Bringing the Leader Back In: Internal Threats and Alignment Theory in the Commonwealth of Independent States

Traditional alignment theories, such as balance-of-power and balance-of-threat theories, suggest that states confronted by more powerful or threatening states are more likely to balance against those states than to bandwagon with them. Yet in the context of the newly independent states of the Commonwealth of Independent States (cis), this proposition has not held true. A refinement of Steven David's theory of omnibalancing sheds light on this empirical puzzle. Using in-depth case studies of Ukraine and Uzbekistan, the authors argue that the alignment calculations of cis leaders have been driven more by internal threats to those leaders' political survival than by external threats to the state. These internal threats include the more traditional variants, such as assassination attempts, coups, and civil war, but also include opposition leaders and parties that may be perceived as challenging a leader's political survival. The post–September 11 security environment and the u.s.-led war on terrorism has also fundamentally changed the strategic calculations of cis leaders, as the United States is now willing to assist leaders against Islamist extremism and terrorism, taking over a role formerly played by Russia. The theoretical nuances offered here provide a more robust and accurate understanding of alignment motivations in the cis, especially in light of recent revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan.     

Explaining the Awakening: Engagement,Publicity, and the Transformation of Iraqi Sunni Political Attitudes

This article explores the reasons for the dramatic change in Sunni Arab Iraqi attitudes toward the United States from 2004 to 2007, which made possible the “Awakenings,” local groups of mostly Sunni tribes and former insurgents that decided to cooperate with the United States against al Qaeda in Iraq. While there have been many studies of the military strategy, there has been little attention paid to the reasons for the underlying attitude change. This article argues that the dramatic changes in the information environment and in the nature of direct contacts across a range of Sunni society played a crucial role. It draws on a wide range of Arabic language primary sources that have generally been neglected in U.S. military-centric accounts. No single dialogue flipped the Sunnis, and the change would not likely have happened without the material changes underpinning their interests. But years of ongoing, intensive dialogues across a wide range of interlocutors reshaped the foundations of the relationship and to convince those involved individuals of the possibility of a strategic shift. American counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine and the surge helped by proliferating the points of contact with Iraqis and by transforming the relations at the individual level. This has broad implications for key debates in contemporary U.S. foreign policy, as well as for counterinsurgency and international relations (IR) theory.     

Undermining Adversaries: Unipolarity,Threat Perception,and Negative Balancing Strategies after the Cold War

This paper engages the ongoing soft balancing debate by suggesting a new analytical framework for states’ countervailing strategies—a negative balancing model—to explain why states do not form alliances and conduct arms races to balance against power or threats as they previously did. Negative balancing refers to a state's strategies or diplomatic efforts aiming to undermine a rival's power. By contrast, positive balancing means to strengthen a state's own power in world politics. I argue that a state's balancing strategies are shaped by the level of threat perception regarding its rival. The higher the threat perception, the more likely it is for a state to choose positive balancing. The lower the threat perception, the more likely it is for a state to choose negative balancing. I suggest that the hegemon provides security as a public good to the international system in a unipolar world in which the relatively low-threat propensity of the system renders positive balancing strategies incompatible with state interests after the Cold War. Instead, states have employed various negative balancing strategies to undermine each other's power, especially when dealing with us primacy. China's negative balancing strategy against the United States and the us negative balancing strategy against Russia are two case studies that test the validity of the negative balancing model.     

The politics of war and debt relief in Uganda

This article analyses the politics behind Uganda's relations with its multilateral creditors, particularly the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, in the context of the country's military intervention in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Ugandan officials exploit the anxieties of creditors, which want the country to be considered a successful case of debt relief and reform to justify similar policies in other states around the world. In reality, however, multilateral creditors help to sustain patronage politics that is increasingly based on access to plunder in a neighbouring state. Positive economic-growth figures and social indicators mask the underlying vulnerability of Ugandan state institutions, as the country's military officers pursue private interests. As a result, creditors face real dilemmas in deepening their support for the regime of Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, which is increasingly reliant on its external backers. Creditors are indirectly subsidising a patronage-based political strategy and the war in the DRC. Alternatively, if they decide to abandon Uganda, they may have to accept a dramatic rise in internal instability.     

