UK government's Open Standards Consultation – A step in the wrong direction?

This paper comments on UK government's Open Standards Consultation which opened on 7 February 2012. It questions the UK government's mandating of open standards defined as standards which include patents licensed on a royalty free basis. The paper suggests that instead of promoting a level playing field, the government's policy will actually restrict competition and hinder interoperability. This policy is contrary to EU policy in a number of different fields which have all accepted, despite significant in-depth debate on this issue, that the best way to ensure the most effective competition, innovation and interoperability is to allow both royalty free patents and royalty bearing patents to compete provided the latter are licensed on FRAND terms. Lastly the paper suggests that the public procurement rules are not the place to apply industrial policy, instead a full market analysis should be conducted involving other government departments such as BIS and the IPO.     

FRANDly fire: are industry standards doing more harm than good?

Legal context: The role of IP rights in standards; the meaning of the obligationimposed by many standards bodies on essential patent holdersto licence on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (‘FRAND’)terms; the example of IPR policy of the European TelecommunicationsStandards Institute; recent US developments. Key points: Industry standards are of key commercial and technical significance.Yet many standards are currently burdened by litigation betweenessential patent holders and licensees. Such standards bodieshave been slow to give guidance on the meaning of the obligationsimposed on essential patent holders. This article takes theexample of the obligation to licence essential patents on FRANDterms, analysing the obligation in the context of European competitionlaw. The article concludes with some suggestions for pointsfor companies to include in their internal policies on licensingstandards essential patents. Practical significance: The meaning of the obligation to licence on FRAND terms is veryimportant for licensors and licensees alike. This article putsthe obligation in context and discusses the various approacheswhich may be taken in practice.     

The Effectiveness of the EU's Ozone Policy

Has the EU's ozone policy been effective? In other words: What caused the 90 per cent phase-out of ozone depleting substances (ODS) within the EU? Was it due to an EU-wide regulatory approach, to national circumstances, or to the Montreal Protocol? As EU's environmental policy has not been overly successful so far, it would interesting to know why ozone policy is an area where the EU and its Member States have reached targets effectively over a relatively short time. We suggest that the effectiveness of EU's ozone policy is due to two factors that together secured this rapid phase-out. First, the ozone policy was enacted by means of an EU regulation – rather than by directives – which required all Member States and all larger ODS-generating corporations to implement a ban simultaneously. Second, with the US administration making a u-turn and the increased availability of ODS-substitute chemicals, Europe saw a political opportunity to speed up the phase-out process. A limited study of the phase-out of ODS in Spain supports this argument. While the EU's ozone policy has been effective, its success owes much to particular economic and political circumstances associated with the issue of ozone depletion.     

Quality standards and certification requirements for mammography facilities--FDA. Interim rule; opportunity for public comment

The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is issuing regulations to implement the Mammography Quality Standards Act of 1992 (MQSA). The MQSA requires the establishment of a Federal certification and inspection program for mammography facilities; regulations and standards for accrediting bodies for mammography facilities; and standards for mammography equipment, personnel, and practices, including quality assurance. This regulation, which amends two previously published interim rules, modifies and adds to the definitions previously set forth. In addition, the interim rule provides a mechanism to request permission to meet alternative requirements, other than those previously set forth, if the proposed alternative requirement is at least as effective as the existing quality standards in achieving quality mammography services for women.     

Compulsory license for cable systems--Copyright Office, Library of Congress. Interim regulations

This notice is issued to inform the public that the Copyright Office of the Library of Congress is adopting interim amendments to 201.11 and 201.17 as amended on June 27, 1978 and July 3, 1980 respectively. These regulations implement portions of section 111 of the Copyright Act of 1976, title 17 of the United States Code. That section prescribes conditions under which cable systems may obtain a compulsory license to retransmit copyrighted works, including the filing of Notices of Identity and Signal Carriage Complement and Statements of Account, and the submission of statutory royalty fees. The effect of the amendments is to modify the filing requirements and royalty fee calculations necessitated by changes in the rules and regulations of the Federal Communications Commission. The amendments are issued on an interim basis in order to permit their immediate application while allowing full public comment.     

