How State Capacity Varies within Frontier States: A Multicountry Subnational Analysis

While there is a growing literature on state formation and the rise of state capacity over time, this literature typically deals with differences between countries, neglecting the fact that state formation also occurs differentially within a country over time. This article examines legacies of state formation spatially, by looking at variation within “frontier” states—countries that in recent centuries have extended rule over new territories adjacent to their core regions. Frontier zones are found to have ongoing lower levels of public order and deficient public goods provision. Several theories are examined to explain this discrepancy, including internal resettlement, costs of monitoring and enforcement, and the relationship between settlers and the indigenous population. It is argued that the formation of strong social institutions among settlers leads to resistance to attempts to impose governance over frontier regions, and to “select for” lower fiscal capacity and lower provision of public goods.     

External Actors and the Provision of Public Health Services in Somalia

Concentrating on the health sector, this article argues that the provision of collective goods through external actors depends on the level of state capacity and the complexity of the service that external actors intend to provide. It shows that external actors can contribute most effectively to collective good provision when the service is simple, and that simple services can even be provided under conditions of failed statehood. Effectively delivering complex services requires greater levels of state capacity. The article also indicates that legitimacy is a key factor to explain variance in health service delivery. To demonstrate this, the article assesses health projects in Somalia. It shows that simple services—malaria prevention and tuberculosis control—are provided effectively in all three Somali regions, including the war‐torn South‐Central region. In contrast, the HIV/AIDS project only achieved substantial results in Somaliland, the only region with a comparatively higher level of state capacity, and failed in the South‐Central region and Puntland.     

Fresh pipes with dirty water: How quality of government shapes the provision of public goods in democracies

A large strand of research holds that democracy with its broad representation and electoral accountability is beneficial for the provision of public goods. Yet, there is a large variation in how democracies perform, indicating that democratic institutions alone do not suffice for securing citizens’ wellbeing. Recent studies have stressed the equal importance of state capacity for public goods delivery. These studies, however, rarely investigate how the lack of state capacity mutes the effects of democratic institutions on public goods provision. This article addresses this gap by using a mixed methods design. First, the conditional effects of democracy and quality of government (QoG) are tested on the previously under-researched domain of the provision of clean water. The results show that democracy is associated with higher water quality only in countries where QoG is high. If QoG is low, more democracy is even related to lower water quality. The second stage of the analysis proceeds by examining how poor QoG disrupts the effects of democracy on public access to safe drinking water using interview data from a typical case of Moldova. The analysis illustrates that democracy has a number of positive effects and incentivises politicians to focus on the visible aspects of water provision, including the expansion of the water pipe network. However, low QoG hampers adoption and implementation of long-term policies necessary for securing an aspect of water provision that is harder to achieve – namely water quality. This leaves the fresh pipes with dirty water.     

Privatization,information and incentives

In this paper the choice between public and private provision of goods and services is considered. In practice, both modes of operation involve significant delegation of authority, and thus appear quite similar in some respects. The argument here is that the main difference between the two modes concerns the transactions costs faced by the government when attempting to intervene in the delegated production activities. Such intervention is generally less costly under public ownership than under private ownership. The greater ease of intervention under public ownership can have its advantages; but the fact that a promise not to intervene is more credible under private production can also have beneficial incentive effects. The fundamental privatization theorem (analogous to the fundamental theorem of welfare economics) is presented, providing conditions under which government production cannot improve upon private production. The restrictiveness of these conditions is evaluated.     

Does Spatial Variation in Heterogeneity Matter? Assessing the Adoption Patterns of Business Improvement Districts

Because they supplement the municipal provision of local public goods, Business Improvement Districts (BIDs) provide an opportunity to examine the space, scope, and determinants of the provision of local public goods. A BID is formed when a group of merchants or commercial property owners in a neighborhood vote in favor of package of self‐assessments and local public goods to be funded with those assessments. These districts solve a collective action problem in the provision of public goods because once a majority has voted in favor, participation is compulsory for all merchants or commercial property owners in the neighborhood. I use a unique dataset on adoption patterns of BIDs in California to test two main claims suggested by the theoretical literature: first, that businesses respond to individual heterogeneity that determines the quality of local public goods, and second, that the type of heterogeneity—overall or spatial—matters. In contrast to the literature on residents, this study finds at best a weak correlation between a city's adoption of a BID and heterogeneity. In addition, despite the theoretical preference for spatial over overall heterogeneity, BIDs are not more likely to be adopted by spatially heterogeneous cities.     

