Corporatism, Pluralism, and Swedish Interest Group Influence in Social Welfare Policymaking

Corporatism and pluralism predict different characteristics of interest groups; their environments are important in understanding the level of influence that these groups have. This article describes variables related to these theoretical approaches and tests them as determinants of two operationalizations of interest group influence, one objective and one reputational. Results of these tests on Swedish interest group information indicate that, although Sweden has usually been considered a model corporatist political system, the situation is more complicated, with some pluralist factors being quite important. The study suggests that interest group influence may be more objectively determinable than is usually believed.     

Net campaign contributions, agricultural interests, and?votes on liberalizing trade with China

We consider the potential influence of contributions from interest groups to political rivals in the voting behavior of US legislators on international trade policy issues. Our application addresses the determinants of the Permanent Normal Trade Relations with China decision, and focuses particular attention on the agriculture/agribusiness lobby. A simultaneous voting-net contributions model suggests that these contributions were very effective relative to organized labor and other corporate groups, despite their relatively small dollar value. Possible explanations arising from differences in targeting strategies are explored.     

Reforms, lobbies and welfare: A common agency approach

Citizens with heterogeneous tastes delegate to policy makers the authority to choose public policies. They may try to influence legislators in various ways. In this paper we assume that monetary lobbying and direct threats are the only instruments private individuals can use to influence the legislator. We model the relationship between the citizens and a single policy maker as a common agency game. Lobbies offer a policy and a payment according to a truthful contribution schedule, and the government takes the policy decision. In the truthful equilibrium, the government implements the social surplus maximizing policy. Introducing also direct threats, we find that, as far as both groups have an instrument to influence the legislator, the efficiency result is robust. We also show that when the lobby groups have asymmetric interests and political power, not all groups necessarily participate in the auction. In particular it turns out that one-lobby or non-lobby equilibria may arise, and those equilibria are also efficient.     

Board Diversity,Stakeholder Representation,and Collaborative Performance in Community Mediation Centers

Does board diversity or representativeness influence organizational performance? Though it is understudied in both the public and the nonprofit sectors, learning more about this critical subject can enhance organizational performance within highly collaborative settings. Community mediation centers, which rely on multiple public and private resources to meet their programmatic objectives, provide excellent case studies for analyzing the impact of different kinds of interorganizational linkages on organizational performance. A multitheoretic view incorporating agency, resource dependence, and stakeholder perspectives is employed through a national sample and a two‐stage analysis using a logic model to test the cumulative impact of board characteristics and interorganizational relationships on organizational outcomes. Organizations’ collaborative capacity depends on several kinds of boundary‐spanning activities, including network ties, revenue sources, and the number of stakeholder groups represented on the board.     

Information, Interests, and Environmental Regulation

This study contributes to the understanding of informational approaches to bringing about compliance with environmental regulations with particular attention to differences in the influence of information provided by different information sources. Based on theorizing from a combination of information processing and interest group literatures, we develop hypotheses about regulatees' reliance upon and the influence of different sources of information. We test these hypotheses for Danish farmers' compliance with agro-environmental rules. Our findings show that information plays a role in bringing about regulatory compliance, but its influence is not as strong and is less direct than might be thought to be the case. In addition, we show that not all information sources have the same influence. The findings demonstrate that interest groups have important roles in information provision and legitimization of policies that have often been assumed in the literature but have rarely been empirically examined.     

Interest Group Access to the Bureaucracy,Parliament, and the Media

A key issue for interest groups and policymakers is the ways through which organized interests voice their interests and influence public policy. This article combines two perspectives on interest group representation to explain patterns of interest group access to different political arenas. From a resource exchange perspective, it argues that access to different political arenas is discrete as it is determined by the match between the supply and demands of interest groups and gatekeepers—politicians, bureaucrats, and reporters. From a partly competing perspective, it is argued that access is cumulative and converges around wealthy and professionalized groups. Based on a large‐scale investigation of group presence in Danish political arenas, the analyses show a pattern of privileged pluralism. This describes a system where multiple political arenas provide opportunities for multiple interests but where unequally distributed resources produce cumulative effects (i.e., the same groups have high levels of arena access).     

The Color of Devolution: Race, Federalism, and the Politics of Social Control

In this article, we seek to advance scholarship on the origins and consequences of policy devolution by analyzing state decisions to give local authorities control over welfare policy. The first part of our analysis explores the political forces that systematically influence state decisions to cede policy control to lower-level jurisdictions. In this context, we propose a general Racial Classification Model of how race influences social policy choice. Our findings support this model as well as social control perspectives on welfare provision. Building on these results, we then show how modest but consistent racial effects on policy choices concatenate to produce large disparities in the overall policy regimes that racial groups encounter in the federal system. The empirical findings illuminate the fundamental role that federalism plays in the production of contemporary racial disparities and in the recent turn toward neoliberal and paternalist policies in American poverty governance.     

