Determinants and directions for Chinese weapons imports

This article assesses and presents the determinants and directions of Chinese acquisitions of weapons and weapons technology from abroad, focusing on major conventional weapons and their relevant technologies. Following a brief development of historical themes which continue to affect Chinese military‐related imports today, the study considers the principal contemporary domestic and international determinants which contribute to shaping Chinese arms import policies, and the type of foreign arms acquisitions likely to result from those policies. In analysing past and current security policies, weapons development policies, foreign weapons procurement policies, the study reaches four main conclusions. First, a wide range of problems — including prohibitive cost, political and bureaucratic infighting, absorptive capacities, managerial and administrative roadblocks, and supplier controls — stand in the way of a Chinese military modernization strategy based on foreign procurement. Second, with the exception of Sino‐Soviet cooperation in the 1950s, Chinese arms and arms technology acquisitions from abroad have consistently been relatively modest, sporadic, and problematic. Even in the case of current transfers from such suppliers as Israel and Russia, it is unclear the extent to which these countries are willing to part with significant amounts of top‐of‐the‐line systems and technologies. Third, the impact upon international security of the improvement of Chinese military capability through the acquisition of foreign weapons and technology is not likely to manifest itself in violent military disruptiveness, but rather in the nuanced and steady expansion of Chinese power and influence in parts of East Asia around China's periphery. Fourth, the military capabilities of China's arms clients will probably not be significantly improved through the acquisition of foreign weapons and weapons technologies by China. In sum, Chinese military modernization through arms and technology imports will continue to be a slow and painful process.     

Strategic arms limitation treaties and innovations in weapons technology

Treaties to limit strategic arms, such as those resulting from the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), are generally viewed as resulting in a reduced level of military spending and an increased level of security for both countries. This paper shows that such treaties generally would accelerate the qualitative arms race and could lead to the introduction of new and potentially destabilizing weapon systems. Thus, the result might be an increase in military spending and a decrease in the level of security for both countries. This result is supported by a formal model of bureaucratic decision making, in which defense bureaus choose between purchases of existing weapons systems or research and development expenditures on new weapons systems. The formal model leads to two theorems which identify the conditions under which arms limitation treaties lead to innovations in weapons technology and to increased military spending.     

The future of conventional arms control

Dramatic changes in conventional military capabilities coupled with nuclear parity should greatly increase the importance of conventional military power as well as raise new opportunities and problems for arms control. Those changes are not yet widely appreciated and in fact, there is a lack of analytic tools by which to appraise their implications and importance.As an initial step to systematic analysis of the desirability and feasibility of conventional arms control agreements, this paper describes current trends in weapons development and evaluates alternative interpretations of the implications of those trends. The requirements of effective and reliable arms control agreements are then enumerated and a general assessment made of the difficulties in meeting those requirements.The conclusions reached are necessarily speculative in light of the limited data and the surprisingly sparse analysis available on the characteristics, combat effectiveness and complementary combat and supporting requirements of new conventional weaponry. However, available evidence suggests the imminent emergence of significantly greater incentives for larger conventional forces, for larger logistics and support bases, for surprise attack, and for campaign strategies that emphasize speed and high attrition on all sides. If true, these factors will increase pressures for larger military budgets while also increasing instabilities in arms competitions. They also should increase interest in arms control measures though the characteristics of new weapons technology may make designing such measures even more difficult than in the past.Prepared for delivery at the 1975 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco Hilton Hotel, San Francisco, California, September 2–5, 1975.     

Viewpoint: Space System Negation in the Context of Space Policy and Law

For 21st century warfare, space is the unquestioned new high ground for military operations. The United States (U.S.) has relied on satellites for significant support to military operations and activities since Desert Storm in 1991. Indeed, the U.S. enjoys an asymmetric advantage in modern warfare utilizing our space capabilities. States with interests hostile to the U.S. believe that the significant dependence on space assets by the U.S. military could become its “Achilles heel” in future combat operations. What are the legal and policy bases for the U.S. to respond to threats to space systems that provide support to our military forces? Should the U.S. rely on space arms control initiatives to ensure security in space? This Viewpoint analyzes the international space law regime and U.S. National Space Policy framework applicable to the conduct of military space operations and activities, including the use of force in space to protect and defend our satellite networks as well as our military forces.     

