Representing the compromise: How institutions serve government support coalitions in European Union policy making

This article presents an original model of policy making by multiparty coalitions at the international level. Specifically, it analyses how domestic institutions serve parties in enforcing policy compromises onto national ministers negotiating legislation in the European Union (EU). In contrast to existing research on coalition politics, the model accounts for the benefits of not only legislative but also executive institutions and incorporates opposition parties as pivotal actors under minority governments. Ministers propose policy positions at the EU level that represent domestic coalition compromises when cabinet participation, executive coordination and parliamentary oversight of EU affairs make it cheap for coalition partners to challenge the minister's position and when ideological divisiveness increases the incentive to do so. Statistical analyses of 1,694 policy positions taken by ministers from 22 member states in the Council of the EU provide strong empirical evidence for the model. The results support the claim of executive dominance in EU policy making but also highlight that, where institutions are strong, ministers represent domestic coalition compromises rather than their own positions.     

Maximizing Policy Learning in International Committees: An Analysis of the European Open Method of Coordination (OMC) Committees

In the voluminous literature on the European Union's open method of coordination (OMC), no one has hitherto analysed on the basis of scholarly examination the question of what contributes to the learning processes in the OMC committees. On the basis of a questionnaire sent to all participants, this article demonstrates that valuable lessons can be learned about policy learning, in practice and theoretically, by analysing the cooperation in the OMC committees. Using the Advocacy Coalition Framework as the starting point of analysis, 15 hypotheses on policy learning are tested. Among other things, it is concluded that in order to maximize policy learning in international committees, empirical data should be made available to committees and provided by sources close to the participants (i.e. the Commission). In addition, the work in the committees should be made prestigious in order to attract well-qualified and engaged participants, and a neutral presidency should be present in order to act as an authoritative persuader.     

Bridging borders through institution-building: the EGTC as a facilitator of institutional integration in cross-border regions

This article examines cross-border integration at the sub-state level in the frame of a European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation (EGTC). The EGTC is a supranational and directly applicable EU legal instrument that regulates the creation of cross-border ‘associations' with legal personality between public authorities. Thus, it represents a policy tool that can have an effect on the institutional frame of cross-border cooperation and potentially enhance cross-border institutional integration at the sub-state level. The aim of this article is to examine the potential effect of this EU instrument on cross-border institutional integration by studying the institutional architecture of selected EGTCs. This is done on the basis of an analytical grid that defines elements of a possible integration process based on an institutional-oriented approach. This analytical grid is applied to four case studies: the Eurométropole Lille-Kortrijk-Tournai, the EGTC Ister-Granum, the Pyrenees-Mediterranean Euroregion and the European Region Tyrol-South Tyrol-Trentino. The empirical analysis shows that despite the considerable improvement of the legal basis for cooperation, the possible effect of the EGTC for further institutional cross-border integration is still rather limited due to a narrow design of institutions and a low level of actor involvement.     

Instrumental political support: bringing policy preferences back into explanations of EU support

There is a joint development towards Europeanisation of public policies and an increasing visibility and politicisation of European issues in EU member states. In this context, the degree of fit between individuals’ policy preferences and European norms could be expected to influence support for the EU: this support might increase when Europeanisation makes the desired policies more likely, and decrease when it hinders these policies. Multilevel analyses of the 2014 wave of the European Election Study confirms the existence of such instrumental support for the EU. The findings demonstrate that this support is shaped by policy preferences on state intervention, immigration, moral issues and environmental protection. The results also show that the impact of these policy preferences is modulated by the level of integration of the designated policy, by the weight of the policy issue in the country and, in some cases, by the level of individual political knowledge.     

The use of EU soft law by national courts and bureaucrats: how relation to hard law and policy maturity matter

Abstract

Soft law instruments account for a sizable share of EU legal acts, with growing importance over time. Yet, while the implementation of hard EU law has been widely studied, little is known about the use of EU soft law at the national level. In the article, it is firstly argued that the type of soft law instrument will affect national usage. Administrators and judges may welcome interpretative guidelines to complicated pieces of legislation, while more open-ended instruments may be ignored. It is further argued that the maturity of the policy field matters. National actors in mature policy fields will be routinely exposed to EU rules and they are socialized into responding to impulses from Brussels. The article probes the plausibility of these expectations in case studies on the use of EU soft law instruments by German administrations and courts in four policy fields: financial market regulation, competition, environmental protection and social policy.     

