COMRADES OR CULPRITS? DONOR ENGAGEMENT AND BUDGET TRANSPARENCY IN AID‐DEPENDENT COUNTRIES

Budget transparency has come to be considered a key aspect of governance. Over the past decade, donors have invested increasing resources in strengthening processes through which budget transparency in developing countries can be enhanced. According to the 2008 Open Budget Index (OBI) Report, however, aid dependency and budget transparency appear to be inversely correlated. This article looks at the role of donor agencies in promoting or preventing budget transparency in aid‐dependent countries. It looks at significant correlations across the whole sample of 84 countries covered in the 2008 OBI, and analyzes more specific data for a sub‐sample of 16 aid‐dependent countries, before selecting six countries for which more detailed findings are then presented. All of these countries have implemented reforms aimed at enhancing budget transparency, with substantial donor support. These, however, often had only limited success, partly because they were not well adapted to the local context, and partly because donors put limited emphasis on improving public access to budget information. Donor efforts were also often offset by other characteristics of donor interventions, namely their fragmentation, lack of transparency, and limited use of programme aid modalities such as budget support and pooled sector funding. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Measuring and Promoting Budget Transparency: The Open Budget Index as a Research and Advocacy Tool

Transparency in public budgeting has been a recognized principle of sound governance for a long time. Yet, reliable measures of budget transparency are hard to come by. This article introduces the Open Budget Index (OBI), a new tool based on surveys by independent researchers that compares key budget information published by governments across the world. Data from the latest survey, published in 2010 and covering 94 countries, reveal that on average, the state of budget transparency around the world is poor. Countries with lower incomes, weaker democratic institutions, and higher dependency on foreign aid and hydrocarbon sales tend to be less transparent. However, a number of countries have improved the quantity and coverage of the budget information that they publish, in some cases following civil society pressure based on OBI findings. More generally, OBI data help identify easy steps that governments and other actors could take to further improve budget transparency.     

Choosing the path of austerity: how parties and policy coalitions influence welfare state retrenchment in periods of fiscal consolidation

What are the conditions under which some austerity programmes rely on substantial cuts to social spending? More specifically, do the partisan complexion and the type of government condition the extent to which austerity policies imply welfare state retrenchment? This article demonstrates that large budget consolidations tend to be associated with welfare state retrenchment. The findings support a partisan and a politico-institutionalist argument: (i) in periods of fiscal consolidation, welfare state retrenchment tends to be more pronounced under left-wing governments; (ii) since welfare state retrenchment is electorally and politically risky, it also tends to be more pronounced when pursued by a broad pro-reform coalition government. Therefore, the article shows that during budget consolidations implemented by left-wing broad coalition governments, welfare state retrenchment is greatest. Using long-run multipliers from autoregressive distributed lag models on 17 OECD countries during the 1982–2009 period, substantial support is found for these expectations.     

FROM DONORSHIP TO OWNERSHIP? BUDGET SUPPORT AND DONOR INFLUENCE IN RWANDA AND TANZANIA

In this article, I analyze the relationship between budget support and ownership, or recipient‐country control over policy outcomes, by exploring how budget support donors in Rwanda and Tanzania attempt to exert influence over domestic policy processes. In contrast to the conventional rhetoric about budget support, my empirical analysis finds little evidence that budget support decreases the influence that donors try to exert over recipient‐country governments. Instead, semi‐structured interviews with donor and government representatives in each country suggest that the aid modality is often used as a tool by which donors attempt to increase their leverage over domestic decision‐making. In particular, I identify three mechanisms frequently used by budget support donors to influence domestic policy processes: voice amplification, a seat at the table, and a license to ask questions. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Does US aid buy UN general assembly votes? A disaggregated analysis

Using panel data for 143 countries over the period 1973–2002, this paper empirically analyzes the influence of US aid on voting patterns in the UN General Assembly. We use disaggregated aid data to account for the fact that various forms of aid may differ in their ability to induce political support by recipients. We obtain strong evidence that US aid buys voting compliance in the Assembly. More specifically, our results suggest that general budget support and grants are the major aid categories by which recipients have been induced to vote in line with the United States. When replicating the analysis for other G7 donors, no comparable patterns emerge.     