Terrorism,the LTTE and the conflict in Sri Lanka

For decades, a number of developing countries have been adversely affected by terrorism, with little sympathy or support from Western governments, in particular. The attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, DC, on 11 September 2001, however, have made the world's sole superpower and its allies painfully aware of the devastation caused by such action. This article analyses how the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LITE), a terrorist group seeking to create a separate state in northeastern Sri Lanka, has been pushing the limits of international tolerance in this regard for almost two decades. While increased international action against terrorism is necessary to stem this destructive menace, the Sri Lankan state must also put forward a durable political solution to the ethnic problem. Ultimately, it would be a mistake for Western governments to allow their frustrations with the slow pace of reform in Sri Lanka to be interpreted as empathy with a terroristic cause.     

Economic aid to post-conflict countries: a methodological critique of Collier and Hoeffler

In the past five years, research sponsored by the World Bank on the economic aspects of civil war1 ?1. The project was titled the Economics of Political and Criminal Violence. View all notes under the research directorship of Oxford economist Paul Collier has had an extraordinary influence on the subsequent study of violent conflict and civil war and on international policy. The research project has now turned its attention to the problem of countries emerging from civil war and what Collier and his co-author, Anke Hoeffler, call ‘a first systematic empirical analysis of aid and policy reform in the post-conflict growth process.’2 ?2. First reported in a World Bank Policy Research Working Paper circulated in October 2002, their article, ‘Aid, Policy, and Growth in Post-Conflict Societies,’ the paper was in 2003 posted on the website of the Centre for the Study of African Economics, Oxford University until it was published in 2004 in the European Economic Review. There are some minor differences between the two versions of their work, but the conclusions are identical. In the present article, the paper version will be referred to as Collier & Hoeffler (2003) and the published version as Collier & Hoeffler (2004). View all notes Building on the influence of their earlier research and the lively interest currently in knowledge about and policy on post-conflict strategies, this work is likely to be equally influential on research, thinking, and policy. It is all the more important, therefore, to subject the research to critical examination before it becomes established as conventional wisdom. This note reports one such attempt to analyze some major methodological problems with the study and argues that the research cannot sustain the conclusions they draw or the resulting policy recommendations.     

Improved learning for greater effectiveness in development NGOs

Learning is a critical component of organisational effectiveness, particularly in the complex world of development NGOs. Drawing from the literature on organisational learning, this article highlights the key dynamics of a strong learning organisation and proposes an integrated ‘leverage-learning’ model adapted to the NGO context. This model integrates learning domains that are critical for greater effectiveness, or leverage. The model is then applied to evaluate the effectiveness of the learning culture and commitment of a specific development NGO, World Vision Burundi. The model shows promise as an heuristic tool to evaluate NGOs and help them become more effective in aid delivery.

Amélioration de l'apprentissage pour parvenir à une efficacité accrue dans les ONG de développement

L'apprentissage est un élément crucial de l'efficacité organisationnelle, en particulier dans le monde complexe des ONG de développement. En s'inspirant des écrits portant sur l'apprentissage organisationnel, cet article met en relief la dynamique clé d'une organisation apprenante robuste et propose un modèle intégré d'« apprentissage par effet de levier » adapté au contexte des ONG. Ce modèle intègre les domaines d'apprentissage qui sont cruciaux pour une efficacité accrue, ou pour parvenir à l'effet de levier. Ce modèle est ensuite appliqué pour évaluer l'efficacité de la culture d'apprentissage et l'engagement d'une ONG de développement précise, World Vision Burundi. C'est un modèle prometteur comme outil heuristique pour évaluer les ONG et les aider à devenir plus efficaces dans la prestation d'aide.