In Search of Better Quality of EU Regulations for Prompt Transposition: The Brussels Perspective

Abstract:  Better regulation cannot be achieved without serious attention to transposition. The quality of EU regulation is crucial to ensuring that Community law is promptly transposed into national law within the prescribed deadlines. But good quality transposition (clear, simple, and effective) goes beyond pre-legislative consultation processes and more frequent use of impact assessments as agreed in the 2003 Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Lawmaking. Presenting new data that covers the full population of all EU transport directives from 1995 to 2004—including the national implementing instruments of France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Spain, Sweden, the Netherlands and the UK—this study shows that elements of the EU directives delay transposition. The binding time limit for transposition, the EU directive's level of discretion, its level of detail, its nature and further characteristics of the directive's policy-making process are all factors. These determining factors are crucial to explaining why Member States miss deadlines when transposing EU Internal Market directives. Brussels' efforts to simplify and improve the regulatory environment have to go beyond more preventive action to strengthen the enforcement of EU legislation at the member-state level if they want to address the Internal Market constraining effects of Member States' non-compliance. This study argues that far-reaching decisions made in the European Commission's drafting and EU policy-making phase have the greatest effect on the European regulatory framework in which businesses operate and the free movement of goods, persons, services, and capital is at stake. Implementation should be part of the design.     

Standards for protection against radiation; extension of implementation date--NRC. Final rule

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is extending the implementation date for its revised standards for protection against radiation and making a conforming change to its regulation. See SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION for specific regulatory parts affected. This rule extends the date by which NRC licensees are required to implement the revised standards for protection against radiation to January 1, 1994. The 1-year extension provides licensees additional time to examine and implement the regulatory guidance developed to support the rule. It also establishes a concurrent implementation date for NRC licensees and Agreement State licensees.     

Law, autonomy and advance directives

The principle of autonomy underpins legal regulation of advance directives that refuse life-sustaining medical treatment. The primacy of autonomy in this domain is recognised expressly in the case law, through judicial pronouncement, and implicitly in most Australian jurisdictions, through enactment into statute of the right to make an advance directive. This article seeks to justify autonomy as an appropriate principle for regulating advance directives and relies on three arguments: the necessity of autonomy in a liberal democracy; the primacy of autonomy in medical ethics discourse; and the uncontested importance of autonomy in the law on contemporaneous refusal of medical treatment. This article also responds to key criticisms that autonomy is not an appropriate organising principle to underpin legal regulation of advance directives.     

The Social Licence as a Form of Regulation for Small and Medium Enterprises

Traditional forms of regulation have been criticized for not adequately protecting the environment. Indeed, there is evidence and growing support for the view that societal pressure can act as a social licence which induces 'beyond compliance' behaviour. In exploring this view, the paper (a) outlines the characteristics of the social licence; (b) assesses how these characteristics can influence the environmental behaviour of small and medium enterprises; (c) presents a model which shows that social licence pressures depend on the interplay of a range of factors; and (d) applies the model to explain why societal pressures rarely induce beyond compliance environmental behaviour among small and medium enterprises.     

Business Response to Regulation: An Economist's Perspective

This chapter presents an economist's perspective on the interrelationship of the compliance and enforcement decisions of business and regulators in the context of regulations governing occupational health. Assuming profit-maximizing firms and harm-minimizing enforcement agencies, it is argued that a degree of preventive activity would be undertaken by businesses even in the absence of regulation. However, if employees are not fully informed about the risks of the workplace, it is likely that the profit-maximizing level of prevention will be less than socially optimal, and consequently there will be a need for regulation. An enforcement agency which attempts to minimize harm through inducing compliance with regulatory standards will be faced with similar informational difficulties to individual employees, and this suggests some scope for cooperative gains with individual firms through negotiated compliance, rather than prosecution.     

Constitutional Directives: Morally‐Committed Political Constitutionalism

About 37 state constitutions around the world feature non‐justiciable thick moral commitments (‘constitutional directives’). These directives typically oblige the state to redistribute income and wealth, guarantee social minimums, or forge a religious or secular identity for the state. They have largely been ignored in a constitutional scholarship defined by its obsession with the legitimacy of judicial review and hostility to constitutionalising thick moral commitments other than basic rights. This article presents constitutional directives as obligatory telic norms, addressed primarily to the political state, which constitutionalise thick moral objectives. Their full realisation—through increasingly sophisticated mechanisms designed to ensure their political enforcement—is deferred to a future date. They are weakly contrajudicative in that these duties are not directly enforced by courts. Functionally, they help shape the discourse over a state's constitutional identity, and regulate its political and judicial organs. Properly understood, they are a key tool to realise a morally‐committed conception of political constitutionalism.     

