Terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir in theory and practice

This article argues there is a need for a more nuanced analysis of terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir than has been available so far. First, the popular legitimacy of violent groups has little bearing on their operation. Rather, the keys to the intensity of terrorist activity are held by Pakistan's military establishment. Second, the supposedly secular-nationalist movement of the early 1990s was in fact deeply Islamist in character; there has been a greater unity of thought underpinning terrorism than the literature admits. Finally, the article argues, the operation of terrorism needs to be read not simply in the limited context of Jammu and Kashmir, but as part of a larger South Asian crisis of identity.     

Homegrown Terrorism in the West

The London bombings in 2005 led to the perception that the terrorist threat had changed from external to internal. This became conceptualized shortly after as “homegrown terrorism.” This article deals with the meaning and scope of this phenomenon. We begin by tracing an ambiguity in the term “homegrown,” which is both about belonging in the West and autonomy from terrorist groups abroad. A quantitative study of Islamist terrorism in the West since 1989 reveals an increase in both internal and autonomous terrorism since 2003 and that most plots are now internal—but not autonomous. Finally we suggest that an increase in autonomous terrorism is a transitory phenomenon.     

Indian counterterrorism policy and the influence of the Global War on Terror

India has been a major victim of Islamist terrorism and has long fought against an array of Islamist terrorist groups. Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, India's previously lonely struggle against terrorism has taken place against the background of the US-led Global War on Terror (GWOT). After outlining India's Islamist terrorist challenge, this article examines India's evolving approach to counterterrorism and how the GWOT has influenced it. It concludes that India has adopted a localized, defensive, law-and-order approach to counterterrorism which has evolved in response to various attacks over the years but still remains seriously underdeveloped. The GWOT has influenced Indian counterterrorism in important ways, although its influence has been subtle and indirect rather than transformative. The GWOT has enhanced Indo-American counterterror cooperation, shaped India's terror environment by launching the war in Afghanistan and enriched Indian counterterrorism with American experience. Just as important, it has also had an impact on India's debate on counterterrorism, civil liberties and human rights.     

Surveying American State Police Agencies About Terrorism Threats,Terrorism Sources,and Terrorism Definitions

This study presents American state police agencies' perceptions about three significant terrorism and public safety issues. First, we asked about the threat posed by specified extremist groups nationally and to their state. We asked about the number of such groups and their supporters, and the number of activities each group participates in during a typical year in their state. We also asked about the number of criminal incidents each group commits and the number of their supporters arrested in a typical year. Second, we asked the agencies to rate the usefulness of fifteen specified terrorism sources. Third, we queried the agencies about their views of eight terrorism definitions. These data were collected by surveying the fifty state police agencies in the United States. We discovered widespread concern about the criminal activities of various extremist groups, with a particular concern about the threat of Islamic jihadists. Interestingly, although the top rated threat was Islamic jihadists, the respondents indicated that other types of groups were much more criminally active. Further, respondents indicated that various open and non-open sources were valuable terrorism sources. Finally, most respondents reacted more favorably to official terrorism definitions—especially the FBI's—as opposed to academic definitions. We conclude with a discussion of the policy implications of our findings and we outline directions for future research.     

The Role of Safe Havens in Islamist Terrorism

This article will develop an explanatory theory on terrorist safe havens. Focusing on Islamist Terrorist networks, this article argues that four specific conditions are necessary for the establishment of a safe haven for Islamist terrorist networks: geographic features, weak governance, history of corruption and violence, and poverty. At the conclusion of the article, the developed theory is applied to the Tri-Border Area of South America (TBA), where the frontiers of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay meet, an area overlooked by the 9/11 National Commission Report's list of Islamist terrorists' safe havens.     

