer.     

The Patent Examiner Sweepstakes

This article presents evidence that patent value varies with random examiner assignment at the U.S. Patent Office. Prior work analyzed firm growth as a function of review by “easy” examiners who grant patents at a high rate. The current research looks past whether a patent is granted and instead focuses on how assignment to an “easy” or “hard” examiner influences the attributes of resultant patents. Focusing on their propensities to reject applications on novelty or obviousness grounds, analysis finds that patents issued by lenient examiners tend to be broader in scope, are more valuable to their owners, and elicit a larger stock market response when granted. Further analysis quantifies the level of variation (“noise”) among examiners. This inquiry finds that the noise level in issuing novelty rejections decreases with examiner experience, while variation among examiners issuing obviousness rejections actually increases with experience. A third line of investigation presents evidence that “stricter” examiners disproportionately reach the correct examination relative to more lenient counterparts. This conclusion is supported by “twin application” analysis comparing outcomes of related U.S. and European applications. Consistent with the literature using this method, the European Patent Office's outcome is considered the “gold standard” for examination, and thus, its decision to grant or deny is assumed correct.     

中小企业如何运用专利建立自己的“市场保护圈”

中小企业依据企业宗旨与发展目标、经济实力、优势资源的不同情况,选择专利投资.并依据实际情况,充分运用专利法赋予自己的权利在推出新产品之前,把涉及他人专利的问题解决好,得以合法利用;按照法定要求分析侵权问题,用足自己的权限;主动申请专利,建立中小企业自己"市场保护圈".在我国已经"入世"的情况下,中小企业如何运用专利,建立自己的"市场保护圈",在很大程度上会影响到自身的生存和发展.     

侵犯专利权犯罪刑事立法之比较研究——兼及我国专利权刑法保护的完善

从各国关于专利犯罪的刑事立法模式、罪名体系、保护对象、刑罚设置及追诉方式上看 ,既有许多共性 ,同时各具特色。完善我国大陆专利权刑法保护的基本构想 :第一 ,采取结合型立法模式 ,充分发挥附属刑法的作用 ;第二 ,完善罪名体系 ,将冒充专利和专利侵权行为纳入到刑法调控的范围 ;第三 ,设置多个量刑幅度 ,实行限额罚金制 ;第四 ,建立以自诉为主、公诉为辅的追诉模式     

侵犯知识产权罪若干问题研究

随着知识经济时代的临近,侵犯知识产权的各种违法犯罪必将日益突出。针对刑法规制知识产权的犯罪存在的一些疏漏,应当从以下几个方面予以完善;反向假冒应纳入假冒商标罪的范畴;在非专利产品上擅自使用专利标记、以自己的非专利产品假冒他人的专利产品、实施专利的行为,是假冒专利罪的具体表现形式;用故意及商业规模来限制侵犯著作权罪的调控范围。     

The contractual alternative to patents

A patent grants the holder a monopoly over the use of the patented invention for a specified time period. Although economists are generally opposed to monopoly, there seems to be a general consensus that the patent system is desirable.¹ The rationale for the patent system is that without ownership rights in inventions, there would not be optimal allocation of resources to inventive activities, just as with any other valuable resource over which there are not well-defined property rights. However, the patent system, since it confers monopoly rights, has its drawbacks as well. If independent parties are working simultaneously toward an invention, the first to produce the invention will receive a monopoly over its use, even though others may have been only a month behind. This may encourage inventors to work too intensively toward a patent, and could also have the effect of producing monopoly in a market that was characterized by competition before the patent was issued. In addition, competitors have an incentive to develop substitute processes to avoid infringement of the patent, when the use of the patented process would be more economical. A substitute for patents which provides ownership rights in an invention without governmental grant of a monopoly is the trade secret. The purpose of this paper is to introduce and develop the idea of the law of trade secrets as a contractual alternative to patents.     

