Populist Communication and Publicity: An Empirical Study of Contextual Differences in Switzerland

Abstract: This study analyzes the context‐dependency of populist communication and asks whether there are variations in populist communication for representatives of different kinds of parties. In contrast to previous research on European populism, which mostly considers only the right‐wing, this study includes the entire scope of political parties; thus allowing for the possibility of the diffusion of populism in contemporary politics. The empirical contribution is a multilevel analysis of speeches in non‐public and public forums (closed parliamentary committees, open parliamentary floors, and the talk show ‘Arena’) on immigration and asylum amendments in Switzerland. A so‐called populist party, the Swiss People’s Party, played a significant role in drafting the legislation. Analysis reveals that a) different public settings influence populist communication differently; b) a non‐populist party, the Christian‐democrats, employs more populist communication on average than any other party and its populism is employed more consistently across contexts than that of the Swiss People’s Party; c) but when speaking in media forms, the Swiss People’s Party employs substantially more populist communication than any other party. Thus, the type of public forum does not uniformly contribute to higher levels of populist communication, but rather the effect of forum type varies substantially by party.     

Populism in the Manifestos of Latvian Political Parties: Increasingly Used but Ineffective?

It is often stated that we live in an era of populist zeitgeist, namely, that populism today has become part of everyday politics. Despite systematic attempts to investigate the validity of this claim in Western European democracies, the situation in the Baltic states has been overlooked. This article marks the first attempt to investigate the dynamics of populism in the Latvian party manifestos by using novel research methodology to quantitatively estimate how populist Latvian political parties have become over an extensive period of time. Our findings reveal that in the last two decades populism has indeed become more widespread in Latvian party manifestos, yet it does not seem to be very effective and is largely primarily used by electorally unsuccessful parties.     

It's not Economic Interventionism,Stupid! Reassessing the Political Economy of Radical Right‐wing Populist Parties

This paper engages in a comparative analysis of the economic positions of radical right‐wing populist parties in Western Europe. Following Ennser‐Jedenastik ( 2016 ), we argue that those parties’ political economy is best captured in terms of the nativist, populist and authoritarian features of their core ideology, each of which produces a specific set of economic policies independent from the issue of government intervention in the economy. On basis of an analysis of the election manifestos of seven radical right‐wing populist parties in Western Europe in the period 2005‐2015, we argue that those parties share similarities in their economic nativism, authoritarianism and populism, whilst their positions on the traditional role of the state in the economy are more diverse. The findings indicate also a unified ‘nativist’ response to the global financial crisis both in terms of welfare chauvinism and economic protectionism. We discuss the role of internal and external factors in explaining the economic profile of radical right‐wing populist parties.     

The Welfare Agenda of the Populist Radical Right in Western Europe: Combining Welfare Chauvinism,Producerism and Populism*

Recent scholarship on the populist radical right tends to imprecisely describe the welfare agenda of this party family with reference to its key ideological characteristics of nativism, authoritarianism, and populism. We propose an alternative analytical framework that considers the multidimensionality of welfare state positions and the “deservingness criteria” that underlie ideas about welfare entitlement. Applying this framework to a sample of four European populist radical right parties, we conclude that three interrelated frames inform their welfare agenda. These parties, we argue, advocate social closure not only on the basis of the deservingness criterion of identity (welfare chauvinism), but also on criteria of control, attitude, and reciprocity (welfare producerism) and on an antagonism between the people and the establishment (welfare populism). Understanding the welfare agenda of the populist radical right requires us to move beyond welfare chauvinism and to reconsider the concept of welfare producerism and its interaction with welfare chauvinism.     

Calling the Ghost of Populism: The AfD's Strategic and Tactical Agendas until the EP Election 2014

Since the formation of the German AfD in spring 2013, political scientists have discussed whether the AfD can be classified as a populist party. Despite the split of the party in summer 2015 leading to this characterisation becoming uncontested, the question remains whether the AfD was populist from its inception. This article demonstrates that distinguishing between the tactical and strategic agendas of the party solves this conundrum. While the AfD seldom applied populist discourse in its official manifestos, its tactical agenda was undoubtedly framed by populism. Ironically, it has been the ideologically moderate economist wing that has applied populist discourse in combination with its critique of the euro.     

Leader Effects and Voting for the Populist Radical Right in Western Europe

Charismatic leaders are often assumed to drive the electoral success of populist radical right parties. Yet, little attention is given to how voter evaluations of leaders influence individual voting behavior. To our knowledge, no systematic and comparative tests of this empirical question exist. In this paper, we test to what extent voters’ support for populist radical right parties is fueled by leaders' appreciation. In order to examine leader effects on the populist radical right vote, we rely on an original dataset pooling 29 National Election Studies from ten established West European parliamentary democracies (1985‐2018). Our analysis finds that: (1) voters’ evaluation of party leaders is significantly associated with voting for populist radical right parties; (2) leader evaluations are more important than left‐right self‐placement when it comes to voting for the populist radical right, and (3) leader effects are more important for populist radical right voters than for other voters.     

