泰国国王宪政地位的流变

泰国宪政始于1932年的六月革命,泰国国王在长达七十余年的宪政历程中扮演了多种角色.泰王在宪政中的作用大致可分为宪政附属者、宪政影响者和宪政幕后操纵者三种前后相继的角色,泰王角色的流变是泰国历史与现实诸多因素使然.     

泰国国王普密蓬·阿杜德

接受西方教育与继承王位现在位泰国国王普密蓬·阿杜德是却克里王朝拉玛第九世。1927年12月5日在美国马萨诸塞州剑桥市特奥本医院诞生,是蒙銮宋卡玛希敦·阿杜德亲王和拍叻差春尼诗讪旺的小儿子。亲王早年在英国读书,后来到德国海军军官学校学习。回国后便决定放弃海军生涯,到美国哈佛大学攻读医科。1928年毕业,以优异的成绩荣获医学学士学位。在波士顿学医期间,结识拍叻差春尼诗讪旺,后来与她结婚,婚后曾返泰国寓居于巴吞汪王宫。亲王身体一直很虚弱,1929年9月24日在美国病     

勤政爱民 博学多才──记泰国诗琳通公主

勤政爱民博学多才──记泰国诗琳通公主郑传良１９９４年１月５日晚，中国国务院总理李鹏，在北京中南海钓鱼合国宾馆亲切会见泰国诗琳通公主时表示，他很高兴再次见到诗琳通公主。诗琳通公主转达了本国国王对李鹏总理的问候，并说，国王陛下现在还很关心泰国的水利建设。...     

枢密院在泰国政治体系中的作用:"平行国家"的视角

作为泰国政治制度的重要组成部分,枢密院在泰国政治中的作用深刻反映了国家建设与民主政治之间的关系.作为朱拉隆功改革的成果,枢密院有助于君主加强集权,从而推动泰国的国家建设.泰国民主政治进程启动后,经过普密蓬国王及前枢密院主席炳· 廷素拉暖数十年的经营,枢密院逐渐成为国王汇聚政治资源的场所.国王通过枢密院成员的社会网络缔造了其与军队、司法机构的政治联盟,形成与民选政府相对的"平行国家",但民选的他信或亲他信政府凭借选票所代表的民意支持,冲击了"平行国家"相对于民选政府所具有的权力优势.作为"平行国家"的枢纽,枢密院通过传递信号、为政变背书及支持非民选政府组建等方式来维护"平行国家"的权威及利益.     

泰国军人与泰国政治发展

1932年,泰国军队首领与文官领袖合作,结成“人民团”,成功地变革了泰国政体——改君主专制为君主立宪制。从此,泰国军人在推动和改变政治发展与社会进步方向,表现出举足轻重的作用。这一时期的军人,由于受西方文化意识和民主改革思潮的影响,有着追求时代进步思想的倾向,因而以新时代的政治发展家和社会改革家姿态,在促进国家的发展繁荣与社会进步、建立民主政治制度方面,发挥了积极的作用。遗憾的是,后来一个时期,泰国军人在政治上的积极作用改变了。从1947年至1973年,泰国先后经     

从文物遗址看佛教在泰国的传播

泰国素有“黄袍佛国”的称呼 ,全国人口的 95 %以上信仰佛教 ,全国共有佛寺 32 ,0 0 0所 ,僧侣 30万人。泰国宪法规定 :“泰国国王 ,必须是佛教徒及佛教的护持者 ,才可以登基为王。”佛教在泰国社会生活中占有很重要的地位。可以说 ,不了解佛教 ,便不能真正了解泰国。笔者利用在泰国任教的机会 ,跑遍泰国 73府 ,考察了重要的文物遗址 ,再参阅、参证中、泰文史籍 ,为各历史时期佛教在泰国的传播和发展勾勒出一个大致的轮廓。     

以国王为元首的民主制:当代“泰式民主”的文化建构

自1932年民党政变之后,泰国开始了民主化进程,但西方民主思想的传播和实践在泰国遭遇困境,使不少泰国人将眼光转向内部,以文化形式解构西式民主,同时建构本土化的民主,由此催生了沙立·他那叻时期的"泰式民主"思想。"泰式民主"理念并未随着沙立的去世而消失,而是被保皇主义者吸收、继承和改造,逐渐发展出"以国王为元首"的当代新"泰式民主"。它通过文化建构的手段,重新诠释传统君主制的"神王"和"法王"观念,使其在现代政治框架下与民主政体相适应,并升级成为一种国家意识形态,成为泰国各界普遍认可的理念,被写入宪法。保皇主义者借助无形的文化权力,一方面汲取传统思想,另一方面融合现代民主理念,将"以国王为元首的民主"打造为"泰式民主"核心思想,它对社会各方面的渗透力和影响力要远超制度化宪法所赋予的权力。     

