Command without control: The case of China's environmental target system

In the existing literature there is general agreement that the effectiveness and efficiency of command and control instruments versus market‐based instruments is highly context specific. A country's particular regulatory environment and state capacity, as well as the features of given environmental problems, play an important role in ascertaining what the “right” set of policy instruments for environmental management might be. This article examines how command and control instruments are used as an environmental enforcement mechanism in China's authoritarian state. Based on extensive fieldwork, this paper shows that the reliance on binding environmental targets as the main domestic policy instrument in China has generated numerous undesirable consequences. While China's target‐based approach to implementation has incentivized local officials to strictly enforce environmental mandates, there are numerous shortcomings in the system. In particular, target rigidity, cyclical behaviour, poor data quality, and the absence of an independent monitoring agency have generated adverse effects and contribute to a yawning gap between regulatory goals and outcomes. The paper concludes that binding environmental targets as the main command–control instrument in China can be more accurately described as “command without control” as the target‐setting central government does not exercise a high degree of control over implementation and monitoring processes. But command and control instruments can be suited for managing “first‐generation” environmental problems and addressing environmental issues that have easily identifiable pollution sources and which are easy to verify.     

The unstable core of global finance: Contingent valuation and governance of international accounting standards

Accounting standards are the foundations of the financial regulatory edifice, and global financial governance is no more stable than the asset valuations that feed it. Yet for two decades and up to this day, no international accounting rule for financial instruments – the bulk of banks' balance sheets – has emerged that was more than a temporary fix, to be succeeded by further reforms. We show how banking regulators have been central to this dynamic and how their support for applying fair value accounting to financial instruments, the cornerstone of regulatory debate, has oscillated throughout the whole period. The two common international political economy approaches to global financial governance, which analyze it either as interest‐based bargaining or as ideas‐driven expert governance, fail to account for this pattern. In contrast, we show how the contingency of financial valuations itself has made it impossible for regulators to embrace or reject a stable set of accounting rules.     

The Era of State Energy Policy Innovation: A Review of Policy Instruments

U.S. energy and climate policy has evolved from the bottom‐up, led by state governments, and internationally recognized for the use of unconventional and innovative policy instruments. This study focuses on policy instruments adopted throughout the era of state energy policy innovation that aim to diversify, decentralize, and decarbonize the electricity sector. Specific attention is devoted to the renewable portfolio standard, net metering, interconnection standards, tax incentives, public benefit funds, and energy efficiency resource standards. This analysis synthesizes the findings from the energy policy literature and provides a summary of the current state of understanding about the effects of various state energy policy instruments, and concludes with a discussion of broader trends that have emerged from the use of policy instruments in the state energy policy innovation era.     

Pedagogy of regulation: Strategies and instruments to supervise learning from adverse events

Diverse scholars have argued that standards and performance measurements are “instruments of control” that have a profound influence on the day‐to‐day lives of individuals and organizations, causing constitutive effects. Regulatory bodies increasingly use standards to oversee and monitor the regulated. This paper discusses the Dutch Health and Youth Care Inspectorate's use of both standards and a performance measurement system introduced to monitor how Dutch hospitals investigate and learn from serious adverse events. Rather than focusing on how standards affect regulated practices and organizations, our study examines how the use of these instruments affects the standard maker, that is, the Inspectorate. We explore how the Inspectorate's work practices, standards, and coupled performance measurement system influence its regulatory pedagogy, reviewing practices, and decisionmaking. We conclude that standards and performance measurement systems are not by definition “instruments of control” as their constitutive effects are (under)determined by the relationships in which they are enacted.     

Explaining the content of impact assessment in the United Kingdom: Learning across time,sectors, and departments

While several studies have documented how evidence‐based policy instruments affect public policy, less research has focused on what causes changes over time in the analyses mandated by the instruments, especially in Britain. Thus, we take the analytical content of a pivotal regulatory reform instrument (impact assessment) as a dependent variable, draw on learning as a conceptual framework, and explain the dynamics of learning processes across departments, policy sectors, and time. Empirically, our study draws on a sample of 517 impact assessments produced in Britain (2005–2011). Experience and capacity in different departments matter in learning processes. Guidelines also matter, but moderately so. Departments specialize in their core policy sectors when performing regulatory analysis, but some have greater analytical capacity overall. Peripheral departments invest more in impact assessment than core executive departments. The presence of a regulatory oversight body enhances the learning process. Elections have different effects, depending on the context in which they are contested. These findings contribute to the literature on regulation, policy learning, and policy instruments.     

