Ideology and candidate evaluation

How does the expressed political ideology of voters influence their evaluation of presidential candidates? The classic answer to this question is provided by the spatial theory of electoral choice in which utility for a candidate is a function of the proximity between the voter and candidate positions on the liberal-conservative continuum. We have argued elsewhere that spatial theory, while intellectually appealing, is inadequate as an empirical model of mass behavior. We have developed a directional theory of issue voting that we believe provides a more realistic accounting of how specific policy issues influence utility for a candidate. Directional theory is based on the view that for most voters issues are understood as a dichotomous choice between two alternative positions. While ideology is widely understood as a continuum of positions, the directional model can be applied to the relationship between ideology and candidate evaluation. In this paper we compare the two theories using National Election Study data from 1972 to 1988. The results tend to favor the directional model over the traditional proximity model. We conclude by briefly tracing out the implications of this finding.     

Political evocation and styles of candidate evaluation

Recent work in cognitive processing and individual decision making has emphasized that individuals vary in the criteria they bring to bear to evaluate political objects. In this paper we argue that individual differences are but one piece of the decision-making puzzle, and that environmental factors are also important. Of particular interest to us is the idea that different candidates evoke different evaluative criteria. Using data from a 1984 sample of undergraduates and the 1980 National Election Study, we find evidence that political evocation effects do exist. This result has implications for understanding both the decision calculus of individuals and the collective rationality of the electorate.     

Congressional campaign effects on candidate recognition and evaluation

To date, most congressional scholars have relied upon a standard model of American electoral behavior developed in the presidential setting. This research extends our knowledge of Congressmen's incumbency advantages and their sources. Candidate preference is viewed as a function of the relative recognition and evaluation of incumbents and their challengers, as well as of Democrats and Republicans. In the recognition model, contact with voters and media effects are quite important, but there is no direct role for party identification. Evaluation is a function of personal contact and party identification, and media variables are insignificant. Relative recognition, relative evaluation, and party identification are three important predictors of candidate preference, and incumbency itself adds little beyond what is contained in incumbent recognition and evaluation advantages.An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1980 annual meeting of the Western Political Science Association, San Francisco, March 1980.     

Symbolic racism in candidate evaluation: An experiment

The authors explored the symbolic racism construct to determine whether discrimination in the evaluation of political candidates can be attributed to a combination of traditional values and antiblack affect as suggested by Sears. Using an experimental design where candidate race was manipulated in three conditions, they found that differential racial attributions do operate in the evaluation of political candidates. Contrary to expectations, however, no antiblack affect was found to be at work in the evaluation of the black candidate. Findings are discussed in the framework of contemporary assumptions of research on racial reasoning.     

Nash equilibrium strategies in directional models of two- candidate spatial competition

The standard approach to two-party political competition in a multi-dimensional issue space models voters as voting for the alternative that is located closest to their own most preferred location. Another approach to understanding voter choice is based on preferred direction of change with respect to some specified neutral point (e.g., an origin or status quo point). For the two-dimensional Matthews directional model (Matthews, 1979), we provide geometric conditions in terms of the number of medians through the neutral point for there to be a Condorcet (undominated) direction. In this two-dimensional setting, the set of residual locations for which no Condorcet directions exist is identical to the null dual set (Schofield, 1978) and to the heart (Schofield, 1993). In two dimensions, for most locations of the origin/status quo point, a Condorcet direction exists and points toward the yolk, a geometric construct first identified by McKelvey (1986). We also provide some simulation results on the size of the null dual set in two dimensions when the underlying distribution of points is non-symmetric.     

Empirical evaluation of bureaucratic models of inefficiency

Two separate but related strands of literature exist regarding the efficiency of public sector service provision – the theoretical base developed in the bureaucratic models of supply and the methodological base developed in the operations research and economic literatures. Most analyses focus exclusively on either the measurement or causes of inefficiency. This paper seeks to empirically test bureaucratic models of supply by drawing on the measurement literature. In anticipation of the results, it is found that there does exist empirical evidence supporting some of the implications of these models.     

On-line processing in candidate evaluation: The effects of issue order,issue importance,and sophistication

This article reports the results of a study that replicates and extends the impression-driven model of candidate evaluation reported in Lodge, McGraw, and Stroh (1989). This model holds that evaluations are formed and updated on-line as information is encountered, and that as a result, citizens need not rely on specific information available from memory to form their candidate evaluations. In the present work we explore whether the order in which information is encountered, as well as whether information that is personally important, influences the weight accorded to evidence in on-line processing. In addition, differences in information-processing strategies due to political sophistication are examined. The results indicate that important information receives more weight than unimportant information. In addition, the evidence suggests that political sophisticates are more efficient on-line processors than are less sophisticated individuals. The implications of these results for models of candidate evaluation are discussed.     

A test of candidate equilibrium

Richard McKelvey predicts that candidates will converge to an equilibrium if candidates and voters maximize their utility and voters' preferences conform to stringent assumptions. Although there are discrepancies between electoral data and the requirements of the theory, an analysis of 1972 and 1976 survey data lends support to basic components of the theory. First, most voters did choose the candidate who provided the greater utility. Second, voter distribution was not asymmetrical enough to allow a candidate to win by moving away from the median toward a concentration of voters. Third, the winning strategy for a candidate was to locate at or near the median. While formal theories' predictions will not hold in their precisely stated form, the assumptions can be robust enough to offer an explanation of electoral choices.     