Modeling China’s military expenditures as an action-reaction process: A preliminary study

This article attempts to study the patterns of China’s military capacity during the cold war era. We believe that this work will not only benefit us in better understanding what factors have contributed to China’s military expenditures over the past 30 years, but also be beneficial in the prediction of China’s future military establishment. The theory directing our work is Lewis F. Richardson’s action-reaction theory which describes military capacity build-up as a process in which changes in a nation’s defense expenditures are a function of its opponent’s defense expenditures and the hostility and the economic burden of producing and maintaining arms. Guided by this action-reaction model, we test whether or not China’s military expenditures are a function of its neighboring rival countries/regions for the period of 1963 to 1990. Sixteen different formulations of Richardson’s model are employed. We use the OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) linear regression technique to test our model. Our findings suggest that possibly in the case of Taiwan and Japan does an action-reaction process occur. In addition, models that employ time lags better illustrate whether an action-reaction process is going on.     

From Combined Arms to Combined Intelligence: Philosophy,Doctrine and Operations

‘Combined arms’ operations have been a central tenet of military planning for nearly a century. They call for the integration of land, air and sea forces to achieve battlefield synergies. This philosophy has equal application to intelligence. The article advances the combined arms concept as a way to foster synergies across the intelligence disciplines – geospatial, signals, measures and signals, human, and most recently open source intelligence. It describes the strengths and weaknesses of each discipline in forming an analytical foundation for such a ‘combined intelligence’ and calls for developing theory to integrate the intelligence disciplines. The authors suggest that combined intelligence would confer several benefits, including more effective collection efforts and stronger countermeasures against adversary denial and deception. The article closes by calling for development of concepts and doctrine to put combined intelligence into practice.     

Science vs. government: A reconsideration

A content analysis is made of arms control arguments made in the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and its Subcommittee on Disarmament by five groups: government scientists, academic scientists, politicians, military persons and citizens.It is found that government scientists are closer in their argumentation to other government persons than to their fellow scientists. It is argued that access rather than professionalism is the important independent variable to consider in predicting policy-related behavior.The author wishes to thank Professor Davis Bobrow for his advice throughout the course of this study.     

Liberalism and the Obligation to Military Service

This article argues that liberalism's failure to address systematically the question of citizens' obligation to military service is indicative of its wider failure to develop a satisfactory concept of citizenship. Whilst liberalism's individualist bias, implicit class assumptions and hope of transcending war have all contributed to neglect of citizen duty to bear arms, the most interesting reason, in relation to contemporary republican critiques, is liberalism's inadequate view of citizenship. This article examines the different approaches of the classical English liberals Locke, Bentham and J. S. Mill to international relations, forms of national defence and the role (if any) of citizens, and considers very briefly the views of some contemporary liberal theorists on military service and justified resistance to the draft. Finally, it comments on the implicit reliance of liberal polities on non-liberal models of citizenship, and the need for a coherent liberal concept of citizenship which includes an examination of responsibility for defence.     

The ASEAN naval build‐up: Implications for the regional order

This paper examines the ongoing ASEAN force modernization in the light of whether it is stabilizing or destabilizing for the region. Donald K. Emmerson's framework for analysing security regimes — the concentration or dispersion of power in achieving regional order — is employed as a basis for analysis. The paper comes to the conclusion that while the ASEAN arms build‐up will not have a destabilizing effect on the wider Asia‐Pacific regional order or balance, it could have serious implications for ASEAN and Southeast Asia. This is because while the actual increase in the number of weapon systems and platforms is not large, it still constitutes a significant increase in percentage terms, and even more so with regard to capability. Moreover, the ASEAN members are building up their forces at a time when there are no obvious military threats. They are in effect engaged in contingency planning. All these factors could be destabilizing for ASEAN's internal balance. As such, there is a need for ASEAN to address the arms build‐up, and introduce confidence‐building measures. One suggested forum for transparency measures is the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).     

Space Weapons: Alternatives for Today

The massive budgets for U.S. military space and missile defense represent the beginning stages of a new arms race in space. But with the United States facing record budget deficits and record defense spending and with the international community expressing increasing concerns about the weaponization of space, the next administration faces some real questions about how hard it wants to push for new attack weapons in space.