Tracing and periodizing China's food safety regulation: A study on China's food safety regime change

How has China's food safety administrative system changed since it was founded in 1949? How can we periodize the process of this historical transformation in terms of regulators, regulatees, and regulatory tools? This review article offers an analytical framework that distinguishes three regimes in the history of China's food safety governance: an old regime of command and control (1949–1977), an intermediate regime of mixed instruments (1978–1992), and a new regime of regulatory governance (1993–ongoing). In the article the regimes' features, advantages, disadvantages, and development tracks are discussed, and the groundwork is laid for an analysis of China's emerging regulatory state. Finally, a new notion of “transitional regulatory state” is used to define the current Chinese regulatory state based on its food safety regulation.     

Deregulation as regulatory reform: the case of environmental policy in the Netherlands

Abstract. Deregulation in the Netherlands has been associated with the perceived crisis of the welfare state. But in the area of environmental policy it has not meant dismantling those substantive regulations designed to promote improved environmental quality. Deregulation in environmental management has involved the retention of overall regulatory objectives while striving to simplify and streamline existing regulatory procedures, and developing alternatives to the more traditional instruments of regulation. Deregulation in this area is a prime example of 're-regulation'- of steps taken to make existing regulations more effective, or to replace rules with other instruments designed to achieve more effectively and efficiently the same behavioural changes sought with the original regulatory scheme.     

Entwicklungswege des regulativen Staates — Ein Vergleich zwischen den Vereinigten Staaten und Kanada

The paper takes Giandomenico Majone’s characterization of the regulatory state as starting point for a comparative analysis of the structures, politics and policies of regulation in the United States and Canada. It argues that Majone’s approach only partly captures the reality of the US regulatory system and, by concentrating on the US, fails to incorporate other versions of the regulatory state. The American regulatory state is only of limited value as a reference model for the European nation states, because the characteristics of national regulatory regimes are shaped by political culture and state structures. In this regard, Canada bears a much stronger resemblance to the European nations. Therefore, its long experience with regulatory institutions and practices is likely to be more instructive for the European debates. Future analysis should focus more strongly on the filtering processes by which national responses to general trends are shaped and on the distinct paths of development resulting from these processes.     

Transactions costs and the optimal instrument and intensity of air pollution control

Conclusions To what extent do the transactions costs of implementing alternative instruments for pollution control affect the choice of the optimal instrument and the efficient intensity of control under that instrument? In a comparison of Least-Cost Regulatory Standards and Revenue-Neutral Pigouvian Taxes, it is the higher transactions costs of implementing the taxes that make Pigouvian Taxes the more costly of the two instruments. However, a more practical comparison of instruments is between Politically Feasible Standards, Marketable Discharge Permits, and Revenue-Raising Pigouvian Taxes. Here, the relationship between the transactions costs of implementation and total pollution costs are in an almost linear inverse relationship. The lower the pollution costs associated with a particular instrument, and therefore the more desirable the instrument, the higher the transactions costs of implementation. Other factors such as political distortion and welfare gains prove to be more important than the transactions costs of implementation.Assuming that variable transactions costs decrease with the optimal level of pollution for regulatory standards but increase with the optimal level for market oriented instruments, an accounting of transactions costs results in less stringent control in the case of regulatory standards and more stringent control in the case of market oriented instruments. However, the percentage effect is very small. Moreover, it is smaller in both cases if marginal pollution damage rises with the level of pollution, as it is usually presumed to do, rather than remain constant as assumed in this paper for purposes of aggregation. A major conclusion of this paper is that Pigouvian Taxes are the superior instrument for pollution control when the raising of public revenues is a desired objective. However, the various conclusions of this paper should be viewed as tentative because the data on which they are based are no longer current. Moreover, the critical estimates of transactions costs are somewhat dubious. It is hoped that new data will be collected for answering the questions raised in this paper. When this is done, a more powerful approach, one that obviates the need for the artificial, one-dollar-damaging, aggregate pollutant, would be an expanded linear programming model in which the transactions costs are treated as separate coefficients of the individual pollution control methods. Separate sets of such coefficients, each corresponding to a different policy instrument such as Least-Cost Regulatory Standards, Revenue-Neutral Pigouvian Taxes, etc., would enable the investigator to directly derive solutions that specify the optimal policy instrument as well as the optimal set of pollution control method activity levels.I am grateful to William Ascher, Murray Weidenbaum, and two anonymous referees for helpful guidance on the paper.     

The Transformation of organic regulation: The ambiguous effects of publicization

The regulatory regime for organic products is different from other non‐state‐market driven (NSMD) regimes because it is the only one that evolved from a purely private into a regime where the establishment of minimum standards has become the monopoly of public powers. This article is the first to study the effects of the process of publicization, a term coined to characterize the transformation of private into public standards. The central hypothesis studied is that the process of publicization has empowerment and containment effects at the same time. To test the hypothesis the article analyses the effects of publicization on regulatory capabilities of private regulators as well as on the quality of the standards. The effects of publicization are further explored by comparing the legal and institutional architecture that shapes the coexistence of private and public regimes in the EU and the US, showing important differences between the two systems. The article offers a new perspective to look at the dynamic interaction between private and public regulation and its findings are of general relevance for the debate on the desirability of governmental intervention on private regulatory schemes.     

