Oslo and Its Aftermath: Lessons Learned from Track Two Diplomacy

Since the collapse of the Oslo peace process and the violence that followed, many scholars have reflected upon the Israeli–Palestinian peace process. Most of this analysis has focused on official negotiations without considering the substantial role that unofficial peace efforts have played in peacebuilding, both prior to and after Oslo. This article, in contrast, seeks to better understand the application of “track two” diplomacy to the Israeli–Palestinian case. It reports on a self‐reflection effort by numerous Israeli–Palestinian peace practitioners to better understand what has worked, what has not, and how new initiatives could be more effectively organized and carried out in the future. The research presented is based on an inventory of seventy‐nine track two projects that occurred between Israelis and Palestinians between 1992 and 2004, personal interviews with many of those who organized and oversaw these projects, and two focus group meetings that brought together a total of forty practitioners. In this article, we seek to better understand two issues: (1) how track two initiatives have changed in scope, organization, and intent; and (2) how track two practitioners have sought to disseminate their work beyond the participants of those initiatives. Our findings present an overall picture of the Israeli–Palestinian second track practice and identify a number of trends and common types of practice. Among the trends we have identified are the following: during the peace process years, more track two initiatives were undertaken with elite/professional participants than with representatives of the grassroots, but in the subsequent decade‐and‐a‐half, Israeli–Palestinian grassroots, track two initiatives gradually replaced senior‐level track two exchanges; most of the grassroots initiatives we studied were relationship focused, whereas those involving elite participants are outcome focused; the track two community subscribes to a set of theoretical propositions about which conditions and contexts facilitate the transmission of track two insights and ideas to the political process, but these propositions have yet to be validated; and track two specialists do little strategic planning about ways to most effectively transfer track two insights and ideas to the political process. Our research also identified four distinct, but not mutually exclusive, approaches to practice: the psychological, the constructivist, the capacity building, and the realistic interest.     

Ballots,Bargains, and Bombs: Terrorist Targeting of Spoiler Opportunities

Benjamin Netanyahu's come-from-behind victory over Shimon Peres in the Israeli national elections of May 1996, following an apparent intensification of Palestinian terrorism over the course of that spring, reminded observers of the political ramifications of terrorism. Since May 1996 was also the month in which Israel reentered Final Status negotiations with a Palestinian delegation in Taba, Egypt, the timing of this surge in violence encourages us to ask if terrorists regularly conceive of elections and rounds of negotiations as “spoiler opportunities,” or opportune times to undermine peaceful political processes. We address this question in the context of Israel's long‐running experience with elections, negotiations, and terrorism. We hypothesize that attacks resulting in fatalities are likely to increase in periods immediately surrounding Israeli general elections and key rounds of negotiations affecting the fate of the Palestinian population. Negative binomial event count analyses of the period 1970–2007 suggest that violent opponents indeed viewed the periods preceding negotiations and the ends of electoral cycles as “spoiler opportunities.”     

Change Nobody Believes In: Obama and the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict

Despite the promise of ‘change’ in President Barack Obama's early dealings with the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, the policy that has since emanated from the White House was in fact commensurate with those of preceding administrations. Rather than heralding a new direction for American engagement with the conflict, the Obama Administration had displayed more patterns of continuity than change in its dealings with both parties. Specifically, by continuing to act as “Israel's attorney” during negotiations, the Obama team had in effect negated the president's early pledges to act as an honest broker in the conflict. In assessing the (in)effectiveness of the Administration's management of the Israeli–Palestinian issue, it seems that on-going mediation efforts to revive the moribund peace process have exhausted their potential. Arbitration may be explored as a more effective method to resolve the Israeli–Palestinian territorial dispute.     