Mejorando el aprendizaje para lograr mayor eficacia entre las ong de desarrollo

El aprendizaje constituye un componente clave de la eficacia organizacional, particularmente en el complejo mundo de las ong de desarrollo. Apoyándose en los conocimientos existentes en torno al aprendizaje organizacional, el presente artículo pone de relieve las dinámicas más importantes de una fuerte organización de aprendizaje, presentando un modelo integrado de “aprendizaje-apalancado” que ha sido adaptado para el contexto de las ong. Dicho modelo incorpora los ámbitos de aprendizaje que se consideran vitales para lograr mayor eficacia o apalancamiento. El modelo se utilizó para evaluar la eficacia de la cultura de aprendizaje y el compromiso de una ong de desarrollo específica, Visión Mundial en Burundi, demostrando tener posibilidades como método heurístico orientado a evaluar a las ong y a apoyarlas en su esfuerzo por ser más eficaces en la entrega de ayuda humanitaria.

Um melhor aprendizado para uma maior efetividade nas ONGs de desenvolvimento

O aprendizado é um componente crítico para a efetividade organizacional, particularmente em um mundo complexo das ONGs de desenvolvimento. Baseando-se na literatura sobre aprendizado organizacional, este artigo destaca as dinâmicas essenciais da organização de um aprendizado sólido e propõe um modelo integrado de “alavanca de aprendizado” adaptado para o contexto das ONGs. Este modelo integra os setores que são cruciais para uma maior efetividade, ou alavanca. O modelo é, então, aplicado para avaliar a efetividade da cultura do aprendizado e compromisso de uma ONG de desenvolvimento específica, a World Vision Burundi. O modelo mostra um compromisso de ferramenta heurística para avaliar ONGs e ajuda essas ONGs a tornarem-se mais efetivas na implementação da ajuda.     

Informal institutions,forms of state and democracy: the Turkish deep state

Democratization studies have proven that the main difference between autocracy and democracy is, counter-intuitively, not the basic regime structure, but rather, the function and validity of democratic formal institutions defined as rules and norms.1 For the institutionalist turn in democratization studies, see O'Donnell, ‘Delegative Democracy’; O'Donnell, ‘Another Institutionalization’; O'Donnell, ‘Polyarchies’; Lauth, ‘Informal Institutions’; Merkel and Croissant, ‘Formale und informale Institutionen’; Weyland, ‘Limitations’; Helmke and Levitsky, Informal Institutions. View all notes In ‘defective democracies’,2 Merkel, ‘Embedded and Defective’. View all notes or in the grey zone between authoritarian regimes and consolidated democracies, formal institutions disguise specific informal institutions which are usually ‘the actual rules that are being followed’.3 O'Donnell, ‘Illusions About Consolidation’, 10. View all notes Moreover, scholars have investigated the issue of stateness: ‘without a state, no modern democracy is possible’.4 Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition, 17. View all notes This article sheds light on this grey zone, particularly, on the type of state whose coercive state apparatus is autonomous. Its autonomy results primarily from the interplay between formal and informal institutions in post-transitional settings where ‘perverse institutionalization’5 Valenzuela, ‘Democratic Consolidation’, 62. View all notes creates and fosters undemocratic informal rules and/or enshrines them as formal codes. If the military autonomy reaches a threshold ranging from high to very high, constitutional institutions become Janus-faced and can enforce a sui generis repertoire of undemocratic informal institutions. Thus, the state exerts formal and informal ‘domination’,6 Weber, Economy and Society. View all notes Herrschaft in a Weberian sense. This modality of dual domination is what I call ‘deep state’.     

