Security Studies and the Use of History: Neville Chamberlain's Grand Strategy Revisited

In The Gathering Storm, Winston S. Churchill claimed that during the 1930s British leaders were willfully blind to the German threat and failed to meet it by rearming. Accepting the Churchillian narrative, leading IR scholars regard British grand strategy during the 1930s as glaring example of strategic adjustment failure. This article reappraises British grand strategy during the 1930s and rejects both the Churchillian narrative, and the scholarly claims that Britain did not adjust its strategy to the German threat. In the 1930s, Britain did balance against Germany and focused on countering what policy makers perceived as the key threat facing Britain: its vulnerability to German air attack. Britain's grand strategic options were limited by external conditions and by domestic economic constraints. Neville Chamberlain, therefore, was playing a weak hand, and did the best that he could with the cards he was dealt. Britain's 1930s grand strategy is one of the historical cases most frequently used by IR scholars for theory testing. For that reason alone, it is important to get the history right. This is not the only reason, however. The 1930s have provided many of the concepts, images, and metaphors that have dominated the discourse about American foreign policy since World War II. Because scholarship about the events of the 1930s shapes the discourse about real-world policy, getting the history right matters.     

Applied Grand Strategy: Making Tough Choices in an Era of Limits and Constraint

This article hopes to contribute to the strategic content of U.S. foreign policy by offering a definition of grand strategy and case for reorienting U.S. policy around it. Rather than advocate a specific grand strategy—a matter still open for debate—the analysis concludes with a set of attributes to assess whether a proposed grand strategy constitutes a “good” grand strategy. It concludes by introducing the concept of an applied grand strategy approach, which may help to identify and assess the strategic implications of foreign policy choices.     

U.S. Grand Strategy Following the George W. Bush Presidency

Debates over U.S. grand strategy have devoted a disproportionate level of attention to the War on Terror itself rather than the evolving strategic environment. Challenges including an impending shift in the balance of power, structural deficits, and divided public opinion will significantly impact the policy options available to government leaders, but they have not been adequately addressed. This article analyzes the options available for U.S. grand strategy following the George W. Bush presidency by relating key U.S. national interests with domestic and international policy constraints on the horizon. The analysis concludes that the United States must adopt a defensive grand strategy to rebuild popular consensus, to prevent further strain on the military, and to consolidate its gains in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, this strategy will require flexible coalitions, not formal international organizations, because of a significant divergence of security interests and capabilities with its European allies.     

Japanese diplomacy during the Cambodian peace process and Japan's post-Cold War role in Southeast Asia: the legacy of the Fukuda Doctrine, 1989–1993

Japan's role during the Cambodian peace process after 1989 is often considered a successful case of post-Second World War Japanese diplomacy. In contrast to claims in the existing literature that Japan began to consider and initiated its involvement in the settlement only beginning in the late 1980s, this article demonstrates that Tokyo's role built upon a diplomatic platform that the Japanese had constructed through peace efforts since the Cambodian conflict erupted in 1979. The policy framework, objectives and initiatives of Japan's Cambodia diplomacy during the peace process represented the culmination of a ten-year diplomatic endeavour. Ultimately, Japan's involvement in the Cambodian settlement, guided by its Southeast Asia strategy of promoting coexistence and cooperation between ASEAN and Indochina, legitimated and favoured Japan's attempts to expand its post-Cold War role in regional political and security affairs.     

Protecting “The Prize”: Oil and the U.S. National Interest

American national security policy is based on a misunderstanding about U.S. oil interests. Although oil is a vital commodity, potential supply disruptions are less worrisome than scholars, politicians, and pundits presume. This article identifies four adaptive mechanisms that together can compensate for almost all oil shocks, meaning that continuous supply to consumers will limit scarcity-induced price increases. The adaptive mechanisms are not particularly fragile and do not require tremendous foresight by either governments or economic actors. We illustrate these mechanisms at work using evidence from every major oil disruption since 1973. We then identify the small subset of disruptive events that would overwhelm these adaptive mechanisms and therefore seriously harm the United States. Finally, we analyze the utility of U.S. foreign military policy tools in addressing these threats. Our findings suggest that the United States can defend its key interests in the Persian Gulf—the world's most important oil-producing region—with a less-intrusive, “over the horizon” posture.     