The lightship in economics

What role does government play in the provision of public goods? Economists have used the lighthouse as an empirical example to illustrate the extent to which the private provision of public goods is possible. This inquiry, however, has neglected the private provision of lightships. We investigate the private operation of the world’s first modern lightship, established in 1731 on the banks of the Thames estuary going in and out of London. First, we show that the Nore lightship was able to operate profitably and without government enforcement in the collection of payments for lighting services. Second, we show how private efforts to build lightships were crowded out by Trinity House, the public authority responsible for establishing and maintaining lighthouses in England and Wales. By including lightships into the broader lighthouse market, we argue that the provision of lighting services exemplifies not a market failure, but a government failure.     

Winning Hearts and Minds in Civil Wars: Governance,Leadership Change,and Support for Violent Groups in Iraq

The “hearts and minds” model of combating rebellions holds that civilians are less likely to support violent opposition groups if the government provides public services and security. Building on this model, we argue that a political event that raises popular expectations of future public service and security provision increases support for the government and decreases sympathy for violent opposition groups. To test this argument, we leverage a unique research design opportunity that stems from the unforeseen announcement of the resignation of Iraq's divisive prime minister in August 2014 while an original survey was being administered across the country. We show that the leadership transition led Iraq's displeased Sunni Arab minority to shift support from the violent opposition to the government. In line with our argument, this realignment was due to rising optimism among Sunni Arabs that the new government would provide services and public goods—specifically security, electricity, and jobs.     

Innovations in the provision of public goods and services

Current efforts at administrative reform in both developed and developing countries have invariably focused on the critical issue of provision of public goods and services. The accumulated experience and attendant innovations are therefore vast. Few attempts have been made to pull this experience together and draw salient features which might be of use to newcomers to the task of improving provision of public goods and services. This article draws on a panel of experts and government officials convened by the author who have reflected and/or experimented with innovative approaches to public good and service provision. After discussing the role of the state, market and civil society relative to public goods and services, the article lays out a set of basic institutional options for innovations in provision. The article concludes with some strategic considerations on the sequencing of steps to achieve successful market-based innovations in the provision of public goods and services in the context of the minimalist and the strong but restrained state. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Intergovernmental Political Competition in American Federalism

Many policies in the United States are jointly determined by federal and state actions. In the game theoretic model offered here, politicians in both the state and national governments seek credit for providing goods desired by the public and avoid blame for the taxes necessary to provide the goods. In line with Peterson's (1995) theory of functional federalism, the level of government that is better able to supply particular goods and services tends to take the lead in their provision, even to the extent of fully crowding out much less efficient governments. However, under a broad set of circumstances, both state and national politicians seek credit via public spending, and their joint provision leads to a relative "oversupply" of public goods and services, and thus to "overtaxation." Under joint provision, states vary in their responses to changing federal spending patterns based both on the causes of the national changes and on state characteristics .     

Civil society and post-communist democratization: Facing a double challenge in post-Milošević Serbia

Abstract

Civil society literature attributes the weakness of post-communist civil society to the communist heritage. It is structurally weak, the argument goes, because post-communist citizens are averse to voluntary organizations and because of ethnic nationalism. This article goes beyond the heritage argument and contends that post-communist civil society is weakened by democratization itself. Post-communist democratizing states are fragmented structurally and ideologically, and lack a consensus on the liberal state as a provider of public goods and an inclusive citizenship. Simultaneously, the non-state sector in post-communism is expanding in both liberal and illiberal directions. While the liberal segments of the state respond to a liberal civil society, its illiberal segments reinforce an illiberal civil society. Consequently, ‘good’ civil society is forced to confront ideologically both the illiberal state and illiberal non-state groups, which limits its potential contribution to promoting good governance. The argument is illustrated by a study of civil society's transformation in post-Milo?evi? Serbia and the struggle by liberal civil society groups for acceptance of responsibility for Serbian war crimes committed in the wars of Yugoslavia's disintegration in the 1990s.     

