A contingency theory of policy innovation: how different theories explain the ratification of the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol

This article tests theories, elaborated by rationalists, constructivists, and network theorists, that explain the ratification of international environmental treaties. Rationalists argue that countries’ material self-interest and political and economic conditions affect the likelihood of countries ratifying treaties. Constructivists argue that countries are influenced by exposure to world society. Structural embeddedness theory argues that countries are influenced by neighboring countries, religion, language, and economic peers, and those whom they have network ties to via diplomatic relations and IGO memberships. The article is a study of how these factors affected the ratification of two environmental treaties: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol. The results show that political and economic factors, peer behavior, and network ties were more important in explaining the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol than the UNFCCC. Similar to von Stein (J Conflict Resolut 52:243–268, 2008), it found that exposure to world society was important in the UNFCCC. The authors suggested that the differences were due to the demands which the Kyoto Protocol placed on countries in contrast to the “softness” of the UNFCCC. They also discussed how social influence—based on a variety of inter-governmental relations and affiliations—may signal a change in the structure of the global environmental regime and how it conducts its business.     

How Can the European Union Contribute to a COP-6 Agreement? An Overview for Policy Makers

During the 6th Conference of Parties (COP-6) in The Hague, the Netherlands, November 2000, crucial progress on a number of outstanding issues related to the Kyoto Protocol will have to be made to open the way for its early ratification, if not to save it from complete failure. Given the present lack of internal US political support for the Kyoto Protocol, the EU may play a pivotal role in making the Kyoto Protocol agreement a reality even without initial ratification of the US, if its able to provide sufficient leadership. In this overview article we discuss the main issues under negotiation, the problems of finding agreement and opportunities for the EU to catalyse a compromise agreement at COP-6, building on key scientific papers as included in this issue and discussions at the European Forum on Integrated Environmental Assessment Climate Policy Workshop in Amsterdam. Key elements are the inclusion of sinks, the use of the Kyoto Protocol mechanisms as a supplement to domestic action and the international compliance system. Domestic implementation of climate policy is a major factor for the EU's credibility.     

Beyond Kyoto: The EU's Contribution to a More Sustainable World Economy

The EU has been leading the world fight against climate change since the late 1990s. This activism on the international scene has served as a stimulus for a common action against global warming that has, in the last 10 years, become a world referent and the central issue in the EU environmental policy. The most relevant initiative is the greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions trading scheme (ETS), adopted in fulfilment of the Kyoto Protocol. In 2008, the EU adopted a new set of measures on climate and energy for the post‐Kyoto period (2013–2020). This new legal framework, coupled with the provisions introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon and the ‘Europe 2020’ strategy, represents the EU's commitment to promote a more sustainable European and world economic model.     

The Scope for Joint Implementation in the EU Candidate Countries

Central and Eastern European Candidate countries are involved in negotiations with the EU on the implementation of the Acquis Communautaire in their domestic law. These countries are also preparing themselves for international co-operation in the framework of the Kyoto Protocol. Through this co-operation the Candidate countries will most likely transfer GHG emission reduction credits to other industrialised countries listed in Annex B of the Protocol. This can take place through JI project co-operation and/or International Emissions Trading. This paper argues that the Acquis environmental requirements will in general lead to GHG emission reduction in the Candidate countries, which will reduce the scope for JI in these countries. The extent to which the JI scope will be reduced depends, among others, on the timing of entering the EU and the transitional arrangements between the EU and the Candidates.     

Graduation and Deepening: An Ambitious Post-2012 Climate Policy Scenario

In the second commitment period 2013–2017, the Kyoto Protocol structure is strengthened considerably. The current Annex B countries agree to reduction targets averaging 23% reductions from 1990 level. This induces non-Annex B countries to take up emissions targets according to a multi-tiered graduation system. Graduation is undertaken according to thresholds defined by per capita GDP and emissions. Compared to the current Annex B, coverage of emissions by absolute caps would increase by about 25%; large low-income countries such as India and China do not graduate. Therefore, large emitters above 50 million t. p.a. can utilise a policy-based Clean Development Mechanism. Sinks of all types – terrestrial, marine and geological can be used. To achieve this policy scenario, voter pressure due to extreme meteorological events and a coordination of all progressive forces in the international climate negotiations are necessary. Moreover, a judicious combination of carrots and sticks has to be developed to entice Non-Annex B countries to graduate.     