Presidential Leadership on Foreign Policy,Opinion Polling,and the Possible Limits of “Crafted Talk”

The strategy of “crafted talk” (or framing) suggests that a politician uses public opinion to anticipate the most alluring, language to convince the public to follow a politician's own preferred policy (Jacobs & Shapiro, 2000 Jacobs, L. R. and Shaprio, R. Y. 2000. Politicians don't pander: Political manipulation and the loss of democratic responsiveness, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  [Google Scholar]). This manipulatory behavior by presidents has important consequences in the realm of constructing foreign policy, especially if the policy involves military service personnel, international prestige, or foreign conflict. However, no scholar has investigated White House archival data to examine the theoretical nuances of presidential “crafting” talk when constructing arguments for foreign policy. This article examines three case studies using internal polling memoranda and focus group results concerning the Vietnam War under President Johnson, the signing of the INF Treaty with the Soviet Union under President Reagan, and the Gulf War under President Bush. In each of the three cases, public opinion places serious constraints on presidential framing of foreign policy. Implications for the effectiveness of political framing and the limits of presidential persuasion are discussed.     

The problem of peace: understanding the ‘liberal peace’

To remember Hiroshima is to commit oneself to peace. Pope John Paul II, 1 ?1. Pope John Paul II, 25 February 1981. View all notes 1981

Pax Invictis2 ?2. ‘Peace to the undefeated’ or the victor's peace. Inscribed on the Tomb of the Unknown Solider in St Mary's Cathedral, Sydney, Australia. View all notes

Virtue runs amok. Attributed to G.K. Chesterton     

Avoiding Audience Costs: Domestic Political Accountability and Concessions in Crisis Diplomacy

We challenge the widely accepted proposition that democratic leaders are more accountable than autocratic leaders. We argue that a winning coalition's abilities to monitor and sanction a leader increase as its size decreases. Hence, contrary to conventional wisdom, our theory suggests that autocratic leaders are more accountable than democratic leaders due to the monitoring and sanctioning advantages of smaller coalitions relative to larger coalitions. Many international relations scholars hold that the conventional wisdom explains important variation in leaders’ behavior during crisis bargaining and in the outcomes of international disputes. We evaluate our theory and the conventional perspective by examining rival predictions regarding leaders’ ability to avoid incurring audience costs by conducting crisis negotiations and making concessions outside their coalitions’ view. A reassessment of us-ussr diplomacy during the Cuban Missile Crisis, a favored case of the conventional wisdom, indicates the plausibility of our theory in the context of security crises.     

The potential of evaluation to promote sustainable development in Russian forest management

This article discusses the potential of evaluation to help NGOs, namely the WWF (the World Wide Fund for Nature), to promote sustainable development in the Russian forest sector. Application of evaluation can strengthen two out of three main functions of NGOs – their expertise and lobbying. The third function of NGOs, as legitimisers, is difficult to perform in the Russian institutional climate. International partnerships address the issue of legitimacy and secure funding for NGOs. This international support is beneficial to a capacity building process and should promote the implementation of independent evaluation, which, in turn, can be helpful to promote sustainable development.

Le potentiel de l'évaluation au moment de promouvoir le développement durable dans la gestion forestière en Russie

Cet article traite du potentiel de l'évaluation au moment d'aider les ONG, et notamment le WWF (Fonds mondial pour la nature), à promouvoir le développement durable dans le secteur forestier russe. L'application de l'évaluation peut renforcer deux des trois principales fonctions des ONG – leurs connaissances techniques et leur exercice de pression. La troisième fonction des ONG, celle de la légitimation, est difficile à mener dans le climat institutionnel russe. Les partenariats internationaux abordent la question de la légitimité et du financement sûr pour les ONG. Ce soutien international est avantageux pour un processus de renforcement des capacités et devrait promouvoir la mise en ?uvre d'une évaluation indépendante, laquelle peut se révéler utile dans la promotion du développement durable.