External Actors,State‐Building,and Service Provision in Areas of Limited Statehood: Introduction

This article introduces the themes and arguments of the special issue. While virtually all polities enjoy uncontested international legal sovereignty, there are wide variations in statehood, that is, the monopoly over the means of violence and the ability of the state to make and implement policies. Areas of limited statehood are not, however, ungoverned spaces where anarchy and chaos prevail. The provision of collective goods and services is possible even under extremely adverse conditions of fragile or failed statehood. We specify the conditions under which external efforts at state‐building and service provision by state and nonstate actors can achieve their goals. We focus on the extent to which external actors enhance the capacity (statehood) of authority structures in weak states, or directly contribute to the provision of collective goods and services, such as public health, clean environment, social security, and infrastructure. We argue that three factors determine success: legitimacy, task complexity, and institutionalization, including the provision of adequate resources.     

Democracy and Education Spending in Africa

While it is widely believed that electoral competition influences public spending decisions, there has been relatively little effort to examine how recent democratization in the developing world has resulted in changes in basic service provision. There have been even fewer attempts to investigate whether democracy matters for public spending in the poorest developing countries, where "weak institutions" may mean that the formal adoption of electoral competition has little effect on policy. In this article I confront these questions directly, asking whether the shift to multiparty competition in African countries has resulted in increased spending on primary education. I develop an argument, illustrated with a game-theoretic model, which suggests that the need to obtain an electoral majority may have prompted African governments to spend more on education and to prioritize primary schools over universities within the education budget. I test three propositions from the model using panel data on electoral competition and education spending in African countries. I find clear evidence that democratically elected African governments have spent more on primary education, while spending on universities appears unaffected by democratization .     

Why International Trusteeship Fails: The Politics of External Authority in Areas of Limited Statehood

International trusteeship is widely touted as a solution to the problem of failed states, an extreme form of limited statehood. Current theories of legitimacy and statebuilding suggest that trusteeships should produce more capable states. These theories, however, fail to take into account the self‐interest and political strategies available to trustees and politicians within new states. We pose a more political model of statebuilding by the international community, the trustee, and national politicians that predicts that trusteeship will fail to produce states with greater capacity. We test for the effects of trusteeship on state capacity, measured by service provision, by creating a matched sample of countries. We find that there is no evidence that states under trusteeship develop greater capacity leading to better provision of public goods than comparable states not under trusteeship. Would‐be statebuilders must be more aware of the political incentives of all parties involved in the process.     

State and Democratization in Nigeria

The articles interrogates the relationship between democratization and people power in Nigeria. It argues that the broadening of the Nigerian public sphere has not led to reciprocal development of democratic principles and practice. As civilian rule reigns and economic growth is reported, Nigeria’s democratization is fraught with many challenges. Democratization remains questionable in Nigeria; it is rudimentary and distorted by irregularities. These have had implications for national development and human securities as the poverty level worsens and acclaimed economic growth and “democratic dividends” fail to enhance Nigerians’ quality of life. The trivialization of democratization raises critical questions about its state and relevance to Nigerians and the Nigerian state. Is Nigeria democratizing or de-democratizing? How does the democratization process bring the Nigerian people closer to state (power)? How has it helped their developmental quests? The article contends that Nigeria’s democratization process is indeed on trial. As Ake argues, Nigerian state democratization does not only trivialize the essence of democracy—it also continues to reverse the democratization process. Against this background, the article concludes that the democratization process in Nigeria requires elite political will and people’s consciousness to advance to the next stage for better democratic consolidated and economic development relevant to Nigerians.     

Spillover Effects: Immigrant Policing and Government Skepticism in Matters of Health for Latinos

To what extent do people become less trusting of the government under threatening policy contexts? The authors find evidence that Secure Communities, a bureaucratic program that enhances immigrant policing through collaboration between local law and immigration enforcement agencies, spurs mistrust among Latinos but not non‐Latinos. This article focuses on the politics of immigration and health, two issue areas marked by large‐scale bureaucratic developments over the last 50 years. The authors argue that a major consequence of expanding immigrant policing is its trickle‐down effect on how individuals view public institutions charged with the provision of public goods, such as health information. The results indicate that Latinos in locales where immigrant policing is most intense express lower levels of trust in government as a source of health information. Through a policy feedback lens, the findings suggest that the state's deployment of immigrant policing conveys more widespread lessons about the trustworthiness of government .     