Interaction between EU carbon trading and the international climate regime: synergies and learning

This article discusses the developing interaction and cross-scale effects between the company-focused EU emissions trading (ETS) and the country-focused international climate regime, in particular the Kyoto Protocol. Key questions discussed are first, what has been the character of selected interactions so far—synergistic or disruptive? Second, what kinds of interaction mechanisms have been driving the interactions; normative, cognitive, or utilitarian? Third, with regard to cross-scale effects, has significant learning taken place between institutions at different levels? Four sub-cases of interaction are analysed: first, the interaction between the Kyoto Protocol as source and the ETS as target which started after the adoption of the Protocol in late 1997. Second, a next phase of interaction started in 2004 when the EU states started to develop national allocation plans (NAPs) where bringing in credits/allowances developed under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) became one compliance strategy. Third, the opposite relationship is examined, i.e., with the ETS as the source and the Kyoto Protocol institutions as targets. The first phase started after the adoption of the 2003 ET Directive and with the developing ETS possibly leading to a more rapid and extensive CDM development than would otherwise have been the case. Fourth and finally, a separate case of interaction deals with the possible role the ETS plays and could play for an emerging global carbon market. Key findings are that these cases are mainly of a synergistic nature. Furthermore, in order to understand the driving forces, it is necessary to draw upon several interaction mechanisms, particularly cognitive and utilitarian ones. Finally, as to cross-scale learning, the post-2012 global regime may avoid pitfalls related to the allocation process experienced by the ETS. But the learning and diffusion potential should not be exaggerated.     

A Bayesian stochastic frontier: an application to agricultural productivity growth in European countries

This paper measures and compares total factor productivity (TFP) growth in agriculture for the European Union (EU) countries and candidate countries (CC), in order to distinguish and investigate cross-country differences in agricultural productivity growth rates from 1993 to 2006. A stochastic production frontier model is estimated using a Bayesian approach capturing country-specific time-invariant heterogeneity and country-specific time-varying inefficiency. Agricultural productivity growth is found to be mostly driven by technological change. The TFP growth rates of the EU-12 countries and CC are about twice the EU-15 growth rate. Catch-up in productivity levels is observed between EU-15 and EU-12 as well as between EU-15 and CC. The results are compared for a situation in which country-specific time-invariant heterogeneity is not taken into account.     

Norway and Emissions Trading: From Global Front-Runner to EU Follower

A striking convergence has taken place in the design of the Norwegian and EU greenhouse gas emissions trading systems from 1998 to 2004. This article argues that the Norwegian adaptation to the EU did not take place as a consequence of perceived legal obligations under the European Economic Area agreement. Nor did it take place due to Norwegian actors being persuaded about the merits of the EU design. The main explanation has to do with interests. The EU market and politics are of course generally very important for Norway. However, before the US pulled out of the Kyoto Protocol in 2001, the Norwegian outlook in climate politics was global. The US pull-out accelerated the development and hence the attractiveness of the EU trading system and resulted in EU emissions trading as the most probable and possibly only international market for Norway to link up to. Hence, this analysis provides further support to the importance of being sensitive to the global context and institutional interaction when analyzing the relationship between the EU and its neighboring countries.     

FROM COPENHAGEN TO DURBAN: ON INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE NEGOTIATIONS

Copenhagen Climate Change Conference began with high expectation but ended in despair. It reached the so-called Copenhagen Accord with some dissenters. The Copenhagen Accord calls for deep cuts in global emissions, but it has not reached a binding goal of greenhouse gas emission reduction commitment and is not a legal effective agreement. EU played a limited role in Copenhagen Climate Change Conference, while the US and China were crucial to achieve the Copenhagen Accord. The subsequent Cancun negotiation reached the Cancun Agreements, but many substantial issues remained unsolved, such as the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol and other core issues. Durban Climate Summit successfully managed to include the main polluters of the globe, especially the US and the main emerging economies (including India and China), to commit their obligations for the first time to reduce greenhouse gas emission reduction under the international framework, and all the parties of the conference agreed that they would negotiate new mechanisms of greenhouse gas reduction which will be implemented by 2020 before 2015. Durban Climate Summit has also reached a package of agreements on climate change. Among them, an important one is about the Global Climate Fund. But some key issues including quantified GHGs emission reduction goals among countries have not been solved.     

Cooperation Between Russia and the EU in the Sphere of Migration

The author attempts to analyze all aspects of cooperation between Russia and the European Union (EU) within the framework of the migration dialogue. She compares the migration policies of Russia and the EU-28 countries, discussing both common problems—the relationship between migration and development, labor immigration, the fight against illegal immigration—and the specific ways in which each side tackles them. She points out that the migration dialogue has great potential for developing further cooperation, exchanging experience, and strengthening trust between Russia and the EU.     

Implementing EU emissions trading: success or failure?