Patent trolls in China: Some empirical data

Prior research found that the Chinese patent system is more pro-patentee than once believed. Patent owners performed much better in both infringement lawsuits and post-grant validity reviews in China than in many other countries, such as the United States and Germany. Also, after a finding of infringement, Chinese courts were quite lenient with regard to permanent injunctions. All these pro-patentee tendencies, together with the rapid growth of China's software industry, cast doubt on the prevalence of troll activities in China. This article analyzes 3435 patent infringement lawsuits decided by local people's courts in China in 2015 and 2016 and provides some valuable insights into two important questions: how often do patent trolls litigate in China, and do they adopt different litigation tactics from practicing entities? Based on empirical data, this article finds that, interestingly, both the number and the size of patent trolls in China are relatively small. Although nearly half (1534, or 44.7%) of all patent infringement lawsuits were initiated by non-practicing entities (NPEs), individual inventors, instead of professional businesses, accounted for an overwhelming majority of all NPE cases (1528, or 99.6%). Patent assertion entities (PAEs), by contrast, only initiated four out of 3435 cases (0.1%) in the two-year period under review. If only patents in the computer industry are taken into consideration, then PAEs initiated zero computer-related lawsuits. Nonetheless, this article does observe some trollish litigation tactics worthy of attention and further research. There were 47 repeat litigants – litigants who initiated 10 or more cases; some performed “commercial enforcement,” asserting patents against multiple small retailers instead of against one large manufacturer; and patent owners, on average, waited for a rather long time before enforcing their patents in China. All these behaviors may introduce bias to the incentives to innovate and put pressure on the overall functioning of the Chinese patent system.     

影响发明或实用新型专利权稳定性的实质因素

有关专利权稳定性的问题，在实践中表现为：一方面是，申请人不正当地将不符合专利法要求的技术方案拿来申请并获得专利权；另一方面是，审查过程中，由于制度方面的因素，将不应当授权的技术方案错误地授予专利权，造成了劣质专利的泛滥。深入研究专利权稳定性问题，探索提高专利权稳定性的有效途径，具有重要的理论和现实意义。     

The nexus between science and industry: evidence from faculty inventions

Knowledge transfer from science to industry has been shown to be beneficial for the corporate partner. In order to get a better understanding of the reasons behind these positive effects, this study focuses on the junction of science and industry by comparing characteristics of academic inventions that are transferred to industry and those staying in the public sector. Academic inventions are identified via patent applications of German academic scientists. We find that academic patents assigned to corporations are more likely to enable firms reaping short term rather than, possibly more uncertain, long-run returns, in contrast to patents that stay in the public sector. Firms also strive for academic inventions with a high blocking potential in technology markets. Academic patents issued to corporations appear to reflect less complex inventions as compared to inventions that are patented by the public science sector.     

Technology transfer offices and university patenting in Sweden and Germany

This paper analyses the factors that impact on the decision of researchers to patent their research results. Particular emphasis is put on the role of technology transfer offices. It builds on a survey of university professors in Sweden and Germany. The regression results show that researchers that received support from the public infrastructure and researchers that have experience with the patenting system—through own previous patents or joint patent applications with firms—are much more likely to apply for patents.     

专利价值之谜及其理论求解

在当今专利制度中,尽管多数专利的价值往往少于专利申请和维持的费用,但专利申请案和授权量却急剧增长。这被称之为专利价值之谜,其理论求解应从专利获取的目的出发。竞争者之所以通过申请大量专利的方式形成专利组合,是因为它既是竞争者的防卫之盾,也是其进攻之矛。非竞争者所拥有的专利组合备受人们指责;但事实上,非实施企业拥有的专利质量大都可靠。此外,大量专利的形成是专利制度为鼓励专利竞赛有意而为的结果。因为由大量专利结合而成的专利组合能够区分市场上真正的创新者和模仿者,从而保障创新者的竞争优势。我国应该采取合理的措施鼓励我国的创新企业形成自己的专利组合。