El potencial de la evaluación en la promoción del desarrollo sostenible en la gestión de bosques en Rusia

El presente artículo analiza el potencial que tiene la evaluación para apoyar a las ong, en particular el wwf (siglas en inglés del World Wide Fund for Nature), en su trabajo orientado a promover el desarrollo sostenible del sector forestal en Rusia. La aplicación de evaluaciones puede contribuir a fortalecer dos de las tres principales funciones de las ong: su experiencia y su cabildeo. La tercera función de las ong, ser legitimadoras, difícilmente puede ser realizada en el contexto institucional de Rusia. Más bien son las alianzas internacionales las que abordan el tema de la legitimidad y obtienen fondos para las ong. Este apoyo internacional aporta beneficios para el proceso de construcción de capacidades, pudiendo promover la implementación de evaluaciones independientes, las cuales, a su vez, pueden ser útiles para impulsar el desarrollo sostenible.

O potencial da avaliação para promover desenvolvimento sustentável na gestão florestal russa

Este artigo discute o potencial da avaliação para ajudar ONGs, especificamente o WWF (World Wide Fund for Nature), para promover o desenvolvimento sustentável no setor florestal russo. A aplicação da avaliação pode fortalecer duas das três principais funções das ONGs – seu conhecimento e trabalho de lobby. A terceira função das ONGs, como legitimadoras, é difícil desempenhar no ambiente institucional russo. Parcerias internacionais abordam a questão da legitimidade e asseguram financiamento para ONGs. Este apoio internacional é benéfico para um processo de capacitação e deve promover a implementação de avaliações independentes que, por sua vez, podem ser úteis para promover o desenvolvimento sustentável.     

“A Genuine and Energetic League of Nations Policy”: Lord Curzon and the New Diplomacy, 1918–1925

At the end of April 1922, S.P. Waterlow of the Central Department of the Foreign Office, which dealt with Franco–German relations and European security, put up a memorandum. This claimed: “Except on paper and as an expedient for minor purposes or an escape for some dilemma, we have not taken the League [of Nations] seriously.” It contrasted London's indifference with the active use which Paris was making of the League, asserted that “the objects of British policy and those of the League are broadly speaking identical,” and urged: “let us institute a genuine and energetic League of Nations policy.” This recommendation was strongly endorsed by the Assistant Under-Secretary, Sir William Tyrrell, who believed that such a policy would secure almost universal popular support for co-operation with France, and he proposed making a joint declaration that for the purpose of maintaining the frontiers created by the Treaty of Versailles: “the two countries would place at the disposal of the League all their resources for the enforcement of its decisions.” ¹ 1. Waterlow memorandum, 28 April, Tyrrell minute, 29 April 1922, both FO 371/7567/6200/6200/18 [Foreign Office Archives, The National Archives, Kew, England}.      

Europe's others and the return of geopolitics

In the context of European Union enlargement and the discussions about a European constitution, the question of Europe's identity has once again entered the limelight of political debates. From a poststructuralist perspective, identities are constructed through practices of othering, articulating a difference. In this article, I follow Ole Wæver to argue that for most of the time after the Second World War the most important other in the construction of a European identity has been Europe's own past. This temporal form of othering offered the possibility to form an identity through less antagonistic and exclusionary practices than was common in the modern international society. However, since the 1990s geographic and cultural otherings are on the increase, marking a return of geopolitics in European identity constructions and undermining the notion of European integration as a fundamental challenge to the world of nation‐states.1 A previous version of this paper was presented at the workshop ‘Other Europes’, organised by the Poststructuralism working group of the British International Studies Association, Keele University, England, 16 May 2003. I would like to thank the workshop participants, Alessandra Buonfino, Bahar Rumelili and the three referees of this journal for their critical and constructive comments. View all notes     

