Assessing State Preferences and Explaining Institutional Choice: The Case of Intra–German Trade

A solid knowledge about states' interests in the case under investigation is required to reinforce the neoinstitutionalist hypothesis that international institutions are built to reap joint gains in issue areas in which uncoordinated activities may lead to a suboptimal outcome. However, most neoinstitutionalists who apply game theory to international politics seem to assume that, regardless of the outcome to be explained, no case–specific empirical assessment of actors' interests is needed to understand regime formation. This article aims to empirically assess the constellation of state interests on the basis of which the intra–German trade regime came into existence. Furthermore, solution concepts are used merely as indicators for describing a situation, they are not taken as unqualified predictions of what will happen. This application of game theory still proves useful. By demonstrating that the intra–German trade regime emerged from a constellation of interests resembling a prisoner's dilemma, the neorealist argument that international institutions are unable to regulate important issues in a really competitive relationship is challenged. At the same time, the article points to at least one necessary addition to the neoinstitutionalist argument, as the explanation of given international institutions requires a two–step procedure: first, the explanation of state interests, and second, the explanation of behavior brought to light on the basis of these interests.     

The rise of the welfare state in international society

In this article I seek to develop a case for viewing the welfare state as a primary institution in international society. This is with particular reference to Norden (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden), where in the course of the 1930s, and particularly in the post-1945 era, the welfare state was elevated to a core principle of legitimacy, largely defining the idea of nationhood for these countries. Furthermore, I will attempt to show how the adoption of this principle of legitimacy conditioned the Nordic countries’ interpretation of a number of other primary institutions in international society such as diplomacy, war and trade. A key contribution of this approach is that it aspires not only to examine the evolution of one institution in isolation, as has often been attempted in English School scholarship, but to actively explore how institutions interact with each other.     

Grasping the Commercial Institutional Peace

While the commercial institutional peace research program provides empirical evidence that international institutions, especially preferential trade arrangements, help reduce the incidence of militarized inter-state conflict, it fails to delineate clearly how such institutions matter. Building from the logic that low opportunity costs for fighting, private information, and commitment problems constitute important causes of war, this article explores three interrelated causal mechanisms. First, the state leaders' increased expectations about future commerce create an incentive for these actors to consider peaceful bargains as an alternative to costly war. Second, security coordination under the umbrella of a commercial institution provides fuller information about state military capabilities, thus making inter-state bargaining for dispute resolution more efficient. Third, in bringing together high-level state leaders on a regular basis, commercial institutions may create the trust necessary to overcome commitment problems in inter-state bargaining. I explore how these mechanisms have operated within the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Economic Community of West African States.     

Domestic Judicial Institutions and Human Rights Treaty Violation

Democratic and autocratic states routinely violate their international agreements protecting human rights. Scholars typically link ratification and compliance behavior theoretically but test their models separately; however, if the behaviors are jointly determined then we should treat them that way empirically. We consider how domestic judiciaries influence the joint choice to ratify and comply with international human rights regimes. Using data on the ratification status of states under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), states' torture practices, and a series of measures of judicial effectiveness, we examine whether legal institutions are likely to constrain state behavior and by implication raise the costs of ratification.     

The interplay of international institutions in Kosovo between convergence,confusion and niche capabilities

Abstract

This article examines the interplay of international institutions in Kosovo and aims at disentangling and explaining the emergence and persistence of this international ‘interim’ regime. In 1999, the UN mission to Kosovo (UNMIK) and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) were the leading institutions in the civilian area following NATO's deployment of Kosovo Force (KFOR). Following the failed status talks on Kosovo, the EU's rule of law mission (EULEX) and the establishment of an International Civilian Office (ICO) have been set up in addition for increasing institutional complexity. The article analyses how institutional complexity is emerging and what strategies international institutions are applying when confronted with policy overlap. The paper finds that the emergence of institutional complexity in Kosovo is largely a result of historical lock-in effects. International institutions have developed two dominant strategies to cope with dense institutional spaces. First, they show signs of a functional convergence and a coordinated pooling of resources. Second, institutions have developed niche competences to avoid competition.     