Civil Society Actors and EU Fundamental Rights Policy: Opportunities and Challenges

This paper examines how civil society actors in the EU utilize the political and legal opportunities provided by the EU’s fundamental rights policy to mobilize against discrimination, notably racism, and xenophobia. It emphasizes the multiple enabling roles that this policy provides to civil society associations engaged in judicial activism, political advocacy, and service delivery both at the EU and Member State levels, and assesses their effectiveness. It describes several factors that hinder the implementation of EU fundamental rights policy and reviews the strategies of civil society to overcome them. It highlights the reluctance of parts of public opinion to combat ethnic prejudice, considers reactions against what at a time of crisis is perceived as a costly project of social regulation, and examines civil society responses. The data sources consist of interviews with bureaucratic and civil society actors at EU level.     

The birth,life, and death of policy instruments: 35 years of EU gender equality policy programmes

Policy instruments research is an essential part of studying European Union governance. A growing interest in processes of (de-)legalisation and patterns of instrument choice requires a more process- and context-oriented analysis of the EU’s instrument selection. Using a political sociology approach, the article analyses patterns of instrument choice in soft law policy programmes, by examining the life cycle of EU gender equality policy programmes from 1982 to the present day. Gender equality policy programmes offer an in-depth understanding of how the Commission upgrades and downgrades policy instruments. The analysis indicates that patterns of policy instrument choice are not necessarily inflexible once a policy instrument is selected. Instead, patterns vary while the instrument is (de-)legalised. Investigating gender equality policy programmes provides explanations for the shifts in the use of legislative instruments and their limitations.     

Limits to EU technocratic regulation?

Abstract. This article has three main objectives. Firstly, it seeks to re–formulate the debate on technocracy in the European Union by drawing upon the concept of the EU regulatory state as developed by Majone (1996). Secondly, it illustrates the limits and tensions of a once politicised technocratic policy–making process by tracing the formulation of media ownership regulation. Although media ownership policy has been presented by the European Commission as a typical regulatory policy, it has followed a more politicised path than previous EU regulatory policies. This implies that media ownership policy does not follow the model of technocratic regulation presented by Majone in his characterisation of the EU regulatory state. Thirdly, the paper contributes to the debate on EU regulation by suggesting a new typology of regulatory policies in the EU. In the conclusion, it is argued that politicisation (which includes inefficiency and prolonged conflict) may be the price that the EU is forced to pay in its progress toward a more democratic polity.     

Territorial Representation and the Opinion–Policy Linkage: Evidence from the European Union

A key feature of federal systems is the representation of subnational units by “territorial representatives” in policymaking at the federal level. How do such arrangements influence the linkage between public opinion and policy outputs? I argue that policymaking under territorial representation should be systematically skewed toward opinion in those states where citizens care about a policy issue and have a uniform view on it. This claim is tested using a novel data set of policy change in the European Union (EU), covering 211 policy issues and 6,506 observations of opinion–policy dyads. Results show that measures weighting opinion across member states by how much national citizens care about an issue are better predictors of policy change than EU‐wide mean opinion. Moreover, congruence between state‐level opinion and EU‐level policy becomes more likely, the more salient and clear‐cut opinion in a member state is. These findings refine our understanding of the opinion–policy linkage under territorial representation.     

Coalitions in European Union Negotiations

Coalitions will probably become an increasingly important theme in European Union (EU) politics. The spread of decision making by majority voting promotes coalition‐building behaviour. The impending enlargement is predicted to differentiate and polarize policy standpoints within the EU. Increasing levels of policy conflict imply increased propensities for coalition building. Still, the role and nature of coalitions in EU negotiations are obscure. This article raises important research questions: What characterizes coalition building in the EU? How important are coalitions? What coalition patterns are discernible?Using data from a questionnaire to Swedish participants on EU committees, it is shown that coalitions are more frequent when majority voting occurs than when unanimity rules. Coalition behaviour is, however, important also under unanimity. The existence of consensus norms diminishes the propensity to form coalitions. As regards coalition patterns, there is a prevalence of coalitions based on policy interests and/or on cultural affinity. Contrary to conventional wisdom, consistent and durable coalition patterns seem to exist. The north–south divide is one such persistent pattern. The Swedish respondents thus reveal a close cooperation between the Nordic member states and Great Britain, whereas France and Spain are seldom approached for coalition‐building purposes. As to future research, evidence from other member states and from case studies is needed in order to learn more about the bases for coalition building in EU negotiations.     

European Parliament Elections and Political Representation: Policy Congruence between Voters and Parties

It is often said that European Parliament elections fail as an instrument to express the will of the European people. However, while the elections are not contested at the European level and are often dominated by national issues, this does not necessarily imply that they fail to connect policy views of voters and representatives. This article examines policy congruence between voters and candidates, utilising the candidate and voter surveys of the European Election Study 2009. First, it demonstrates that policy preferences of candidates and voters are constrained by three separate policy dimensions. Second, it shows that the quality of representation is high in terms of left/right, the main dimension of conflict in European politics, but lower on the cultural and European integration dimensions. Finally, it establishes that in some cases the aggregation of national parties in political groups in the European Parliament poses problems for effective political representation.     