Europe under occupation: the European diplomatic community of practice in the Jerusalem area

ABSTRACT

This article shows how the existence of a community of European practitioners in the Jerusalem area gives substance to the European stance on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. The often-stated European Union (EU) support for a two-state solution could appear meaningless in the absence of peace negotiations. However, European diplomats (i.e. diplomats of EU member states and EU officials) in the East Jerusalem–Ramallah area are committed to specific practices of political resistance to Israeli occupation and recognition of Palestinian institutions. These practices have led not only to a specific political geography of diplomacy, but also to a community of practice, composed of European diplomats and based on their daily experience of resisting occupation and bestowing recognition. It is this group of officials who represent and actively “do” Europe’s position and under occupation.     

Two Complementary Settings of Peace-making Diplomacy: Political-Elite Diplomacy and Public Diplomacy

In terms of the question, “how to create an effective peace-making process in the Israeli–Palestinian case,” this article argues that the answer is a multidimensional approach to peace-making diplomacy that contains two main settings: political-elite diplomacy and public diplomacy. Political-elite diplomacy suggests various modes of peace-making interactions between political-elites. Public diplomacy provides instruments to involve the people in the peace-making struggle, prepares them for a change, and presses the leadership to reach agreements. The analysis suggests establishing an institution for the operation of public diplomacy—a major Israeli-Palestinian public negotiating congress. The congress is a democratic peace-making institution that invites representatives of the opposing societies to discuss, debate, and negotiate solutions to their struggle. The article also presents the concepts of political-elite diplomacy and public diplomacy as competitive settings that should be regarded as complementary. It includes lessons from the “Minds of Peace Experiment”—a small-scale Israeli–Palestinian public negotiating congress—which has been conducted in different places around the world.     

Influencing Negotiation Willingness in the Middle East: The Potential Contributions of Private Actors

Numerous efforts to solve the Israeli–Palestinian conflict through diplomacy have taken place over the last four decades. To shed light on this dilemma in this article, the role that private actors and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) can play to enhance the negotiation willingness of nonstate armed groups was examined. It was argued that the NGOs in particular could play key roles in promoting the negotiation willingness of nonstate actors and also in influencing their internal dynamics and increasing their cohesion. Specifically, we examine two pairs of efforts to resolve the conflict in Israel and Palestine: the “Road Map” and the track two Geneva Initiative of 2003, and the Olmert Peace Plan and Jimmy Carter's visit to the Middle East in 2008. In the first pair, NGO efforts yielded unexpected results. The Palestinians were ready to compromise even though the deal offered by the Israelis did not seem very generous. In the second pair, the reaction of the Palestinians to Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's generous peace offer seemed especially puzzling, illustrating, the internal dynamics between the Palestinian factions. Negotiation willingness was closely related to cohesion, and that cohesion plays an important role in conflict negotiations. President Jimmy Carter's efforts in 2008 to enhance cohesion among the Palestinians illustrated the potential that NGOs have to complement official negotiations.     

Is Unilateralism Always Bad? Negotiation Lessons from Israel's “Unilateral” Gaza Withdrawal

Using the 2005 unilateral Israeli withdrawal from Gaza as a case study, this article exposes an apparent paradox: circumstances may exist in which an outcome that serves the interests of parties to a conflict cannot be achieved through bilateral negotiation but can be achieved by unilateral action. Although the withdrawal was seen at the time as serving the interests of both the Israeli government and the Palestinians, we argue that the same result could not have been achieved through bilateral negotiations. “Behind‐the‐table” internal conflicts on each side would have made it impossible for the leaders to agree on the scope of these negotiations. Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's success in implementing his Gaza withdrawal was attributable in significant measure to his ability to maintain ambiguity about his long‐run plans for the West Bank. Only by focusing attention on Gaza was he able to build the necessary coalition to implement the controversial move. The Palestinian leaders, on the other hand, could never have agreed to come to the table to negotiate about Gaza alone — they would have insisted that the scope of any negotiations address a broad range of final status issues. In this article, we identify some of the lessons that the Gaza example teaches regarding the utility and limits of unilateralism as well as the benefits and potential costs of employing ambiguity as a strategy to help accomplish a controversial move. Finally, we also explore the aftermath of the withdrawal and its many missed opportunities for improving the outcome. We suggest that, even when acting unilaterally, leaders should carefully consider the probable impact of their actions on the internal conflicts of their adversaries.     