Voter Decision Making in Election 2000: Campaign Effects, Partisan Activation, and the Clinton Legacy

How do citizens respond to campaign events? We explore this question with a unique repeated measures survey design, fielded during the 2000 presidential campaign. We model transitions in support for the major party candidates following the party conventions and presidential debates. In the aggregate, Gore support increases following the conventions (but not the debates), while Bush support increases with the debates (but not the conventions). But there is considerable microlevel variation in the data: responsiveness to campaign events is greatest among Independents, undecided voters, and “mismatched partisans,” but exactly how these groups respond differs for each event. Moreover, attitudes toward then President Clinton mediate the effect of the campaign events on voter preferences. Two primary conclusions follow: (1) rich data sets are required to observe the effects of campaign events; (2) the influence of campaign events on vote choice is conditional on previous preferences, partisan dispositions, and political context.     

Religion, Spirituality, and the Workplace: Challenges for Public Administration

The relationship between religion and politics in the United States is a much-studied academic area, particularly evident in political institutional and behavioral venues such as interest groups, electoral behavior, and political culture. One academic area that has not received much attention is the influence of religion on public administration. Recently, however, public administration scholars have begun to mimic their counterparts in the business world by examining the role of religion and spirituality in the public workplace, especially with regard to organizational performance, ethical behavior patterns, decision making, and the personal spiritual health of employees. This article examines the role and impact of religion and spirituality in the workplace, reviews court cases and political measures regarding religious expression in the public sector, explores a private sector model to explain the interrelationship between religion and spirituality in the public workplace, and challenges public administrators to consider the positive role that religion and spirituality can play in the public workplace.     

Strategic institutional choice: Voters, states, and congressional term limits

States’ choices on term limits are quantified as a multiple-categorical variable capturing variation in the type of limits passed. Measures of relative political influence in Congress explain much of this variation. Using 1992 data on the American states, the model controls for unobserved heterogeneity due to voter access to direct democracy in some states. At 2002 values for congressional tenure and federal spending, the model predicts approximately eight to ten additional states would choose to limit their own members’ terms but cannot under a Supreme Court ruling. We discuss implications for institutional federalism and the potential passage of similar political institutions across the states.     

Updating Political Evaluations: Policy Attitudes, Partisanship, and Presidential Assessments

The pervasive influence of partisanship on political evaluations is well known and understood. Whether citizens rely on their policy attitudes has received less attention, especially in the context of how people update and revise their evaluations. This paper focuses on presidential assessments and uses panel data covering three presidencies to model the determinants of opinion change. The results indicate that policy preferences (like partisanship) exert a regular and substantial influence on how citizens update their presidential evaluations.     

Informal Accountability, Socially Embedded Officials, and Public Goods Provision in Rural China: The Role of Lineage Groups

In recent studies, analysts have found that so-called “informal accountability” exerts significant influence on public goods provision in rural China. According to these studies, such informal accountability may be formed through the embedment of local officials in social groups. However, there seems to be no agreement on the identification of such embedment and the conditions under which this embedment can influence public goods provision. To advance the literature of this debate, this study examines village officials who are embedded in such social groups as lineage groups and explores their role in shaping public goods provision in rural China based on a unique set of nationwide-survey data. Using a direct measure of social embeddedness of village officials, we have found that the embedment of village officials in a social group can be identified through a direct measure designed in this study and that the embedment has a positive effect on public goods provision in rural China. Finally, we draw some important policy implications from our findings.     

Is Spending More Potent For or Against a Proposition? Evidence from Ballot Measures

The recent academic literature suggests that pressure from special interest groups has little or no influence on whether initiatives and referendums are passed or defeated. Further, there is a consensus that, to the degree that groups' campaigning is important for explaining outcomes, groups opposing the initiative and favoring the status quo have an advantage over groups that support change. These studies have not considered that interest groups campaign strategically and therefore that campaigning is endogenous in ballot measure elections. This study examines the effect of campaigning on ballot proposition elections and develops a research design that accounts for strategic and endogenous campaign advertising. The research design uses a two-way fixed-effects model to estimate the effect of interest group pressure on ballot measure outcomes. The data are based on television advertising for or against California ballot measures from 2000 to 2004. The results show that supporting and opposing interest groups' campaigning has a quantitatively important and statistically significant influence on ballot measure outcomes. The campaigning of supporting interest groups is at least as productive as that of opposing interest groups.     

