Does voter polarisation induce party extremism? The moderating role of abstention

This article contributes to the literature on representation by examining how the ideological polarisation of the electorate affects parties’ programmatic positions in multiparty systems. The main argument is that parties face incentives to adopt more extreme positions when the electorate becomes more ideologically polarised and the share of non-moderate voters is higher. The reason is that by adopting moderate positions parties will prompt their non-moderate core constituents to sit out the election. This risk is conditioned by voters’ propensity to abstain. A higher (lower) propensity to abstain means that parties alienate a larger (smaller) share of their core constituents when adopting a moderate position. Parties therefore respond to greater voter polarisation by adopting more extreme positions, but the effect declines as voters’ propensity to abstain decreases. An empirical analysis of parties’ programmatic positions in 11 Western European countries between 1977 and 2016 strongly supports this expectation.     

‘Bigwig hatred’ and the emergence of the first Scandinavian agrarian-populist party

In the genealogy of the Scandinavian populist-party family, agrarian populism has been largely neglected and, when discussed at all, it is traced back to Finland in the late 1950s. This paper argues: (i) that agrarian populism long predated the 1950s and that it was politically salient from the decade before Finnish independence in 1917; (ii) that it is useful to distinguish between an agrarian-class and agrarian-populist party type; (iii) that in wider comparative perspective, first-wave Finnish agrarian populism was distinctive; and iv) that during the critical party-building phase, the Finnish Agrarian Party (AP) is best characterised a populist party embodying a diffuse small-farmer antipathy towards socially superior urban elites. The AP did not create this ‘bigwig hatred’ (herraviha), but in perpetuating it and ‘othering it’ within a binary ‘us-and-them’ paradigm, it became the first populist party in both Finland and Scandinavia.     

The Italian party system in transition: The end of polarised pluralism?

This article examines Giovanni Sartori's polarised pluralist model and its application to the Italian party system. It suggests a more appropriate alternative method for testing the model's applicability to present‐day Italy. This modification, far from changing the model of polarised pluralism, improves its empirical usefulness. The suggestion then is put forward that Italy, rather than being an example par excellence of polarised pluralism, as Sartorisees it, is neither characterised by increased polarisation nor by centrifugal competition. Instead, Italy today witnesses the prevalence of depolarisation and centripetal electoral competition.     

The ‘party‐state’ in Greece and the fall of Papandreou

Revelations of corruption and of maladministration have forced a re‐examination of some of the basic characteristics of the Greek party‐state and party system. The purpose of this article is to examine how the controversies ‐ ‘scandals’ ‐ arose, and to assess their consequences for political development in Greece in the light of the June 1989 national elections. The elections may prove critical for the evolution of the State and the party system.     

How stable is party identification?

This essay refines and extends our argument (Green and Palmquist, 1990) that net of the distorting effects of measurement error, Americans' partisanship tends to be highly stable over time. Three challenges to this thesis are addressed. In response to doubts about the generalizability of our earlier findings to panel studies of longer duration or from other eras, we show that nine multi-wave panel studies yield similar results. Next, we take up the question of whether our model can account for observed patterns of partisan conversion. The rate of party-switching forces some modifications in the statistical assumptions used to model party identification over time, but a revised model which can account for inter-party change reproduces earlier findings of partisan stability. Third, we grapple with the question of how our findings square with fluctuations in what has been termed macropartisanship. We suggest that aggregate shifts in party identification need not be incompatible with strong over-time correlations at the individual level. Finally, we develop a simulation of micropartisanship to illustrate that over long stretches of time very gradual changes in partisanship can accumulate to produce appreciable levels of micropartisan change.Donald Philip Green, Yale University.Bradley Palmquist, Harvard University.An earlier version of this paper was presented at the annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, September 3–6, 1992.     