This article assesses and explains the implementation of the EU emissions trading scheme (EU ETS). It argues that implementation in terms of ambitiousness has been only moderately successful so far, but significant differences between the Member States are also observed. Similarities and differences are then explained within a multi-level governance approach emphasizing the need to search for explanations at national, EU, and global levels. The EU ETS case shows that the multi-level governance approach can be as relevant for understanding implementation as for explaining policy-making. In addition to factors located at the national level, the decentralized nature of the EU scheme itself is important for understanding how the system works in practice. At the global level, the link to the Clean Development Mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol is particularly important for determining how well the EU ETS will perform in the future.     

The erratic behaviour of the EU ETS on the path towards consolidation and price stability

The Kyoto Protocol envisages the use of various instruments to achieve emission reduction targets, one of which is the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS), the most important market worldwide for CO₂ emission allowances. The volume of European Union Allowances traded represents over 45% of all the carbon dioxide generated by human activity within the continent. In its first two phases (2005–2012), the behaviour of the EU ETS was erratic, as a result of discretionary policies, an oversupply of allowances and reduced economic activity due to the global crisis. These factors caused excessively low prices that distorted the initial goals of achieving low-carbon solutions. From 2013, changes were made to the market regulation mechanisms in order to correct these structural deficiencies. Empirical analysis of daily prices in the two central phases of the market, following the pattern of ARCH and GARCH models, shows that the measures taken within the EU generated greater confidence and stability in the market and thus reduced volatility. Subsequent price behaviour, following a bullish path, has confirmed the success of the measures taken and their contribution to fulfilling emission reduction targets.     

REFLECTIONS ON EU INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: AN INTROSPECTIVE VIEW

This article presents three main arguments: First, shared competence exists between the national and supranational levels within the European Union (EU) because EU Member States do not trust the European Commission in the external relations law of the EU. Second, the EU will have greater bargaining power in international negotiations if it speaks in a single voice. Within the EU-27, we have compatible values, overlapping interests, shared goals, as well as economic, social and political ties. Therefore, there is a presumption of collective action in the EU’s external relations. However, EU Member States disagree on many issues before they start negotiations, while trying to define a mission together as partners of the European project. Third, Member States confer specific negotiating powers on the EU only when it is in their own national interest to have a common European position on international negotiations.     

‘Caminante,no hay camino,se hace camino al andar’1: EU Citizenship,Direct Democracy and Treaty Ratification

Abstract: This article argues that obligatory, simultaneous, and simple Treaty ratification by referenda is the next step in the consolidation of the political core of European citizenship. In the first part, general remarks about the special nature of EU citizenship highlight the relevance of referenda on EU Treaties for EU citizenship. In the second part, the normative and empirical case in favour of direct democracy is put forward. It is followed by the assessment of direct democracy in European integration as we have known it so far. The practice is irreversible and gaining in momentum. But it is in need of substantial reform due to procedural dysfunctions and discriminatory consequences for the citizens. Section V relates this result to a legal analysis of EU citizenship. The suppression of the discriminatory consequences of the Treaty ratification procedure is necessary from a legal point of view, but it cannot be expected from the ‘judicial incrementalism’ that has characterised the development of EU citizenship regarding free movement and residence. In section VI , the conclusions of the previous sections are drawn into the final proposal of obligatory, simultaneous and simple Treaty reform by referenda in all Member States. At the end, five counter‐arguments to the proposal are discussed.     

The Bonn Agreement to the Kyoto Protocol – Paving the Way for Ratification

This article provides a short account of the international climate negotiations that took place in Bonn from 16 to 27 July 2001. After the Sixth Conference of the Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change failed in November 2000, the Parties had decided to suspend the meeting. The ministers present at the resumed session successfully adopted the "Bonn Agreement to the Kyoto Protocol", a set of political compromises for the most contentious issues left open by the Kyoto Protocol. Although many details had been transferred to the Seventh Conference of the Parties, November 2001 in Marrakesh, Morocco, the Bonn Agreement already paved the way for ratification of the Kyoto Protocol and its entry into force. The Marrakesh Accord adopted on 10 November 2001transforms, with a few exceptions, this political agreement into bindinglegal text.     