Evaluating Spain's Reparation Law

The Reparation Law1 This article follows Aguilar, Balcells, and Cebolla in referring to the Law of Historical Memory as the Reparation Law. Although Aguilar et al. do not specify why they choose this terminology, the term is used here as it better denotes the law's content. Aguilar, Balcells, and Cebolla, ‘Determinants of Attitudes Towards Transitional Justice’, 3. View all notes approved on 26 December 2007 is the latest link in a chain of reparatory measures from the earliest days of Spain's transition to democracy to deal with the legacy of the Civil War and the Francoist dictatorship. Numerous articles have analysed the historical memory movement2 See Encarnación, ‘Reconciliation After Democratization’; and Gálvez Biesca, ‘El proceso’. View all notes and the reasons behind the timing and scope of Spain's reckoning with the past.3 See Encarnación, ‘Reconciliation After Democratization’; Aguilar, ‘Justice, Politics and Memory’, Barahona de Brito, Gonzaléz-Enríquez, and Aguilar, The Politics of Memory; and Blakeley, ‘Digging Up Spain's Past’. View all notes This literature presents the case of Spain as a counterpoint to the received wisdom of the transitional justice literature that successful democratization requires reconciliation. This article contributes to the specific literature on Spain, and the wider transitional justice literature, by focusing on an area which has not yet been analysed: the ‘co-construction’ and content of the Law. Through a comparison of the draft bill and the final Law, this article fills this gap.     

Reflections on Producing Security

Whether China's strategic culture is offensive or defensive in nature is an interesting question in understanding Chinese foreign policy behavior. Alastair Johnston argues for a parabellum culture of offensive realism that leads to a pattern of Chinese aggressive behavior. But China's behavior in the Korean War, the Sino-Indian War, and the Sino-Vietnam War shows a defensive pattern that Johnston's analysis cannot fully explain. By analyzing the operational code of Mao Zedong's public foreign policy speeches, using the automated Verbs in Context System (VICS) of content analysis, this article attempts to determine whether Mao's belief system reflected the influence of a defensive or an offensive strategic culture, and compares the results to Johnston's analysis. The results indicate that Johnston's cultural realist argument is only partially correct and needs to be qualified in important respects. The operational-code analysis of Mao Zedong reveals a more complex reality than did Johnston's analysis. The results partly support Johnston's claim about Mao as an offensive realist, but this result cannot be generalized across situations, as the operational code analysis shows that strategic beliefs are not static. Mao's beliefs were also the product of his personality and of the international historical setting.     

The success of Afghan NGOs

During the 1990s, and as part of a broader drive towards the “Afghanisation” of humanitarian assistance in Pakistan, Afghan NGOs became key implementing agencies supporting refugee-related and reconstruction activities in Afghanistan. This paper provides a detailed account of their emergence and consolidation, with a twofold objective. First, it complements and contributes to recent studies on Afghan NGOs and Afghan civil society, by providing historical insights on their trajectory. Second, it assesses such trajectory as a way of engaging with broader discussions on the role of NGOs within humanitarian operations.

Le succès des ONG afghanes

Durant les années 1990, et dans le cadre d'une initiative plus générale vers l’« afghanisation » de l'assistance humanitaire au Pakistan, les ONG afghanes sont devenues des agences clés de mise en ?uvre soutenant des activités de reconstruction et d'aide aux réfugiés en Afghanistan. Cet article propose un compte rendu détaillé de leur apparition et de leur consolidation, dans un double objectif. En premier lieu il complète et contribue à des études récentes sur les ONG afghanes et la société civile afghane, en donnant un aperçu historique de leur trajectoire. En second lieu, il évalue cette trajectoire dans le but de prendre part à des discussions plus larges sur le rôle des ONG dans les opérations humanitaires.