Throwing the rascals out? Problems of accountability in two‐party systems

This article critically examines the concept of ‘accountability’ as it is understood in two‐party systems and majoritarian democracy – namely the ability of voters to remove governments that violate their mandates or otherwise perform poorly. Voters’ capacity to ‘throw the rascals out’ is one of the main normative appeals of two‐partism and the single‐member plurality (SMP) electoral system. However, this article uses a spatial model to show that in at least two types of situation voters are left in a bind when confronted with a mandate‐breaking governing party: (1) when both major parties undertake unexpected non‐centrist shifts in opposing directions after an election, leaving centrist voters with an unappealing choice; and (2) when a governing party that had won an election on a non‐centrist platform undertakes a post‐election shift to the centre, leaving its more radical supporters dissatisfied. In each case, voters have four imperfect options: punish the governing party by throwing the rascals out, but in doing so vote for a party that is ideologically more distant; abstain, and withdraw from the democratic process; vote for a minor party that has no hope of influencing government formation, but which might detach enough votes to allow the ideologically more distant major opposition party to win; and forgive the governing party its mandate‐breaking. All of these options represent accountability failures. The problems are illustrated with two case studies from two‐party systems: the United Kingdom in the mid‐1980s and New Zealand in the period 1984–1993. In both instances, many voters found it difficult to ‘throw the rascals out’ without harming their own interests in the process. The article concludes that accountability may sometimes be better achieved if voters can force a party to share power in coalition with another party in order to ‘keep it honest’ instead of removing it from government completely, as can happen in multi‐party systems based on proportional representation. Thus, although two‐partism based on plurality voting is normally regarded as superior to multi‐partism and proportional representation on the criterion of accountability, in some instances, the reverse can be true. The article therefore undermines a core normative argument advanced by supporters of majoritarian democracy and SMP.     

Party subsidies and the freezing of party competition: Do cartel mechanisms work?

The number of countries offering public subsidies to political parties has vastly increased in recent decades, but there have been few attempts to assess how these subsidies affect political competition. Expectations about their likely impact vary widely. Some have described subsidies as key devices used by so-called ‘cartel parties’ to buttress their status and exclude new challengers. Others see subsidies as incentives that encourage new party formation and sustain fledgling parties that otherwise might disappear. The research reported here investigates the circumstances under which subsidies seem more likely to play one or the other of these roles by considering the development of party systems and party subsidies in European democracies. It finds little evidence that subsidies freeze out new parties, but there are signs that certain schemes may encourage party fragmentation.     

Towards a multi‐party Britain?

This article examines the rise of the minor parties since 1973. Some of the causes of this increase were common to all the minor parties in Great Britain, others peculiar to particular parties. The scope for a rise in the support of minor parties is greater than is often supposed but they face special problems in mobilising this potential. Since 1974 their support has fallen, but the nineteen‐eighties are likely to see intermittent increases in their vote; unless there are major institutional changes however, the two party system is likely to survive albeit in a modified form.     

Party politics of the right: Neo‐populist parties and the future of the West European party system

Radical Right‐Wing Populism in Western Europe. By HANS‐GEORG BETZ. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994. Pp.x + 226, 22 tables, biblio. $18.95 (paper); $45.00 (cloth). ISBN 0–312–12195–4 and 0–312–08390.

Volkes Stimme? Rechtspopulismus in Europa. By Armin PFAHL‐TRAUGHBER with contributions by OLIVER SCHMIDTKE and CAS MUDDE. Bonn: Dietz, 1994. Pp.191, biblio. DM19.80 (paper). ISBN 3–8012–3059–7.

Wer wählt rechts? Die Wähler und Anhänger rechts‐extremistischer Parteien im vereinigten Deutschland. By JÜRGEN W. FALTER, in collaboration with MARKUS KLEIN. München: C.H. Beck, 1994. Pp.167, biblio. DM17.80 (paper). ISBN 3‐ 406–37442–5.

Rechtsextremismus in Deutschland. Voraussetzungen, Zusammenhänge, Wirkung. Edited by WOLFGANG BENZ. Frankfurt a.M.: S. Fischer, 1994 (new exp. and rev. edition). Pp.331, index. DM18.90 (paper). ISBN 3–596–12276–7.

The Dark Side of Europe. The Extreme Right Today. By GEOFFREY HARRIS, foreword by GLYN FORD. Edinburgh University Press, 1994 (2nd edition). Pp.xi + 265, index, £12.95 (paper). ISBN 0–7486–0466–9.

