National Security and Imperial Defence: British Grand Strategy and Appeasement, 1930–1939

British grand strategy in the 1930s had two cardinal elements: security of the home islands and Imperial Defence. This article questions the view that Britain did not have a strategic commitment to the continent of Europe till late in the 1930s. It also provides an over-arching analysis of the two distinct but intertwined periods in the evolution of national strategy and Imperial defence in that decade: before 1930 till late 1937 built around the strategy of the balance of power; and from late-1937 till early 1939 built around the strategy of appeasement. Moreover, it is impossible to understand the high level debate within the British government over strategic issues without putting the domestic political situation into the context of the impact of the First World War on Britain's society and economy. Similarly, the development of the new international order created at the Paris Peace Conference – and its demise in the ‘hinge years’ of the early 1930s – also needs to be better understood in terms of how British grand strategy emerged in this period. A rational and realistic policy, appeasement was a tactical diplomatic manoeuvre; it had no place serving as the strategic basis of British external policy.     

The Spirit of Ulysses? Ideology and British Appeasement in the 1930s

The British government's appeasement of fascism in the 1930s derived not only from economic, political, and strategic constraints, but also from the personal ideologies of the policy makers. Widespread guilt about the terms of the Versailles Treaty and tensions with France created sympathy for German revisionism, but the Cabinet properly recognized that Nazi Germany represented the gravest threat to peace in the 1930s. Fear of war and the recognition that Britain would have to tolerate peaceful change underlay attempts to appease the dictators, culminating in the Munich agreement in September 1938. After Munich, continued German belligerence, the Kristallnacht, and British intelligence assessments indicating that Hitler was prepared to attack the Western powers led to a reassessment of appeasement. The British government gave security guarantees to several European countries, seeking to deter future aggression and to lay the groundwork for a successful war against Germany should it prove necessary. While most of the British elite detested communism, anti-communist views did not govern British policy; security considerations required Soviet support in Eastern Europe, and Britain and France made a determined effort to secure Soviet support for the Peace Front.     

Powerless and Frustrated: Britain's Relationship With China During the Opening Years of the Second Sino–Japanese War, 1937–1939

Foreign policy is multi-faceted. It was not only diplomatic, political, socio-cultural, economic, Imperial, and strategic factors that structured—and limited—Britain's foreign policy during the interwar period; so, too, did those of other countries. Given the number and variety of Britain's—and the interconnected other Powers'—interests in China, Britain's relationship with China during the opening years of the Second Sino–Japanese War provides a useful insight which has wider implications on Britain's road to war narrative. Given the topic's neglect, one can be forgiven for inferring that events in Europe entirely eclipsed those of East Asia. This article demonstrates the contrary. As awareness of Chinese suffering spread and as Japanese aggrandisement threatened British interests, sinophilism became vogue once again. However, the often insurmountable obstacles that the interwar period presented to Britain and others—particularly the United States—limited Britain's ability to aid China. It was not for want of fortitude.     

The Rhetoric of Appeasement: Hitler's Legitimation and British Foreign Policy, 1938–39

Few grand strategies have been more scrutinized than Britain's decision to appease Nazi Germany. From 1933 to 1938, Britain eschewed confrontation and attempted to settle German demands. However in the five months following the negotiations at Munich, the British abandoned appeasement and embraced a policy of confronting the German state. The roots of both appeasement and confrontation can be found in Germany's legitimation strategies. Until the Munich crisis, Adolf Hitler justified Germany's aims with appeals to collective security, equality, and self-determination—norms central to the European system established by the Treaty of Versailles. After Munich, in contrast, German politicians abandoned these legitimation strategies, arguing instead that expansion was justified as a matter of German might, and not international rights. As Britain came to see German demands as illegitimate, so too did they decide this revisionist state was insatiable, impervious to negotiation, and responsive only to the language of force.     

Exit Britain: British Withdrawal From the Palestine Mandate in the Early Cold War, 1947–1948

The British decision to withdraw from the Palestine mandate in 1947–1948 may at first glance appear contradictory to British strategic interests. The Middle East and Palestine were vital to Britain's Cold War strategy, and its government repeatedly stated the need for a continued British presence in the region to prevent Soviet expansion. Why then withdraw from Palestine just as the Cold War started? The traditional explanation is that Britain withdrew because of economic exhaustion and its inability to remain a great power. But this article shows that economic and strategic considerations both contributed to the decision to withdraw. Britain's involvement in Palestine threatened to undermine its relations with the independent Arab states, and the decision to withdraw from Palestine was therefore taken in the hope that this would secure Britain's position in the rest of the Middle East.     