Organised Interests,Authority Structures and Political Influence: Danish and Norwegian Patient Groups Compared

The article presents a comparative analysis of the strategies applied by Danish and Norwegian patient organisations and organisations for disabled persons in order to promote the interests of their members. Three research questions are addressed: Are Danish and Norwegian patient organisations service organisations operating according to a ‘logic of membership’ or political pressure groups acting according to a ‘logic of influence’? Do patient organisations apply ‘insider’ or ‘outsider’ strategies in their efforts to influence healthcare policies? What impact do different authority structures have on the patient organisations' influencing strategies? The latter question is related to recent reforms in the public healthcare systems of the two countries. The major responsibility for public hospitals now rests with regional authorities in Denmark and central government in Norway. The study is based on a survey among nationwide patient organisations in the two countries and shows that most patient groups are ‘polyvalent’‘venue shoppers’ combining a variety of influencing strategies.     

Are they listening? Public opinion,interest groups and government responsiveness

What is the role of interest groups in the transmission of issues between the public and government policy? While government responsiveness to voters has received widespread scholarly attention, little is known about the role of interest groups in the transmission of public opinion to government. It is argued here that interest groups importantly influence government responsiveness to public opinion, but that the effect varies by type of interest group: while cause groups increase the responsiveness of governments to their electorate, sectional groups decrease government responsiveness. Drawing on a new and unique dataset, this article examines the relationship between public opinion, interest groups and government expenditure across 13 policy areas in Germany from 1986 until 2012 and shows that interest groups indeed have a differential effect on the responsiveness of governments. The article’s findings have important implications for understanding political representation and the largely overlooked relationship between public opinion, interest groups and government policy.     

Economic influences on presidential popularity among key political and socioeconomic groups: A review of the evidence and some new findings

This paper analyzes presidential popularity among important political and socioeconomic groups in the United States from 1965 to 1980, making use of the Gallup Poll indicators of support for the incumbent president among the main socioeconomic, regional, generational, sexual, and racial groups, and among Democratic, Republican, and independent voters. The analysis allows fully for both economic and noneconomic influences on incumbent popularity and includes in an integrated rational model underlying partisan orientations. The conclusions suggest the strong importance of partisanship, with the public's political response to the economy depending largely on the political affiliation of the incumbent president. Beyond this, we find economic predictors generally are more important than any of the systematic political or cyclical predictors tested here, with unemployment the single most important influence on presidential popularity. For all presidents, macroeconomic conditions have greater political significance than do the government's redistributive policies designed to influence economic well-being. And with minor exceptions, the economy's political importance is equally strong for all economic classes in American society.     

Black electoral power,white resistance,and legislative behavior

This paper examines the relationship between black electoral power and white legislative behavior in Mississippi. The initial theoretical foundation is provided by the work of William R. Keech. Keech's implicit model is presented and a more elaborate model which views black payoffs as a function of black electoral power and white resistance, and the political generation of white legislators is developed and tested. A typology of electoral contexts is constructed, and the impact of such contexts on the relationships between the key variables is examined. The findings suggest that the processes responsible for the curvilinear relationship between black electoral power and black payoffs are more complex than previous research has implied and that the nature of electoral contexts may have a substantial influence on these processes.     

Interest groups,campaign contributions,and probabilistic voting

This essay develops a simple model to analyze the impact of campaign contributions on electoral-policy decisions of candidates for office. Interest groups here are firms that select contributions under the assumption that candidates' policies and opposing groups' donations remain unaltered. Candidates, however, recognize that their policy choices affect contributions. Campaign contributions are used by candidates to affect policy-oriented voters' perceptions of candidates' positions. In this framework the introduction of campaign contributions may affect candidates' electoral policies, and if they do then they benefit surely exactly one of the two interest groups.     

Campaigns,political mobility,and communication

We study the interdependence between campaign contributions, the candidates’ positions, and electoral outcomes. In our model, a candidate who moves away from his firmly established position towards a more risky one generates costs for the voters. Campaign contributions allow the candidates to reduce these mobility costs. We show that if donations were prohibited, then a unique equilibrium regarding the position choices of candidates would exist. With unrestricted financing of political campaigns, two equilibria emerge, depending on whether a majority of interest groups runs to support the leftist or rightist candidate. Interest groups may finance candidates whose position is far away from their own ideal point. The equilibria generate a variety of new features of campaign games, and may help identify the objective functions of candidates empirically.     

A political economic analysis of labor migration and income redistribution

We present a two-country political economic model of income redistribution with internationally mobile labor. Migration can be exogenous and/or endogenous (i.e., determined by labor income differentials). Political influence is determined by the size and homogeneity of the groups, where the latter can be affected by immigration. We show that immigration can increase the transfers to, and the income of, the mobile group. We also investigate the possibility of migration regulation, tax-transfer policy competition and coordination and, finally, coordination of regulation policies. It is shown that the selection of any of those regimes will depend on the particular distribution of political influence among the relevant social groups in the two countries.