Breaking the rules and making the rules: Evasion, avoidance, and policy reform

Rule evasion and avoidance can have a significant impact on policy outcomes, and therefore on the design, implementation, and enforcement of policies. The purposes of this paper is to assess the causes and consequences of evasion and avoidance in general settings, including their implications for policy reform. Evasion of rules often serves a socially useful role, and can promote efficient policies. Small-scale evasion typically provokes one of three responses: it is either effectively ignored, enforcement is increased, or the rule is revised. Large-scale evasion, alternatively, tends to meet with major policy shifts. Avoidance and evasion frequently temper the anticipated impacts of policy reforms, but are unlikely to render reform futile. Indeed, ongoing processes of reform might be required to maintain effective policies.     

Land and Water Institutions in the Blue Nile Basin: Setups and Gaps for Improved Land and Water Management

This study undertook an assessment and gap analysis of the institutional arrangements for improved land and water management in the Tana and Beles Sub‐basins highlands of the Blue Nile Basin. We explored the mandates and design features of the major land‐ and water‐related institutional arrangements. Focus group discussions, key informant interviews, and a literature review were used in the analysis. The results of our work reveal that a lot of progress has been made in creating an institutional framework for improved land and water management and the policies and laws hitherto developed reflect global policy changes consistent with the widespread adoption of the integrated water resources management (IWRM) principles. There are also cases where informal institutions replace formal institutions. Judged by their enforcement, the water resources management, pollution control standards, and regulations and land use rights are not enacted effectively because of poor enforcement capacity. Overall there is a tendency to focus on command‐and‐control type policies. There is a need to strengthen traditional institutions by drawing lessons from their strengths and establish the legitimacy of these institutions. There is also a need to improve formal policy design, developing policies with specific objectives, goals, targets, and overall institutional changes and resources through active adaptive management to maximize the level and effectiveness of institutional learning. Finally, more focus needs to be given to incentive‐based policies through increased use of positive incentives and more emphasis needs to be given to self‐enforcement rather than third‐party enforcement.     

Revisiting renewable portfolio standard effectiveness: policy design and outcome specification matter

Renewable portfolio standards (RPS) differ widely across US states. Prior research findings on the effectiveness of these policies to stimulate renewable electricity deployment are equally wide ranging. This study investigates patterns of RPS policy design and analyzes the effects on policy outcomes measured at the level of utility compliance. Measuring organizational outcomes of RPS corrects for the first time the challenges of prior research focused on state-level renewable capacity or generation outcomes. The quantitative analysis also takes into account the complexity of RPS design, by making use of a state-by-state database of RPS design characteristics developed for this study. Patterns of RPS design across states are compared, including the compliance schedule, scope, eligibility of resources, quotas and subsidies, renewable energy credit provisions, as well as enforcement and penalties. Together, the map of state RPS design and the new approach to RPS outcome analysis illuminate the diversity of RPS policy practice across the United States. They suggest the need to both account for the variety of design characteristics and accurately specify the policy outcomes in evaluations of these policies.     

Long-term care: common issues and unknowns

All industrialized countries are grappling with a common problem—how to provide assistance of various kinds to their rapidly aging populations. The problem for countries searching for models of efficient and high-quality long-term care (LTC) policies is that fewer than a dozen countries have government-organized, formal LTC policies. Relatively new surveys focused on the elderly populations of about 25 countries could become the basis for research on which LTC policy design choices have desired outcomes for individuals and society and might be replicable in other countries. As in earlier decades when U.S. researchers created the Current Population Survey (CPS) modules and the Survey of Income and Program Participation to answer policy questions, researchers and policy analysts are now at a point where a concerted effort is needed to generate questions that international comparative research on LTC could answer as well as the data needed to address the questions.     

Fiscal Policy Cycles and Public Expenditure in Developing Countries

The paper studies empirically the fiscal policy instruments by which governments try to influence election outcomes in 24 developing countries for the 1973–1992 period. The study finds that the main vehicle for expansionary fiscal policies around elections is increasing public expenditure rather than lowering taxes, and public investment cycles seem particularly prominent. Institutional mechanisms which constrain discretionary expenditure policies and which strengthen fiscal control are therefore worthwhile considering to prevent opportunistic policy making around elections.     