Dueling Security Stories: Wilson and Lodge Talk Strategy

Perhaps the most consequential effort to expound a grand strategic narrative was Woodrow Wilson's campaign to persuade the American people, the US Senate, and world public opinion to embrace his concept for making the world safe for democracy. Wilson and his interlocutors in grand strategy illustrate the role of rhetoric and narrative in managing two kinds of complexity in discussions of grand strategy: the conceptual integration of facts and values (of “is” and “ought”) in strategic persuasion and the political integration of diverse perspectives among partners in a strategic coalition. In particular, I explore the hypothesis that rhetorical and narrative persuasive devices permit grand strategists to obfuscate internal contradictions in their vision, facilitating persuasion in the short run but producing characteristic patterns of eventual policy failure and thereby serving as an engine of change in grand strategy.     

René Massigli's Mission to London, 1944–1954

René Massigli's considerable contribution to French diplomacy began during the First World War. After being closely involved with many significant developments in French foreign policy during the inter-war years, Massigli then served alongside Charles de Gaulle during the Second World War. Informed by his experience of the 1930s, he adopted a view of western European security that saw him determined to promote greater co-operation between France and Britain to withstand a potential German resurgence and a looming Soviet threat. But following France's efforts after 1950 to promote European integration based on Franco-German co-operation, Massigli re-defined his role of ambassador and openly challenged French initiatives such as the Schuman Plan and, in particular, the European Defence Community, not only because they did not include Britain, but also because they threatened his view of French security. This analysis assesses Massigli's strategic vision and his attempts to overcome the underlying constraints.     

Revisiting the Transatlantic Triangle: The Decolonisation of the British Caribbean in Light of the Anglo-American Special Relationship

The international collapse in the price of sugar, together with increasing immigration restrictions in the late 1920s and 1930s, produced great pressure on wages and employment throughout the British Caribbean. The underlying tensions reached their boiling point in the years between 1935 and 1938. The chronology proved fateful and speaks for itself: a sugar strike in St. Kitts, 1935; a revolt against an increase of customs duties in St. Vincent, 1935; a coal strike in St. Lucia, 1935; labor disputes in the sugar plantations of British Guiana, 1935; oil strikes in Trinidad and Tobago, 1937; urban riots in Barbados, 1937; and acute disturbances in Jamaica, 1938. While these disturbances, together with the radicalization of the colonial discourse, facilitated the archipelago's constitutional decolonization, attributing all social, economic, and constitutional postwar reforms to the riots alone constitutes an immense leap of faith. A careful analysis of the chronology, let alone a detailed study of the archival records, suggests a robust correlation between the islands’ constitutional evolution and the geopolitical worries of the Anglo-American alliance. The German threat, on the one hand, led Britain to re-articulate its colonial project and, on the other, compelled the US to make sure the British did not walk away from their responsibilities. The strategic importance of “the slums of empire” came to light dramatically once the theater of war became apparent. The Caribbean now became “the show window” where British and American interests collided against each other.     

Revisiting the Transatlantic Triangle: The Decolonisation of the British Caribbean in Light of the Anglo-American Special Relationship

The international collapse in the price of sugar, together with increasing immigration restrictions in the late 1920s and 1930s, produced great pressure on wages and employment throughout the British Caribbean. The underlying tensions reached their boiling point in the years between 1935 and 1938. The chronology proved fateful and speaks for itself: a sugar strike in St. Kitts, 1935; a revolt against an increase of customs duties in St. Vincent, 1935; a coal strike in St. Lucia, 1935; labor disputes in the sugar plantations of British Guiana, 1935; oil strikes in Trinidad and Tobago, 1937; urban riots in Barbados, 1937; and acute disturbances in Jamaica, 1938. While these disturbances, together with the radicalization of the colonial discourse, facilitated the archipelago's constitutional decolonization, attributing all social, economic, and constitutional postwar reforms to the riots alone constitutes an immense leap of faith. A careful analysis of the chronology, let alone a detailed study of the archival records, suggests a robust correlation between the islands' constitutional evolution and the geopolitical worries of the Anglo-American alliance. The German threat, on the one hand, led Britain to re-articulate its colonial project and, on the other, compelled the US to make sure the British did not walk away from their responsibilities. The strategic importance of “the slums of empire” came to light dramatically once the theater of war became apparent. The Caribbean now became “the show window” where British and American interests collided against each other.     

Britain's power and influence: Dealing with three roles and the Wilson government's defence debate at Chequers in November 1964

Prior to the advent of the Wilson government, there existed a large number of official memoranda and reports on Britain's power and influence in the world. Central to Whitehall's concern was the discovery of some means of reducing the cost of maintaining Britain's three main strategic roles ‐ nuclear deterrence, the defence of western Europe and East of Suez. It was clear that Britain should not, and could not, maintain these three roles indefinitely, a view which was shared by Labour ministers at the Chequers meeting. This article examines the evolution of Whitehall's thinking on Britain's long‐term world role during the period before and after Labour came into power in October 1964, and concludes that British ministers and officials began to consider Britain's eventual disengagement from bases East of Suez, a disengagement which was finally announced by the Wilson government in July 1967.     