From Hasbara to the Palestine-Israel Sport Conflict

This analysis highlights the role of sport—particularly football—in nation-building. Using netnographic techniques, it focuses on the Palestinian struggle for self-determination and nationhood through the efforts of the Palestinian Football Association [PFA] to challenge Israeli hegemony and function independently of Israeli surveillance in a sovereign Palestinian nation-state. It explains how the PFA has attempted to harness its status, manifested in its Fédération Internationale de Football Association [FIFA] membership, to threaten Israel’s own FIFA membership and its international image. The value of this analysis stems from the way it embeds the empirical narrative within a broader international relations analytical/theoretical framework that problematises the central concept of “soft power” that has predominated the current “sports and international relations” literature.     

Human Rights Dilemmas in Using Informers to Combat Terrorism: The Israeli-Palestinian Case

ABSTRACT

Using informers is a basic tool in preventing terror attacks and the nature of current terror threats makes it even more crucial. This use, however, often leads to human rights violations, both of the informers and by them, and to many problematic ethical questions. Drawing on the Israeli–Palestinian example—where a main strategy of Israeli intelligence activity in the Palestinian areas has been an extensive use of informers—this article presents the main human rights dilemmas in the field, divided into three stages: recruitment, operation and post-operation obligations, and also points to the possible counter-productive consequences of such a use.     

Old (Molotov) cocktails in new bottles? “Price-tag” and settler violence in Israel and the West Bank

In the early morning of July 31, 2015, masked attackers threw firebombs into two Palestinian homes in the West Bank village of Duma, south of Nablus, killing three Palestinian civilians. Contrary to claims by Israeli and Palestinian politicians, this attack was neither an isolated anomaly nor just another incident of settler violence. Instead, it was the latest attack in an important but largely unknown phenomenon called “price-tag,” in which a loosely connected group of young Israelis called “hilltop youth” burn Palestinian mosques and destroy property in hundreds of attacks accompanied by threatening graffiti that references Israeli settlers, outposts, and anti-Arab slogans. Using an original dataset of price-tag incidents and interviews with key actors, we demonstrate that the perpetrators, targets, and strategies of price-tag are different than previous patterns of settler violence. Whereas previous settlers saw the Israeli state as legitimate and largely decided to cooperate with it, the hilltop youth have decided to confront it by using price-tag attacks to deter settlement withdrawals and chain-gang the state into a conflict with the Palestinians. This analysis of the strategic logic of price-tag reveals its potential to shift the political landscape within and between Israelis and Palestinians.     

American military presence in Europe

Despite the efforts put into negotiations, they have created a self-perpetuating cycle of disappointment, frustration and empty dialogue. With contradictory Palestinian and Israeli agendas – Palestinians negotiating for an independent state, an end to occupation, etc., and Israel negotiating primarily over security concerns – one must question the reason behind prolonged negotiations. Is US mediation, accused by many of extreme bias towards Israel, to blame? Or are negotiations an Israeli objective to execute a particular political agenda? In spite of the international community's recognition of establishing an independent Palestinian state, the current reality on the ground undermines any creation of one. This reality was allowed only by the strategic prolonging of negotiations. A particular focus on the proceedings following the Oslo Accords explains how Palestinian--Israeli negotiations have been used to pursue a specific objective.     

De-terrorising the Palestinian national struggle: the roadmap to peace

This article follows the representation of Palestinian nationalism as a history of terrorism. This representation was produced in the Israeli media and academia, and broadcast by the state's political elite in international arenas. In the West, this image was accepted in many circles and affected the chances of the Palestinians having a fair hearing in the peace negotiations which began after the 1967 war. The article follows the construction of the equation of Palestinian nationalism with terrorism, assesses its impact on the peace process, and suggests the deconstruction of this narrative as the best way forward in future negotiations.     