Controlling Nonconventional Expenditure: Tax Expenditures and Loans

Tax expenditures, credits and guarantees, and other nonconventional expenditures are prominent features of the public finances of the United States and other industrialized democracies. While reliable data on these practices have generally been available only for a decade or less, there is reason to believe that these types of transactions now constitute a larger share of total public expenditure than they did in the past. This article discusses the concepts arid implications of two types of nonconventional expenditures—tax expendituures and loans—as well as recent efforts to bring them within the scope of the budget process. The article deals mostly with American practices, but it also draws on the experiences of other democratic countries.     

Penal Populism and the Public Thermostat: Crime,Public Punitiveness,and Public Policy

This article makes the case that feedback processes in democratic politics—between crime rates, public opinion, and public policy—can account for the growth of penal populism in Britain. It argues that the public recognize and respond to rising (and falling) levels of crime, and that in turn public support for being tough on crime is translated into patterns of imprisonment. This contributes to debates over the crime–opinion–policy connection, unpacking the dynamic processes by which these relationships unfold at the aggregate level. This uses the most extensive data set ever assembled on aggregate opinion on crime in Britain to construct a new over‐time measure of punitive attitudes. The analysis first tests the thermostatic responsiveness of punitive attitudes to changes in recorded crime rates as well as self‐reported victimization, and then examines the degree to which changes in mass opinion impact on criminal justice policy.     

Political Support: Social Capital, Civil Society and Political and Economic Performance

This article assesses two main theories of the decline of political support that is found in many western democracies. The first is society centred and built on the concepts of social capital, trust and civil society. The second is politics centred and focuses on the performance of government and the economy. The two theories are not necessarily incompatible, but they are usually treated in a mutually exclusive way. In this article they are tested against a combination of aggregate cross-national comparative data and detailed case studies of four countries that have suffered exceptional decline of political support for politicians, political institutions and the systems of government. The puzzle is that cross-national comparative evidence about a large and diverse number of nations supports social capital theory, whereas in-depth study of four countries that have experienced substantial decline of political support does not. The erosion of support coincides in all four with poor economic and/or political performance. A way of reconciling the two theories and their supporting evidence is suggested, arguing that while social capital is a necessary foundation for democratic support, it is not a sufficient cause.     

Political budget cycles and election outcomes

This paper addresses two empirical questions. Is fiscal policy affected by upcoming elections? If so, do election-motivated fiscal policies enhance the probability of re-election of the incumbent? Employing data for 65 democratic countries over 1975–2005 in a semi-pooled panel model, we find that in most countries fiscal policy is hardly affected by elections. The countries for which we find a significant political budget cycle are very diverse. They include ‘young’ democracies but also ‘established’ democracies. In countries with a political budget cycle, election-motivated fiscal policies have a significant positive (but fairly small) effect on the electoral support for the political parties in government.     

Multi-Year Budgeting: A Review of International Practices and Lessons for Developing and Transitional Economies

In recent years, many developed countries have moved to develop their annual budget process in a strategic multi-year framework. While a common feature of multi-year budgeting approaches is the inclusion of revenue forecasts and expenditures estimates for two or three years beyond the current year, multi-year budget practices vary substantially between countries. This article reviews multi-year budgeting practices in six developed countries (Australia, Austria, Germany, New Zealand, Great Britain, and the United States) and attempts to draw lessons from these experiences for the potential application of multi-year budget techniques by developing and transitional countries. We draw five lessons from the multi-year budget practices of developed countries that are relevant for developing and transitional economies: (1) a multi-year dimension could be a valuable fiscal policy and management tool for developing and transitional countries; (2) the approach chosen in each developing or transitional economy should reflect the country's policy objectives, unique budget institutions and traditions, and administrative capabilities; (3) the introduction of a multi-year budget dimension is a gradual process; (4) the multi-year budget should be used to encourage the constructive involvement of line ministries in the budget process; and (5) the usefulness of the multi-year budget approach will crucially depend on the reliability and accuracy of the medium-term budget estimates.     