Private roles in food safety provision: the law and economics of private food safety

Private food safety standards play a crucial role in ensuring the safety of the foods we consume. A voluntary instrument, private standards are so widespread to have become de facto mandatory for suppliers who wish to access the most profitable markets. Developed by retailers and business coalitions and enforced through third-party certification, private food safety standards constitute one of the principal food safety governance instruments of agribusiness value chains. Albeit private and voluntary, such standards have profound public implications because they contribute to food safety and protect consumers’ health. This article uses law and economics theory to identify their strengths and vulnerabilities and understand the relationship between public and private regulation. Specifically, it examines whether private standards can fulfill the public interest objective of protecting consumers’ health and whether they compete with or rather complement public regulation. The article argues that private standards have emerged in response to food scares to coordinate complex food value chains and have become ever more relevant in the context of intense market globalization, an area in which public regulation often failed. Among the advantages of private standards, are their flexibility and ability to rapidly respond to new risks. Through their focus on management-based regulation and strong market incentives for producers, private standards promote compliance better than traditional inspection methods. Private standards also present several gray areas including increased risk of capture due to their limited transparency and gaps in enforcement by third-party certifiers. The article suggests areas that deserve additional scrutiny, especially the opacity of standards vis-à-vis consumers and the public sector and the quality and reliability of third party certification.     

PATENT HOLDUP AND OLIGOPSONISTIC COLLUSION IN STANDARD-SETTING ORGANIZATIONS

Current controversies over patent policy place standard-settingorganizations (SSOs) on a collision course with antitrust law.Recent theoretical research conjectures that, in an SSO, patentowners can "hold up" patent users in the sense of demandinghigh royalties for a patented input after the SSO has adoptedthe patented technology as an industry standard and manufacturerswithin the SSO have incurred sunk costs to design end productsthat incorporate that standard. Consistent with this conjecture,actual SSOs have recently sought no-action letters from theAntitrust Division for a variety of amendments to SSO rulesthat would require or request, at the time a standard is underconsideration, the ex ante disclosure by the patent owner ofthe maximum royalty that the patent owner would charge underthe regime of fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory licensing.This price information—which is characterized as the "cost"of the patented input—would, under at least one recentSSO rule modification, be a permissible topic for potentialusers of the patent to discuss when deciding whether to selectit in lieu of some alternative standard. This exchange of informationamong horizontal competitors would occur ostensibly becausethe cost of the patented technology had been characterized assimply one more technical attribute of the standard to be set,albeit an important technical attribute. The Antitrust Divisionand the Federal Trade Commission have jointly stated that suchdiscussion, by prospective buyers who are competitors in thedownstream market, of the price of a patented invention thatmight become part of an industry standard should be subjectto antitrust scrutiny under the rule of reason rather than therule of per se illegality. The rationale that the antitrustagencies offer for applying the rule of reason to such conductis that such horizontal collaboration might avert patent holdup.The Antitrust Modernization Commission (AMC) similarly endorsedthe view that rule-of-reason analysis is appropriate for exante discussion of royalty terms by competing buyers of patentedtechnology. This rule-of-reason approach, however, is problematicbecause it conflicts with both the body of economic researchon bidder collusion and with the antitrust jurisprudence oninformation exchange and facilitation of collusion. Put differently,because of their concern over the possibility of patent holdup,the U.S. antitrust agencies and the AMC in effect have indicatedthat they may be willing in at least some circumstances to forgoenforcement actions against practices that facilitate oligopsonisticcollusion by encouraging the ex ante exchange of informationamong competitors concerning the price to be paid for a patentedinput as an implicit condition of those competitors' endorsementof that particular patented technology for adoption in the industrystandard. However, neither the proponents of these SSO policiesnor the antitrust agencies and the AMC have offered any theoreticalor empirical foundation for their implicit assumption that theexpected social cost of patent holdup exceeds the expected socialcost of oligopsonistic collusion. This conclusion does not changeeven if one conjectures that such collusion will benefit consumersby enabling licensees to pass through royalty reductions intheir pricing of the downstream product incorporating the patentedtechnology. Proper economic evaluation of the plausibility ofthe pass-through conjecture will require information about thecalculation of royalty payments; the demand and supply elasticitiesfacing the licensees; and the structure of any industries furtherdownstream between the manufacturer and the final consumer.Consequently, the magnitude of this effect will likely be amatter of empirical dispute in every case. Moreover, such ajustification for tolerating horizontal price fixing finds nosupport in antitrust jurisprudence. Given the analytical andfactual uncertainty over whether patent holdup is a seriousproblem, it is foreseeable that antitrust questions of firstimpression will arise and affect a wide range of high-technologyindustries that rely on SSOs. However, there is no indicationthat scholars and policy makers have seriously considered whetheroligopsonistic collusion in SSOs is a larger problem than patentholdup.     