The impact of scandal on candidate evaluations: An experimental test of the role of candidate traits

Correlational studies have found candidate traits to be an important determinant of vote preferences but cannot rule out reverse causality processes in explaining these findings. The present study demonstrates the independent impact of trait inferences on candidate evaluations using experimentally controlled candidate profiles of hypothetical U.S. congressmen. Using the scandal situation as a testing ground, this experiment examines whether task-relevant, competence traits actually have greater impact on political judgments than the more general, warmth-related trait qualities. Two types of scandals are considered (marital infidelity and tax evasion), both implying negative trustworthiness characteristics of the officeholder. Results demonstrate that trait inferences do have a causal impact on global evaluations. Consistent with past survey studies, competence qualities appear to be more important than warmth qualities but only for those with greater political information levels.     

Assessing the citizen – candidate model

Citizen–candidate models postulate a politics without political parties. Any citizen may become a candidate for office. A winner is chosen from among the candidates by voting with ties broken by the flip of a coin. All voters have preferences over a set of policies. The winning candidate adopts his preferred policy. It is proved on certain assumptions that there exists an equilibrium in these models and that the equilibrium is efficient. The significance of the proof is tested here with reference to the paradox of voting, the exploitation problem, the transposition of the Nash equilibrium from markets to politics, and constitutional constraints. The quest for a political equilibrium leads in the end to the recognition of a minimal rock-bottom requirement for cooperation and negotiation in democratic government.     

Individual campaign contributions and candidate ideology

Individual citizens are the largest source of contributions for congressional candidates in the United States. This paper investigates if and how fundraising from this source is related to the ideological positions of candidates. Specifically, we ask whether the amount of contributions depends on: (1) the extremity of candidate ideology; and (2) the level of candidate divergence in the same race. These results have important implications for candidate positioning strategies, as well as for evaluating the effects of recent campaign finance reforms.     

A model of candidate location with endogenous valence

This work gives a theoretical explanation for the increase in campaign spending and party polarization in U.S. politics. I assume that the effectiveness of persuasive advertising, and of costly valence campaigning in general, positively depends on the share of nonpartisan voters. A decline in the number of partisan voters in a constituency results in greater campaign spending by the candidates. If the voters are risk-averse, the candidates who maximize their expected office rents minus the cost of campaigning will choose divergent policy platforms strategically in order to reduce the costs of subsequent campaign spending. The degree of policy divergence positively depends on the share of nonpartisan voters for a broad class of voter disutility and candidate cost of valence functions.     

A technique for estimating candidate and voter locations

This paper develops a simple technique for locating voters and candidates in two-party US elections. Such a procedure is attractive because it overcomes the limitations of existing techniques that fail to place incumbents, challengers, and constituents on the same scale. The method is demonstrated using data from the 1988 presidential and congressional elections. The new data are then used to reevaluate spatial theories of candidate competition.     

Voter discernment and candidate entry in pluralitarian election

The paper develops a sequential model of candidate entry into elections decided on the basis of plurality. We analyze the kinds of candidates who are most likely to enter elections and simulate several plausible myopic entry sequences under various assumptions about voter abilities to discern differences in candidate positions. In the cases examined, open elections for “important” positions attract the entry of more than two candidates. Moreover, myopic entry often generates electoral outcomes which depart from the median-mean outcomes of the conventional models. These results are consistent with the observed diversity of candidates in presidential and other significant primary elections which contrasts with many previous analyses of electoral entry.     

A comparison of rent-seeking models and economic models of conflict

This paper provides a comparative analysis of the basic rent-seeking model and a simple economic model of conflict. Each model is concerned with a game in which players invest resources in pursuit of a prize. The purpose of the analysis is to elucidate structural differences between the two models, and to analyse the consequent behavioral differences and equilibrium outcomes in the two cases. A key finding is that, where such comparisons are possible, the conflict model tends to involve greater relative expenditure on wealth-redistribution activities than does the rent-seeking model.     

Voter turnout and candidate choice: A merged theory

An alternative approach to the explanation of voting behavior is offered, suggesting that the starting point of electoral decision making is individuals' recall of their behavior in the last similar situation. Whether or not this recall is accurate is irrelevant in our model, since the voters' reasoning proceeds from their belief about their earlier behavior, whether or not it is correct. Using this approach we are able to treat voting from a unified perspective, rather than adopting the current stance of treating the turnout decision as separate from and preceding the candidate choice decision.     

Chasing an elusive concept: Ideological identifications and candidate choice

This research examines the manner in which ideological identifications covary with candidate choice. Ideological ID is not purely an independent variable for evaluating candidates; evaluations of the candidates affect both individual identification and candidate placements. Prospective voters try to create a consistent cognitive system of candidate preference, ideological ID, and ideological placement of their candidate. Results demonstrate that candidate preference has a strong effect on less salient attitudes.     

Mixed equilibriums in a three-candidate spatial model with candidate valence

We study a spatial model of electoral competition among three office-motivated candidates of unequal valence (one advantaged and two equally disadvantaged candidates) under majority rule assuming that candidates are uncertain about the voters’ policy preferences and that the policy space consists of three alternatives (one at each extreme of the linear policy spectrum and one in the center) and we characterize mixed strategy Nash equilibriums of the game. Counterintuitively, we show that (a) when uncertainty about voters’ preferences is high, the advantaged candidate might choose in equilibrium a more extremist strategy than the disadvantaged candidates and that (b) when uncertainty about voters’ preferences is low, there exist equilibriums in which one of the disadvantaged candidates has a larger probability of election than the disadvantaged candidate of the equivalent two-candidate (one advantaged and one disadvantaged candidate) case.