USING PRODUCER INCENTIVES TO ACHIEVE SOCIAL OBJECTIVES: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE MARKETPLACE AND PUBLIC POLICIES

The purpose of this paper is to recast the light in which we have come to evaluate public policy initiatives and open the door for a more careful examination o f the effects markets have on the course of public policies employing producer incentives to achieve policy goals. Specifically, the paper will review the past experience of urban renewal to show the relationship between policy objectives and outcomes when policy is designed to work through the marketplace. By arguing that market incentives cons train policy outcomes, it is maintained that policies which are judged to have failed in its goals may in reality have succeeded when viewed in terms of normal market operations.     

The Craft of Policy Design: Can It Be More Than Art?

The craft for predicting and evaluating the impacts of policy alternatives has received much of the attention of students of public policy analysis. Relatively little attention has been given to understanding and improving the craft for designing alternative policies. Beyond catalogs of generic policy instruments, two sources provide useful insights into policy design. First, the study of institutional choice as policy design draws attention to the selection of procedures and incentive systems to achieve substantive policy outcomes. Second, the study of the manipulation of the dimensions of policy choice (heresethetics), which provides insight into strategy in political arenas, may help with the broader problem of packaging and presenting policies so that they remain viable during implementation.     

Economic liberalisation,market institutions and labour rights

What effect do pro‐market economic policies have on labour rights? Despite significant debate in policy and academic circles about the consequences of economic liberalisation, little is known about the labour rights effects of pro‐market policies. Extant literature has focused only on the possible outcomes of market‐liberalising policies, such as trade and investment flows, rather than directly assessing market‐friendly policies and institutions. Moreover, this line of research has found mixed results on how these outcomes influence labour conditions. To provide a comprehensive assessment of this linkage, this article combines data on five distinct policy areas associated with economic liberalisation with data on labour rights for the period 1981–2012. The results indicate that pro‐market policies – except the ones involving rule of law and secure property rights – undermine labour rights. Thus while there are some positive economic and political outcomes associated with market‐supporting policies, economic liberalisation comes at the cost of respect for labour rights.     

Continuity and change in U.S. foreign policy: Carter and reagan on el salvador

In attempting to understand continuity and change in U.S. foreign policy, analysts have tended to place too much emphasis on the importance of process and too little on that of values, interests, and strategies. In formulating policies toward the conflict in El Salvador, both the Carter and Reagan administrations were constrained by some enduring moral and political factors in the U.S. civic culture and by some fundamental processes of decision-making, which together account for the similarities in policy between administrations. Despite such factors, each administration's remaining space for choice produced a decidedly different set of policies with different outcomes.     

When Mayors Matter: Estimating the Impact of Mayoral Partisanship on City Policy

U.S. cities are limited in their ability to set policy. Can these constraints mute the impact of mayors’ partisanship on policy outcomes? We hypothesize that mayoral partisanship will more strongly affect outcomes in policy areas where there is less shared authority between local, state, and federal governments. To test this hypothesis, we create a novel dataset combining U.S. mayoral election returns from 1990 to 2006 with city fiscal data. Using regression discontinuity design, we find that cities that elect a Democratic mayor spend a smaller share of their budget on public safety, a policy area where local discretion is high, than otherwise similar cities that elect a Republican or an Independent. We find no differences on tax policy, social policy, and other areas that are characterized by significant overlapping authority. These results suggest that models of national policymaking are only partially applicable to U.S. cities. They also have implications for political accountability: mayors may not be able to influence the full range of policies that are nominally local responsibilities.     

Biased beliefs and retrospective voting: why democracies choose mediocre policies

There are two well-established empirical regularities about voters. First, they entertain systematically biased beliefs about how public policies affect economic outcomes. Second, voters vote retrospectively: they punish the incumbent for poor and reward him for good macroeconomic performance. Thus, political parties face a trade-off: offering popular yet economically harmful policies increases the chance of being elected today, but decreases the chance of re-election. We provide the first rigorous game-theoretical analysis of the trade-off. The model addresses two questions: How can biased beliefs and retrospective voting be explained consistently? What policy outcomes emerge in party competition? To micro-found persistently biased beliefs we introduce the psychological concept of mental models. Deviating from earlier studies, we allow parties to choose strategic mixtures of populist (i.e., bad yet popular) and good (but less popular) platforms. We show that retrospective voting provides a self-correction mechanism, so that parties offer strategic mixtures of policies in equilibrium rather than purely populist or purely good policy platforms. Thus, democracy is characterized by mediocre policy choices and half-hearted reforms. An incumbent bias or unclear responsibilities weaken the self-correction mechanism.     