Stability and Change in U.S. Grand Strategy

Since the Global War on Terror (more recently termed the Long War) emerged as the centerpiece of U.S. grand strategy in 2001, the post–Cold War U.S. debate has narrowed significantly. Essentially three alternative strategies now compete for pride of place. Two are variants of a “primacy” strategy; one is a variant of “restraint,” sometimes termed “offshore balancing.” All three strategies take globalization as a given and as a positive development. None specifically connects U.S. military power to globalization. To the extent that globalization can be argued to have negative consequences, restraint offers a different remedy than either version of primacy. This article offers a brief characterization of globalization and speculates on its positive and negative results. The three grand strategies that remain visible in the U.S. public policy debate, and their suggested remedies, are then discussed. Finally, the U.S. military strengths and weaknesses are evaluated in order to gauge which strategy's remedies are most feasible.     

Grand Strategy of ‘Restrainment’

With the end of the Cold War, the subsequent global war on terror, the global economic recession, and wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, one would think that the United States would have formulated a grand strategy for dealing with these problems. This, however, is not the case. This article advances a grand strategy of “restrainment,” as a guiding concept for our approach to international politics. It builds from the principle that U.S. policy must seek to restrain—individually and collectively—those forces, ideas, and movements in international politics that create instability, crises, and war.     

Confrontations on the Issue of Terrorism Between Iran and the U.S. after 1979

The issue of terrorism has been a significant source of influence on the relationship between Iran and the U.S. since the Islamic Revolution. Iran's friendship with extremist groups that are designated as terrorist groups by the U.S. State Department is seriously challenging America's foreign policy. This article attempts to explore the prospect of confrontations on the issue of terrorism between Iran and the U.S. through a detailed analysis of their different interpretations and mutual recognitions of terrorism and through an in-depth analysis of the measures each party has taken regarding this confrontation. This article argues that the confrontation between Iran and the U.S. regarding the issue of terrorism is not strictly about terrorism. Rather, it is also about the conflicts of policies that result from different security interests and political values. Resolving the issue of terrorism depends on the reconciliation of the relationship between Iran and the U.S. Without mutual trust between the two nations, Iran will continue to support extremist groups in order to increase its influence against the external and internal pressures it is currently under, and the U.S. will continue to contain Iran's regional ambitions and seek changes in its behavior.     

Explaining Changes in U.S. Grand Strategy: 9/11, the Rise of Offensive Liberalism,and the War in Iraq

This paper proposes a model for explaining shifts and variations in U.S. grand strategy. The model is based on a distinction between four ideal-type grand strategies or ideational approaches to security according to the objectives and means of security policy: defensive and offensive realism, and defensive and offensive liberalism. While the four approaches are continually present in the U.S. policy community, it is the combination of two systemic conditions—namely the distribution of capabilities and the balance of threat—that selects among the competing approaches and determines which grand strategy is likely to emerge as dominant in a given period. Great power parity is conducive to realist approaches. In contrast, a situation of hegemony encourages the emergence of ideological grand strategies, which focus on ideology promotion, according to the ideology of the hegemon. In the case of a liberal hegemon, such as the United States, liberal approaches are likely to emerge as dominant. In addition, a relative absence of external threat encourages defensive approaches, while a situation of high external threat gives rise to offensive strategies. Thus, various combinations of these systemic factors give rise to the emergence of various grand strategies. This model is tested in two cases of the two most recent shifts in U.S. grand strategy following 1991. In accordance with the expectations of the model, a change in the distribution of capabilities with the end of the Cold War made possible a change from realist to liberal strategies. In the benign environment of the 1990s the dominant strategy was defensive liberalism, while the change in the balance of threat after 9/11 gave rise to the grand strategy of offensive liberalism.     

