Transformative Women,Problem‐Solving Men? Not Quite: Gender and Mediators' Perceptions of Mediation

A large field study examined female and male mediators' perceptions of their jobs, looking in particular at their attitudes toward mediation styles lying on the continuum between instrumental and transformative. Based on scholarship on gender and negotiation literature that has portrayed women as more interpersonal and somewhat less task oriented than men, we expected female mediators to be more transformative and less instrumental in their practice than their male peers. Our study was both qualitative and quantitative: we formulated the content of twenty in‐depth interviews into an extensive questionnaire, answered by a representative sample of 189 Israeli mediators. Compared with their male counterparts, we found female mediators to be more transformative, but no less instrumental, in their view of mediation's goals and orientation. They were also somewhat more facilitative in preferred style, while male mediators were somewhat more directive. We also found additional intriguing gender differences, including that women mediators reported higher job satisfaction than did male mediators, but they also displayed a greater readiness to perceive failure in mediation.     

The Conditional Effectiveness of Directive Mediation

ABSTRACT

This research re-examines the effectiveness of directive mediation in interstate rivalries. To do so, highlighting the importance of disputants’ willingness for successful directive mediation, this study identifies four conditions that affect the levels of disputants’ willingness to engage in mediation talks and proposes that the presence of such conditions improves or worsens the efficacy of directive strategies. We expect heavy-handed mediators will be less effective in a dispute involving highly interdependent or power-imbalanced rivalries while directive mediation performs poorly when it is led by unbiased mediators or when it is employed for long-running rivals. Our empirical findings, based on two existing rivalry datasets, suggest that directive mediation fares well when mediators are biased, when rivals are power-balanced, and when rivalries are protracted, and that the efficacy of directive mediation improves in disputes involving highly interdependent strategic rivals but decreases in the cases between highly interdependent general rivals.     

Introduction: Survey and Experimental Research in International Political Economy

Studies in international political economy (IPE) that use survey-response data sets and survey (or field) experiments have grown dramatically in recent years. New developments in survey and experimental methodology have arguably influenced IPE scholars not only to think more deeply about the microfoundations of the preferences, attitudes, and political behavior of key IPE actors but also to use survey or experimental methods to test causal claims and predictions. Yet the reasons for the rapid growth in survey and experimental methods in IPE are more multifaceted. We therefore seek to answer the following three pertinent questions in the introduction. First, what are the main substantive puzzles and issue-areas that IPE scholars analyze via survey and experimental methods in their research? Second, what are the main methodological advantages and drawbacks from using survey and experimental methods in IPE? Third, what are the key substantive theoretical and empirical insights that scholars have learned from recent research in IPE that employs either survey or experimental methods (or both)? In addition to answering these questions here, we also provide a summary of each article included in the special issue. The introduction concludes with a road map for future studies on survey and experimental research in IPE.     

Incentives for Talking: Accepting Mediation in International and Civil Wars

This paper examines the conditions under which warring parties will accept an outside party's offer to mediate. Specifically, we explore variation in the incentives for accepting third-party offers in interstate conflicts as compared to civil wars. We argue that since mediation in civil wars transfers legitimacy to the non-state actor and can generate a precedent of exceptions to the norm of sovereignty, the political cost associated with accepting international mediation will be substantially higher in civil wars compared to international conflicts. States should therefore only accept mediation in the most serious disputes, or when the costs of legitimizing an opponent are outweighed by the benefits of conflict resolution. Building on this theoretical reasoning, the paper analyzes the implications of differences in incentive structures between inter- and intrastate conflicts for offer and acceptance of mediation. We find an empirical discrepancy between interstate and civil wars in regard to demand-side (acceptance) of mediation, and to a somewhat lesser extent the supply-side (offer) of international mediation. In line with our argument, we find that the historical ties between the potential intermediary and at least one of the disputants play different roles in regard to acceptance of mediation in interstate compared to civil wars. This is important to take into consideration in the emerging debate on mediation bias.     

Credibility and Strategy in International Mediation

We study mediation in international conflict as a process of strategic interaction among the two disputants and the (would-be) mediator. We develop a rational model that examines the choice, process, and outcome of mediation. We start with a conflict game of incomplete information played by rational players that examines the conditions under which disputants and would-be mediators would consider mediation a preferred strategy. The mediation game that follows models the mediator's choice of mediation strategy and the possible responses of the disputants offers. Finally, we explore the conditions under which a mediated solution emerges and the conditions under which mediation fails.

The credibility of the mediator—defined as the extent to which disputants believe the mediator's statements, threats, or promises and her ability to deliver the promised agreement—emerges as a key factor that drives the model. Each disputant has an assessment of the mediator's credibility. Broadly speaking, the more credible the mediator is perceived by the disputant, the more accepting the disputant will be of her offers. Yet, the mediator does not know how credible she is in the view of the disputants. This uncertainty affects the mediator's decision to intervene and her choice of strategies. We derive testable propositions from this model and test them on a dataset consisting of mediation efforts in international conflicts over the years 1945–1995. The findings generally support the propositions derived from the model, and we explore the theoretical and empirical implications of these findings.