Organizing international armaments cooperation: institutional design and path dependencies in Europe

Abstract

Few issues are more important to scholars of Europe's emergence as a foreign policy actor than whether the European Union (EU) can forge a common defense-industrial policy out of 27 states' procurement policies and defense industries. Overlooked in most scholarly analyses of European defense-industrial cooperation, the story of Europe's international armaments organizations stretches back more than six decades. In this article, we examine the impact of past institutional outcomes on the defense-industrial field by applying the concepts and analytic tools of historic institutionalism to European armaments organizations. Because past institutional dynamics have channeled the subsequent development of armaments cooperation, what has emerged is a polycentric governance architecture wherein organizations with transatlantic, pan-European and restrictive-European memberships dominate distinct components of the cooperative process. We demonstrate that this maturing institutional pattern will likely limit the opportunities for the EU – and especially its Commission – to shape the future contours of European defense-industrial cooperation.     

外国在印度市场上直接投资的现状分析及对中国的启示

一、印度的投资环境(一)外国对印度投资的有利条件1.印度是一个潜力巨大的市场。印度人口10亿 ,是世界上人口仅次于我国的发展中国家 ,GDP达5200亿美元 ,人均GDP为504美元 ,近年来经济保持年均5%～6%的增速 ,是全球经济增速最快国家之一 ,其经济增长势头和市场潜力不容忽视。目前约有2亿中产阶级(人均收入在1400美元以上)①,劳动力成本较低 ,劳工标准不像发达国家那样严格 ,对环保没有特殊要求 ,有着和西方国家一样的政治制度 ,故随着环境的不断改善 ,印度将是最有潜力的国际资本市场、商品市场和劳务市场。2.印度利用外资的政策有了新发…     

European Union Armaments Policy: Options for Small States?

Abstract

This article addresses the question of small states and their future role in any EU armaments policy. It argues that their traditional tactics of demanding equality of membership in armaments organisations, using protectionist tactics to preserve the indigenous defence industry and using their home markets as a method of gaining advantages for their firms, are increasingly failing at the EU level. A combination of their own choices on defence spending, the agreement to allow permanent structured cooperation within the European Defence Agency and the Commission's efforts to liberalise the defence procurement market seem likely to force most small states into the backseat of EU armaments policy-making.     

长吉图先导区扩大利用外商直接投资研究

积极利用外商直接投资,对于促进长吉图先导区经济加快发展、全面提高对外开放水平和产业升级等都具有极为重要的意义。针对长吉图先导区利用外商直接投资存在的总体规模小、对外商直接投资具有较强承接能力的产业偏少、资金到位率波动明显且水平偏低等问题,长吉图先导区扩大利用外商直接投资,应该重点抓好全面优化投资环境、明确利用外商直接投资重点区域、拓宽利用外资领域、协调区域招商引资政策等工作。     

1990年代以来中印对外直接投资探析

中印正逐渐成为世界经济领域中日趋活跃的对外直接投资者。比较两国1990年代以来对外直接投资的现状及特点，分析两国在投资行业、区位选择、投资方式和投资主体等方面的差异，有利于我国企业在进行对外直接投资时做出更趋理性的判断。     

Looking Beyond the National Level: Foreign Direct Investment Attraction in U.S. States

International relations scholars need to look beyond the national level because U.S. states and governors are increasingly important actors in world politics. One way to look at their international activities is by examining the ways in which U.S. states seek to attract foreign direct investment (FDI), just one research puzzle at the nexus of international relations and U.S. state politics, two fields that rarely talk to one another. After pointing out the gaps within theories from international relations and international political economy, this paper describes the evolving global roles of both U.S. states and governors and shows how U.S. states attract FDI through the use of their international offices and governor-led overseas missions. Empirical findings indicate that U.S. states' international offices and a higher level of economic interdependence help states attract FDI, and the paper argues that extension of institutional approaches from IPE may be valuable for future research about the international capabilities of subnational governments and their leaders.     

越南外商直接投资的特点及其对经济增长的影响

从20世纪80年代后期开始,越南开始推行经济体制改革,鼓励外商投资者到越南投资.由于越南丰富的劳动力资源和良好的社会环境,越南经济增长很快,良好的经济基本面吸引了大量外商直接投资,而外商直接投资在越南经济增长中也发挥了重要作用.     

The Arms Collaboration Dilemma: Between Principal-Agent Dynamics and Collective Action Problems

One of the most dramatic developments in the field of armaments has been the rise of international collaboration over the last several decades. Nowhere has this phenomenon been more pronounced than the domain of military aircraft, where few states possess the resources to remain autonomous. Surprisingly, despite the theoretical advantages of interoperability and economies of scale, armaments collaboration has rarely, if ever, proven efficient. This article examines how states have employed governance structures, over time, to improve the collaborative process. To preview the conclusion, a stark trade-off exists between states’ ability to control principal-agent dynamics and minimize collective action problems. Consequently, the dilemma of armaments collaboration is that any attempt to address principal-agent dynamics will aggravate collective action problems and vice-versa. With this in mind, it may be futile to continue reforming armaments collaboration because any governance structures will result in a deleterious combination of principal-agent dynamics and collective action problems.     