现代世界中的泰国佛教——一个人类学的视野

众所周知,佛教为泰国民族国家的三大支柱之一,同时也是现代泰国社会与文化不可或缺的组成部分。本文立足于人类学视野,认为泰国佛教是一个意涵丰富的文化体系。本文通过对泰国佛教观念和实践的考察,以及对佛教与泰民族国家、日常生活以及现代社会相互关系的叙述与分析,阐述以"业"为实践核心的佛教如何渗透至泰国人民的社会生活当中,并成为现代泰国国家社会重要的文化特质,以及泰民族持久的民族精神。     

泰国新总理差猜·春哈旺

差猜·春哈旺于1922年4月5日生于曼谷,骑兵出身。1940年毕业于泰国陆军朱拉冲高等军事学院、骑兵学校。1948年就读于美国诺克斯堡陆军装甲兵学校。同年任泰国第一骑兵国王警卫队军官。     

泰国佛教介入政治冲突的表现形式及其原因探析

从古至今,泰国不断有佛教介入政治冲突的事件,佛教积极介入政治的方式是僧人干政,消极介入的方式是以接纳政客出家的方式为其提供庇护。从政客角度来看,是为了获取宗教庇护、积累功德以及保护自身名誉;从佛门人士来看,是为了在政治斗争中利用宗教身份为自己迅速树立权威;从佛教教义和佛教在泰国的本土化特征来看,佛教论证了国王的政治权威的合法性,从根本上与政治相连。泰国的佛教在历史舞台中展现出功能性和世俗性的特点,这些特点为佛教介入政治冲突事件提供了土壤。泰国佛教观念留出的阐释空间为佛教赢得了强大的生命力,它不断被人们用来建构泰国社会的象征权威,这是催生出政教乱象的根本原因。     

汉族、越族民间灶神信仰之比较研究

尽管越南越族灶神信仰在其自身发展演变的过程中受到汉族祭灶习俗的影响,但由于信仰的深层象征及各民族选取、发展文化材料的方式不同,两者仍呈现出较大差异。越族灶神信仰的形成过程即越族本土民间文化与汉文化的交流与整合过程,它较为典型地反映了越族民间信仰乃至越族文化形成的规律。     

菅原道真与佛教渊源考

作为平安前期儒家用贤政治思想的倡导者,菅原道真的个人思想除了深受儒家思想文化影响之外,与佛教也有很深的渊源关系。通过对平安前期社会对佛教的接受、菅原道真与家族信奉的吉祥天信仰、菅原道真与法华经信仰、菅原道真与观音信仰这四个方面进行分析,可以把握菅原道真与佛教的渊源关系,了解菅原道真家族以及菅原道真父母的佛教信仰从不同方面对菅原道真的佛教信仰所产生的影响。     

日本国风文化的特征与意义

国风文化是产生于平安时代中期以后的独具日本风韵的文化。其主要表现为净土信仰的流行、造型艺术的繁荣以及国文学的隆盛。以贵族为中心、以和风为主体的国风文化,对后世日本文化的发展与繁荣给予了深远而持久的影响。     

东北亚文明的创造性起源与发展性保存——以中国和韩国的宗教思想和礼仪为中心(上)

中国将自身的固有思想和印度思想融合后,产生了禅宗和新儒学两种创造性的宗教思想。韩国狂热地接受了这两种思想。不过有趣的是,这两种思想的痕迹在中国人的日常生活中已经难觅踪迹,而在韩国人的日常生活中却能够轻易找到。可以说在理论和实践方面依然保存着这两种思想的国家大概在全世界也只有韩国了。例如,现在韩国的僧侣还在沿用中国唐朝时僧侣背诵的礼法文,普通韩国人举行婚礼、葬礼和祭祀时依然遵循中国的朱子家礼。与此形成对照的是,现在在中国人身上已经很难找到这些旧习俗的痕迹了。     

东北亚文明的创造性起源与发展性保存——以中国和韩国的宗教思想和礼仪为中心(下)

中国将自身的固有思想和印度思想融合后,产生了禅宗和新儒学两种创造性的宗教思想。韩国狂热地接受了这两种思想。有趣的是,如今这两种思想在中国人的日常生活中已经难觅踪迹,而在韩国人的日常生活中却能够轻易找到。可以说,在理论和实践方面依然保存着这两种思想的国家大概在全世界也只有韩国了。例如,现在韩国的僧侣还在沿用中国唐朝时僧侣背诵的礼法文,普通韩国人举行婚礼、葬礼和祭祀时依然遵循中国的朱子家礼。     

Understanding urban Alevism through its socio-spatial manifestations: cemevis in İzmir

Cemevis emerged as the spaces of the Alevi identity in contemporary cities of Turkey. On the basis of in-depth interviews conducted in ?zmir with the heads of cemevi associations, this study claims that, while cemevis were enforced by the process of urbanization, they have been transforming the Alevi practices and collective organizations and eventually constructing a new type of Alevism as to religious practices, community institutions and collective imagination. Though no legal–political recognition has yet been granted to cemevis as the places of worship, they have established themselves as central institutions of urban Alevis with their extensive use beyond the limited oppositional categorization of culture–religion. This denial of legal status which has been seen as the violation of basic human rights is one of the main constitutive dynamics in the ongoing debates on Turkey's Alevi question. It is to such an extent that the denial of legal status to cemevis has today come to be identified by Alevi groupings with the denial of Alevi collective identity itself.     