The United States' approach to Algeria's civil conflict: Implications for democratization,internal peace and anti-American violence

The United States' approach to Algeria's civil conflict has been based on the stringent assumption that a choice must be made between a secular government that is prowestern (although corrupt and repressive) and an Islamist regime that is anti-western (although equally repressive if allowed to govern). The article shows that this approach not only works to sustain authoritarianism in Algeria and reinforce a vicious cycle of poverry and civil violence, but also ignores the causal links between the practice of dictatorship in the country and the rise of anti-American violence. In this sense, America's foreign policy towards Algeria is a contributory factor to transnational terrorism. An alternative approach that is based on economic development and democracy promotion is proposed here to achieve sustainable democracy and internal peace in Algeria and weaken the forces that give rise to antiAmerican violence.     

The Evolution of Jihadist Terrorism in Morocco

Over the last few years, Moroccans have been disproportionately involved in jihadist terrorism. Morocco has been increasingly identified as one of the largest producers of terrorists and insurgents in Afghanistan, Iraq, and throughout Europe. This article examines the factors behind the emergence of jihadist terrorism in Morocco, and how this terrorist threat has gone beyond this country's borders. Three factors have contributed to this development: the influence of global jihad on potential Moroccan jihadists; the growing Islamization of the country; and deteriorating socioeconomic conditions. In analyzing these variables, special attention will be paid to the Casablanca terrorist attacks on May 16, 2003, marking the debut of suicide terrorism in Morocco. The article will also examine the principal counterterrorist initiatives Morocco has implemented in response to this threat.     

Defeating the Sixth Column: Intelligence and Strategy in the War on Islamist Terrorism

For the first time since the late 1940s, Washington is attempting a comprehensive analysis of the role and performance of the American intelligence system. In rethinking intelligence, it needs to address that the sixth column—Islamist terrorists residing in states that knowingly or unknowingly give them sanctuary—is the weak underbelly in the war on terror. To defeat this sixth column, important personnel, doctrinal, and cultural issues need to be addressed. The experience of other countries that have had success in fighting terrorism suggests that the United States must focus on offensive counterintelligence, penetrating terrorist groups, and creating mistrust among them.     

Women and Support for Terrorism in Pakistan

ABSTRACT

While there have been many scholarly inquiries about the sources of support for terrorism among Muslim publics, to date, scholars have generally not asked whether or not gender predicts support for Islamist militancy. Instead, most scholars and officials assume that “men of military age” are the most important segment of interest. Instead, gender is usually treated as a “control variable” rather than a “study variable,” reflecting the paucity of interest in this subject. This is likely an important scholarly and policy-analytic oversight. Many terrorist groups have women’s wings and women-oriented publications and other outreach programs because they understand the important role that mothers, wives, and sisters play in a male family member’s decision to take up arms with a terrorist group. In some conflicts, women also join as combatants. In this paper, we seek to address these scholarly lacunae by examining gender-wise support for two militant groups based in and operating from Pakistan: the Afghan Taliban, which has no female outreach program, and the sectarian Sipha-e-Sahaba-e-Pakistan, which does. We leverage a dataset drawn from a relatively large national survey of Pakistanis collected in 2011 to model support for these groups using gender as an independent variable along with other demographic and control variables. We find that females are significantly more likely to support the sectarian group with a women’s outreach-wing. In contrast, there is no significant gender effect on support for the Afghan Taliban. We argue, from these results, that gender deserves more attention in understanding who supports and participates in Islamist militancy.     

Provisional IRA Attacks on the UDR in Fermanagh and South Tyrone: Implications for the Study of Political Violence and Terrorism

This article continues a discussion begun in the 1990s on the degree to which Provisional Irish Republican Army activities were sectarian. Henry Patterson's recent contribution raises issues that concern not only interpretations of the Irish conflict but also have implications for the more general study of the causes and consequences of political violence and terrorism. After addressing some of these issues, Patterson's contribution is placed more firmly into the framework of the previous discussion. Then follows a careful examination of Irish Republican Army attacks on the locally recruited security forces in Fermanagh and South Tyrone, from the 1950s to today.     