Beijing's March West: Opportunities and Challenges for China's Eurasian Pivot

China's Eurasian frontiers have emerged as a major factor in Beijing's foreign policy through President Xi Jinping's “One Belt, One Road” strategy. The article argues that this strategy has been given impetus by the shifting geopolitical landscape in Central Asia resulting from the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, Russia's relative decline, and Beijing's quest for stability in its restive province of Xinjiang.     

美国的出口管制政策及其对美中贸易的影响

美国出口管制政策演变的历史表明,出口管制始终是美国国家战略的一个重要组成部分。自中华人民共和国成立以来,美国对华一直实行歧视性出口管制政策。这不仅在相当程度上加剧了美中贸易失衡,而且使两国都付出了巨大的经济代价。由于奥巴马政府并未改变美国对华的一贯立场,因此其推动的出口管制改革并未惠及美中贸易,使美中贸易关系的发展日趋复杂。在对华出口管制问题上,美中两国的博弈将是一个长期的过程,在美中双边经济相互依赖关系中明显处于弱势地位的中国应当积极采取措施予以应对。     

“Under the Influence of Mahan”: Theodore and Franklin Roosevelt and their Understanding of American National Interest

This article explores links in the grand strategic outlook of Theodore Roosevelt and Franklin Roosevelt, with particular reference to the influence upon both men of Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan. It focuses upon an episode during Franklin Roosevelt's tenure as Assistant Secretary of the Navy, when he was in direct correspondence with both Theodore and Mahan on matters of grand strategy and naval policy. The paper argues that Theodore Roosevelt proved a crucial conduit in the formulation of Franklin Roosevelt's grand strategic outlook, both through his promulgation of Mahanian thought and his support of Franklin's correspondence with the Admiral. This in turn would be important later during Franklin Roosevelt's leadership of the United States.     

Mixing Grand Strategies: Trump and International Security

ABSTRACT

When a new President is elected in the United States, the first thing analysts do is define that President’s grand strategy; yet, naming Donald Trump’s grand strategy was a difficult task as his pre-election speeches often contradicted traditional US foreign policy norms. Trump’s ambiguous grand strategy combines two US foreign policy strategies: nationalism in the sense that his preference is for unilateral policies prioritising American interests, and a traditional foreign policy approach, as seen in the moves taken against China and Iran. Surprisingly, this grand strategy unintentionally contributes to cooperation in Eurasia, as actors like Russia, China, Turkey, India and the European Union continue to try to balance the threat from the United States instead of competing with each other, while smaller countries are reluctant to challenge the regional powers due to mistrust towards Trump.     

Dismantling the Oil Wars Myth

This article argues that, contrary to the assumptions of international relations scholars, policymakers, and the general public, states do not engage in oil wars. A twofold strategy is employed to support this assertion. First, the article scrutinizes the logical underpinnings of oil war claims, arguing that proponents have underestimated the obstacles to seizing and exploiting foreign resources and, consequently, exaggerated the likelihood of oil wars. Second, the article examines four conflicts that are commonly identified as international oil wars: Japan's attack on the Dutch East Indies in World War II, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the Iran--Iraq War, and the Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay. It finds that the desire to control additional oil resources was not the fundamental cause of aggression in any of these conflicts. In the latter two cases, aggression was unconnected to oil interests. In the former, states fought for their survival, not for an oil prize.     

