Dagher redux: searching for the missing pieces

The most relevant question for any joint venture is, when does the relationship become a jointventure and not simply a price-fixing cartel? With respect to this question, this Article juxtaposes Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, 126 S. Ct. 1276 (2006), against years of contrary precedent. In Dagher, the Court altered the seemingly settled foundation of antitrust law by changing its view on past holdings and abandoning the ancillary effects doctrine. The Article provides an outline of key holdings prior to Dagher, as well as a discussion of the issues that can arise as joint ventures are formed. Additionally, the authors examine how the decision altered the foundation of joint venture law in the United States. In particular, the Article exposes several important antitrust concerns relating to joint ventures that the Supreme Court did not address in Dagher. Perhaps the most perplexing issue of Dagher is whether the venture at issue would have survived analysis under the Federal Trade Commission's "continuum" approach.     

企业合资行为的反垄断法考察

不当的合资行为因其与垄断的密切联系,可能造成对现有竞争秩序的破坏,对市场经济带来危害。因此,规范企业合资行为,有效防止企业利用合资的合理、合法外衣,从事限制竞争行为,降低企业间串谋的可能性,成了反垄断法研究领域的新课题。试从合资行为的概念、合资行为限制竞争的种种表现分析着手,对反垄断法规制合资行为的实体规则、程序规则和执行机构进行设想和探讨。     

The Welfare Effects of Research and Production Joint Ventures

This paper develops a model to analyze behavior and welfare effects of a research and production joint venture (JV). In the model, a research dollar is more productive if spent in the joint venture because it increases the achievable probability of new product introduction. This efficiency of research and production joint ventures offsets, to some degree, the loss due to higher consumer prices. For some parameter configurations and joint venture membership rules, research and production joint ventures yield higher social welfare than research-only joint ventures (RJVs). This contrasts with some of the industrial organization literature on research collaboration and with traditional antitrust views.     

IRS General Counsel Memorandum threatens some hospital-physician joint ventures

To defend against the heightened scrutiny of hospital-physician relations expected from the IRS, hospital management should closely examine any activities now conducted with physicians to determine whether each activity, as organized and operated, furthers the hospital's charitable mission of promoting the health of its community, rather than merely enhancing the financial health of the institution itself. Any arrangements that do not appear to satisfy the principles enunciated in GCM 39862 should be examined to see if they should be restructured or dissolved. In structuring new transactions and examining existing arrangements, the following principles should be kept in mind: 1. Transactions should not be premised upon increased utilization or physician referrals. Enhancing or protecting market share, even for the purpose of preserving an institution's presence in the community, will likely no longer be accepted as a justification for pursuing joint venture arrangements. In justifying such ventures, management must distinguish between benefit to the community and benefit to the institution. 2. Transactions whereby existing services or equipment are "spun off" to a hospital-physician joint venture run a serious risk of enhanced IRS scrutiny. 3. Transactions creating or providing new facilities or services should be more favorably perceived, particularly where participants other than the hospital take an active role in managing the venture. Where the hospital is the sole general partner and merely manages what it would have managed had there been no physician investors, the question of why physicians are involved will likely be of greater concern than it has been in the past.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 250 WORDS)     

Special report on antitrust. Criminal antitrust enforcement--when, who, and why?

Government civil antitrust enforcement and private antitrust litigation are not always easy to avoid, because even innocent actions can be alleged to have been improperly motivated or to adversely affect competition. On the other hand, criminal antitrust violations can be readily avoided by following a set of basic, simple, and easy to remember rules: 1. Providers should not agree with competing or potentially competing providers on any terms of price, quantity, or quality of service; 2. Providers should not agree with competing or potentially competing providers as to which patients (or payors) will be served, what kinds of services will be offered, or where to locate offices or facilities; and 3. Providers should not agree with competing or potentially competing providers to refuse to offer services to payors or other alternative delivery systems. There are circumstances in which exceptions to these general rules are appropriate, such as when an agreement among providers is necessary in order to participate in a legitimate alternative delivery system, preferred provider organization, or individual practice association. However, these exceptions are narrow and technical. The best advice is the following warning to providers by Charles F. Rule, former U.S. Assistant Attorney General for antitrust: "You should never act as if an exception applies until after you have consulted an experienced antitrust lawyer or until you have obtained adequate assurance that competent counsel has structured the system to eliminate antitrust problems."     