The Expat Gap: Are Local‐Born Entrepreneurs in Developing Countries at a Disadvantage When Seeking Grant Funding?

Donor agencies and foundations use grants to stimulate entrepreneurial growth in developing countries. However, some practitioners have asked whether these grants tend to flow to expatriate entrepreneurs with ties to developed countries (where most grants originate), rather than to local entrepreneurs. This article tackles this question using a data set of 3,434 nascent ventures from 92 developing countries. The authors find that ventures with ties to a developed country are significantly more likely to raise grant financing and in more substantial amounts. Ventures with a founder born in a developed country are the most likely to receive grants, with a weaker effect when considering prior work experience in a developed country. This “expat gap” cannot be explained by differences in education level, prior experience, or ties to other developing countries. Donors seeking to support local entrepreneurs in developing countries should consider ways to make their recruitment and selection processes more equitable.     

Effects of the IMF and World Bank on public expenditure accountability in Jamaica

This article analyses the positive and negative effects of IMF stabilization programmes and World Bank structural adjustment programmes on the accountability of public expenditure management in Jamaica in the period 1980–1992. Particular attention is given to the negative accountability effects of IMF budget deficit reduction targets imposed on a Government uncommitted to meeting such targets. Many of the arguments presented in this article relate to expenditure accountability problems more generally and it cannot be proved that IMF conditionality was the sole cause of these problems. It is argued, however, that IMF conditionality contributed. This argument is based on a large number of semi-structured interviews conducted in 1993 with Jamaican bureaucrats, politicians, donors, academics and private sector representatives, many of whom were involved in Jamaica's budget formulation process, and on analysis of the existing literature and data. The conclusion reached is that donor-guided reform programmes have complex and often conflicting impacts on the accountability of the Government's budgetary practices. A major question that arises is the relative importance that donors such as the IMF place on budget conditionality as against accountability. The conclusion based on the Jamaican experience is that the IMF placed greater emphasis on the former. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Ups and Downs of State Budget Process Reform: Experience of Three Decades

From zero-base budgeting to the Government Performance and Results Act, state budgeting systems have been synonymous with budgeting reform for over 30 years. This article examines the trends, both long-term and short-term, which have been identified through analysis of state budgeting office practices. Particular emphasis has been placed on understanding the changes in performance measurement over the period of 1970 to 2000. The findings reveal trends such as changes in the makeup of budget office personnel, a lack of budget offices in moving toward cost accounting, and trends in budget preparation and budget documents. Some budget reforms seem to have plateaued, beginning in the mid-1990s, while other reforms have exhibited "backsliding." It is clear that the states are not all marching in unison in reforming their budget systems. As with earlier phases of this study, the 2000 data raise many questions that will be explored in future research.     

Conditional political budget cycles: a review of recent evidence

Until recently, most research on political budget cycles was based on the (often implicit) presumption that these cycles do not differ across countries. However, more recent studies focus on heterogeneity. This paper surveys studies examining the factors conditioning the occurrence and strength of manipulation of fiscal policy for electoral purposes, at the aggregate level or at the level of a particular type of government expenditure. Conditioning factors discussed include: the level of development, institutional quality, age and level of democracy, electoral rules and form of government, transparency of the political process, the presence of checks and balances, and fiscal rules.     

Internet Search Data and Issue Salience: The Properties of Google Trends as a Measure of Issue Salience

This article examines the conditions required for using Internet search data as measures of aggregate issue salience. Internet data have clear advantages over survey data in terms of cost, availability and frequency. These advantages have led the media and some researchers to use Internet search data as proxies for public opinion. However, these analyses do not present systematic evidence that search data tell us about the general public's views rather than those of an unrepresentative subset. This article outlines a general method for assessing the validity of search data against existing measures, including content validity and criterion validity. To this end, weekly Google search data are tested against Gallup's “most important problem” question. The article finds the salience of four issues, fuel prices, the economy, immigration and terrorism, can be measured in the United States using search data. Weekly measures of issue salience are generated for these issues, from 2004 to 2010, for empirical analysis. The search indices performed less well outside of these domains.     