Context and Content toward Consensus in Public Mediation

The mediation of public conflicts is a complex interactive, social‐psychological, and often politicized process. Because of their complexity, the literature on how to effectively mediate these conflicts remains imprecise. In this study, I have focused on the sequencing of the overall mediation process and the interplay between initial conditions, mediation styles, and process dynamics to explore predictable patterns from early stage to deadline negotiations. By undertaking a two‐step qualitative comparison of twenty‐three public mediation cases, I have attempted to identify “equifinal” pathways — that is, a variety of different ways in which the same outcome can be achieved — that can lead to mediation success (or failure). My analysis reveals that both inclusivity (i.e., including all relevant participants in the process) and mediation institutionalization (i.e., the mediation process is sufficiently embedded in the political and administrative system) correlate to greater mediation effectiveness. Furthermore, this study also suggests that such key elements of deliberative negotiations as recognition and argumentation are essential for reaching a consensual agreement.     

A critical analysis of the NBC news special “six days plus twenty years: A dream is dying”

The July 1, 1987 NBC News documentary on Israel's occupation of the West Bank neglected the context of the occupation, failing to give any historical perspective on the Israeli‐Palestinian dispute. The nature of the Palestinian opposition— characterized by intransigence and violence—was virtually ignored by NBC. The unbalanced coverage of the conflict served only to confuse the viewer and distort the salient issues involved.     

Nuclear Weapons in Britain's Policy towards France, 1960–1974

This article will attempt to draw attention to the Anglo–French nuclear weapons negotiations that ran alongside the British applications to join the EEC during the years 1960–1974. It suggests that the prospect of an entente nucléaire was an issue that played a unique role in the UK's negotiating strategy. It will argue that three successive Prime Minister's—Macmillan, Wilson and Heath—attempted to forge an agreement in the hope of overcoming French objections to Britain's entry, albeit for different reasons. All three were hampered by the “special nuclear relationship” with the Americans and this eventually precluded a mutually beneficial resolution.     

The Internal Israeli Conflict: The Past, Present, and Future of the Jewish West Bank and Gaza Settlements

On October 14 and 15, 2004, just days before the Israeli government submitted to the Knesset a draft legislation to authorize the evacuation of Jewish settlers from Gaza Strip and some settlements on the West Bank, a two‐day conference titled “Past, Present, and Future of the Jewish West Bank and Gaza Settlements: The Internal Israeli Conflict” was held at Harvard Law School. The conference was sponsored by the Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School, the Saltman Center for Conflict Resolution of the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, and the United States Institute of Peace. This interdisciplinary conference's six panels, whose proceedings are summarized in the series of articles that follow, explored the religious, ideological, psychological, political, legal, and international dimensions of the conflict. Presenters included former and current Israeli and American government officials, experts on resettlement policies and compensation mechanisms, and scholars from a variety of disciplines. While presentation topics covered a range of issues relating to the settlements, three broad themes arose from the conference. First, participants agreed that it is important, if not fundamental, to understand the perspectives of the national religious settlers who are the driving force behind the settlement movement. Exploring the settlers’ diverse interests, fears, and identities is necessary in order to see why relocation is so threatening to them. The Israeli government can lessen opposition to withdrawal by showing the settlers empathy and reassurance, but only if government officials first achieve a true understanding of the settlers’ concerns. Participants also argued that a reframing of the relocation in ideological terms could be another critical component of a solution to this problem. It may be necessary for the leaders of the settlement movement to develop a new narrative or modify the existing one in order to legitimize their relocation. Part of this narrative will involve the concept of “a greater good”— the government must reassure the settlers that their sacrifice is for a higher cause. Several participants noted that Israel needs to show the settlers “tough love.” When the relocations begin, many expect that there will be violence and that disturbing images will be broadcast throughout Israel and around the world. Internal disruption could put the government led by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and his Likud party coalition in jeopardy. The government must not waver in the face of this crisis, conference participants argued. In fact, the threat of violent and disruptive resistance by settlers and their allies can be part of the solution, not just the problem. The government and relocation supporters can use this extremism to justify decisive measures and to redefine the problem for the broader population to convince them that the stability of the country is at stake. Another major conclusion of conference participants was that, while the Israeli settlement issue has unique features, there is much to be learned from comparative analysis. Other countries have dealt with settlement situations, and their experiences offer invaluable lessons. In particular, participants contrasted Israel's settlements in Gaza and the West Bank with French settlements in Algeria and English settlements in Ireland. Some pointed to the French withdrawal from Algeria, which was politically painful but ultimately successful, as an example of “tough love” that Israel should follow. Finally, the involvement of third parties to help solve this conflict is indispensable. Participants noted that while much of Israel feels alienated from the European Union and the United Nations, the Israeli government is highly sensitive to the concerns of the United States, as evidenced by Sharon's decision to show the Gaza withdrawal plan to the U.S. government before he had even raised it with his cabinet and the Israeli parliament, the Knesset. International participation could help legitimize withdrawal and reduce Israeli responsibility for Gaza's future. Third parties can apply political pressure to encourage an accountable and responsible Palestinian leadership. They may also be called upon to provide some sort of financial aid. The participants acknowledged the complexity of the settlement problem and recognized that easy solutions do not exist. Yet, if the Israeli government works toward understanding the settlers’ perspectives, learns from comparative analysis, and involves third parties appropriately, the likelihood of a successful outcome increases greatly.     