The Ancient Fire: Religion and Suicide Terrorism

Does religion lead to greater destructiveness from suicide terrorism? And if so, how does it influence this form of political violence? Recent analyses of terrorism point to the significance of religion, but are divided as to whether religion itself matters, or certain types of religious terrorist groups are actually driving suicide terrorist violence. This article draws on social movement theory and recent work in the study of suicide terrorism to argue that religion influences the severity of suicide terrorist attacks as an ideology groups use to justify their struggle and gain public support. This effect occurs regardless of a group's goals or organizational nature. The theory is tested using a generalized estimating equation to account for multiple attacks by several groups. The study finds that the religious ideology of a group greatly increases the number of deaths from a suicide attack, even if varying group motivations and structural factors are taken into account. The article helps to clarify the effect of religion on contemporary terrorism, contributing to the study of both terrorism and religion and politics.     

Confrontations on the Issue of Terrorism Between Iran and the U.S. after 1979

The issue of terrorism has been a significant source of influence on the relationship between Iran and the U.S. since the Islamic Revolution. Iran's friendship with extremist groups that are designated as terrorist groups by the U.S. State Department is seriously challenging America's foreign policy. This article attempts to explore the prospect of confrontations on the issue of terrorism between Iran and the U.S. through a detailed analysis of their different interpretations and mutual recognitions of terrorism and through an in-depth analysis of the measures each party has taken regarding this confrontation. This article argues that the confrontation between Iran and the U.S. regarding the issue of terrorism is not strictly about terrorism. Rather, it is also about the conflicts of policies that result from different security interests and political values. Resolving the issue of terrorism depends on the reconciliation of the relationship between Iran and the U.S. Without mutual trust between the two nations, Iran will continue to support extremist groups in order to increase its influence against the external and internal pressures it is currently under, and the U.S. will continue to contain Iran's regional ambitions and seek changes in its behavior.     

Rethinking the Roots of Terrorism: Beyond Orthodox Terrorism Theory—A Critical Research Agenda∗

The orthodox understanding of terrorism does not seem to provide adequate means for explaining the root causes of terrorism. This study is an attempt to critically rethink the roots of terrorism by relocating the study of terrorism into a conceptual space in which it can gain access to the tools provided by conflict studies. As a result this work addresses a gap in the field of terrorism studies and provides an explanation and clarification of the existence of orthodox terrorism discourse and the creation of an alternative theoretical framework for rethinking the roots of terrorism.     

The Challenges of Conceptualizing Terrorism

This analysis begins by exploring various reasons that the concept of terrorism has evaded a widely agreed upon definition for so long despite the efforts of so many writers. Emphasis is placed on the difficulties associated with all “essentially contested concepts.” In addition, the investigation calls attention to such problems as conceptual “stretching” and “traveling.” In an effort to solve the difficulties, the inquiry attempts to determine a consensus definition of terrorism by turning to an empirical analysis of how the term has been employed by academics over the years. Specifically, the well-known definition developed by Alex Schmid, based upon responses to a questionnaire he circulated in 1985, is compared with the way the concept has been employed by contributors to the major journals in the field: Terrorism, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, and Terrorism and Political Violence. The 22 “definitional elements” of which Schmid's definition is composed are compared to the frequency with which they appear in the professional journals. If these elements appear frequently in both the Schmid definition and those employed by the journal contributors, they are then used to form a consensus definition of the concept. The most striking feature of this academic consensus over the meaning of terrorism is the virtual absence of references to the psychological element, heretofore widely thought to be at the heart of the concept.     

The Four Horsemen of Terrorism: It's Not Waves,It's Strains

David Rapoport's concept of Four Waves of terrorism, from Anarchist terrorism in the 1880s, through Nationalist and Marxist waves in the early and mid-twentieth century, to the present Religious Wave, is one of the most influential concepts in terrorism studies. However, this article argues that thinking about different types of terrorism as strains rather than waves better reflects both the empirical reality and the idea that terrorists learn from and emulate each other. Whereas the notion of waves suggests distinct iterations of terrorist violence driven by successive broad historical trends, the concept of strains and contagion emphasizes how terrorist groups draw on both contemporary and historical lessons in the development of their tactics, strategies, and goals. The authors identify four distinct strains in total—Socialist, Nationalist, Religious, and Exclusionist—and contend that it is possible to trace each strain back to a “patient zero” active in the 1850s.     