Federal Institutions and Multinational Investors: Federalism,Government Credibility,and Foreign Direct Investment

Political risk is an important factor in the decision to invest abroad. While the investment potential might be lucrative, there is always the risk that the host government will expropriate the profits and assets of the foreign investor. Political institutions, however, can serve as constraints on the actions of political actors in the host country. We argue that federal structures lower political risk. Joint-reputational accountability in overlapping political jurisdictions increases the likelihood that investment contracts will be honored. Empirical analyses of cross-sectional time-series data for 115 countries, from 1975–1995, are used to study how political institutions affect foreign direct investment (FDI) flows. After controlling for the effect of relevant economic and political variables, we find that both democratic and federal institutions help attract FDI, although the additive effect of democracy and federalism is small. This is not surprising; democratic systems already have low political risk; they do not need the additional credibility that the federal system provides to attract FDI. In contrast, we expect that federal structures significantly improve the trustworthiness of less democratic states. Empirically, we find that less democratic countries with federal political systems attract some of the highest levels of FDI.     

Defense Spending and Economic Growth around the Globe: The Direct and Indirect Link

In this study, we combine both demand- and supply-side models to investigate the direct and indirect link between defense spending and economic growth. With data from 161 states for 1990–2012, we conduct a comprehensive examination of the defense-growth nexus in the post-Cold War world. Our findings suggest that at the global level, military spending significantly dampens private investment but somewhat reduces unemployment. However, the direct economic effects of defense spending on growth are minimal at best.     

The Politics of Foreign Direct Investment in Authoritarian Regimes

While political scientists find that democracy reduces political risk, little scholarship analyzes how authoritarian regimes attract foreign direct investment (FDI). This article argues that while authoritarian countries are generally risky, this risk can be minimized when authoritarian regimes are constrained from both “above” and “below.” Signing international investment treaties are critical for authoritarian countries to signal a commitment to FDI-friendly policies. However, only authoritarian signatories that allow some degree of public deliberation in their policymaking are then constrained from deviating from the policies of the international investment treaties. Panel statistical regressions and a case analysis support the hypothesis.     

How China’s New Silk Road Threatens European Trade

For all the promises of mutually beneficial cooperation, Chinese policy documents about the New Silk Road, also called ‘One Belt, One Road’, mostly testify to a strong ambition to unlock foreign markets and support domestic firms in taking on foreign competitors. This confirms China’s shift from defensive mercantilism, which aims to protect the home market, towards offensive mercantilism, which seeks to gain market shares abroad. In a context of global economic stagnation, this comes as a major challenge to Europe. As China’s market share grows spectacularly in countries along the New Silk Road, key European member states have both lost market shares and even seen their exports shrink in absolute terms.     

A New Kind of Competition: How American Producers Respond to Incoming Foreign Direct Investment

Domestic producers in the U.S. have not lobbied for formal restrictions on incoming foreign direct investment in the same way that they have for import barriers, even though both types of foreign competition depress profits. At the same time, many U.S.-based multinational corporations, despite their global orientation, have put forth demands for government policies that favor American ownership. Domestically based producers have conflicting economic interests; they want protection against foreign competitors, against the possibility of retaliation, and against the perceived injuries sustained from investment restrictions abroad. Economic interests, then, lead to indeterminate predictions of how firms will respond to IFDI. Firms will only demand policies that they see as feasible (which depends on the presence of domestic institutions to channel demands and supply the policy output) and legitimate (which depends on how the policy accords with widely held norms regarding the proper role of the state). Understanding the domestic responses to globalization requires more research on the political, as well as economic, origins of policy demands.     

印度经济改革的成绩与问题

1991年印度发起经济改革,减少政府对经济发展的干预,放松对私营经济和外国投资的限制,放松对进出口贸易的限制,改革财政税收制度和银行金融制度,促使印度对外经济联系逐渐扩大和高新技术产业异军突起,推动印度经济加速增长和建筑崛起。但是,印度经济改革中也存在这样那样的问题。     

Small States in the European Union: What Do We Know and What Would We Like to Know?

Recent developments in the European Union have created new opportunities and challenges for small member states, increasing the demand from policy-makers and diplomats for coherent and accessible analyses of the conditions and potential strategies of small states in the EU. Unfortunately, the academic literature on small states in the EU appears both diverse and fragmented: there is no agreement on how we should define a small state, what similarities we would expect to find in their foreign policies, or how they influence international relations. However, if we are to understand the challenges and possibilities currently faced by small EU member states, we need to systematise what we already know and to identify what we need to know. This article makes a modest contribution towards this goal by answering three simple questions: What is a small state in the European Union? How can we explain the behaviour of small EU member states? How do small states influence the European Union?     