Lessons from the Asian financial crisis for the eurozone: a comparative analysis of the perilous politics of austerity in Asia and Europe

This paper comparatively examines diverse responses from three major actors in the global political economy (the state, civil society, international financial institutions) to the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and the current eurozone crisis. First, it analyses conditional lending policies of international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the International Monetary Fund toward countries in fiscal distress. It then critically examines how the lending policies engendered social tensions and conflicts as austerity measures such as cuts to social welfare programmes hit hard on the populace. Examining how the state and civil society in Asia reacted to and, as a result of contentious state–civil society interactions, altered the policies of IFIs, the paper draws lessons from the Asian financial crisis for the European Union and puts forwards alternative policy suggestions.     

地方政府参与区域合作的国际制度分析——以云南、广西为例

传统上,地方政府并不是地区主义及国际制度研究中的主要关注对象,但在经济区域化日益加深的今天,它们在地区合作及国际制度中有着独特的意义。本文在简要讨论地区主义、国际制度及地方政府的概念及相互关系的基础上,选择云南、广西这两个具有典型意义的例子来讨论地方政府参与区域合作的制度建设、主要特征、效用及前景等问题。作者认为,制度化程度低、存在着主权——非主权以及国家——市场的双重“裂口”是地方政府参与区域合作国际制度的根本特征。     

Explaining Costly International Institutions: Persuasion and Enforceable Human Rights Norms

Why do states create enforceable international human rights norms that empower third parties to prevent and sanction domestic human rights abuses? Recent theories suggest that international institutions are shaped not only by power and interests but also by the content of arguments during intensive communication and argumentation processes. Moving beyond the simple notion that "communication matters," I argue that states are likely to be persuaded by arguments that draw on widespread taken-for-granted norms, in particular, prohibitions on bodily harm, the importance of precedent in decision making, and the link between cooperation and progress. This model extends previous theories by specifying mechanisms and scope conditions for international change through persuasion. I illustrate the argument by examining the convention against torture, a costly international institution that allows domestic courts to prosecute crimes that occur in the territory of other states (universal jurisdiction). Because of its enforcement mechanisms, the torture convention poses a difficult case for theories explaining international institutions. If persuasion models can explain even costly institutions, they should be more widely considered as explanations for all kinds of international institutions.     

Reputation,Cult of Reputation,and International Conflict

Building on recent scholarship on reputation in international politics, this article argues that, because reputation for resolve cannot form in international conflicts due to anarchy, politicians’ persistent belief in the value of reputation for resolve is merely a cult of reputation. After outlining the logic of the cult and an operational code derived from it, this article examines the pattern of influence that the cult has exerted on state behavior in conflicts. It then explores the possible cause of the cult. Finally, it proposes that integrating structural and psychological factors may be a productive enterprise for understanding state behavior, and that further work along this line may lead to interesting findings.

     

Transnational Terror and Human Rights

Do terrorist attacks by transnational groups lead governments to restrict human rights? Conventional wisdom holds that governments restrict rights to forestall additional attacks, to more effectively pursue suspected terrorists, and as an excuse to suppress their political opponents. But the logic connecting terrorist attacks to subsequent repression and the empirical research that addresses this issue suffer from important flaws. We analyze pooled data on the human rights behavior of governments from 1981 to 2003. Our key independent variable of interest is transnational terrorist attacks, and the analysis also controls for factors that existing studies have found influence respect for human rights. Repeated terrorist attacks lead governments to engage in more extrajudicial killings and disappearances, but have no discernable influence on government use of torture and of political imprisonment or on empowerment rights such as freedom of speech, assembly, and religion. This finding has important implications for how we think about the effects of terrorism and the policy responses of states, non-governmental organizations, and international institutions interested in protecting human rights.     

Formal versus traditional institutions: evidence from Ghana

Citizens in Ghana have a host of options when it comes to local governance provision as a result of the government’s decentralization policies. We undertake to explore and understand how Ghanaians navigate the constellation of local institutions, both formal and traditional, to solve an array of common problems. A four-constituency survey was administered during the summer of 2009 and asked respondents about their experiences interacting with four formal institutions and one traditional institution. We find that formal institutions are by and large working effectively and are enhanced by the presence of a traditional institution. We consider the implications of our results with respect to both democratization and decentralization.     