Islam and Ethnicity in the Republics of Russia

An American sociologist reports results of survey research conducted in 1993 among Muslims in the five Islamic Autonomous Republics of Russia (N = 4,955). The data demonstrate that the strength of Islam as both a religious and social institution varied regionally despite the shared experience of Soviet anti-religious policies. Muslims in Chechnya and Dagestan were much more likely to report that they actively practiced Islam than Muslims living in Kabardino-Balkariya, Tatarstan, and Bashkortostan. Moroever, religious practice was high among non-traditional groups of Chechentsy and Avartsy. The young, the urban migrants, the highly educated, and men reported high levels of active worship. In Bashkortostan, Tatarstan, and Kabardino-Balkariya, in contrast, active religiosity was primarily confined to old, rural women with low levels of education. These differences, it is argued, are linked to the Sufi Islam tradition present in Chechnya and Dagestan but absent in the other Muslim autonomous republics. Journal of Economic Literature, Classification Numbers: O50, R10, Z1.     

Therapies of Resistance? Yuta,Help-seeking,and Identity in Okinawa

In contemporary Okinawa shamanism and psychiatry are both employed by Okinawans to bring relief from what are understood to be godly or psychiatric interventions in their lives. This paper examines some of the reasons that shamanism is still popular and well-patronized in a society that is part of one of the world's most developed nations. By situating the role of shamans within a historical context, it becomes clear that repression of these women has taken place at a number of junctures in Okinawan history, mainly because they were seen as “backward,” “primitive,” or “too” Okinawan. In other words, their primary identity as Okinawans led those in political power to attempt to remove them from being socially acceptable, forcing them underground as the state reinvented itself to suit broader political strategies. Notwithstanding almost four centuries of discrimination and attempted repression, shamans continue to prosper in contemporary society, using markers of Okinawan identity (in particular ancestor worship) to legitimate their roles as therapists and healers. Patients, too, hybridize both systems today in informed and idiosyncratic ways, moving comfortably between treatment regimes. Both shamans and psychiatrists are perceived as therapists in this article.     

东亚内韩国人生礼仪的普遍性和固有性

本文的目的在于考察韩国人生礼仪的东亚普遍性和固有性。分析的基础是东亚儒教文化圈，因而儒教式冠婚丧祭就是人生礼仪的普遍性。因为普遍性和固有性是相对的，站在西方的立场上看，东亚的普遍性也可以是固有性，也可能变做相反的逻辑。韩国人生礼仪的东亚普遍性和东亚其他民族、国家一样，都在于接受冠丧祭的传统。在韩国人生礼仪的固有性方面，首先是东亚儒教式冠婚丧祭的态保存最为完整。其次是根据韩国固有的文化对儒教式人生礼仪进行改造。婚形最后是固有信仰和儒教式冠婚丧祭相互融合。     

MEDIA,IDENTITY, AND STRUGGLE IN TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY CHINA

The experience of international migration is generally found to turn migrants into culturally hybrid communities. Yet, migrant communities often hold on to their religious moorings even as they relocate. From the 1970s onwards, the emerging leadership of Hindu settlers in Denmark consciously tried to transfer with them what they saw to be key aspects of Hinduism as they migrated to Denmark. In 1985, Hindus organized a major conference to position the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (World Hindu Council) as the umbrella organization for Hinduism in Denmark. Later on they established a Temple of Indians called Bharatiya Mandir to provide a place of worship for local Hindus. The philosophy behind the temple conformed to the nondenominational Hindu nationalist vision of Hindus as a unified community. This article, which contrasts the aim of Hindu nationalism with the on-the-ground realities of Hindu mobilization in Denmark, reveals that two major factions spearheaded Hindu nationalist endeavors in Denmark from the 1980s until 2006. The two factions successfully launched several projects, and even collaborated in their execution, but the initiatives were beset with rivalries that hampered the communal unity they had set out to achieve. The authors analyze this factional rivalry as an expression of Indian political culture, arguing that tensions among Hindu activists in Denmark is an instance of the political factionalism prevalent in the Indian subcontinent. The unintended emergence of such factionalism represents the successful transfer of a core element of Indian political culture to a new locale through Hindu nationalist politics. The authors base their argument on field observations since the 1980s, recent interviews with key religious players, and more than two hundred pages of written materials that offer a rare entry point to the study of Hindu nationalism ex situ.