Special report on reimbursement. The safe harbor for small investment interests: where do joint ventures go from here?

There is no specific federal self-referral legislation presently proposed or in effect that statutorily prohibits providers from referring Medicare or other patients to entities in which the referrers have an investment interest, except for existing "Stark" legislation, which applies only to clinical laboratory services, effective January 1, 1992. (See Newsletter, Vol. 6, No. 1, January 1991, at 3.) Thus, health care joint ventures are not per se illegal. The publication of the Safe Harbor Regulations does nothing to change this fundamental fact, and it should not cause providers to abandon existing joint ventures, or planned ones, in a "knee-jerk" fashion, without careful analysis. Of course, there is no guarantee that expanded "Stark" legislation, or some other new self-referral legislation, will not be enacted in the future to prohibit providers from referring patients to entities in which they have an investment interest. Because of this uncertainty, all health care joint ventures should contain "unwinding" provisions to govern the rights and obligations of investors in the event that the venture is required to, or the participants voluntarily elect to, dissolve. Any new venture being contemplated should plan for dissolution, and existing ventures should undertake an internal review of their charter documents to assess whether the rights and duties of all participants upon dissolution are properly spelled out. If not, amendments should be made now, while all participants are on good terms. A failure to agree in advance upon such important issues is an invitation to discord, and possibly even litigation.     

Antitrust, health care quality, and the courts

Antitrust law represents the principal legal tool that the United States employs to police private markets, yet it often relegates quality and nonprice considerations to a secondary position. While antitrust law espouses the belief that vigorous competition will enhance quality as well as price, little evidence exists of the practical ability of courts to deliver on that promise. In this Article, Professors Hammer and Sage examine American health care as a vehicle for advancing understanding of the nexus among competition, quality, and antitrust law. The Article reports results of a comprehensive empirical review of judicial opinions in health care antitrust litigation between 1985 and 1999, with specific attention to courts' handling of quality and other nonprice concerns. Professors Hammer and Sage conclude that, although antitrust law cannot be expected to serve as the sole oversight mechanism for industries as complex and quality dependent as health care, courts have been successful incorporating some nonprice factors into antitrust analysis.     

Market Structure and R∧D Joint Ventures: The Case of Product Innovations

Departing from the received fact that research joint venture agreements are allowed on the grounds of a permissive ruling, we study what conditions are necessary for venture partners to carry on RD cooperation to the marketing stage. We treat the case of product innovations exploitable with different usages in unconnected markets. Two main results appear: firms always have incentives for a distribution of varieties, but not always agree on the distribution of products. The condition for the last result to happen gives a useful rule for antitrust authorities relating the degree of sustitutability across varieties and the relative profitability of the markets.     

Blockchain governance: The missing piece in the competition puzzle

Antitrust law deals with economic matters as if they were all industrial processes, that is, processes through which companies transform inputs into outputs. In this sense, we could say that antitrust law is still a Nineteenth Century law, even when it comes to platforms that transform digital data into services.For this reason, when we look at blockchains through the lenses of antitrust law, they are either framed as the result of an industrial process (the blockchain as an output) or as a means that allows the development of an industrial process (the blockchain as a tool). However, these two pieces do not complete the puzzle: they do not say much about the competitive impact of blockchains. Studying the operating mechanisms of blockchains and, in particular, their governance, one realizes that the puzzle must acquire a new piece: the information on who controls the blockchain. This piece of information reveals that even dominant blockchains, which are still nowhere to be seen, could be harmless if truly devoid of any central authority and that even strategic exchanges of information via permissioned blockchains should not trigger any antitrust liability, if blockchains’ administrators managed to allow the exchange only among non-competing participants.     