All spending is not equal: European Union public spending,policy feedback and citizens’ support for the EU

While public support is central to the problem‐solving capacity of the European Union, we know little about when and why the EU can increase its citizens’ support through spending. Extensive research finds that citizens living in countries that are net beneficiaries of the EU budget are more supportive of the EU, assuming that citizens care equally about all forms of spending. It is argued in this article, however, that the amount of spending is only part of the story. Understanding the effects of spending on support requires a consideration of how transfers are spent. Drawing on policy feedback theories in comparative politics, it is shown that support for the EU is a function of the fit between the spending area and economic need in individuals’ immediate living context. Results from a statistical analysis of EU spending on human capital, infrastructure, agriculture, energy and environmental protection in 127 EU regions over the period 2001–2011 corroborate this argument. As the EU and other international organisations become increasingly publicly contested, the organisations themselves may increasingly try to shore up public support through spending, but they will only be successful under specific conditions.     

Eastern and Western Perceptions on EU Aid in Light of the Arab Spring

The European Union welcomed the demonstrators’ demands wholeheartedly during the Arab Spring, trying to maximize the assistance that it could offer to support genuine democratic transition, at least at a rhetorical level. This article reflects on the changes in the neighborhood policy by focusing on public perceptions measured in Europe and in countries in close proximity to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. European views on solidarity are compared to local public opinion on EU involvement in the region. Recipient views in Jordan, Egypt, Palestine, and Israel are explored by analyzing relevant results of the Arab Barometer and Neighborhood Barometer surveys. Findings indicate that the Middle Eastern public opinion tends to appreciate the EU’s gestures with the exception of Egypt, but conditionality is more in line with European public opinion.     

Political Competition and Voter Mobility

The existing model of political competition is extended to allow voters to live in different regions and to migrate between regions in response to an inter-regional transfer policy. We then show that regions have a different ``weight'' in the expected vote function of political parties. This gives parties an incentive to bias the transfer policy in favour of relatively high weight regions, with potentially adverse efficiency and equity effects. However, we then show that parties always propose efficient and equitable regional transfers, regardless of whether regions have different weights, if there is some mobility of citizens across regions. Mobility constrains parties to act efficiently and equitably even though they face an incentive to act otherwise. However, when voters are immobile political competition leads to inequitable though efficient outcomes.     

官僚体制的内在缺陷:新公共管理视角的分析

古典官僚制理论认为 ,官僚体制所体现的工具理性与价值理性的冲突是官僚体制自身不可超越的内在困境。在新公共管理的视角下 ,官僚体制不但存在工具理性与价值理性的冲突 ,在工具理性的内部也可能产生冲突 ,它所带来的效率也只是一种相当有限的机械效率。其内在缺陷就是缺乏竞争效率和创新机制 ,在政策制定和公共利益认定上偏离了原定的目标     

Legitimacy through targeted transparency? Regulatory effectiveness and sustainability of lobbying regulation in the European Union

Regulating interest groups’ access to decision makers constitutes a key dimension of legitimate and accountable systems of government. The European Union explicitly links lobbying regulation with the democratic credentials of its supranational system of governance and proposes transparency as a solution to increase legitimacy and regulate private actors’ participation in policy making. This lobbying regulation regime consists of a Transparency Register that conditions access to decision makers upon joining it and complying with its information disclosure requirements. The extent to which transparency‐based regulatory regimes are successful in ensuring effective regulation of targeted actors and in being recognised as a legitimate instrument of governance constitutes a key empirical question. Therefore, the study asks: Do stakeholders perceive the transparency‐based EU lobbying regulation regime to be a legitimate form of regulatory governance? The study answers by building on a classic model of targeted transparency and proposes perceived regulatory effectiveness and sustainability as two key dimensions on which to evaluate the legitimacy of the Register. The arguments are tested on a new dataset reporting the evaluations of 1,374 stakeholders on the design and performance of the EU lobbying regulation regime. The findings describe a transparency regime that scores low in perceived effectiveness and moderate to low in sustainability. Citizens criticise the quality of information disclosed and the Register's performance as a transparency instrument. The Register did not effectively bridge the information gap between the public and interest groups about supranational lobbying. In terms of sustainability, interest organisations appreciate the systemic benefits of transparency, but identify few organisation‐level benefits. Organisations that are policy insiders incur more transparency costs so they instrumentally support transparency only insofar it suits their lobbying strategies and does not threaten their position. Insiders support including additional categories of organisations in the Register's regulatory remit but not more types of interactions with policy makers. They support an imperfect regulatory status quo to which they have adapted but lack incentives to support increased transparency and information disclosure. Targeted transparency proves an ineffective approach to regulating interest groups’ participation in EU policy making, constituting a suboptimal choice for ensuring transparent, accountable and legitimate supranational lobbying.     