Second Face of Security Strategies: Anglo-German and Anglo-Japanese Trade Concessions During the 1930s

Great powers can pursue deliberate Trojan horse policies to transform rising and threatening states into followers and supporters rather than challengers by altering their domestic political and economic institutions. I contend that a great power can use trade concessions, rather than punishment, to enable a favorable foreign policy coalition in a target country. The intent is to strengthen the political power of state and societal elites who have a stake in deepening international ties, while opponents of such policies will be weakened politically and economically. The societal winners will then apply pressure on the government to support their preferred outward-oriented grand strategy. I term this process the second face of security since it entails a less direct and more nuanced method of creating security. I examine Britain's commercial policies toward Germany and Japan during the 1930s to better understand second-face strategies. I argue that the intent of Britain's industrial and commercial policy was to strengthen conservative business, government officials, and economic circles in banking, light industry, and finished goods, and even heavy industry in order to steer Berlin and Tokyo away from rearmament, extreme autarky, and war.     

Identity,Insecurity, and Great Power Politics:The Tragedy of German Naval Ambition Before the First World War

Why did Germany pursue naval expansion at the turn of the twentieth century? This question has long puzzled scholars of international security, who consider German naval ambition to be an instance of suboptimal arming—a decision that decreased Germany's overall security and risked the survival of the German state. This article argues that the social desire to be recognized as a world power guided Germany's decision to challenge British naval hegemony. From the beginning of its naval planning, Germany had one clear aim: a powerful fleet of battleships stationed in the North Sea would alter the political relationship with Britain in such a way that it could no longer ignore Germany's claim to world power status. Reconceptualizing Germany's naval ambition as a struggle for recognition elucidates the contradictions at the center of German naval strategy, explaining how the doomed policy could proceed despite its certain failure. The article concludes that the power-maximizing practices of great powers should be seen as an important component of identity construction and an understudied dimension of contemporary security practice.     

High Hopes,Bold Aims,Limited Results: Britain and the Establishment of the NATO Mediterranean Command, 1950–1953

Although a great deal has been written about British policy in the Middle East in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the reorganization of the Southern flank of Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe after the admission of Greece and Turkey into the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the assumption of NATO's naval Mediterranean Command by Britain has attracted little attention. This article analyses British aims and policy on the formation of the Mediterranean Command, the talks between London and Washington concerning the appointment of a Naval Commander-in-Chief, the attitudes of France, Italy, Greece, and Turkey towards British policy, and finally, the establishment of NATO's Mediterranean Command in conjunction with the reorganization of SHAPE's Southern flank. For strategic as well as prestige reasons, Britain tried to retain its traditional dominant eastern Mediterranean position by encouraging the establishment of an Allied naval Mediterranean Command under a British Commander-in-Chief. However, the decline of British military and naval power and political influence meant that Britain secured a compromise settlement which only partially satisfied its aspirations.     

Anglo-American Competition in Central America, 1905-13: The Role of Sir Lionel Carden

Lionel Carden's years as a senior diplomat coincided with the rise of American power in, and Great Britain's strategic disengagement from, the Caribbean region. This changing order naturally gave rise to complications: Great Britain had extensive economic interests in the region, and diplomatic personnel - Carden in particular - endeavoured to protect these interests while at the same time the Foreign Office sought to maintain a good relationship with the United States. Carden's vigorous defence of British economic interests in Central America earned him the reputation in Washington of being 'anti-American'. Carden, however, was most likely acting as a 'buffer' to deflect criticism from policy makers at home.     

Decolonizing an informal empire: Argentina,Great Britain,and the United States, 1930–1943

The key to understanding how the relationship between Argentina and Great Britain changed during the decade after 1930 lies in the evolution of the British economy and the shifting configuration of political forces within the British Commonwealth of nations after World War I that made it impossible for Great Britain to maintain the old imperial relationship with Argentina. The purpose of Argentine foreign policy during the 1930s was to buy time to alter the internal structure of dependence and allow Argentina greater flexibility in world affairs. Until the structure of the economy could be Changed, primary product exports were vital to the national interest. First the Argentines tried to salvage some portion of their relationship with Great Britain and the market stability they needed in the Roca‐Runciman Pact (1933). Next, they turned to the U.S. for help, but with no success. By 1943, the British and Argentine economies were no longer structurally compatible and the U.S. had declined to accommodate Argentine economic needs. These frustrations provoked a strong nationalist reaction in Argentina against dependence. Argentine governments‐civilian and military‐retreated to a policy of neutrality as the best means of securing the most favourable terms for the sale of the nation's exportable agricultural surplus.     