El éxito de las ong afganas

Como parte de un esfuerzo dirigido a “afganizar” la asistencia humanitaria en Pakistán durante los años noventa, las ong afganas se volvieron agencias operativas clave para el apoyo de actividades vinculadas a los refugiados y a la reconstrucción en Afganistán. El presente artículo proporciona una historia detallada de su aparición y de su consolidación y tiene dos objetivos. En primer lugar, complementar y contribuir a los estudios recientes respecto a las ong afganas y a la sociedad civil afgana, esclareciendo su trayectoria histórica. En segundo lugar, realizar una valoración de dicha trayectoria como una manera de participar en el debate más amplio en torno al rol jugado por las ong en el ámbito de las operaciones humanitarias.

O sucesso de ONGs afegãs

Durante a década de 1990, como parte de uma orientação mais geral para a “Afeganização” da assistência humanitária no Paquistão, ONGs afegãs tornaram-se agências implementadoras cruciais que apoiam atividades relacionadas a refugiados e à reconstrução no Afeganistão. Este artigo oferece um relato detalhado sobre o seu surgimento e consolidação, com um duplo objetivo. Primeiramente, ele complementa e contribui para estudos recentes sobre ONGs afegãs e a sociedade civil afegã, fornecendo informações históricas sobre sua trajetória. Em segundo lugar, ele avalia tal trajetória como forma de engajamento com discussões mais gerais sobre o papel de ONGs dentro de operações humanitárias.     

New Media and the Polarization of American Political Discourse

Scholars of political communication have long examined newsworthiness by focusing on the news choices of media organizations (Lewin, 1947 Lewin, K. 1947. Frontiers and group dynamics. Human Relations, 1: 143–153. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]; White, 1950 White, D. M. 1950. The “gate keeper”: A case study in the selection of news. Journalism Quarterly, 27: 383–390. [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]; Sigal, 1973 Sigal, L. V. 1973. Reporters and officials, Lexington, MA: Heath.  [Google Scholar]; Gans, 1979 Gans, H. J. 1979. Deciding what's news, New York: Vintage Books.  [Google Scholar]). However, in recent years these traditional arbiters of the news have increasingly been joined or even supplanted in affecting the public agenda by “new media” competitors, including cable news, talk radio, and even amateur bloggers. The standards by which this new class of decision makers evaluates news are at best only partially explained by prior studies focused on professional journalists and organizations. In this study, we seek to correct this oversight by content analyzing five online news sources—including wire services, cable news, and political blog sites—in order to compare their news judgments in the months prior to, and immediately following, the 2006 midterm election. We collected all stories from Reuters' and AP's “top political news” sections. We then investigated whether a given story was also chosen to appear on each wire's top news page (indicating greater perceived newsworthiness than those that were not chosen) and compared the wires' editorial choices to those of more partisan blogs (from the left: DailyKos.com; from the right: FreeRepublic.com) and cable outlets (FoxNews.com). We find evidence of greater partisan filtering for the latter three Web sources, and relatively greater reliance on traditional newsworthiness criteria for the news wires.     

Old Europe,New Europe and Transatlantic Relations

This article establishes the broader framework for the rest of the volume by addressing the contemporary context of transatlantic relations and secondly by establishing strategic culture as the conceptual tool for the collection. The article takes issue with realist/material explanations of recent transatlantic disputes, as posited, for example, by Rober Kagan, which tend to portray the transatlantic divide as the US on one side and Europe on the other. In fact Europe itself was very much divided over Iraq and the conduct of US foreign policy. Moreover, the sources of this division, manifest vividly in the notion of Old and New Europe, were based on cultural, historical as well as material factors and as such are best understood by invoking the concept of strategic culture.

Thoughtful Europeans know that Europe must unite in some form if it is to play a major role in the long run. They are aware, too, that Europe does not make even approximately the defense effort of which it is capable. But European unity is stymied and domestic politics has almost everywhere dominated security policy. The result is a massive frustration which expresses itself in special testiness toward the United States. (Henry Kissinger, 1969) ¹ 1 Henry A. Kissinger, American Foreign Policy: Three Essays, New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1969, p. 69. ¹The author is grateful to several anonymous reviewers for valuable comments on a previous draft.