The Role of EU Internal Policies in Implementing Greenhouse Gas Mitigation Options to Achieve Kyoto Targets

This paper reviews the role of internal European Union (EU) policies and measures in implementing the target for greenhouse gas mitigation in the Kyoto Protocol. It starts with a discussion of the EU Burden Sharing Agreement, which distributes the target between Member States. This leads to a review of the appropriate level of implementation of policies, i.e. at the EU level or Member State level. There is a role for the flexible mechanisms of the Protocol, particularly emission permit trading, in complementing Member State policies at the EU level. The implementation is to be done against the background of three major factors which may have an important bearing on the policies: the probable long-term requirement of substantial reductions in greenhouse gas emissions a changing structure of energy markets, following liberalisation of the gas and electricity markets EU enlargement to include economies in transition with the potential for further substantial reductions in emissions.The paper concludes with a discussion of ancillary benefits of the policies that may be substantial and a summary of the position as regards the "unfinished business" of the Protocol to be discussed at the Conference of the Parties in the Hague in November 2000.     

The nature, origin and impact of legally binding consequences: the case of the climate regime

The Marrakesh Accords provide a detailed compliance system for the Kyoto Protocol. An innovative feature of this system is an Enforcement Branch authorized to apply punitive measures or “consequences” in the second commitment period to Annex I Parties that have been found to be in non-compliance in the first commitment period. However, even after the latest Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), COP-11, and the first COP serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, COP/MOP-1, it is not yet clear whether these consequences will be legally binding. The purpose of this paper is three-fold. First, we examine the legal nature of the punitive consequences embedded in the Marrakesh Accords. Second, we discuss potential motives for making these consequences legally binding. We point out that one such motive is that their implementation requires cooperation by the Party that is in non-compliance. In this regard, Kyotoȁ9s compliance system differs from other international compliance systems equipped with punitive consequences, such as those of the WTO and the UN. Finally, we consider whether making the punitive consequences legally binding is likely to make a difference. The conclusion, which should be of interest to both academic researchers and the policy community, is that the legal status of the consequences is likely to have only a modest effect on compliance levels. A country that deliberately fails to abide by other legally binding commitments under the Kyoto Protocol is also likely to resist the application of punitive consequences, regardless of whether these consequences are made legally binding or not.     

The Legality of the EU's Stand-Alone Approach to the Climate Impact of Aviation: The Express Role Given to the ICAO by the Kyoto Protocol

The aviation sector is not yet covered by the European Union's Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). Taking into account the fact that aviation increasingly contributes to climate change, the European Commission adopted a proposal for legislation to include aviation in the EU ETS. The proposal foresees the inclusion of internal EU flights as well as external flights to and from the Union within the EU ETS. On 20 December 2007, EU Environment Ministers reached political agreement in the Environment Council on the basis of a new compromise text tabled by the Presidency. However, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), as well as various stakeholders, does not consider that the EU has the competence to include aviation within the EU ETS. A crucial point concerning the legality of including aviation in the EU ETS is the fact that Article 2(2) of the Kyoto Protocol states that the parties 'shall pursue limitation or reduction of emissions of greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol from aviation . . . working through the International Civil Aviation Organization . . .'. This article reviews the legality of the EU's stand-alone approach, focusing on the European and international legal framework and taking into account the express role given to the ICAO by the Kyoto Protocol.     

Improving Cost-effectiveness and Facilitating Participation of Developing Countries in International Emissions Trading

This paper discusses ways in which the next climate agreement – a renegotiated Kyoto Protocol or a second-period agreement – can be made more cost-effective. The discussion focuses on the design of international emissions trading to facilitate early participation by developing countries. Four aspects are highlighted: the design of compensation rules, the need to regulate the use of the CDM, the effect of allowing borrowing and the implications of a Commitment Period Reserve.     

An Evaluation of Pre-Kyoto Differentiation Proposals for National Greenhouse Gas Abatement Targets

Although the Kyoto Protocol has set a precedent for future climate negotiations, particularly with respect to differentiation of targets between countries, the current approach is likely to be insufficient as a foundation for future targets. A more systematic approach is deemed necessary to meet the challenges of negotiating new targets after 2012 as well as involving the USA and perhaps developing countries. We argue that better negotiation tools can be helpful in this regard. We thus present an overview of more systematic differentiation methods for national greenhouse gas reduction targets. We draw from the proposals that were submitted in the climate negotiations from 1995 to 1997 leading up to the Kyoto Protocol, the EU's Triptique approach for internal differentiation of targets, and three proposals discussed in the literature on fairness principles. The most promising and helpful proposals for future negotiations are given particular attention: the second proposal by Japan, the French proposal, the Norwegian proposal, the Brazilian proposal, and Triptique. A numerical illustration of the former three together with the Sovereignty, Egalitarian, and Ability to Pay fairness principles is provided. Using resemblance to the Kyoto Protocol to measure political feasibility, we find that the proposals rank in the order; (1) the second Japanese; (2) the French; (3) the Norwegian; (4) the Sovereignty; (5) the Ability to Pay; and (6) the Egalitarian, the last being particularly infeasible.