No matter how the upcoming U.S. presidential election turns out, the next administration faces dilemmas with respect to the lack of a justifying threat, the technical difficulty and cost of placing weapons in space, how far its international partners want to go with missile defense and with weapons in space, and, finally, the type of international negotiations in which it is willing to engage. Each of these situations creates alternatives for today, alternatives which the next U.S. President will confront and the international community can and should engage.     

Japan’s uncertain security environment and changes in its legislative‒executive relations

Abstract

Focusing on Japan, this paper explores whether powers and competences in the political system are likely to be recalibrated in favour of the executive when the environment is perceived as increasingly threatening. It shows that the executive has been significantly strengthened during the past two decades of political reforms, though a closer look reveals that only the most recent efforts are motivated by security concerns. Case studies on military deployments and arms exports do not expose any clear trend towards curbing parliament’s formal control powers, but they indicate two related mechanisms that affect executive?legislative relations. Firstly, the executive has sought to ensure faster decision-making in security policy, which may limit the Diet’s ability to scrutinise policies in depth. Secondly, the level of contestation over security policy issues has been decreasing, especially given the securitisation of North Korea and China. This provides the executive with more leeway in devising policies.     

The debate on a regional arms register in Southeast Asia

Abstract

ASEAN member states are no longer opposed in principle to military information sharing and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is now actively considering ideas for new confidence‐building measures in this area. The first specific transparency measure supported by ARF was the UN Register of Conventional Arms, whose success in the region has been a result, at least in part, of its flexibility. Because of the limited scope of the UN Register, debate has continued on the possibility of a regional Register. As this debate has proceeded, however, it has become apparent that the creation of such a Register will require a number of complex and difficult issues to be resolved. What additional data should such a Register include? Who should be responsible for operating such a Register? Which countries should be included? Because of these difficulties, the prospects of a regional Register being established in the near future are rather slender. But, as they become more comfortable with the concept of transparency, there is still considerable scope for ARF members to do more to adopt regional ‘best practice’ in their replies to the main UN Register. The Register formula of framework plus flexibility could also be used as a model for the development of parallel transparency arrangements in areas other than arms transfers. The experience of the Register debate suggest that the development of concrete confidence‐building measures in the ARF region is likely to be a gradual process. Progress is possible, but is unlikely to transform levels of national openness on military affairs overnight. The main obstacles to increased transparency may prove to be domestic and political rather than international and military: demonstrating once again the way in which the confidence‐building agenda is linked to broader debates about the necessary political foundations of a secure regional order.     

A Unified Theory and Test of Extended Immediate Deterrence

We present a unified theory and test of extended immediate deterrence—unified in the sense that we employ our theoretical deterrence model as our statistical model in the empirical analysis. The theoretical model is a straightforward formalization of the deterrence logic in Huth (1988) and Huth and Russett (1984) , coupled with private information concerning utilities. Our statistical analysis suggests that the attacker and defender's decisions are influenced by the balance of forces, nuclear weapons, defender-protege military alliances, arms transfers, and trade, as well as the regime types of those involved. Many of these findings contradict previous research by Huth (1988) and Huth and Russett (1988) . We find that many of the variables involved in the deterrence calculus are nonmonotonically linked to the probability of deterrence success or war. We illustrate the results with case studies of the Soviet-Japanese dispute over Manchukuo (1937–1938) and the Berlin Blockade (1948).     

Myth or Reality? The Red Hand and French Covert Action in Federal Germany during the Algerian War, 1956–61

During the Algerian war of independence (1954–62), Federal Germany became the theatre of a series of unexplained bombings and shootings that targeted Algerian nationalists and German arms dealers. At the time, these crimes were attributed to the Red Hand, a counter-terrorist organization or parallel secret service with a mission to defeat the enemies of l’Algérie française. This article argues that the attacks on West German territory were executed neither by vigilantes nor by renegade agents. Instead, they were carried out by the French foreign intelligence service SDECE with the full approval of the highest political authorities in Paris. Using the case of Federal Germany as an example, this article seeks to reveal how and why covert action – including state-sanctioned murder – became an integral and important part of the Algerian war, particularly of France's campaign to undermine the Algerian rebels' efforts to procure military and non-military supplies. The article will show that the Red Hand served merely as a cover to detract from the state's resort to such violent and criminal means.     