Keeping Friends Close and Enemies Closer: Classical Realist Statecraft and Economic Exchange in U.S. Interwar Strategy

This article addresses the relationship between economic exchange and grand strategy and explains why rival states exchange with each other. The theoretical debate among realists is defined, while a novel, yet classical, realist exchange theory is proffered and evaluated against the record of U.S.-Japanese exchange, 1918–41. In this particular case, the origins of Japan's oil dependency on the United States are detailed for the first time as is the U.S. policy toward Britain and the Netherlands that created this dependency. The article finds U.S. strategic coordination of Japan's economic vulnerabilities and their use advanced U.S. grand strategy leading into WWII. The article concludes that the July 1941 U.S. oil embargo against Japan was purposeful and the product of a larger policy arc from the early post-WWI period.     

Theory as Thought: Britain and German Unification

Inspired by Rudra Sil and Peter Katzenstein's call for analytic eclecticism and making use of newly available, previously classified archival documents, we distill the essential logics of realism, neoliberal institutionalism, and constructivism and examine their role in shaping the debates amongst British policymakers in the context of German unification in 1989-90. We find that, although all the theoretical logics help shape the policymaking surrounding unification, none stands alone as a basis for understanding social reality. Indeed, all functioned together as British policymakers thought in terms of theory to make sense of German unification. The logic of realism clearly played an important role in shaping the perceptions of top British leadership, particularly Margaret Thatcher, of German unification as a problem. But realism did not determine the solution to the "problem." Instead, British policymakers drew on the logic embedded in neoliberal institutionalism, turning to institutions to manage the unification process. The reason for this can be found in the role of constructivist logics-particularly identity and rhetorical entrapment-that constrained British policymakers to cooperative policy options. By taking this approach, this article makes several important contributions. First, it sheds light on British policy during a critical historical moment. Second, it significantly improves understanding regarding Germany's historical and current place in Europe. Third, it ties major theoretical traditions together through a foreign policy analytical approach, and in the process suggests that many of the theoretical boundaries separating scholars are overdrawn. Finally, the article pushes international relations scholars to keep in mind the complex relationship between reality and theory. In the final analysis, bringing to bear these three perspectives highlights the complexity of the processes that produced British policy-and by extension those that shaped German unification-as well as the importance of breaking free of the strictures of the ideas versus materiality debate.     

“We Can't be more Russian than the Russians”: British Policy During the Liman von Sanders Crisis, 1913–1914

This article examines British policy in the Liman von Sanders crisis, which arose between Germany and Russia in late 1913. It takes issue with recent arguments that Britain was too closely bound to the Dual Alliance of France and Russia, that concern for her Indian empire determined her foreign policy, and that the Anglo-German cooperation in 1912 and 1913 was a hollow détente. Britain played an important role in resolving the crisis, by restraining an erratic Russian policy and appealing to Germany to make concessions. Moreover, Britain was the dominant power in the entente and influenced French restraint in this crisis. This served Britain's interests in Turkey, which aimed at the strengthening of that state. Finally, the resolution of the crisis demonstrated a functioning international system, based on alliances and the Concert of Europe, not a system on the verge of collapse into war.     

British Policy and the Ruhr Crisis 1922–24

This article provides an overview of British policy during a defining episode in the interwar period — the Ruhr crisis of 1923–4. The author assesses the external considerations influencing Britain's policy (especially the roles of France, Germany, and the United States), and also explores the processes of foreign policy making within Britain's complex bureaucratic system. In particular, the relationship between the Foreign Office and the Treasury is analyzed and its impact on European policy assessed. The article challenges traditional views of British policy at this time, concluding that it was far more complex, but also far more limited and constrained, than previous studies would suggest.     

Germany’s Ocean Greyhounds and the Royal Navy’s First Battle Cruisers: An Historiographical Problem

Recently some revisionist historians have contested the evidential basis for the argument put forward by their post-revisionist colleagues that the growth of the German mercantile marine, most particularly ships capable of being transformed into armed commerce raiders, was viewed with alarm in the British Admiralty and played a significant part in shaping British naval policy before 1914. Looking in detail at their reasoning, this assessment demonstrates that the rejection of this argument is based upon a faulty and incomplete understanding of the documentary record. Moreover, it is driven by a desire to defend the thesis that they have previously articulated that the expansion of German maritime power played a limited role in British defence policy before 1914. However, their objections do not withstand detailed scrutiny. Whatever might have been the British view of the long-term threat posed by Russia and France, Germany’s growing strength, including in merchant shipping, loomed large as a security problem in the decade and a half before 1914. The wartime activities of German commerce raiders, notably the Kronprinz Wilhelm, suggest that fears of a German commerce war were entirely rational.