Rechtsextremismus: weiblich ‐ männlich? Eine Fallstudie zu geschlechtsspezifischen Lebensverläufen, Handlungsspielräumen und Orientierungsweisen. By URSULA BIRSL, foreword by PETER LOSCHE. Leverkusen: Leske + Budrich, 1994. Pp.369, biblio. DM48 (paper). ISBN 3–8100–1204–1.

Rechtsextremismus und Fremdenfeindlichkeit. Studien zur aktuellen Entwicklung. Edited by INSTITUT FÜR SOZIALFORSCHUNG. Frankfurt a.M./New York: Campus, 1994. Pp.219, biblio. DM18 (paper). ISBN 3–593–35026–2.

Racism, Ethnicity and Politics in Contemporary Europe. Edited by ALEC G. HARGREAVES and JEREMY LEAMAN. Gower House, Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1995. Pp.296, index, £39.95 (cloth). ISBN 1–85278–8838–0.

Das Gewalt‐Dilemma. Gesellschaftliche Reaktionen auf fremdenfreindliche Gewalt und Rechtsextremismus. Edited by WILHELM HEITMEYER. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1994. Pp.463, DM29.80 (paper). ISBN 3–518–11905–2.     

STI policy conventions in Uruguay. An analysis of political party platforms 2004–2019

Science, Technology, and Innovation (STI) have been considered as critical tools in development processes, gaining growing importance in the public policy agenda. We assert that an intersubjective agreement about STI policy has emerged in Latin America from the beginning of the twenty-first century. This operates as a developmental convention which is based on a hybrid theoretical rationale from neoclassical economics and the innovation systems approach. This process has been analyzed from different perspectives of innovation and political economy studies. However, as far as we know, the role of political parties in the construction and reproduction of STI conventions has not been studied. After illustrating the general assertion with stylized facts from the whole Latin American region, we study the platforms that Uruguayan political parties presented in the national elections between 2004 and 2019. Text analysis techniques show that platforms of both left- and right-wing political parties were embedded in the current STI policy convention. However, critical discrepancies emerge in relation to policy implementation—the positive and negative agendas—which show that there has been political competition regarding the role of the state and of markets. This leads us to conclude that even though one can observe a shared set of building blocks on STI policy and development, there is competition within the current convention, suggesting that any agreement is illusory.     

The coalitions of 1989–90 in Greece: Inter‐party relations and democratic consolidation

The Greek coalitions of 1989–90 were unusual by comparative European standards, given their political composition and ideological span. But, above all, they were significant as an historical departure in Greek politics, however much political expediency lay behind their formation. Coalitions are as such almost unknown in postwar Greece, and one‐party government has been the rule since the return to democracy in 1974. Even more significant was the inclusion of the Communist Left in the governments of 1989–90 in view of the polarised state of Greek politics since 1974 and historical memories of the Civil War. Drawing on lessons from coalition theory, the formation and maintenance of these two governments are discussed. While their policy achievements were limited, the governments of 1989—90 allowed Greece to overcome the crisis of the PASOK government and the scandals of 1988–89 and they made way for a second alternation in power. On balance, therefore, they are likely to have contributed to the ongoing process of democratic consolidation in Greece.     

What’s a losing party to do? The calculus of contesting state legislative elections

Existing theories of contesting elections typically treat all potential challengers as identical while under-playing the importance of political parties and primary contests. We offer a theory addressing these issues based on how the various actors in the process define and evaluate the probability of winning an election and the value of the office being contested. We test our theory by estimating a model predicting which of three responses a party that loses a legislative race makes in the next cycle: nominating the same candidate, nominating a new candidate, or nominating no one. We find substantial empirical support for our theory.     

Does context matter – The impact of electoral systems,political parties and individual characteristics on voters' perceptions of party positions

This article aims to investigate under which circumstances policy representation can exist in terms of agreement in voters' perceptions of parties' left–right positions. The focal point in the study is on how voters' perceptions are affected not only by individual characteristics but also by various contextual factors related to the political parties and the political systems. With data from the CSES on individual voters and various system characteristics from election surveys in 32 countries, this article shows that what in earlier findings have appeared as national context effects rather are party effects when being decomposed. System related variables have only a small impact on voters' perceptions while the party- followed by the individually related variables exerted the greatest impact.     