A two-dimensional analysis of seventy years of United Nations voting

International relations scholars frequently use roll-call votes on resolutions in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) to measure similarity in the foreign policy ideologies of states. They then correlate those measures with consequential outcomes, such as development lending, trade, or military disputes. Dynamic ideal point models of UNGA voting thus far have been restricted to a single dimension. We examine the existence of a stable, important, and interpretable second dimension underlying contestation in the UN. From the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s, North–South conflict constitutes a stable second dimension, shaped heavily by the agenda-setting powers of the so-called Non-aligned Movement and the Group of 77. In the periods before and after, the second dimension neither is stable nor easily interpretable, though it is sometimes important. We suggest that in most applications, our original one-dimensional estimates have conceptual advantages with minimal losses in explanatory value. We illustrate that conclusion with an analysis that correlates ideal point changes with militarized interstate disputes. Yet, our findings also suggest that scholars interested in specific issues, such as the Middle East, human rights, or arms control, might benefit from more specifically tailored ideal point estimates.     

For Queen and Company: The Role of Intelligence in the UK's Arms Trade

This article analyses the role that the UK intelligence services (particularly Secret Intelligence Service [SIS or MI6], the Defence Intelligence Staff [DIS], Government Communication Headquarters [GCHQ] and associated agencies) play in the legal UK arms trade. The article shows that intelligence has been used in support of British-based private commercial businesses, and occasionally in providing intelligence on the negotiating positions of rival manufacturers. This raises important questions about the role of the state in the private sphere, particularly the use of a large number of government assets in support of private interests and the elision of British government interests with those of a section of the manufacturing industry. This article also challenges existing conceptions of how the UK's intelligence agencies operate and relate to their customers. Conventional typologies of UK intelligence have emphasised the importance of the 'central machinery', highlighting the Joint Intelligence Committee as the focal point of intelligence tasking and analysis in the UK. However, in this case the intelligence support provided to the sale of military equipment suggests a range of parallel practices that are much more decentralised and often informal. This research therefore suggests that our conception of the UK intelligence architecture requires some reassessment.     

Creating Shared Responsibility through Respect for Military Culture: The Russian and American Cases

The key problem in civil‐military relations in established polities such as Russia and the United States is not civilian control of the military, but rather how to create a symbiotic relationship of “shared responsibility” between senior military officers and civilian leaders. In such a situation, civilian leaders obtain much needed expertise from the military, but ultimately remain in control. The keys to symbiotic civil‐military relations are a desire on the part of military officers to work with civilians and civilian respect for military culture. When civilians respect military culture—that is, the military’s (1) devotion to clear executive leadership, (2) commitment to corporate identity, (3) drive to increase professional expertise, and (4) dedication to political responsibility—a system of shared responsibility is likely to emerge. This thesis is elaborated by comparing recent civil‐military relations in Russia and the United States.     

Military professionals as political governors: A case study of contemporary Greece

In this article we attempt to measure the performance of the Greek military with regard to social change. Using Eckstein and Gurr's model of regime performance—consisting of four variables we hypothesised that military professionalism did not provide the military governors with the necessary political skills to become effective agents of social change. Our analysis, based on interview data supplemented with socio‐economic indicators of the years of military rule (1966–74), led us to the conclusion that aspects of military professionalism, at least in the case of Greece, prevented the military regime from performing well and thus hampered its ability to generate social change.     

Loyalty for sale? Military spending and coups d’etat

Coups d’etat continue to be common around the world, often leading to changes in leaders and institutions. We examine the relationship between military spending and coups and find that (i) successful coups increase military spending by more than failed attempts, and (ii) coups are more likely when military spending as a share of GDP is relatively low. Our identification strategy deals with the problem of reverse causality between coups and military spending by exploiting the conditional independence between a coup’s outcome and the change in military spending that follows it. We interpret our results as evidence that the military may stage coups in order to increase its funding, and rule out several alternative explanations.