Health care joint ventures between tax-exempt organizations and for-profit entities

Health care exempt organizations have many options regarding their structure and affiliations with for-profit entities. As long as any joint ventures are carefully structured and the nonprofit retains control over the exempt health care activities, the Internal Revenue Service should not question the structure. However, as outlined above, if the for-profit entity effectively gains control over the activities of the venture, the structure is not likely to be upheld by the IRS or the courts, and either the exempt status of the nonprofit will be denied or revoked, or health care income will be subject to the unrelated business income tax. In summary, the health care industry has been severely impacted by many economic forces, including uncertainty in the area of joint ventures between nonprofits and for-profit health care systems. The uncertainty as to whether the joint venture would negatively impact the nonprofit's tax-exempt status undoubtedly caused many nonprofits to form for-profit subsidiaries and otherwise expanded operations in a for-profit marketplace. Fortunately, with the guidance that is currently available in the form of Revenue Ruling 98-15, Redlands, St. David's, and now Revenue Ruling 2004-51, health care institutions can move forward with properly structured joint ventures with greater confidence that the joint venture will not endanger the tax-exempt status of the nonprofit.     

PATENT HOLDUP AND OLIGOPSONISTIC COLLUSION IN STANDARD-SETTING ORGANIZATIONS

Current controversies over patent policy place standard-settingorganizations (SSOs) on a collision course with antitrust law.Recent theoretical research conjectures that, in an SSO, patentowners can "hold up" patent users in the sense of demandinghigh royalties for a patented input after the SSO has adoptedthe patented technology as an industry standard and manufacturerswithin the SSO have incurred sunk costs to design end productsthat incorporate that standard. Consistent with this conjecture,actual SSOs have recently sought no-action letters from theAntitrust Division for a variety of amendments to SSO rulesthat would require or request, at the time a standard is underconsideration, the ex ante disclosure by the patent owner ofthe maximum royalty that the patent owner would charge underthe regime of fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory licensing.This price information—which is characterized as the "cost"of the patented input—would, under at least one recentSSO rule modification, be a permissible topic for potentialusers of the patent to discuss when deciding whether to selectit in lieu of some alternative standard. This exchange of informationamong horizontal competitors would occur ostensibly becausethe cost of the patented technology had been characterized assimply one more technical attribute of the standard to be set,albeit an important technical attribute. The Antitrust Divisionand the Federal Trade Commission have jointly stated that suchdiscussion, by prospective buyers who are competitors in thedownstream market, of the price of a patented invention thatmight become part of an industry standard should be subjectto antitrust scrutiny under the rule of reason rather than therule of per se illegality. The rationale that the antitrustagencies offer for applying the rule of reason to such conductis that such horizontal collaboration might avert patent holdup.The Antitrust Modernization Commission (AMC) similarly endorsedthe view that rule-of-reason analysis is appropriate for exante discussion of royalty terms by competing buyers of patentedtechnology. This rule-of-reason approach, however, is problematicbecause it conflicts with both the body of economic researchon bidder collusion and with the antitrust jurisprudence oninformation exchange and facilitation of collusion. Put differently,because of their concern over the possibility of patent holdup,the U.S. antitrust agencies and the AMC in effect have indicatedthat they may be willing in at least some circumstances to forgoenforcement actions against practices that facilitate oligopsonisticcollusion by encouraging the ex ante exchange of informationamong competitors concerning the price to be paid for a patentedinput as an implicit condition of those competitors' endorsementof that particular patented technology for adoption in the industrystandard. However, neither the proponents of these SSO policiesnor the antitrust agencies and the AMC have offered any theoreticalor empirical foundation for their implicit assumption that theexpected social cost of patent holdup exceeds the expected socialcost of oligopsonistic collusion. This conclusion does not changeeven if one conjectures that such collusion will benefit consumersby enabling licensees to pass through royalty reductions intheir pricing of the downstream product incorporating the patentedtechnology. Proper economic evaluation of the plausibility ofthe pass-through conjecture will require information about thecalculation of royalty payments; the demand and supply elasticitiesfacing the licensees; and the structure of any industries furtherdownstream between the manufacturer and the final consumer.Consequently, the magnitude of this effect will likely be amatter of empirical dispute in every case. Moreover, such ajustification for tolerating horizontal price fixing finds nosupport in antitrust jurisprudence. Given the analytical andfactual uncertainty over whether patent holdup is a seriousproblem, it is foreseeable that antitrust questions of firstimpression will arise and affect a wide range of high-technologyindustries that rely on SSOs. However, there is no indicationthat scholars and policy makers have seriously considered whetheroligopsonistic collusion in SSOs is a larger problem than patentholdup.     