State and standards

In this paper a new economic approach to standardization has been presented. Standardization has been regarded as a problem ofgradual choice. An individual chooses to apply more or less standards within a hierarchy of standards. With this decomposition of standards, the problem of strategic market power becomes less important than in the traditional models of standardization. It becomes possible to analyze the problems of network externalities within a framework of non-strategic behavior and to apply the tools of the traditional theory of externalities and public goods. While decentralized action may lead to too little standardization, committees may overcome this deficiency to some extent, but bureaucracies are likely to lead to overstandardization. In the empirical section of the paper it has been shown that our approach can be applied to the standard-setting process in languages, railroads, and telecommunications. In all three cases the tendency of bureaucracies to generate more standardization than committees has been corroborated.The authors are indebted for helpful comments to the participants of the Berlin Seminar on Political Economy and of the colloquium Algemene Economie, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, and to A. Roemer, Saarbrücken.     

The boundary conditions for regulation: Welfare systems,state traditions,and the varied governance of work safety in Europe

Studies of the relationship between the welfare and regulatory state have hitherto either focused on the latter displacing the former, or presented regulation as an alternative means for achieving welfare goals. Little is known, however, about their varied mutual interactions. This article addresses that gap by examining the coevolution of workers' compensation and occupational safety regulation in Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands. Drawing on an extensive international analysis of primary documents, secondary literature, and interviews with regulator, insurance, business, and labor representatives, the article identifies strikingly varied but stable national preferences for: (a) the use of financial versus regulatory instruments and (b) the allocation of regulatory responsibilities between state and nonstate actors. The article presents a novel explanation of that variation as dependent on the relative coherence of interactions between the particular cost‐control logics of welfare provision and wider norms and traditions of state action in each country.     

Accountability in the EU's para-regulatory state: The case of the Economic and Monetary Union

This article revisits Majone's famous argument about accountability in the regulatory state in reference to the European Union's (EU) Economic and Monetary Union. We show that the EU has entered the stage of a “para-regulatory state” marked by increasing EU regulation in areas linked to core state powers. Despite the redistributive and politicized nature of these policy areas, the EU's “para-regulatory state” has continued to rely on its regulatory model of accountability, focused on decisionmaking processes, and interest mediation. In line with Majone, we describe the model as procedural and contrast it to substantive accountability – which is necessary when regulation has clear redistributive implications. Using two case studies from fiscal policy and monetary affairs, we illustrate the predominance of procedural accountability as exercised by the European Parliament and EU Courts. We complement the empirical analysis with a normative discussion of how substantive accountability could potentially be rendered in both fields.     

The American State and Social Engineering: Policy Instruments in Affirmative Action

The American state is conventionally depicted as inactive and organizationally weak compared with the state in comparable industrial democracies, and it is sometimes depicted as weak compared with the private sector’s capacities to effect change. This interpretation stems from applying an inappropriate Weberian model of stateness. This article examines the way in which measures to implement affirmative have been employed through the policy instruments of quotas to reengineer the divisions between key groups in American society. Placed in historical context, affirmative action illustrates a powerful activism associated with the American state conceived as an institution engaged in setting and monitoring national standards.     

Exploring the formal and informal roles of regulatory intermediaries in transnational multistakeholder regulation

Research on regulation and regulatory processes has traditionally focused on two prominent roles: rulemaking and rule‐taking. Recently, the mediating role of third party actors, regulatory intermediaries, has started to be explored – notably in a dedicated special issue of the ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. The present special issue extends this line of research by elaborating the distinction between formal and informal modes of regulatory intermediation, in the specific context of transnational multistakeholder regulation. In this introduction, we identify two key dimensions of intermediation (in)formalism: officialization and formalization. This allows us to develop a typology of intermediation in multistakeholder regulatory processes: formal, interpretive, alternative, and emergent. Leveraging examples from the papers in this special issue, we discuss how these four types of intermediation coexist and evolve over time. Finally, we elaborate on the implications of our typology for regulatory processes and outcomes.     

The congressional foundations of agency performance

When Congress delegates a policy mandate to a regulatory agency, Congress acts as a principal, choosing the institutional arrangements, or the ‘rules of the game’ for agency decision making. Individuals in the agency, acting as agents, take the rules of the game as given and do the best they can within these institutional arrangements. In this paper we develop a simple model that relates the congressional choice of institutional arrangements to two underlying environmental factors — uncertainty and conflict. We suggest that uncertainty and conflict of interest lead Congress, in delegating, to prescribe a greater scope of permissable regulatory activity, a wider array of regulatory instruments, and more confining regulatory procedures. Increased scope and stronger instruments tend to broaden the overall discretionary authority of the agency, while more confining procedures tend to narrow it. We conjecture that with increased uncertainty or conflict the narrowing tendency more than offsets the broadening tendency, for a net decrease in the agency's overall discretionary authority. Lastly, we argue that the performance of a regulatory agency in fulfilling its mandate is determined in large measure by the foundations Congress constructs for the implementation of delegated authority.     