The social construction of international institutions: the case of ASEAN + 3

Slowly but steadily, a new international institution is emergingin East Asia: the ASEAN + 3 forum, comprising the ten membersof the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) plus China,Japan and South Korea. ASEAN + 3 is an interesting case of institution-buildingin that it is constructed around the core of an already existinginstitution, ASEAN, which was founded in 1967. The followinganalysis of this multilateral forum seeks to answer two theoreticalquestions: (i) Why do states cooperate? (ii) What happens totheir interests and identities once they communicate with eachother? In view of this task, I will offer a social constructivistvariant of international relations theory to explain the instigationof the process on the one hand and the processual constructionof the institution on the other. The underlying belief is thatnot only do states influence the development of internationalinstitutions, but that institutions can also exert influenceon foreign policy behaviour. The approach introduced here acknowledges that internationalreality is a social construction driven by collective understandingsemerging from social interaction. This approach to the explanationof the initiation and the subsequent development of an institutionrecognizes the existence of both material and normative groundsof foreign policy action. It differs from neoliberal institutionalismbecause in this theory as well as in realism collective interestis assumed as pre-given and hence exogenous to social interaction.In contrast, we suppose that social interaction ultimately doeshave transformative effects on interests and identity, becausecontinuous cooperation is likely to influence intersubjectivemeanings. This method of analysis corresponds with Moravscik'stripartite analysis of integration decisions: while the initialphase refers to the formation of state preferences, the secondand third involve the dynamic aspect of ‘constructing’international institutions: the outcomes of interstate bargainingand the subsequent choice of the institutional design.     

Ideas and interests in global financial governance: comparing German and US preference formation

Financial crises underline the necessity for more effective global governance. Despite the creation of the Basel II Accord, no agreement has been reached on the reform of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Why do governments only selectively agree to reform global governance? I argue that convergence and divergence of governmental positions cannot be explained solely by the logic of the international system, institutions or globalization. Instead, they strongly reflect domestic ideas and interests. Furthermore, the ability of governments to compromise internationally is influenced by the different impact of domestic ideas and interests. With regard to their prevalence in domestic preference formation, ideas prevail when governance affects lobby groups diffusely and poses fundamental questions on the role of politics in governing the economy. Interests prevail when lobby groups are affected directly and new governance concerns a specific distribution of costs. These arguments are tested on the preference formation of the United States and German governments on the IMF and Basel II.     

The Reputational Impact of Investor-State Disputes

To what extent do alleged violations of international commitments damage state reputation? This article explore this question with specific reference to investor-state disputes arising under the protection of international investment agreements. Its main contributions are threefold. First, building on the political institutions literature, the study places the theoretical importance of information about the rules of the game, and the actions of the participants at the center of analysis. Second, in contrast to prior empirical research, the study systematically analyzes the costs of state involvement in investment treaty arbitration by examining all known disputes. Third, the study addresses the impact of investment disputes on both foreign investment flows and state reputational rankings. We show that the consequences of investment disputes vary with the transparency of the investor-state dispute settlement process. The central implication of these findings for the broader body of literature on international institutions is that reputational mechanisms for effective treaty enforcement cannot be taken as given but instead need to be explored on the basis of a nuanced approach that addresses the pivotal issues of institutional design and information costs.     

Convergence and Divergence in Post-Cold War British,French, and German Military Reforms: Between International Structure and Executive Autonomy

Post-Cold War military reforms in Britain, France, and Germany have been characterized by patterns of convergence in the objectives, instruments, and institutional forums of defense policy but by divergence in temporality. These patterns of convergence and divergence cannot be fully explained by cultural approaches. Neither can they be explained solely by a focus on the role of international structure, as neo-realism posits, although the post-Cold War distribution of capabilities is driving Britain, France, and Germany toward policy convergence. Instead, the analysis builds upon the insights of neoclassical realism. Culture emerges not so much as a cause of action as instrumental and a resource for policy leaders in the domestic political and temporal management of reform.     