从中外合营企业到中外合资公司: 内部组织机构体制的多样化

现行中外合营企业组织机构体制有其利弊。涉及中外合资公司组织机构体制有两种立法取向：保证公司决策的效率、质量及公正性;或强化股东“共同经营”,从而达到合资各方“优势互补”的目的。在这两种立法政策的主导下,中外合资公司应采取多样化的组织机构模式,以使中外投资者拥有选择各种公司组织机构形式的自主权。     

Intellectual property issues in joint ventures and collaborations

Legal context: The IP issues involved in forming, operating, and (inevitably)terminating a joint venture or collaboration are much more numerousthan would typically apply to a straightforward investment inan organic growth, or on a merger or acquisition. The pitfallsare also more insidious. Key points: The author approaches the topic within the commercial context,discussing the commercial rationale behind joint ventures andcollaborations and the life cycle of a joint venture or collaboration. The article explores the four key stages of a joint ventureor collaboration: (1) pre-contract stage: confidentiality andtrade secrets; due diligence; structural considerations; (2)formation stage: assignment and licensing of existing rights;the terms of transfer; valuation of IP contributions; (3) durationstage: future contribution of existing and future backgroundrights; ownership and exploitation of foreground rights; maintenanceand protection of rights; and (4) termination stage: providingfor both unexpected and expected events. The article also provides advice as to avoiding the pitfallsof joint ownership: understanding the differences between jurisdictions;potential problems; and avoiding the banana skins. Practical significance: Joint ventures and collaborations are widely used across a rangeof industry sectors, but particularly high-tech sectors, suchas pharma/bio, information technology, and communications, inwhich IP rights are particularly important. Parties consistently cite the loss of background IP rights asa major risk in joint venture collaborations, and dealing withIP that is generated in the course of a joint venture or collaborationcan also present particular problems, particularly if it isto be used or owned jointly by more than one party.     

Physician organizations: two years under the FTC/DOJ guidelines

The joint antitrust enforcement statement for physician networks was designed in part to dispel uncertainty in the physician community about antitrust agency law enforcement intentions. In the two years since its issuance, the antitrust agencies have generally, but not always, been consistent in applying the methodology and standards set forth in their enforcement statement. Even though agency pronouncements like the enforcement statement are not binding on private parties or the federal courts, both the statement and subsequent advisory opinions and business review letters have been exceptionally helpful, if not always encouraging, to health care providers in their antitrust planning efforts.     

Integrating Environmental Protection and EU Competition Law: Why Competition Isn't Special

One of the biggest challenges facing environmental policy makers at present is that of integrating environmental protection goals into economic policy areas. Unless this is genuinely achieved, it is clear that environmental degradation will continue apace. Though one of the EU's most important areas of economic competence is competition policy, many policy makers and commentators reject the notion that environmental concerns should play a significant role in EU competition analysis. In that light, this article addresses two key questions. First, should this approach apply? Second, if not, what are the principles that govern how environmental protection requirements should be taken into account by decision makers applying EU competition law? In answering these questions, the article puts forward three theoretical arguments as to why, and how, the environmental benefits and damage flowing from goods and services should be taken into account by EU competition decision makers, based, respectively, on legal systematic, governance and economic reasoning.     