Revisiting the governance of privacy: Contemporary policy instruments in global perspective

The repertoire of policy instruments within a particular policy sector varies by jurisdiction; some “tools of government” are associated with particular administrative and regulatory traditions and political cultures. It is less clear how the instruments associated with a particular policy sector may change over time, as economic, social, and technological conditions evolve. In the early 2000s, we surveyed and analyzed the global repertoire of policy instruments deployed to protect personal data. In this article, we explore how those instruments have changed as a result of 15 years of social, economic and technological transformations, during which the issue has assumed a far higher global profile, as one of the central policy questions associated with modern networked communications. We review the contemporary range of transnational, regulatory, self‐regulatory, and technical instruments according to the same framework, and conclude that the types of policy instrument have remained relatively stable, even though they are now deployed on a global scale. While the labels remain the same, however, the conceptual foundations for their legitimation and justification are shifting as greater emphases on accountability, risk, ethics, and the social/political value of privacy have gained purchase. Our analysis demonstrates both continuity and change within the governance of privacy, and displays how we would have tackled the same research project today. As a broader case study of regulation, it highlights the importance of going beyond technical and instrumental labels. Change or stability of policy instruments does not take place in isolation from the wider conceptualizations that shape their meaning, purpose, and effect.     

Devolving Regulatory Authority:The Federal and State Response

One of the major legacies of the Reagan administration was its devolution of regulatory authority to the states, particularly in the area of environmental protection. The article descr&es how federal officials at EPA and the OfFce of Surface Mining (Department of the Interior) transferred regulatory responsibility to the states and how state officials initially responded to devolution. In a number of states, regulatory officials clwse to vigorously enforcefederal environmental standards despite the administration's desire for a more relaxed approach to regulation. Haoever, euidence generated by the GAO and others suggest that many of the states lacked the willingness and ability to effectively shoulder their new responsibilities. By the end of the Reagan administration, opposition to devolution had emergedfrom a number of quarters and administration officials were faced with, once again, refashioning the regulatory partnership.     

Still a poster child for social investment? Changing regulatory dynamics of early childhood education and care in Denmark and Sweden

This paper investigates the regulation of publicly organized early childhood education and care (ECEC) in Denmark and Sweden, through the regulatory welfare state (RWS) framework. The analysis focuses on how alterations in funding and quality of care are shaped by governmental and nongovernmental actors at national and local levels of government. Through focused structured analysis, we examine how various actors have shaped the funding and quality of childcare in Denmark and Sweden, from the early 2000s to 2020, with special attention to the period during and after the 2008 financial crisis. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, concerns about quality in care were raised on the political agenda by various actors in both countries, leading to decisions to improve the quality of care. Yet, the regulatory dynamics differ: In Denmark, the debate led to a decision in 2019, to implement a minimum statutory requirement of regulatory quality standards. From an RWS perspective, this outcome can be qualified as “double expansion,” because regulatory quality standards, and public funding for childcare increased. In Sweden, the debates about quality of ECEC led, in 2016, to political guidelines about quality standard, but with no additional national funds, and no mandatory regulatory quality requirements. Analytically, this can be qualified as “regulatory-led expansion,” that is requirements for quality standards, although the lack of additional national funds suggests that it will be difficult to improve ECEC quality substantially. The RWS perspective, which focuses on national and municipal levels of governance, also gives insights into hidden inequalities between municipalities regarding funding and quality of ECEC, which are more pronounced in Sweden than in Denmark.     

From developmental to regulatory state? Japan's new financial regulatory system

Abstract

Recent financial reforms in Japan and elsewhere in Asia represent, for various authors, a fundamental shift in financial governance and in state–business relations in the region. The old ‘developmental’ state in East Asia has supposedly made way for a neoliberal ‘regulatory’ state, with its emphases on agency independence and the non-discretionary enforcement of rules. I show in this paper that this interpretation exaggerates the extent of the transformation in the important case of Japan. Although the outward institutional forms of economic governance in Japan, as with many Asian developing countries, has changed dramatically since the mid-1990s, discretion still remains at the core of economic and financial policy. In the area of Japanese banking regulation and supervision, I show how this highly discretionary application and enforcement has been consistent with domestic political pressures. The result is a substantial divergence between superficial convergence upon international regulatory standards and underlying behaviour. I also give reasons why globalization does not mean that this hybrid regulatory model is unsustainable.