美国法学教育和法律职业养成

美国法学教育是普通法传统下三年制研究生层次的职业教育。美国法学院力求教会学生学会在广泛学科领域中进行法律分析、掌握法律技能和理解职业价值。美国法学教育也遭到了各种各样的批评,有人批评法学院是否有效地为学生从事法律职业提供了充分准备。本文对美国法学教育作了概括介绍,分析了美国法学教育面临的挑战,并介绍了对当前的法学教育模式所提出的批评等内容。     

美国法学教育及其对我国的启示

法学教育在美国具有十分重要的地位,世界上最好的法学院和最先进的法学教育方法都产生在美国。美国在自身的法学教育改革中不断完善和发展法学教育的理念、方法、观念、模式等,为其他国家的法律教育改革提供了有益的经验。其法学教育的历史、法学教育的定位、教学方法、课程设置、研究生培养等方面,都值得我们借鉴。     

在美国学法律——美国法学院教育的特点

美国的法律体系来源于英国，但它又经过了不断的改革创新而有别于英国，它的法学院教育就是一个很好的说明。19世纪美国哈佛法学院的院长Christopher Columbus Langdell决定要改革美国法学院的教育。他认为律师所需要的执业素养和法律技能必须经过严格、系统的训练，而当时美国已有的法学本科皿LB）不能满足这样的要求。     

实践性法律教学与法学教育改革

我国现行的法学教育模式注重向学生传授必要的法学原理和基于现行规范的法律知识,忽视了对学生的实践能力和操作能力的培养,因而面临着越来越多的批评和责难。面对压力,国内部分法律院系开始引进美国的"实践性法律教育模式",它包括"诊所式法律教育"和"模拟法庭训练"课程。这种法律教育模式在诸多方面根本有别于我国现行的法学教育模式,对我国的法学教育改革极具借鉴价值。     

日本法科大学院构想与司法考试制度改革

日本法学教育的基本目的不是为了直接培养法律职业人员,通过司法考试选拔法制精英的法律职业选拔模式与法学教育是脱节的。但是这种法学教育和法律职业选拔制度在新的条件下暴露出越来越明显的弊端．在社会变动、司法改革、教育改革的时代背景下,日本参照美国的(Law School)模式,提出了法科大学院构想,开始将法学教育与选拔、培养法律职业家有机地结合起来。可以预见这种变化将会对日本司法制度和法学教育制度产生重要影响,并在比较法文化上具有重要意义。     

比较法视野下的东亚法律人才养成制度改革

本文对20世纪末以来中国、日本、韩国借鉴美国法学院制度进行的法学教育改革进行了概要介绍,在此基础上,对三国继受美国法学教育模式的动因进行了分析,比较了中、日、韩三国在新法学教育制度设计上的差异,评价了改革的实践效果。作者认为,比较法的研究可以为中国法学教育改革提供更加广阔的国际视野,中国建构科学合理的法律人才养成制度,必须全面反映和评估对法律人才的需求,并在此基础上进行整体性改革才能确保改革目标的实现。     

重读美国法律现实主义

美国法律现实主义不仅颠覆了传统法律思维范式,而且也在美国社会转轨时期对变革美国法制和法学教育提出了初步方案.     

教育法学的基本理论

教育法学是整个法学体系中的一个分支,是以法学理论和教育学理论为基础,与其他相关学科相联系,研究存在于教育过程中的法律现象及其发展规律的科学.教育法学作为一门新兴的部门法学,它是在教育行政规范的不断法律化和教育立法工作的逐渐深化、发展的基础上,逐步形成和发展起来的.教育法学在世界各国的发展情况不很平衡,从总的情况看,西方发达国家对于教育法律科学的研究起步较早,最早在观念上形成“教育法学”的要属西德和美国(大约在本世纪60年代).此外,英国、法国和日本几乎是在与美国和西德同期着手     

司法竞技、法律诊所与现实主义法学教育——从耶鲁的法律现实主义传统展开

作为法学教育界领袖的耶鲁法学院的崛起绝非偶然,这背后是法学教育理念的变迁轨迹和现实主义法学教育的勃兴。现实主义法学教育是对于兰德尔所创立的案例教学法的批判与修正。其适应了司法竞技主义与对抗式诉讼的需要,是法律人专业化大背景下的一项改革,也是法律职业所面临的道德性与非道德性困局的一种妥协。法律诊所是现实主义法学教育的一个重要载体,契合了学徒式和实践型法学教育模式。相应地,当代美国法学教育的内容、方法、课程设置、师资配备、授课方式等诸多方面发生了重大变革,其背后是理想主义与现实主义之间的抉择。     

实用主义视野下的法律观

美国现实主义法学的奠基人奥利弗·温德尔·霍姆斯首次提出了“法律的生命不是逻辑,而是经验”这个命题。他所说的“经验”是指法官在遵循先例的前提下,充分根据变化中的社会生活,给予先例以新的生命。这个观点的提出与当时美国传统的价值观念受到挑战、一些反传统的进步思潮出现有关。这个观点反映出霍姆斯的实用主义法学观,对美国后来的现实主义法学产生了深远的影响。     

法理和情理

情感并非只能是任性的和不公正的,并非不能作为法律价值的终极来源.从中国儒家的传统哲学思想出发,一种"中和"的情感是可能通过修身渠道获得的,它可以称为情理.以修身作为治国根本,实质上是奠定社会形而上的价值基础的根本.情理可从修身中被发现,并进入日常生活的正义认知中.在法律推理中,情理可以弥补现代法律的价值亏空.     