A small state’s anticipation of institutional change: effects of the looming Brexit in the areas of the CSDP and internal market

ABSTRACT

Brexit will profoundly change politics in the European Union, and all countries will have to adjust to the new situation. But the issue is more pressing for small member states that are more dependent on international organisations than big states. This article studies how the institutional setting affects a small state’s preparations for Brexit in the areas of the common security and defence policy and internal market. Contrary to the expectations, it shows that the Czech Republic, the small state under scrutiny, has invested more effort into a preventive adjustment in the internal market policy than to the CSDP. This result is explained by the existence of alternative institutional frameworks that are expected to mitigate the impact of Brexit on EU’s security and defence policy. It also suggests that while small states profit from the existence of strong institutions, they also face the risk of unmitigated impact when these institutions change.     

Governing failure: development,aid and audit in Haiti

This paper analyses practices for monitoring, tracking and assessing the international aid and reconstruction efforts in Haiti in an attempt to ‘build back better’ from the devastation of the January 2010 earthquake. We suggest that aid and reconstruction efforts filter through an international network of development organisations. This network also acts as a governing auspice, overseeing the transformation of Haiti from a ‘failed state’ to a strong democratic state. The central governing mechanism in this reconstruction effort involves the embedding of the ideas and practices of audit within Haitian political and civic culture. We reveal how, in Haiti, this culture of audit monitors aid and reconstruction through biopolitical technologies such as benchmarks and performance indicators, and through the constitution of calculable and accountable entities. More than a means of implementing disaster recovery, audit culture is a technique of biopolitical governance that aims to transform Haiti's state, civic institutions and citizens into entities accountable to an international development agenda.     

Transnational Networks and Policy Diffusion: The Case of Gender Mainstreaming

How can we account for the global diffusion of remarkably similar policy innovations across widely differing nation-states? In an era characterized by heightened globalization and increasingly radical state restructuring, this question has become especially acute. Scholars of international relations offer a number of theoretical explanations for the cross-national convergence of ideas, institutions, and interests. We examine the proliferation of state bureaucracies for gender mainstreaming. These organizations seek to integrate a gender-equality perspective across all areas of government policy. Although they so far have received scant attention outside of feminist policy circles, these mainstreaming bureaucracies—now in place in over 100 countries—represent a powerful challenge to business-as-usual politics and policymaking. As a policy innovation, the speed with which these institutional mechanisms have been adopted by the majority of national governments is unprecedented. We argue that transnational networks composed largely of nonstate actors (notably women's international nongovernmental organizations and the United Nations) have been the primary forces driving the diffusion of gender mainstreaming. In an event history analysis of 157 nation-states from 1975 to 1998, we assess how various national and transnational factors have affected the timing and the type of the institutional changes these states have made. Our findings support the claim that the diffusion of gender-mainstreaming mechanisms has been facilitated by the role played by transnational networks, in particular by the transnational feminist movement. Further, they suggest a major shift in the nature and the locus of global politics and national policymaking.     

Do governments mean business when they derogate? Human rights violations during notified states of emergency

Whether international human rights treaties constrain the behavior of governments is a hotly contested issue that has drawn much scholarly attention. The possibility to derogate from some, but not all, of the rights enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) during declared and officially notified states of emergency provides a hitherto unexplored test case. If governments were increasingly violating non-derogable rights during derogation periods then this provides evidence that the ICCPR has no sufficient constraining effect on state parties. I analyze whether specific individual human rights as well as two aggregate rights measures are systematically more violated during derogation periods in a global sample over the period 1981 to 2008. I find that regime type matters: autocracies step up violation of both non-derogable and derogable rights, anocracies increasingly violate some derogable and some non-derogable rights, whereas democracies see no statistically significant change in their human rights behavior during derogation periods. This result suggests that the main general international human rights treaty fails to achieve its objective of shielding certain rights from derogation where, as in autocracies and anocracies, a constraining effect would be needed most.     

Breaking Deadlocks in International Institutional Negotiations: The WTO, Seattle, and Doha

Negotiations among members of international institutions often stalemate yet the outcomes vary. Sometimes talks end in impasse and other times in agreement. Several familiar theories are unable to explain the contrast between two prominent outcomes in the World Trade Organization—its 1999 deadlock in Seattle and its 2001 agreement in Doha, Qatar, on an agenda for a new round. Extensive original evidence from these cases documents mechanisms that can tip the negotiation process between impasse and agreement in any institution, not only economic ones. The study illustrates benefits for international relations research of building on the relatively neglected tradition of negotiation analysis, a substantial part of which is outside political science.