Examining the Distinct Effects of Emotive Triggers on Public Reactions to International Terrorism

In recent years, a growing body of research has set out to examine the role that emotions play in shaping political attitudes and behaviors regarding terrorism. However, one major issue that is generally overlooked is whether the thematic relevance of emotive triggers leads to differential effects on people's reactions to international terrorism. Specifically, does anger—regardless of its source—tend to drive people towards supporting an aggressive foreign policy option to counter terrorism, or do the thematic underpinnings of anger (i.e., the specific contents that trigger this particular emotion, such as watching a news story about a recent terrorist attack) matter vis-à-vis the policy choice? To address this gap, this study experimentally examines the impact of anger—induced by thematically relevant versus irrelevant emotive triggers—on people's cognitive processing and foreign policy preferences regarding international terrorism. Overall, we find that the induction of anger via thematically relevant emotive triggers leads to a higher tendency for selecting a military option, a lower amount of information acquisition, and a shorter processing time in response to terror-related incidents.     

Nuclear Terrorism Post-9/11: Assessing the Risks

This paper discusses, with an emphasis on the technical issues involved, some of the possible forms that nuclear terrorism might take, loosely referring to all forms of terrorism involving radioactive materials, such as crude nuclear weapons, radiological dispersal devices, and attacks on the nuclear infrastructure, including nuclear reactors. The first two forms of terrorism necessarily depend on terrorists' obtaining suitable materials, so the problem of nuclear smuggling, especially from the former Soviet Union (FSU), with its huge and decrepit nuclear complex, is addressed, as is the region's reservoir of unemployed or underemployed nuclear expertise. The West, however, is not ignored. As one observer remarked, Osama bin Laden might soon have more luck shopping for nuclear materials there than in the FSU. The paper concludes that although it is most unlikely that terrorists will detonate a true nuclear weapon, the other forms are real and pressing threats.     

Sources of Fujimori's Popularity: Neo-liberal Reform or Ending Terrorism

Much has been discussed regarding the support for Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori during the implementation of his 'fujishock' program. In the voting behavior literature, the role of Fujimori's success in ending the terrorism is mentioned, but is a mere footnote to the story. However, we present historical analysis, public opinion data and economic statistics to argue that had he not controlled terrorism, Fujimori would not have been able to implement his stabilization programs and maintain popular support. We first show that the problem of terrorism was paramount and Fujimori's success in ending it was greatly rewarded in terms of personal support. Second, we show that the subsequent gains in the economic situation can be traced to improvements in security, because the political and social risks inherent in terrorism significantly curtail domestic and foreign investment.     

Representative Democracy and Fighting Domestic Terrorism

Does more representative government improve states' ability to fight domestic terrorism? In prior work, democracies are seen as more susceptible to terrorism because their respect for human rights prevents them from fully eliminating terrorist groups. However, such extrajudicial aggression could also alienate large portions of the population and create the ideal conditions for an insurgency. I argue that since terrorism is the lowest-capacity form of political violence, it is natural that states that do best at deterring political violence experience the most terrorism. While representative democracies should see terrorist groups initiate spells of attacks at a greater frequency, full political representation should also galvanize major political actors to unite and eliminate terrorist threats. I test this assertion through statistical models that treat the process of terrorist group initiation and its duration and intensity separately. Results not only show that less consolidated democracies and autocracies experience longer and more intense terrorist campaigns, but that, in support of the theory's mechanisms, groups are more likely to shift to terrorism from insurgency when their political base gains more political representation. The results call the division among research programs of various political violence types into question.