Complaining about rivals: Indifference,cooperation, and competition in the governance of advertising

What should rivals do when they see competitors breaking agreed rules within systems of self‐regulation? This study investigates compliant behavior among British advertisers to empirically answer this question. It analyses five years of complaints (n = 146,062) and adjudications (n = 4,832) published by the self‐regulatory body for the British advertising industry. The majority of firms adopt a strategy of indifference and rarely regulate their rivals. Highly engaged firms either adopt an angelic strategy as they use their resources to complain about their rivals; a deviant strategy as they are subject to a large number of complaints; or a predatory strategy as they attack their rivals through advertising regulation. This illustrates a unique form of regulatory capture in which a regulatory system becomes an arena of competition for some actors while continuing as a governance mechanism for others.     

What do Australian consumers think about current advertising standards?

The concept of community standards is the cornerstone of advertising self‐regulation in Australia. However, there is a dearth of research on current attitudes towards advertising and a virtual absence of such data in an Australian context. A questionnaire was developed to assess consumer attitudes towards advertising; respondents were 872 adults residing in New South Wales. We found high levels of concern regarding advertising standards in general and a consistent perception that advertising should not, for example, use coarse language or violent images, portray women or men as sex objects or show nudity, stereotype or make fun of groups of people, or convey messages that undermine parental authority. In relation to specific appeals and executional elements, although we identified numerous statistically significant demographic differences, there was a clear majority view as to what elements are unacceptable. That is, rather than the posited vocal ‘moral minority’, there is a consistency of views across the community on key issues of advertising standards. The finding that only a very small proportion of community‐based respondents knew how to make a complaint to the correct organisation suggests that studies utilising complainant samples are unlikely to be representative of those who are concerned about advertising. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Establishing New Advertising Self‐regulatory Schemes: A Comparison of the UK and Australian Approaches

Advertising is the most visible element of modern marketing, and an important component of trading. It is also an activity often accused by its critics of being intrusive and pervasive. Such accusations are not easily refuted by a worldwide industry which spends billions of dollars each year reaching and persuading its target markets through daily bombardment of thousands of ads in most developed countries. When advertising does offend, mislead, or is untruthful, a structure needs to be in place in order to provide protection to all parties and, in most cases, a country's legal system is complemented by a self‐regulatory scheme. Self‐regulation is a common approach to controlling conduct or behaviour in society and, indeed, Australian advertisers have opted for this system of control for more than 60 years.     

Assessing the impact of stricter alcohol advertising standards: the case of Beam Global Spirits

Reducing youth exposure to alcohol advertising is a global health priority. In most countries around the world, the alcohol industry is given the opportunity to regulate itself with respect to advertising practices. Generally, the alcohol industry self‐regulations are lax, allowing youth to be disproportionately exposed to alcohol advertising. However, Beam Global Spirits and Wine (Beam) voluntarily adopted more restrictive advertising standards in the United States in 2007. This study assessed Beam's compliance with their new standard and estimates its effect on youth exposure and advertising costs. We found that Beam's compliance with its more restrictive standards was imperfect, but never‐the‐less, we estimated that youth exposure to alcohol advertising was reduced compared to other spirits brands. Beam's more restrictive standards did not increase their advertising costs, and therefore other alcohol companies should consider adopting similar standards around the world. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

‘Women of substance’: Commodification and fetishization in contemporary advertising within the Indian ‘Urbanscape'

Advertising today has become an intrinsic part of modern culture. Apart from the obvious and tangible extolment of the virtues of a product and/or brand, more insiduously and less tangibly, advertising plays a key role in the functioning of social attitudes and values. This paper examines how advertising discourses in India, in particular the hugely successful and representative Woman of Substance’ ad campaign in the magazine Femina, transforms the manifold attitudes and qualities of the woman into commodities to be marketed; and how the ad campaign positions the woman within the nexus of her social interactions. The paper traces the economic and socio‐cultural changes that have characterised India's transition towards an open market economy to situate the role that advertising discourse plays in urban India today in the representation of the ‘Woman of Substance’. These changes have occurred in a relatively short space of time and have interacted profoundly with advertising discourse. This can best be seen in the fact that an urbanising trend in India has diversified the range of approved cultural models available to women in the search for what has come to be fashionably referred to in recent times as ‘lifestyles‘— exemplified both in the ‘Woman of Substance’ ad campaign, and the magazine itself, Femina.     