The most ambitious plan in 26 years of telecoms market reform? No way!

The European Commission's claim that their proposed new telecoms regulation² constitutes “the most ambitious plan in 26 years of telecoms market reform” is preposterous. That honour must belong to the set of new European directives in 2002 which transformed the structure of telecoms regulation and facilitated competition throughout Europe. Instead the plans make great play of a number of actually pretty minor changes and, the Body for European Regulators for Electronic Communications (“BEREC”) has been particularly critical that the proposals will create unnecessary complexity and uncertainty and limit innovation and competition.     

Risk assessment and geography teachers: a survey

Recently the issue of health and safety procedures on field trips and school visits has come to the fore, as a result of a series of tragedies involving the deaths of pupils. A review of some of the recent court cases and inquests involving the victims of field trips was undertaken. This indicated that schools and teachers are failing to implement risk assessment procedures which are a requirement of the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999. The research focuses on the perceptions and practices of geography teachers as leaders of field trips. A central question is whether or not geography field trips are operating to acceptable safety standards. A questionnaire was constructed which set out to explore a sample of Northern Ireland geography teachers' attitudes to issues of liability and risk assessment. The findings indicate that teachers' compliance with Regulation 3, the requirement to conduct adequate risk assessments is variable, and a small proportion never undertake any risk assessments. The majority of respondents indicated that they had not received any training in conducting risk assessments. The findings raise concerns about the self‐regulation of safety procedures by teachers on field trips.     

The efficacy of international regulation of uranium mining: Malawi as a case study

This article explores the basis for an international law framework for the adoption of binding minimum standards to govern the exploitation of uranium mining within States. By focusing on international environmental law, the following discourse exposes, a) the inimical impact of State sovereignty over natural resources to effective regulation of uranium mining; and b) the practical ramification of the impreciseness and wooliness of international regulation of uranium mining. This article suggests a need to re‐evaluate the extent to which States may be subject to standards imposed under international law in their exploitation of natural resources.     

The Persistent Significance of Jurisdiction*

According to Joseph Raz's sources thesis, the existence and content of authoritative directives must be identifiable by resort to the social fact of their provenance from a de facto authority, without regard to any of the normative considerations that the authority in question is supposed to rely on in its judgment. This article argues that the sources thesis fails to account for the role of jurisdictional considerations (namely, considerations about the scope of a de facto authority's power) in the identification of valid law. It examines a legal system with a legislature and courts and a practice of constitutional review of legislation by the courts for its conformity with fundamental rights and argues that the special normative status of (at least some) authoritative directives in this legal system depends on respect for jurisdiction. An assessment of whether an authority has stayed intra vires involves recourse to the normative considerations that it is the authority's job to weigh up. This criticism of the sources thesis highlights the importance of incorporating jurisdiction into our philosophical accounts of legal authority.     

Accountability for Delegated and Implementing Acts after the Treaty of Lisbon

The comitology regime, the committee‐based system developed as a mechanism for controlling the Commission's exercise of its powers to implement EU measures, has been subject to severe criticism on grounds of lack of accountability and transparency. The system has recently been fundamentally reformed by means of the new Implementing Acts Regulation, which came into force on 1 March 2011. This paper investigates whether the new rules are sufficient to remedy accountability deficits as regards implementing acts and concludes that as far as accountability to the Member States is concerned, their control powers have remained static. In addition, the new‐delegated acts procedure introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon grants the European Parliament (EP) more control powers, although the EP's gains are more modest than they might appear. This change has come at the cost of reduced control powers for Member States as well as lowered standards of transparency for the public.     

Compliance Motivations: Affirmative and Negative Bases

This research addresses affirmative and negative motivations for compliance with social and environmental regulations. Affirmative motivations emanate from good intentions and a sense of obligation to comply. Negative motivations arise from fears of the consequences of being found in violation of regulatory requirements. The relevance of these is examined for data concerning the motivations of homebuilders to comply with requirements of building codes. The findings highlight the importance of affirmative motivations for situations such as homebuilding for which regulation is better characterized as fulfillment of a social contract than solely as compliance with enforced directives.