The Hofstadgroup Revisited: Questioning its Status as a “Quintessential” Homegrown Jihadist Network

Despite the Dutch Hofstadgroup's status in the literature as a prime example of a homegrown Salafi-Jihadist terrorist network, the authors, using newly available primary sources, argue that this classification is to a large extent unwarranted. The lack of a rudimentary organizational structure, the existence of divergent views on the legitimacy and desirability of political violence, and the absence of collective action in pursuit of a violent goal rule out labeling the Hofstadgroup as a terrorist organization or network for the largest part of its 2002–2005 existence. A smaller subgroup of extremists did begin developing into a proto-terrorist inner circle from late 2003 onwards. In 2004, this extremist core brought forth the murderer of filmmaker Theo van Gogh. But it was only in 2005, when the remnants of the inner circle tried to resuscitate the Hofstadgroup in the wake of the arrests that had followed Van Gogh's death, that these individual actions were replaced by the communal efforts necessary to warrant the “jihadist network” label often ascribed to the Hofstadgroup. Arguably the most archetypical aspect of the Hofstadgroup case is its ability to illustrate the deleterious effects of the ongoing scarcity of primary sources-based research on terrorism.     

The Quantitative Analysis of Terrorism and Immigration: An Initial Exploration

This article uses immigration and other biographical data to refute much of the conventional wisdom about the relationship between terrorism and immigration. Using a database created from the biographical data of 373 terrorists, we have established a number of significant findings. Over forty percent of our database is made up of Western Nationals. Second, despite widespread alarms raised over terrorist infiltration from Mexico, we found no terrorist presence in Mexico and no terrorists who entered the U.S. from Mexico. Third, we found a sizeable terrorist presence in Canada and a number of Canadian-based terrorists who have entered the U.S. In addition to illuminating the terrorist networks entrenched in the West, this paper is also an attempt to advance the field of terrorism studies by taking a quantitative approach to data analysis.     

The Strength of Weak Terrorist Ties

The current age of technology, mass communication, and globalization makes networks analysis an especially useful tool for understanding cell-based terrorism. Some concepts from traditional networks analysis may be especially relevant. The Strength of Weak Ties hypothesis (SWT) is particularly promising and will be used here to demonstrate the usability of traditional networks analysis for studying modern terrorism. The findings suggest that the strength of weak terrorist ties may improve Al Qaeda's operational capabilities despite the group's decentralization following the U.S.-led military campaign in Afghanistan beginning in 2001.     

NATO and the war on terror: The organizational challenges of the post 9/11 world

This paper deals with NATO’s ability to contribute to the war on terrorism. The paper highlights the difficulties that the organization has encountered in dealing with a threat that is entirely different from the one that the organization was created to deal with. The paper discusses NATO’s new policies, al Qaeda’s transformation since 9/11, and the nature of terrorism. The paper suggests that although NATO has drafted a number of new antiterrorist policies they are all premised on the idea of fighting a war against terrorism as if terrorism were a well defined military enemy. We conclude by arguing that the organizational behavior demonstrated by NATO is consistent with what Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow predict in their organizational process model and that many of the difficulties encountered by NATO in the war against terrorism are due to the nature of the organization. An erratum to this article is available at .