THE STOCHASTIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PATENTS AND ANTITRUST

This article develops a novel theory by which to construe theinteraction between the patent and antitrust laws. The rulesof these respective disciplines are often portrayed as conflictingin means, yet harmonious in purpose. Although the intellectualproperty and antitrust laws have ostensibly divergent viewson the role of competition, their interaction is typically limitedto one of constraint. More specifically, antitrust rules havebeen (poorly) designed to limit the exclusivity inherent ina patent grant to the claimed invention alone. This article,however, articulates a new vision for the role of antitrust:it posits that competition rules operate as a stochastic regulatorof exclusionary patent rights. The Sherman Act constrains patentees'efforts to positively transform the probabilistic nature oftheir intellectual property rights through contract. Yet, becausethe empirical calculation of optimal innovation rates is anelusive, if not Sisyphean, task, the normative desirabilityof the foregoing fact is abstruse. Nevertheless, policymakers'inability to pinpoint precisely the ex post rewards requiredto trigger ideal levels of ex ante investment need not bindour hands to inaction. If contemporary rates of innovation aredeemed acceptable (even if not necessarily perfect), there maybe ways to trigger equivalent levels of ex ante investment withlower social cost. In this regard, it is clear that currentlyenacted competition rules significantly accentuate the uncertaintysurrounding patents' apotropaic effect. Concluding that contractssecuring otherwise stochastic rights may be highly desirable,the article calls for the incorporation of this concern intocontemporary rules, with modest substantive effect, and furtheradvocates a qualified antitrust immunity for "gold-plated" patentsif and when they are introduced.     

The Damage Done: Cocaine Methods in Detroit

The pro-competitive antitrust doctrine has originated in the free-market economies of Western capitalist countries but with economic transformations in Eastern Europe the doctrine ceased to be an exclusive Western concept. Using the example of the Polish law on combating Trust in the National Economy of 1987, the author demonstrates the spread of the antitrust doctrine from capitalism to socialism. Apart from these changes, the doctrine has been spreading on the international level because increasingly it has found application not only within particular countries but also with regard to trade and commerce between and among countries. The multidimensional nature of the antitrust doctrine has important implications for combating both domestic and international antitrust crime. The efficiency of efforts to combat abuse of a dominant market position, limiting access to the market or other forms of restraining competition will depend increasingly on the degree to which organs responsible for fighting antitrust crimes are willing to benefit from the multi-dimensional nature of the antitrust doctrine.     

Applying antitrust concepts to the acute care hospital industry: defining the relevant market for hospital services

In considering the possible antitrust implications of a merger of two or more competing hospitals, the courts have generally found that hospitals provide a cluster of services which have significant peculiar characteristics that allow them to be considered a single product market. Spurred by changes in their environments, hospitals during the last decade have become markedly less homogeneous in their range of products and geographic markets. As a result, the impact of hospital mergers in the future may need to be assessed in multiple, more narrowly defined relevant markets, for which several possible definitional bases are suggested in this paper. The increased precision associated with such multidimensional antitrust analysis should permit a more effective consideration of the trade-offs between increases in hospitals' market power and advances in their relative operating efficiency and/or quality of services.     

Why don't courts treat hospitals like tanks for liquefied gases? Some reflections on health care antitrust enforcement

In this article, I use the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice 2004 report Improving Health Care: A Dose of Competition as an occasion to comment on two specific issues that have arisen in health care antitrust: the recent string of losses by the enforcement agencies in hospital merger cases and an antitrust exemption for physicians to bargain collectively with health insurers. One of the more salient facts about health care antitrust enforcement is the notable recent lack of success of the enforcement agencies in hospital merger cases. This may be due to judges and juries holding views of hospital markets as being different from markets for other goods and services. My conclusion is that hospitals are an industry with unique attributes, but nothing about the specifics of the health care industry suggests that the unregulated use of market power in this industry is socially beneficial. As a consequence, the antitrust laws should be enforced here as in any other industry. Countervailing power is an issue that has come to the fore in health care antitrust. Physicians have explicitly asked for legislative exemption from the antitrust laws in order to bargain collectively with insurance companies, as a means of counteracting insurers' monopsony power. It is not clear that health insurers possess significant monopsony power. Even if they do, bestowing monopoly power on physicians will not necessarily improve matters. Active antitrust enforcement in insurance markets is the correct response, not blanket exemptions for providers.