A theoretical analysis of the case for a balanced budget amendment

A balanced federal budget is not a best outcome for all situations, and a constitutional amendment to require annually balanced budgets is not well defended on grounds that it is. However, the case for a balanced budget amendment may have some merit on other, subtler grounds. This article outlines a set of such grounds.Specifically, if it can be shown that the political process systematically undervalues a desirable relationship between revenues and expenditures, a balanced budget requirement might be defensible. The grounds would be that annually balanced budgets are a second best solution, given an argument that the unconstrained political process produces even less desirable outcomes. However, existing knowledge does not make an adequate case that such a rule is needed.I would like to acknowledge the support of National Science Foundation Grant #SES-8218421, and the comments of the following persons on an earlier version: Arthur Benavie, J. Budziszewski, Henry Chappell, Richard Froyen, Paul (Kress, Peter Lange, Jeffrey Obler, Donald Searing, Kenneth Shepsle and the late Clement Vose. Of course, none of the above bears any responsibility for the content.     

Making rules credible: divided government and political budget cycles

Political budget cycles (PBCs) can result from the credibility problems office-motivated incumbents face under asymmetric information, due to the temptation to manipulate fiscal policy to increase their electoral chances. We analyze the role of rules that limit public debt, because borrowing is a necessary condition for aggregate PBCs. Since the legislature must typically authorize new debt, divided government can make these fiscal rules credible. Commitment is undermined by either unified government or imperfect compliance with the budget law, which can help explain why PBCs are stronger in developing countries and in new democracies. When divided government affects efficiency, voters must trade off electoral distortions and government competence.     

Reforming Budget Systems in Countries of the Former Soviet Union

The countries of the former Soviet Union (FSU) required considerable revision to their budget processes and procedures to establish systems consistent with transformation from controlled dependencies within a larger planned economy to independent governments of fledgling market-oriented democracies. This article considers the degree to which preexisting, reforming, and reformed budget systems in FSU countries deliver the basic expectations of a public sector resource allocation system. Evidence indicates failures to realign budgeting and finance systems designed for command and control environments to the demands of more market based economic systems, with effects often magnified by the hybrid economies of these transitional states. Significant difficulties and shortcomings in the ability of existing systems to perform basic public sector allocation, management, and control functions are the result, but some countries are ahead of others and their experience can guide reforms across the FSU.     

Information, visibility and elections: Why electoral outcomes differ when voters are better informed

This article assesses the aggregate effect of information shortfall on the outcome of the last six Canadian elections. Building on Bartels' analysis, the authors find an information effect in three of the six elections examined, and in each case the information gap benefits the Liberal Party. That finding raises the question: why does information matter in some contexts but not in others? It is argued in this article that the information gap is related to lack of visibility. When and where all political parties have some degree of visibility, the less informed vote like the better informed, but when and where a party is hardly visible, the less informed are less likely to support that party. The less informed appear to consider a smaller set of options when they decide how to vote.     

Trust Matters: Enhancing Government Legitimacy through Participatory Budgeting

Legitimacy is a problem of contemporary governance. Communities lack trust in elected officials—in their effectiveness, fairness, and representation of the public interest. Participatory budgeting (PB)—a set of democratic processes where residents determine how to spend a public budget—helps bridge that distance by letting the public make spending decisions. Since 2011, some of New York City’s (NYC) council members have been implementing PB with their capital budget—setting aside a million dollars in their districts each budget cycle for PB. Participatory budgeting has the potential to rebuild relationships between government and communities. Using data from over eighty interviews conducted by New York University (NYU) graduate students in 2013 and 2014 with PBNYC participants over two years, this article suggests that in council districts using PB, residents have greater feelings of access to and voice in local government, and better understanding of the complexities of spending public monies, often leading to a more positive view of government officials, and bolstering legitimacy of local government.