Informal Accountability, Socially Embedded Officials, and Public Goods Provision in Rural China: The Role of Lineage Groups

In recent studies, analysts have found that so-called “informal accountability” exerts significant influence on public goods provision in rural China. According to these studies, such informal accountability may be formed through the embedment of local officials in social groups. However, there seems to be no agreement on the identification of such embedment and the conditions under which this embedment can influence public goods provision. To advance the literature of this debate, this study examines village officials who are embedded in such social groups as lineage groups and explores their role in shaping public goods provision in rural China based on a unique set of nationwide-survey data. Using a direct measure of social embeddedness of village officials, we have found that the embedment of village officials in a social group can be identified through a direct measure designed in this study and that the embedment has a positive effect on public goods provision in rural China. Finally, we draw some important policy implications from our findings.     

The Political Economy of Tax Coordination as a Bargaining Game Between Bureaucrats and Politicians

In the public finance literature, the view prevails that taxcompetition among countries gives rise to an underprovision ofpublic goods and that coordinated tax increases are thereforedesirable. Public choice arguments, in contrast, suggest thattax coordination may not be in the interest of thetaxpayers/citizens because imperfections of the politicalprocess (political distortions) may lead to a waste of taxmoney. According to this view, tax competition is a desirablecheck on the power to tax whereas tax coordination would onlyrelax the budget constraint of an inefficient public sector.The present paper integrates the underprovision argument andthe public choice view into a common theoretical framework.The government is assumed to consist of politicians andbureaucrats with diverging interests. Fiscal policy ismodelled as the outcome of a bargaining game between thebureaucrats and the politicians. It turns out that coordinatedtax increases always raise the provision of public goods butalso increase the cost of political distortions. The effect onthe welfare of the representative citizen may be positive ofnegative, depending in particular on the distribution ofbargaining power between bureaucrats and politicians.     

The second-order dilemma of public goods and capital accumulation

The second-order dilemma arises from each individual’s incentive to free ride on a mechanism to solve the public goods provision problem (the first-order dilemma). We show by a voluntary participation game that if the depreciation rate is low, public goods can be accumulated through voluntary groups for provision, and that the accumulation is effective in solving the second-order dilemma. This analysis also shows that population growth increases the accumulation of public goods in the long run.     

农村公共品供给效率实证研究

运用公共服务满意度理论对农村公共品供给效率进行评价研究。研究认为,效率既是主体行为结果的投入产生的比较效果,又是一个对于主体行为而言的相对概念。农村公共品供给效果,既包括物质性效果,也包括精神效果,即公共品受众的感觉效果。在农村公共品供给效率评价中,从农民主体而言,只有农民认为有用的公共品,才是有效率的。相反,即使政府反复认定有用并强制去供给的公共品,当农民认为没有用时,农民依然感觉它是无效率的。利用126个乡(镇)农户对农村公共品供给效率"满意度"评价(CSI)抽样调查数据,运用CSI-Probit回归模型对农户的农村公共品供给效率"满意度"及其影响因素进行了实证分析,得出:当CSI值处于同一类型的市(州)时,其影响因素表现出明显的共性特征。总体而言,CSI的主要影响来自农民受教育年限、医疗可及性、农民收入水平、农户有效灌溉面积率、农户距乡镇政府的距离、农林技术站服务次数以及被调查者年龄等因素。     

The power of process: State capacity and climate policy

State capacity is central to the provision of public goods, including environmental protection. Drawing on climate policy making, this article argues that the division of labor between the bureaucracy and legislature in policy formulation is a critical source of state capacity. In cases of bureaucratic policy design, the legislature sets policy goals and delegates policy design to bureaucracies. This division of labor shifts distributional conflict to autonomous bureaucracies, allowing for effective policy design. California followed this path in climate policy making, setting it on track to meet climate goals. In cases of legislative policy design, bureaucracies set goals and legislatures design policy measures. Since legislators have incentives to respond to vested interests, legislative policy design is vulnerable to regulatory capture. In Germany, legislative policy design in climate policy making is preventing attainment of emissions reduction goals, as industry interests succeeded in blocking key policy measures. Our findings highlight procedural sources of state capacity.