A COMPARISON OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INCENTIVES AND DIRECTIVES: THE CASE OF DUTCH WATER QUALITY POLICY

The use of effluent charges as an instrument o f regulatory policy has been the object of much dispute. The controversy between advocates and opponents of replacing directives by incentive strategies in various fields of public intervention has always been rather heated, though carried on more in terms of theory than of empirical evidence drawn from experience with policy instruments in actual operation. Much like permit trading in the United States, regulatory effluent charges in The Netherlands more or less "sneaked in through the back door." The Dutch system o f water quality charges had originally been designed to fulfill solely a revenue-raising function.
The unique features of The Netherlands system make it an interesting example of the use of charges. The Dutch system of effluent charges has been in operation since 1970 and, in terms of the level of the charges, is more than twice as large as the more recent German program. Furthermore its use as a regulatory instrument has been "accidental." It did not replace the official intervention strategy of direct regulation. Given this situation, the Dutch case provides a unique opportunity to examine the effects of these two approaches as they were applied to the same case.
Three statistical analyses of the impacts of the policy instrument used, supplemented by two expert assessments of these impacts, show the Dutch effluent charges have had a very remarkable effect on industrial polluters. In Holland, t h e water quality policy i s regarded as one of t h e few examples o f successful governmental intervention. The final section presents some general thoughts on relevance of the Dutch experience with effluent charges for other countries.     

The Greek General Election of 2009: PASOK – The Third Generation

The policy networks model recently has become a more frequent analytical tool of EU policy analysts. In a recent article, Hussein Kassim offers a sceptical view about its applicability to the EU. Kassim fails to make explicit the key variables — or internal characteristics of policy networks ‐ which help to explain policy outcomes. However, his own analysis echoes many of the assumptions of the model: that policy networks are rife in the EU because they facilitate informal bargaining amid fluid policy processes, that networks provide order amid extreme institutional complexity and frequent change, and that the hard work involved in identifying EU policy networks is worth the effort. The policy networks model requires further testing and refinement at the EU level, but it remains the most analytically powerful approach on offer.     

The embedded flexibility of Nordic labor market models under pressure from EU-induced dualization—The case of posted work in Denmark and Sweden

While many coordinated market economies have responded to internationalization by regulation that creates dualization between insiders and outsiders, the Nordic countries have opted for an embedded flexibilization in which strong unions and cooperative employers have combined flexibility and equality. However, in recent years, the Nordic countries have come under pressure from an EU-induced dualization that has institutionalized mobile low-wage workers as an outside group. This article presents case studies of how Denmark and Sweden have responded to these challenges. While political processes have been different in the two countries, pressure from EU regulation and changes in employers' incentive to compromise implies that there is now a specific category of low-wage workers in both countries' otherwise egalitarian labor markets. The article, thus, contributes to the literature on dualization by highlighting the pressure coming from EU regulation rather than national policy.     

Party debate over Europe in national election campaigns: Electoral disunity and party cohesion

Few political parties are willing to lead the public debate on how the European Union should develop and parties rarely publicly discuss issues on the EU agenda. This is probably one of the most important democratic problems in the contemporary EU. When and why parties are willing (or not willing) to discuss European cooperation is therefore an essential issue in which political science should engage. Previous research has shown that parties that are internally divided on EU issues downplay these issues in order to avoid internal disputes. At the same time, parties that have severe intraparty conflicts over the issue are unable to contain the debate. Thus, parties that are unified in their position on EU issues and parties that are heavily split speak about the EU, but others do not. Also, earlier research has shown that political parties downplay issues in response to internal divisions among their supporters. It is argued in this article that the focus should not be solely on intraparty conflict or whether or not a party's voters are hesitant or disunited, but rather on how these factors interact in order to better understand how parties act strategically regarding EU issues. Using a new dataset that relies on quantitative content analysis of quality newspapers during the national election campaigns in the period 1983–2010 in France, Germany, the United Kingdom and Sweden, it is found that parties that have a high degree of internal dissent on European issues, while at the same time having an equally divided electorate, are the parties that are most present in the public debate. Hence, it is the interaction between these two important factors that explains much of the variation in the amount of attention paid to European issues in national election campaigns.