The regulatory state and the UK Labour Government's re‐regulation of provision in the English National Health Service

Following its election in 1997, the UK Labour Government embarked upon a 10 year program of reform of the National Health Service (NHS). By 2005, Labour had doubled the NHS budget and dramatically transformed the shape of the Service. In England, a basic characteristic of the NHS is the organizational split between provider and commissioning agencies. In this article I argue that Labour's re‐regulation of NHS provision is a coherent representation of the influence of the “regulatory state” in restructuring arrangements between government, market, and society. The article offers an account of the regulatory state based on a discussion of five key theses: The Audit Society, Regulation Inside Government, The New Regulatory State, The British Regulatory State, and Regulatory Capitalism. The article unfolds Labour's program of reform across themes common to these accounts: the division of labor between state and society, the division of labor within the state, the formalization of previously informal controls, and the development of meta‐regulatory techniques of enforced self‐regulation. It concludes that the key themes of the regulatory state are at work in Labour's transformation of NHS provision and it offers a discussion of the implications for both scholars of regulation and the UK and European health policy literature.     

The effectiveness of NGO self‐regulation: theory and evidence from Africa

Non‐governmental organizations (NGOs) play an increasingly important role in public service provision and policy making in sub‐Saharan Africa, stimulating demand for new forms of regulatory oversight. In response, a number of initiatives in NGO self‐regulation have emerged. Using cross‐national data on 20 African countries, the article shows that self‐regulation in Africa falls into three types: national‐level guilds, NGO‐led clubs and voluntary codes of conduct. Each displays significant weaknesses from a regulatory policy perspective. National guilds have a broad scope, but require high administrative oversight capacity on the part of NGOs. Voluntary clubs have stronger standards but typically have much weaker coverage. Voluntary codes are the most common form of self‐regulation, but have the weakest regulatory strength. This article argues that the weakness of current attempts to improve the accountability and regulatory environment of NGOs stems in part from a mismatch between the goals of regulation and the institutional incentives embedded in the structure of most self‐regulatory regimes. The article uses the logic of collective action to illustrate the nature of this mismatch and the tradeoffs between the potential breadth and strength of various forms of NGO self‐regulation using three detailed case studies. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Legitimacy through targeted transparency? Regulatory effectiveness and sustainability of lobbying regulation in the European Union

Regulating interest groups’ access to decision makers constitutes a key dimension of legitimate and accountable systems of government. The European Union explicitly links lobbying regulation with the democratic credentials of its supranational system of governance and proposes transparency as a solution to increase legitimacy and regulate private actors’ participation in policy making. This lobbying regulation regime consists of a Transparency Register that conditions access to decision makers upon joining it and complying with its information disclosure requirements. The extent to which transparency‐based regulatory regimes are successful in ensuring effective regulation of targeted actors and in being recognised as a legitimate instrument of governance constitutes a key empirical question. Therefore, the study asks: Do stakeholders perceive the transparency‐based EU lobbying regulation regime to be a legitimate form of regulatory governance? The study answers by building on a classic model of targeted transparency and proposes perceived regulatory effectiveness and sustainability as two key dimensions on which to evaluate the legitimacy of the Register. The arguments are tested on a new dataset reporting the evaluations of 1,374 stakeholders on the design and performance of the EU lobbying regulation regime. The findings describe a transparency regime that scores low in perceived effectiveness and moderate to low in sustainability. Citizens criticise the quality of information disclosed and the Register's performance as a transparency instrument. The Register did not effectively bridge the information gap between the public and interest groups about supranational lobbying. In terms of sustainability, interest organisations appreciate the systemic benefits of transparency, but identify few organisation‐level benefits. Organisations that are policy insiders incur more transparency costs so they instrumentally support transparency only insofar it suits their lobbying strategies and does not threaten their position. Insiders support including additional categories of organisations in the Register's regulatory remit but not more types of interactions with policy makers. They support an imperfect regulatory status quo to which they have adapted but lack incentives to support increased transparency and information disclosure. Targeted transparency proves an ineffective approach to regulating interest groups’ participation in EU policy making, constituting a suboptimal choice for ensuring transparent, accountable and legitimate supranational lobbying.     

Fast cars,fast food,and fast fixes: industry responses to current ethical dilemmas for Australian advertisers

• This paper reviews three ethical dilemmas currently facing advertisers for cars, fast food and pharmaceuticals in the U.S., U.K. and Australia, and discusses Australian industry responses to these dilemmas. In Australia, as in the U.S. and U.K., the main response mechanism for advertisers has been the introduction of self‐regulatory codes of practice. It is important to note that in a number of cases there is no conclusive evidence of the argued harm from advertising that is subsequently banned or regulated. A review of the general and trade press, and the records of the Australian Advertising Standards Board, finds that industry responses tend to be based on industry rather than community concerns, with the primary motive being to avoid deleterious outcomes for the industry rather than for society as a whole.

Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Turning defiance into compliance with procedural justice: Understanding reactions to regulatory encounters through motivational posturing

This paper uses Braithwaite's motivational posturing framework to explain how individuals react to encounters with regulatory authorities. Of interest is whether procedural justice can reduce defiance and improve self‐reported compliance among individuals who are either resistant or dismissive of regulatory authority. Using longitudinal survey data collected from tax offenders (Study 1), and individuals who had a recent police‐citizen interaction (Study 2), it will be shown that procedural justice can promote compliance behavior. Procedural justice is also found to be effective for reducing resistant forms of defiance over time, but not dismissive defiance. Further, the results reveal that neither resistant defiance nor dismissive defiance moderate the effect of procedural justice on compliance, suggesting procedural justice works equally well for both low and high resisters and low and high disengagers. Finally, an unexpected result reveals that resistance, but not dismissive defiance, mediates the effect of procedural justice on self‐reported compliance behavior. The findings have implications for procedural justice research and for the regulation of defiance.     

Top‐Down Self‐Organization: State Logics,Substitutional Delegation,and Private Governance in Russia

This study investigates the counterintuitive emergence of self‐regulation in the Russian construction sector. Despite its proclivity for centralizing political authority, the government acted as the catalyst for the delegation of regulatory powers to private industry groups. The article argues that a factor little considered in extant literature—namely, a weak and corrupt bureaucracy—is key to explaining why the normally control‐oriented executive branch began to promote private governance despite industry's preference for continued state regulation. The article's signal contribution is to theoretically explain and empirically demonstrate how a government's prior inability to establish intrastate control over an ineffective and bribable public bureaucracy creates incentives for political authorities to search for alternative means for policy implementation outside of existing state agencies. These findings are important for understanding the impetus and logic behind particular regulatory shifts in countries where the state apparatus is both deficient and corrupt.     

The IMF's Rethink of Global Banks: Critical in Theory,Orthodox in Practice

The International Monetary Fund's (IMF) new financial interconnectedness agenda, developed in response to postcrisis calls from G20 to better understand systemic financial institutions, deploys a critical approach that stresses the spatial, political, and institutional dimensions of cross‐border financial networks. It portrays global banks as key nodes in those networks, “super‐spreaders” of systemic risk through complex business models that involve yield search, regulatory and tax arbitrage. Yet this critical view does not translate into its policy advice at country level. In regular surveillance of developing countries, the IMF remains committed to a benign view of transnational banking, even when confronted with growing cross‐border fragilities. During crises of cross‐border banking, the IMF tailors its conditionality to minimize domestic regulatory challenges to cross‐border banking models and to propose crisis measures that create new profit opportunities for transnational banks.     

Regulatory capabilities: A normative framework for assessing the distributional effects of regulation

This paper develops the normative concept of “regulatory capabilities.” It asserts that nobody – individuals, groups, or entities – should be subjected to a regulatory regime without some freedom to determine its nature. Self‐determination in this context means the ability to accept or reject a regulatory regime imposed by others or to develop viable alternative approaches. We use the term “regulatory capabilities” to capture the importance of enabling conditions for regulatory self‐determination. This is particularly important in the transnational context where private, hybrid public–private, and public actors compete for influence, shape domestic regulation, and, in doing so, limit the scope for democratic self‐governance. In short, this paper seeks to contribute to the general debate on the normative foundations of and the requisite conditions for transnational regulation and governance.     

Introducing and applying a new Australian alcohol advertising code

This article introduces the new Australian Alcohol Advertising Review Board (AARB) Code and assesses television advertising practices against its advertising content provisions. The Code is administered by independent experts to provide an alternative to the industry‐led Alcohol Beverages Advertising Code Scheme that has attracted substantial criticism. The new Code aims to balance the alcohol industry's right to promote a legal product against critical protections for young people and public health. To assess whether the new Code will require substantial changes to alcohol advertising practices, a content analysis was conducted of alcohol advertisements aired prior to its introduction on all four free‐to‐air commercial television channels over two months. A majority of the analysed advertisements (48 of 64) contained at least one element that could be construed as a breach of the AARB Code. The largest numbers of potential breaches were for the provisions relating to the association of alcohol with success and using appeals that are likely to be attractive to young people. The results demonstrate that the Australian alcohol industry will need to reassess current advertising practices to achieve compliance with the new Code. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Uniformity as response to soft law: Evidence from compliance and non‐compliance with the Dutch corporate governance code