法律理性与法律的技术化

现代法律制度的每一个建构性要素及其运作过程的每一个环节,都表现出很强的技术性特征,这使得法律成为一种典型的社会技术。法律技术铸成了法律的确定性,使法律规范系统化;它划定了行为合法与不法的界限,使人们对自己的行为后果更有预期。可以说,技术化是法律理性在形式方面最重要的表现,而实践的特点决定了理性必然是形式理性与实质理性的统一,作为法律价值的载体和法律目的的支持系统,法律技术本身也是法治的基本条件之一。因此,法律的技术性特征及其意义应当受到重视,法律技术的功能也有待于我们加以深入地研究。     

法律发展与法律知识化

法律发展首先必须面对合法化与价值诉求问题，而这一切又无不与作为基础的法律主体的知识立场密切相关。如何谋求“法律知识化”、话语合法化以及法律主体的价值立场的有效运作，是法律文明、有效发展的必要途径，也是法律发展话语摒弃规则主义弊端制约而建构自我所不可回避的挑战。从西方国家的经验看，现代法治的确立与以理性化为核心的法律知识化过程密不可分，法律知识化由知识对法律的关系提升、扩展为一种法律观，再由一种法律观落实为一种价值观、方法论，并由此引导法律主体追求和建设一种新的法律文明。更为重要的是，“法律知识化”使法治成为近代法律发展的本质性，把知识化原则导入法律发展领域，从而实现了法律发展的革命性变革。     

Legal Theory for Legal Empiricists

There is a widespread view that one does either theory or empirical work, and that theory and empiricism represent distant concerns, opposing worldviews, and perhaps distinct mentalities or personalities. This prevalent view has deep roots and is also the result of pragmatic and understandable tendencies toward division of intellectual labor. Against this view, this essay suggests that the relations between theory and empirical study ought to be understood as more intimate and that making legal theory an explicit focus can improve empirical scholarship. We pursue this claim by articulating a basis for legal theory and by showing how that basis illuminates both the application and design of empirical research on law. Legal theory, we argue, follows jurisprudence in interrogating the law as a set of coercive normative institutions. The upshot of this approach is a recognition that an interdisciplinary analysis of law must rely on both a theory (explicit or implicit) of the way law's power and its normativity align and an account of the way in which this discursive cohabitation manifests itself institutionally. We thus argue that legal theory is necessary in order to draw fruitfully on empirical research and further claim that legal theory provides guidance both for setting up an empirical research agenda on law and for designing research into specific topics.     

Legal Positivism and Legal Disagreements

This paper deals with the possibility of faultless disagreement in law. It does this by looking to other spheres in which faultless disagreement appears to be possible, mainly in matters of taste and ethics. Three possible accounts are explored: the realist account, the relativist account, and the expressivist account. The paper tries to show that in the case of legal disagreements, there is a place for an approach that can take into account our intuitions in the sense that legal disagreements are genuine and at times faultless.     

Legal Principles and Legal Theory

Current legal theory is concerned with the presence of principles in law partly because they are at the core of Dworkin's criticisms of Hart's rule of recognition. Hart's theory is threatened by the possibility that the identification of some principles follows an extremely relaxed rule of recognition, or even no rule at all. Unfortunately, there is no conclusive test to ascertain what is the case in actual practice. On the other hand, the evaluative arguments which support Dworkin's proposal of principled adjudication are forceful but not conclusive. Moreover, since ultimate controversy over values is plausible, judicial discretion may sometimes be inevitable.     

Legal Transplants and Legal Downloads

Online legal education has the potential to address a global audience. But little attention has been paid so far to the question of how teaching methods developed in one jurisdiction interact with the substantive law of another legal system. This paper challenges the assumption of the independence of substantive law and law teaching on the basis of a comparative evaluation of online law tutorials in Scotland and Germany. It concludes that the transplanting legal education, as transplanting substantive law, can have unpredictable consequences.     

Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory Revisited

This article deals with the relation between a theory of law and a theory of legal reasoning. Starting from a close reading of Chapter VII of H. L. A. Hart's The Concept of Law, it claims that a theory of law like Hart's requires a particular theory of legal reasoning, or at least a theory of legal reasoning with some particular characteristics. It then goes on to say that any theory of legal reasoning that satisfies those requirements is highly implausible, and tries to show that this is the reason why not only Hart, but also writers like Neil MacCormick and Joseph Raz have failed to offer a theory of legal reasoning that is compatible with legal positivism as a theory of law. They have faced a choice between an explanation of legal reasoning that is incompatible with the core of legal positivism or else strangely sceptical, insofar as it severs the link between general rules and particular decisions that purport to apply them.     

Global Legal Interaction and Legal Cultures

Abstract . The legal discourse of a steadily growing European legal community and universal legal harmonization is misleading since it abstracts completely from the cultural dimension of law which consist of patterns of interpretation and behavioral routines with respect to law. The article makes use of abundant literature in administrative sciences, international management research and socio-psychological studies in Intercultural Communication in order to propose indicators for a comparison of legal cultures in the areas of European legal integration, international commercial transactions and international lawyering.