Book reviews

Research on the impact of parties on public policy, and on immigration policy in particular, often finds limited evidence of partisan influence. In this paper, we examine immigration policy-making in the UK coalition government. Our case provides evidence that parties in government can have more of an impact on policy than previous studies acknowledge, but this only becomes apparent when we open up the ‘black box’ between election outcomes and policy outputs. By examining how, when and why election pledges are turned into government policies, we show that partisan influence depends not only on dynamics between the coalition partners, but how these dynamics interact with interdepartmental conflicts and lobbying by organised interests. In-depth process tracing allows us to see these complex dynamics, which easily get lost in large-n comparisons of pledges and outputs, let alone outcomes.     

Designing policies that intentionally stick: policy feedback in a changing climate

Policy feedback is a widely used concept, but many who use it only focus on the positive and/or unintentional feedback effects of certain types of policy. The literature as a whole is therefore poorly equipped to make sense of the negative policy feedbacks that often appear in more regulatory areas such as climate change, where target groups are put under pressure to shoulder concentrated costs. Advocates of the ‘new’ policy design have an opportunity to address this gap by exploring how policy makers approach the design of policies that intentionally generate positive policy feedbacks and/or are resilient to negative ones. This paper contributes to that effort by identifying the conditions under which specific instrument designs are likely to have opportunity enhancing and/or constraining effects. It relates these expectations to a design situation where positive feedback seemed unlikely, and hence, the challenge of designing locked-in policies was correspondingly greater. It concludes by drawing on the findings of this exploratory case to investigate what the ‘new’ policy design can do better to explicate the temporal aspects of design.     

Iron Houses in the Tropical Heat: Decentralization Reforms in Africa and their Consequences

Abstract

Decentralization reforms introduced to Africa have not always delivered the intended outcomes. Through interaction with the broader historical, political, social and economic context, reforms seem to have engendered political consequences beyond decentralization itself. Most of the literature on decentralization and development emphasizes questions of institutional design and policy, but here we expand the focus of analysis and incorporate the harder-to-pin-down political patterns marking the workings of decentralization in Africa. Through the case-studies of Ghana, Senegal, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Ethiopia and Uganda we seek to connect the debates on development with the scholarly literatures on comparative federalism, comparative decentralization and local democracy. The conclusion that emerges is that no magic formula which can turn countries into peaceful, stable and prosperous democracies overnight exists. And, importing formal institutions without regard to the local historical, political, social and economic context risks leaving us with elegant but dysfunctional iron houses in the tropical heat.     

Partisanship in the setting and coordination of fiscal and monetary policies

Abstract. The principal concerns of this paper are with the roles partisan politics have played in the making of fiscal and monetary policies within OECD countries as well as the extent to which these policies have complemented each other. It is argued that parties of the left pursue fiscal policies that are distinctly different from those pursued by the right. The critical difference is in the way these parties use fiscal policy as a corrective mechanism for dealing with macroeconomic problems: leftist parties adopt counter–cyclical fiscal policies while rightwing parties adhere to pro–cyclical fiscal stances. The paper also examines two arguments regarding monetary policy and how partisan politics affect this policy area. The first and most conventional argument sees the formal independence of the central bank from government as a means of negating partisan influences on monetary policy; the second advances the proposition that, regardless of central bank independence, monetary authorities are not politically neutral but instead share views similar to those of parties on the right–hand side of the political spectrum. Empirical analysis, using a pooled cross–section time–series design with data from 14 countries between 1961 and 1994, produces evidence in favor of the argument concerning the role of partisanship in fiscal policy; it also shows little support for the view that central bank independence inhibits partisan influences while at the same time provides support for the thesis that central banks are politically non–neutral. Thus, coordination between fiscal and monetary policies is far less likely to occur when left–wing parties are in power.     