Flesh of the Same Flesh: A Study of Voters for the Alternative for Germany (AfD) in the 2017 Federal Election

Using the 2017 post-election German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES), this article examines the voters for the Alternative for Germany (AfD) in the 2017 German federal election. We show that AfD voters in 2017 were truly ‘flesh of the same flesh’ of the mainstream German political parties, with the AfD drawing its voters from across the political party spectrum as well as from previous non-voters in 2013. In contrast to previous scholarship, we find that in most respects AfD voters in 2017 did not differ demographically from voters for all other parties, be that in terms of gender, education, employment status, and union membership. Furthermore, we find that AfD voters were not driven by anxiety about their own economic situation: they are no ‘losers of globalisation.’ Instead, AfD voters in 2017 were driven solely by two factors: their attitudes towards immigrants/refugees and anti-establishment sentiment/satisfaction with democracy in Germany.     

乌克兰民粹主义的特征及影响(2000-2019年)

乌克兰自独立以来,政治民粹主义伴随其政治经济转型进程不断蔓延加剧。进入21世纪,虽然民粹主义政党和运动出现仅十几年,但乌克兰已然成为后苏联空间中遭遇民粹主义浪潮席卷的突出案例。在经历了2014年的政治危机和持续的顿巴斯冲突后,乌克兰政治逐步进入了民粹主义全面盛行的新阶段。乌克兰民粹主义相较整个欧洲区域具有一些显著的特征,主要表现在:反精英和反建制的极端化,强烈的反民主属性和家长制政府偏好,分裂矛盾的意识形态,过度渲染和营造社会危机,以及盲目的区域一体化期待。究其成因,可归结于该国历史上对统治精英"外来化"的认知,独立后缺乏新的民族国家认知与主流意识形态,"团结主义"的政治文化传统,以及整个社会对阶层分化和等级制度的共识。这种特殊的民粹主义,将对乌克兰政治持续产生一系列负面影响。     

CDU refugee policies and the landesverband oder/neiße: Electoral tool or instrument of integration?

Despite the recognition that the integration of refugees and expellees into west Germany has been one of the success stories of the post‐war period, little light has been shed on the process of political integration of this group into the political system of the nascent Federal Republic. As the ‘newcomers’ were prevented from organising themselves in political or cultural organisations, the only legitimate way of exercising political influence was the way through the licensed parties. The CDU/CSU as a conglomerate of liberal and conservative traditions made use of its historic opportunity to adapt its flexible party apparatus and encourage refugee participation. Thereby, it made an important contribution to the political representation of refugee demands as well as attracting a large proportion of the newcomers’ votes.     

Different Types of Right-Wing Populist Discourse in Government and Opposition: The Case of Italy

Does right-wing populist discourse change when parties move from opposition to government? How do different ideological types of right-wing populist parties express this discourse? Through an analysis of the Lega Nord and Forza Italia/Popolo della Libertà between 2006 and 2013, we find that while the switch to office does bring some changes, the main elements of their populist discourse remain largely the same. We also show how their respective emphases on ‘elites’ and ‘others’ distinguish the parties: FI/PDL focuses overwhelmingly on ‘elites’ while the LN places similar emphasis on both ‘elites’ and ‘others’.     

Spain: No Country for the Populist Radical Right?

Although there is growing research interest in populist radical right (PRR) parties in Western Europe, little attention has been paid to the case of Spain – a country where these parties are almost non-existent or irrelevant from an electoral and political point of view. In a nutshell, we maintain that in contemporary Spain there is real demand for PRR parties, but three supply-side factors are impeding their electoral breakthrough and persistence: the cleavage structure of the country, the strategy of competition of the mainstream right and the electoral system. At the same time, we postulate that at least in the case of Spain the Great Recession has not improved the electoral odds of the PRR as such but rather facilitated the emergence of leftist populist forces.     

Not Dead Yet? Explaining Party Member Activity in Germany

While political parties in Germany have been steadily losing members for more than two decades, there has been no sign of a breakdown in their day-to-day grass-roots activities. Despite many prophecies of doom, the ‘party on the ground’ does not seem to be dead yet. There is some evidence that the declining number of party members is compensated for by an increasing share of party activists. The question is how the erosion of the political parties’ member-ship base affects their levels and types of activity. This paper aims to describe and explain these two dimensions of activity in German political parties, using data from German party membership studies from 1998 and 2009. The analyses show that parties are partly able to compensate for membership losses via an increased activity of the remaining members, but at the same time, it is possible that changes in the social profile and motivations of the most active group of members may lead to future difficulties in coping with party work and canvassing new members.     