International relations scholarship,academic institutions and the Israeli–Palestinian conflict

This paper explores the role of academic scholarship and practice in constituting, aggravating, and resolving the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. The first section of the paper examines how scholarly discourse and methods of analysis contribute to shaping (mis)understandings of on-the-ground conflict dynamics. To demonstrate this point, the paper first overviews conventional social science methods used in mainstream international relations (IR) scholarship that tend to reify, freeze and homogenize ‘the conflict’ as well as conflict parties and then uses a different scholarly approach—namely a processual, peace-studies-oriented methodology—that provides a very different ‘picture’ of the conflict, its parties and appropriate strategies of engagement in the pursuit of peace. The second section of the paper uses three brief case studies to demonstrate how Israeli and Palestinian academics help constitute ‘the conflict’ and its parties not only through their scholarship but also through their ‘practice’. These examples also show the importance of re-evaluating analytical models to include contextual dynamics such as time, place and sources of available power as well as to recognize the diversity of Palestinian and Israeli views regarding the sources of—and best approaches for addressing—‘the conflict’.     

Hard Bargaining in the Classroom: Realistic Simulated Negotiations and Student Values

Empirical research into the negotiation practices of lawyers shows that “hard bargaining,” including at least some unethical conduct, is an inescapable fact of a lawyer's life. To prepare students for legal practice, negotiation instructors must expose them to hard bargaining in the classroom. In doing so, however, instructors should be sensitive to the moral and ethical values of their students, so that the classroom experience does not unduly pressure students to compromise their values. The simulation is the primary tool of negotiation instruction. By selecting and manipulating simulations, a negotiation instructor can expose students to a wide range of negotiating behaviors, from distributive negotiations marked by the use of power tactics to value‐creating negotiations in which participants must consider many interests and collaborative strategies predominate. With that flexibility, however, comes the potential for classroom exercises to pressure students, in ways both subtle and overt, to adopt behaviors that feel uncomfortable. In this article, I examine the use of simulations to teach different types of negotiating behavior, including hard bargaining. Referring to a number of widely available simulations, I suggest ways to focus student attention on three dimensions of negotiation behavior — the issues over which the parties are bargaining, the objectives the parties seek, and the tactics the parties use to achieve their objectives — in order to push students to reflect on their own negotiation behaviors and to prepare for the tactics of others. I assess the potential for simulations to pressure students to compromise their values, and I conclude with my own thoughts on the goals of a negotiation course.