Partisanship in the setting and coordination of fiscal and monetary policies

The principal concerns of this paper are with the roles partisan politics have played in the making of fiscal and monetary policies within OECD countries as well as the extent to which these policies have complemented each other. It is argued that parties of the left pursue fiscal policies that are distinctly different from those pursued by the right. The critical difference is in the way these parties use fiscal policy as a corrective mechanism for dealing with macroeconomic problems: leftist parties adopt counter–cyclical fiscal policies while rightwing parties adhere to pro–cyclical fiscal stances. The paper also examines two arguments regarding monetary policy and how partisan politics affect this policy area. The first and most conventional argument sees the formal independence of the central bank from government as a means of negating partisan influences on monetary policy; the second advances the proposition that, regardless of central bank independence, monetary authorities are not politically neutral but instead share views similar to those of parties on the right–hand side of the political spectrum. Empirical analysis, using a pooled cross–section time–series design with data from 14 countries between 1961 and 1994, produces evidence in favor of the argument concerning the role of partisanship in fiscal policy; it also shows little support for the view that central bank independence inhibits partisan influences while at the same time provides support for the thesis that central banks are politically non–neutral. Thus, coordination between fiscal and monetary policies is far less likely to occur when left–wing parties are in power.     

Responsiveness without Representation: Evidence from Minimum Wage Laws in U.S. States

How well does public policy represent mass preferences in U.S. states? Current approaches provide an incomplete account of statehouse democracy because they fail to compare preferences and policies on meaningful scales. Here, we overcome this problem by generating estimates of Americans' preferences on the minimum wage and compare them to observed policies both within and across states. Because we measure both preferences and policies on the same scale (U.S. dollars), we can quantify both the association of policy outcomes with preferences across states (responsiveness) and their deviation within states (bias). We demonstrate that while minimum wages respond to corresponding preferences across states, policy outcomes are more conservative than preferences in each state, with the average policy bias amounting to about two dollars. We also show that policy bias is substantially smaller in states with access to direct democratic institutions.     

Local Autonomy, Local Democracy and the 'New Localism'

Most studies of local autonomy and local democracy fail to distinguish adequately between the two terms. As a consequence, there is an assumed bilateral relationship between them in which changes in one are always deemed to affect the other – particularly in policy formulations. This article develops a stronger analytical distinction between them by considering local autonomy in three separate ways: as freedom from central interference; as freedom to effect particular outcomes; and as the reflection of local identity . Each of these conceptualisations raises different challenges for local democracy and its relationship to broader forms of democratic practice. When used to analyse the recent emergence of the 'new localism' as a policy approach within Britain, this separation also shows significant limitations in current policies towards democratic renewal and central policies that are supposedly focused on outcomes rather than processes. Although localities are being afforded some autonomy, most initiatives are not supporting the enhancement of local democracy.     

Diversity,Trust, and Social Learning in Collaborative Governance

Scholarship on collaborative governance identifies several structural and procedural factors that consistently influence governance outcomes. A promising next step for collaborative governance research is to explore how these factors interact. Focusing on two dimensions of social learning—relational and cognitive—as outcomes of collaboration, this article examines potential interacting effects of participant diversity and trust. The empirical setting entails 10 collaborative partnerships in the United States that provide advice on marine aquaculture policy. The findings indicate that diversity in beliefs among participants is positively related to relational learning, whereas diversity in participants' affiliations is negatively related to relational learning, and high trust bolsters the positive effects of belief diversity on both relational and cognitive learning. In addition, high trust dampens the negative effects of affiliation diversity on relational learning. A more nuanced understanding of diversity in collaborative governance has practical implications for the design and facilitation of diverse stakeholder groups.     

The Policy Design Effect: Proximity as a Micro‐level Explanation of the Effect of Policy Designs on Social Benefit Attitudes

Public and individual support for a policy is affected by how it is designed – that is, how eligibility is determined. This results in universal policies being more popular than contributions‐based policies, which in turn enjoy more public support than the selective kind. The literature on welfare attitudes have argued that this ‘policy design effect’ can be explained by a combination of self‐interest patterns, public perceptions of the recipient group and whether eligibility under the policy is perceived as fair or arbitrary. The explanations, however, lack micro‐level theory and testing as to why the design of a policy affects individual and public support. This article seeks to explain this policy design effect by theoretically outlining and testing how being proximate to recipients of a social benefit affects attitudes towards the benefit. A survey of attitudes towards spending on five social benefits in Denmark shows a large impact on attitudes from being proximate to recipients under selective policies, little or no impact from universal policies and a pattern that falls in‐between for the contributions‐based policy. This article thus provides micro‐level evidence for the different impacts on attitudes depending on the design of a policy, and a possible explanation for why the design impacts attitudes differently.