Flirting with Authoritarian Fantasies? Rodrigo Duterte and the New Terms of Philippine Populism

This commentary aims to take stock of the 2016 presidential elections in the Philippines that led to the landslide victory of the controversial Rodrigo Duterte. It argues that part of Duterte’s electoral success is hinged on his effective deployment of the populist style. Although populism is not new to the Philippines, Duterte exhibits features of contemporary populism that are befitting of an age of communicative abundance. This commentary contrasts Duterte’s political style with other presidential contenders, characterises his relationship with the electorate and concludes by mapping populism’s democratic and anti-democratic tendencies, which may define the quality of democratic practice in the Philippines in the next six years.     

Laboring Under Chávez: Populism for the Twenty‐first Century

This analysis addresses two interrelated questions: what were labor conditions like under Hugo Chávez? and what do those conditions suggest about the relationship between populism and leftism in Latin America? The answer to the first question is unequivocal. Despite its socialist rhetoric, the Chávez regime fragmented and weakened organized labor, undermined collective bargaining, and exploited vulnerable workers in cooperatives. Thus the regime's primary foible was not its radical leftism but its pursuit of populist control at the expense of the leftist goals of diminishing the domination of marginalized groups and expanding their autonomous participation in civil society. This appraisal of labor politics under Chávez indicates substantial tension between the realization of these leftist goals and populist governance. It further suggests the need to distinguish more clearly between leftism and populism and their respective impacts on democracy.     

Elite interests and political participation in Botswana, 1966–2014

ABSTRACT

Botswana’s tiny economy is overwhelmingly government-driven and political participation, particularly on the side of the ruling party, is critical for one’s economic survival and prosperity. This has led to enduring intrigue and conflict among the country’s political power elite. Opposition party activists traditionally have embraced leftist policies and claimed to be representing the country’s poor and downtrodden while castigating the ruling Botswana Democratic Party (in power since 1966) of being pro-rich and politically connected business. Ironically, some members of the opposition elite also engage in business ventures with their ruling party counterparts. The scramble for economic opportunities has fuelled debilitating factionalism within both the ruling and opposition parties over the years. In some instances tribalism was mobilised in intra- and inter-party elections for positions of influence even though voters are more interested in service delivery than traditional ethnic issues. Our paper considers the question: ‘Whose interests do Botswana’s politicians represent?’     

Populist possibilities and political constraints in Mexico

This article defines populism (in Latin American context) as a form of politics that is based mainly upon a personalist appeal, attracts significant popular support and, if successful, significantly redesigns social or political institutions. Neopopulism is defined as a form of populism which begins outside the state as opposed to classic populism which originates within the state. The main theoretical argument is that the study of populism can be made significant for comparative politics if we emphasise the issue of institutional redesign and then conceptualise it in structure vs agency terms. The comparative question then becomes whether a particular set of political institutions is robust enough to withstand the challenge of a charismatic individual. The empirical background is that Latin America has seen a significant number of populist movements that have indeed fundamentally altered institutional structures. By the same token, there have been an even larger number of populist attempts which ultimately failed. Having made this point, the discussion then focuses on Mexico. It seeks to understand the different sets of conditions which allowed Lázaro Cárdenas to succeed as classic populist in the 1930s, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas to come close to success as a neopopulist in the 1980s and which greatly reduce the likelihood of successful neopopulism in the near future.     

A Rising Tide for Jean–Marie,Jörg, & Pauline? Xenophobic Populism in Comparative Perspective

Many analysts attributed right–wing victories in Italy, Portugal, Scandinavia, Holland, and in the 2002 French presidential elections, to a rising wave of xenophobic populism voicing opposition to elitism, migrants, crime, and corruption. Drawing upon increasing political mistrust and volatility, and upon discontent with moderate, left–centre governments, this populist wave looked to be tidal. The generic causes of xenophobic populism are widespread and, although complex, understandable. They now extend beyond a simple response to socioeconomic hardship, mass unemployment or uncontrolled migration. In countries like France, Austria and Australia, which have overcome most major economic and security problems, other cultural and political factors have fostered resentment. The National Front, the Freedom Party and, in Australia, perhaps even Pauline Hanson's One Nation, have assembled a durable, organised, hard core of supporters. Even without their charismatic leaders, these parties may well survive, build on their relative success, and implant themselves as a fairly permanent nuisance in the political arena.     

Not to the highest bidder: the failure of incumbency in the Zambian 2011 elections

Incumbent political parties in emerging democracies tend to use clientelism and state resources to mobilise electoral support. In most cases, they go on to win these electoral contests. However, this paper uses the Zambian example to demonstrate that mere incumbency may not always win elections. Despite the advantages of incumbency, the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) lost the 2011 elections to the opposition Patriotic Front (PF). To explain this, the paper argues that the qualities of an incumbent political party matter. For the MMD, the paper identifies three major contextual variables which undermined incumbency: first, the internal long-term but sustained centrifugal conditions which systematically eroded the party’s strength. Second, the public perception of the MMD as a decaying and recalcitrant party which increasingly detached itself from the electorate. Third, the presence of a surging populist, grassroots-based opposition political party.