Japanese political economy revisited: diverse corporate change,institutional transformation,and Abenomics

Abstract

This introductory article to the special issue on “Japanese Political Economy Revisited: Diverse Corporate Change, Institutional Transformation, and Abenomics” starts with a short summaryof the changing perceptions of Japan's political economy from its meteoric rise as worldwide leading model in the 1970s and 1980s to its demotiontoa problem and reform case since the later 1990s. Based on this overview, it identifies some striking issue and open questions in this conventional view of Japan's political economy as problem and the high expectations on Abenomics as Japan's current economic reform programme. Then we discuss the articles of the special issue and their new contributionsto a better understanding of the developments at the corporate level as well as institutional change and economic reforms at the macro level in the last two decades. Finally, this introductory article ends with a short outlineof a new research programme and four central research questions about the Japanese political economy.     

If Not Soft Balancing,Then What? Reconsidering Soft Balancing and U.S. Policy Toward China

Some scholars argue that soft balancing is a typical state behavior against the hegemon under unipolarity. Others contend that soft balancing against the hegemon is ineffective. We challenge both arguments and suggest that soft balancing is not only a product of specific configurations of the power distribution in the system, unipolarity, but also a rational behavior under another condition, economic dependence. We argue that the interplay between power disparity and economic dependence shapes a state's decision in choosing different balancing strategies. The higher the power disparity and economic dependence, the more likely a state chooses soft balancing to pursue its security. Using U.S. policy toward China after the Cold War as a crucial test, we suggest that the huge power gap and increasing economic interdependence between the United States and China shape U.S. soft balancing rather than hard balancing toward China. We conclude that future U.S.-China relations depend on whether the United States declines as a result of China's rise and on the degree of economic interdependence between the two countries.     

美国TPP战略的动机及其对东北亚经济一体化的影响研究

美国TPP战略既是美国外贸政策的重大调整,也是对WTO全球多边贸易秩序的系统性突破。它不仅反映了美国政府试图重振其国内脆弱经济的努力,同时也标志着美国亚太经济合作战略的重大转变。本文运用一般均衡模型,模拟了不同情境下美国TPP战略对不同地区产生的各种经济影响。模拟结果显示:TPP加入国家福利增加,而非加入国将受损,一个不包括中国的TPP将使得中国福利受损,贸易条件恶化。中国需要迅速建立包含中日韩三国的东北亚自由贸易区,同时应根据自己的长远利益构建针对美国TPP战略的其他对冲性政策。     

How to Tame Your Dragon: An Evaluation of India's Foreign Policy Toward China

In the past 60 years, India-China relations have oscillated between friendship, hostility and indifference. In recent times, both countries have started competing for global economic gains and political status. In light of these events, the objective of this article is to analyze various strategies used by China against India, and India's policy response to these strategies. The article evaluates the process of foreign policy decision making in India, and traces the historical evolution of India's foreign policy towards China. It then deconstructs China's foreign policy towards India, and provides the rationale behind its strategies. The article suggests that after initial engagement with India on the question of boundary disputes, Chinese foreign policy has undergone a dramatic shift since 2007. It specifically evaluates the twin Chinese tactics of military incursions and denial of legitimacy to the Indian territories of Arunachal Pradesh and Ladakh. Based on an analysis of China's previous boundary disputes resolution record with neighbors, these tactics are identified as an extension of China's new strategy for resolving such disputes. The article concludes by suggesting various policy options available to India to counter China's new strategy on the Sino-Indian border.     

The U.S.-Indian Nuclear Agreement: Balancing Energy Needs and Nonproliferation Goals

President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh of India signed a statement of intent in 2005 to allow India access to civilian nuclear technology, despite its not being a signatory to the Nonproliferation Treaty. This deal would reverse decades of U.S. nonproliferation policy, since India was the source for much of U.S. law on this count. It would require Congress to amend that law to create special exceptions for India. Rationales and critiques of the proposed deal have focused on its impact on the future exercise of U.S. authority on nonproliferation policy worldwide. But the broader impact may be felt internally, since nonproliferation decisions have been inextricably linked to national security imperatives. In acknowledging an economic justification for allowing India access to nuclear energy, the deal has also created a new dependency between U.S. national security policy and the energy profile of emerging powers.