Mind the gap: How party–voter incongruence fuels the entry and support of new parties

This article examines to what extent ideological incongruence (i.e., mismatch between policy positions of voters and parties) increases the entry of new parties in national parliamentary elections and their individual-level electoral support. Current empirical research on party entry and new party support either neglects the role of party–voter incongruence, or it only examines its effect on the entry and support of specific new parties or party families. This article fills this lacuna. Based on spatial theory, we hypothesise that parties are more likely to enter when ideological incongruence between voters and parties is higher (Study 1) and that voters are more likely to vote for new parties if these stand closer to them than established parties (Study 2). Together our two studies span 17 countries between 1996 and 2016. Time-series analyses support both hypotheses. This has important implications for spatial models of elections and empirical research on party entry and new party support.     

Social or political cleavages? A spatial analysis of?the?party system in post-authoritarian Chile

Lipset and Rokkan??s (Party system and voter alignments: cross national perspectives, Lipset and Rokkan eds., New York: Free Press, pp. 1?C64, 1967) sociological model of cleavages and the so-called ??freezing hypothesis?? dominate theorizing about party system formation. Torcal and Mainwaring (Br. J. Polit. Sci. 33:55?C84, 2003) show the relevance of a purely political cleavage for structuring the party system in the case of Chile, challenging the freezing hypothesis??s claims. They also dispute case-specific research that argues Chile??s party system still reflects a ??three-thirds?? division between Left, Right, and Center. Revisiting this debate, our study employs spatial maps of the party system. Such political-economy models are rare in studies of Latin American politics. The application here supports a democratic/authoritarian political cleavage in Chile.     

The German grand coalition of 2005–09 and party system change: Catalyst or continuity?

Two times in the last fifty years grand coalitions have altered traditionally bi-polar patterns of German electoral competition, changing the electoral context by making it difficult for voters to endorse anti-incumbent alternatives. How have voters reacted under these circumstances, and were their responses different because of the weakening of partisan attachments in the forty years between the two grand coalitions? This study explores these questions by examining voter behavior in German state elections under the federal grand coalitions of 1966–69 and 2005–09, comparing voters’ responses with long-term trends in German party system development. The second grand coalition saw a continuation of trends in declining turnout and increasing electoral volatility, but in contrast to the first grand coalition there was no surge in support for far-right parties. Such a change may be the result of differences between the party systems in the two period, with voters in unified Germany having many more options for expressing discontent.     

Whatever happened to Italian communism? Explaining the dissolution of the largest communist party in the West

This article attempts to explain why the largest and most successful communist party in the West (the Italian Communist Party) has been the first to dissolve itself under the apparent impact of the revolutions in Eastern Europe. It does so by utilising and comparing four possible approaches to the study of West European Communist parties: ideological, electoral, strategic and ‘internal‐external’ approaches. The first three approaches are outlined and their limitations indicated before a more detailed exposition and application of the fourth approach is made as offering the most adequate framework to explain of one the most significant developments in Italian politics and West European communism.     

Is there a friends-and-neighbors effect for party leaders?

The friends-and-neighbors effect, which refers to voters' tendency to support politicians near hometown areas, has not yet been tested systematically for party leaders. Linking a built-for-purpose dataset on 266 leaders to a sample of 380,208 voters from 50 country elections in 19 parliamentary democracies drawn from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) project, this article examines the effect of party leaders' local proximity on voters' leader evaluations and voting intentions. I hypothesize that leaders receive more positive evaluations and electoral support from voters in the district where they run for election. The results show that shared district increases voters' sympathy for leaders and their inclination to vote for the party of ‘near’ leaders. While the location of party leaders affects voters in all electoral systems, I find that the friends-and-neighbors effect on leader evaluations and party vote choice is stronger in systems with personalized, preferential and combined ballots.