The objective of the paper is to examine how firms have dealt with the trade‐off between flexibility and uncertainty that is characteristic for the decision‐making of firms in coping with self‐regulatory initiatives in general and the comply‐or‐explain principle in corporate governance in particular. Using unique data for 126 listed Dutch firms, we find that firms respond to this self‐regulatory initiative by largely complying with the code recommendation, possibly out of fear that the firm's reputation may be damaged. Furthermore, we find evidence suggesting that firms confine themselves to adopting a specific set of code recommendations and use similar arguments to explain non‐compliance. Our findings indicate uniformity in adopting the standard of good governance which is not in line with the logic of corporate governance codes and casts doubt on the effectiveness of this form of soft law. Overall, the paper's findings indicate that more restrictive (regulatory) instruments may be necessary to make firms conform to the spirit of codes.     

Exploring the formal and informal roles of regulatory intermediaries in transnational multistakeholder regulation

Research on regulation and regulatory processes has traditionally focused on two prominent roles: rulemaking and rule‐taking. Recently, the mediating role of third party actors, regulatory intermediaries, has started to be explored – notably in a dedicated special issue of the ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. The present special issue extends this line of research by elaborating the distinction between formal and informal modes of regulatory intermediation, in the specific context of transnational multistakeholder regulation. In this introduction, we identify two key dimensions of intermediation (in)formalism: officialization and formalization. This allows us to develop a typology of intermediation in multistakeholder regulatory processes: formal, interpretive, alternative, and emergent. Leveraging examples from the papers in this special issue, we discuss how these four types of intermediation coexist and evolve over time. Finally, we elaborate on the implications of our typology for regulatory processes and outcomes.     

The rise of the constitutional regulatory state in Colombia: The case of water governance

This article interprets the regulatory state in Colombia as the result of a dialectic process between transnational knowledge and domestic politics, which influence, transform, and inspire each other. Such a process results in an interesting constitutional variant of the regulatory state, in which neo‐constitutionalism becomes a counterbalance to the unchecked expansion of neo‐liberal regulatory practices. I, therefore, distinguish between neoliberal and constitutional regulatory states. As a result of neo‐constitutionalism, the domestic judiciary is empowered, and becomes a crucial actor to understand both the specific traits of this regulatory experience, and its interaction with global centers of power.     

Self‐Provision of Public Services: Its Evolution and Impact

This article establishes a framework for explaining the ways in which citizens, as clients of public services, attempt to deal with situations of combined market and government failures. Under certain conditions, citizens are driven to create self‐production mechanisms that often are extralegal or illegal. When faced with such social initiatives, politicians often support them, either passively or actively, by institutionalizing the new mechanisms. The article explains the evolution of the self‐provision model and its implications. The analysis includes a theoretical framework and a practical intervention scheme.     

Uber Über regulation? Regulatory change following the emergence of new technologies in the taxi market

Can emerging technologies transform not only markets, but also foster new regulatory change mechanisms? In the context of prevailing theories of regulatory change, this article explores the extent to which an interest‐based explanation can account for the regulatory responses toward emerging Transportation Network Companies (TNCs). Based on a primary cross‐city analysis of the 40 largest cities in the United States, the study found that although the existence of ex ante interest groups indeed somewhat limited the extent of ex post regulatory acceptance of TNCs, regulators seemed to prefer the newcomers over existing incumbents and approved TNCs in 77.5 percent of the examined cities, rarely pursuing harsh enforcement even when TNCs operated illegally. The research attempts to explain this intriguing phenomenon by extending the interest‐based approach to account for the key role played by “technological regulatory entrepreneurs.” The entrepreneurs bridged collective action barriers by becoming the central agent that managed, and reaped the benefits of, the collective action, by lowering the organizational costs and by disseminating information effectively and turning consumers into political campaigners, thus successfully promoting regulatory change.     

Campaign‐Style Enforcement and Regulatory Compliance

This article examines the recoupling mechanism of campaign‐style enforcement and its effects on environmental regulatory compliance. Drawing on the policy implementation literature and institutional theory, the authors develop a conceptual model of campaign‐style enforcement in which both resource mobilization and power redistribution are theorized to address decoupling problems in regulatory compliance. The two‐pathway recoupling mechanism is evidenced by an empirical investigation of the implementation of China's energy conservation and emission reduction policy as part of that country's 11th Five‐Year Plan. Findings suggest that campaign‐style enforcement can effectively improve regulatory compliance when it addresses the efficiency/legitimacy conflict by providing policy incentives and reorganizing a clear hierarchy of political authority. The article concludes with a discussion of the strengths and limitations of campaign‐style enforcement.