Contracting with Whom? The Differential Effects of Investment Treaties on FDI

Under what conditions can governments use international commitments such as Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) to attract foreign direct investment (FDI)? Although numerous studies have attempted to answer this question, none considers how investment treaties may have heterogeneous affects across industry. I argue BIT effect is strongest when the obsolescing bargaining problem between firms and governments is most protracted, namely, when FDI relies on strong contracts between firms and states. Using a time series cross-sectional data set of 114 developing countries from 1985 to 2011, I find BITs are associated with increases in infrastructure investment, an industry particularly reliant on the sanctity of government contracts, but not with total FDI inflows. Moreover, BITs with strong arbitration provisions display the strongest statistical effect on infrastructure investment, while BITs that do not provide investors with such protections are not associated with increased investment. My results have implications for both scholarship on the relationship between governments and multinational firms as well as for the study of international institutions more broadly. To properly ascertain the effects of international treaties and institutions, scholars should consider not just whether institutions constrain or inform—or matter at all—but also the extent to which the targets of institutions have heterogeneous responses to them.     

Mapping Internationalization: Domestic and Regional Impacts

This article introduces a conceptual design for mapping the domestic impact of internationalization. It proposes that internationalization leads to a trimodal domestic coalitional profile and advances a set of expectations about the regional effects of each profile. Aggregate data from ninety-eight coalitions in nineteen states over five regions suggests that between 1948 and 1993 the three coalitional types differed in their international behavior. Internationalizing coalitions deepened trade openness, expanded exports, attracted foreign investments, restrained military-industrial complexes, initiated fewer international crises, eschewed weapons of mass destruction, deferred to international economic and security regimes, and strove for regional cooperative orders that reinforced those objectives. Backlash coalitions restricted or reduced trade openness and reliance on exports, curbed foreign investment, built expansive military complexes, developed weapons of mass destruction, challenged international regimes, exacerbated civic-nationalist, religious, or ethnic differentiation within their region, and were prone to initiate international crises. Hybrids straddled the grand strategies of their purer types, intermittently striving for economic openness, contracting the military complex, initiating international crises, and cooperating regionally and internationally, but neither forcefully nor coherently. These findings have significant implications for international relations theory and our incipient understanding of internationalization. Further extensions of the conceptual framework can help capture international effects that are yet to be fully integrated into the study of the domestic politics of coalition formation.     

Good for some,bad for others: US investors and non-trade issues in preferential trade agreements

Preferential trade agreements (PTAs) trigger investment through their commitment to a liberal market economy. Increasingly however, PTAs go far beyond liberalizing trade and investment flows. Especially controversial features included in most modern PTAs are environmental and labor standards. Do these standards affect business activity? If so, how do investors react to such non-trade issues in trade deals? The literature provides inconclusive findings about the impact of standards on foreign direct investment (FDI). Some contributors argue that strict standards decrease FDI, whilst others claim that environmental and labor protection increases productivity and, in consequence, inward investment. In all likelihood, the usage of aggregated FDI data, as is the case for most studies, causes confusion. I expect standards to influence investors’ decisions – but heterogeneously across sectors. Environmental and labor standards should reduce FDI in polluting and low-skilled labor endowed industries, but increase investment in environmentally clean and high-skilled labor abundant sectors. Based on an original dataset of environmental and social standards in trade agreements and at the sector-level disaggregated US-FDI data, I find robust support for my argument. The paper provides a more nuanced picture on the standards and investment nexus: Standards have no uniform effect on multinationals. Instead, they are good for some, but bad for other industries.     

Thinking Outside the Bloc: Explaining the Foreign Policies of Small States

What explains change and continuity in the foreign policy behavior of small states? Given the proliferation of small states over the past century, this topic has received relatively little systematic attention. When researchers do focus on small states, the emphasis has been on external and international factors, and the primary conclusion has been that small states are more likely to bandwagon with threatening great powers than to balance against them. In this article, we suggest that state- and individual-level variables can play a greater role in explaining the foreign policy behavior of small states and that small states sometimes choose to balance rather than bandwagon, especially when elite ideology is deeply embedded in formulating foreign policy. We develop this claim in terms of elite ideas about the identity and purpose of the state and examine its plausibility using primary sources and exclusive interviews with the security and foreign policy elite in Georgia. We find that this approach offers a more plausible explanation for Georgia's otherwise puzzling foreign policy behavior than frameworks that focus on the international or regional system. Although Georgia may be the exception that proves the rule, it can advance an understanding of the conditions under which standard explanations of small-state foreign policy behavior may miss their predictive mark and when incorporating the role of elite ideas can provide additional explanatory leverage.     

Conditional on Conditionality: IMF Program Design and Foreign Direct Investment

The article explores how International Monetary Fund (IMF) program design influences foreign direct investment inflows. The author argues that stricter IMF conditionality signals a program-participating government's commitment to economic reforms, as it incurs larger ex ante political cost and risks greater ex post political cost. Thus, the catalytic effect of an IMF program is conditional on conditionality: programs with stricter conditions catalyze more foreign direct investment than those with less stringent conditions. Empirical analysis of the IMF conditionality dataset supports the argument and shows that after accounting for IMF program participation, the more structural conditions included in an IMF program, the more foreign direct investment flows into the country.