纯经济损失的理论与中国法实践及展望

纯经济损失是一个新兴概念，它是对以往民事赔偿制度的重大冲击，它能更好的保护民事主体的合法权益。传统的侵权法对这类利益的保护非常不完善，通过对国外立法以及相关理论的借鉴可以看出，有必要对纯经济损失在侵权法上给予保护，理应通过侵权法来保护作为权益的一种类型的纯经济利益。将来我国制定民法典时，应考虑将纯经济损失的基础性规范与具体类型的规范相结合的模式。     

产品责任中纯经济损失涵义之探析

纯经济损失作为一种新型的损害已成为侵权法领域的焦点,学者们对这一概念的争论从未停止过。同时,纯经济损失的案件大量涌现,而立法的缺失和司法的尴尬使得厘清这一概念显得尤为必要。产品责任中的纯经济损失既具有一般属性又具有特殊属性,本文试图从概括式和列举式两个角度对纯经济损失的涵义予以界定以揭开纯经济损失"神秘的面纱"。     

我国纯经济损失赔偿制度之构建

纯经济损失是被害人所遭受的有形人身损害或有形财产损害产生的经济损失之外的损失。本文通过一则案例指出构建纯经济损失赔偿制度的必要性，并明确了纯经济损失的概念，其后又介绍了其它国家对纯经济损失赔偿的处理方式和中国现在的立法及其研究状况，从而对中国纯经济损失赔偿制度之构建提出了一些建议，希望中国能够在借鉴外国经验的同时建立有中国特色的纯经济损失赔偿制度。     

论船舶油污纯经济损失的赔偿范围

纯经济损失在船舶油污损害赔偿公约体系中没有得到规定。依据公约设立的国际油污赔偿基金确认对纯经济损失的赔偿 ,并制定了赔偿标准来限定纯经济损失赔偿范围。美国 1990年《油污法》也承认对纯经济损失的赔偿 ,但没有明确赔偿范围。我国一方面应充分利用公约体系 ,保证公约适用范围内的纯经济损失赔偿 ,另一方面应建立我国的船舶油污纯经济损失赔偿制度。     

论油污损害中的纯经济损失

随着海上油类货物运输的增加，海洋污染也日益变得严重，由此产生了一些损害赔偿问题，尤其是关于纯经济损失是否应予赔偿以及赔偿的范围究竟到何种程度，很久以来一直没有一个明确的规定。纯经济损失索赔通常数额大，且涉及多方，因此确定一个明确的赔偿原则，不仅对世界航运业将产生深远影响，同时，也将有利于海洋环境保护。一、纯经济损失的概念纯经济损失是一种性质特殊的损失，有别于一般诉讼请求中以金钱尺度加以衡量的、包括有形的物质损失和非物质损失的广义的经济损失。在普通法系国家把它解释为“一种不是伴随着物质损害的经济损…     

纯救助的法律性质分析

利用概念比较法与历史分析的方法探讨纯救助的法律性质,结合民法理论中的"无因管理"不当得利"准契约"等相关制度,对纯救助的法律性质进行了分析.     

纯经济性损失的侵权赔偿责任

纯经济性损失同时涉及侵权和合同法领域.大多数国家对其不予以赔偿,不予赔偿的理由表面都很充分,实际都没有基本的法哲学基础,而是实用主义的产物.应该在一定限度内认可对纯经济损失的可赔性.     

论纯粹经济损失的几个基本问题

纯粹经济损失不因受害人的财产、人身或者权利的受损而发生;它们只是受害人因特定事由而遭受的纯粹金钱上的不利益;在纯粹经济损失概念得到认同的法域里,这些不利益一般不被法律所认许,难以获得赔偿.在我国法律体系中引入纯粹经济损失概念,有益于我国侵权法调整方式的进步.     

纯粹经济损失赔付与第三人利益保护

纯粹经济损失作为一个横跨侵权法与契约法边界的概念,具有明显的独立性、无形性和不利益性。它不仅反映了对受害人经济利益的一种救济保护,在更多的情况下还要求加强对第三人利益的保护。不同国家在纯粹经济损失是否赔付以及赔付范围的限制等问题上争议颇大,我国也只在特殊情况下对纯粹经济损失进行赔付。为弥补第三人纯粹经济损失的法律制度漏洞,通过借鉴欧美发达国家的先进立法与处理手段,对建立我国的第三人纯粹经济损失赔付制度进行探讨。     

论纯粹经济损失的概念

纯粹经济损失概念的意义在于构建一个过滤可赔偿损害的特别法律范畴。纯粹经济损失概念产生的历史缘由为近代法确定的以有形财产为基础的损害赔偿制度。从法技术的维度看,纯粹经济损失概念的产生是德国侵权法以绝对权为基础确定严格限定的可赔偿损害范围模式的直接结果,非限定性的法国模式没有也不需要这一概念。纯粹经济损失概念在法律政策上有以下重要意义：将受害者与他人利益联系切断,而＂塑造一个利益独立的个人＂;为维护行为人的自由而免除加害人过重的负担;改变投射损失的光源点而大幅度地缩小可请求赔偿的间接损失范围,扩大不可赔偿的纯粹经济损失范围。我国损害赔偿法对纯粹经济损失的立法应采德国模式和法国模式的混合模式。     

违背善良风俗故意致人损害与纯粹经济损失保护

"背俗故意致损",是在权利和利益区分的基础上进行侵权法思考必然会遭遇的一个问题。德国民法典立法者设立第826条时,并不具有利用该条将法律与道德、习惯等法外规范相连通的直接目的。第826条的功能在后世学说的解释中形成了形式功能与实质功能两大功能群。试图为"背俗"设置实质判断标准的实质功能越来越受到学者的批判,并且在学说上出现了将纯粹经济损失保护作为第826条核心功能的观点。故意要件的本质是在缺乏社会典型公开性的纯粹经济损失领域维持行为人的预见性。法解释对该要件有所软化,但不宜将故意降低为重大过失。背俗要件的判断标准存在于判例之中。应当借鉴动态系统理论,以本土判例为素材,建构我国的"背俗故意致损"判例类型。纯粹经济损失概念并不表达一个真正的类别,而是包含了千差万别的事物,该领域不存在一般保护规则。"背俗故意致损"只是纯粹经济损失保护中的"最小值"。应当建立特别规范、保护性法律和"背俗故意致损"三层纯粹经济损失的立法保护体系。     

The comparative law and economics of pure economic loss

Law and economics shows that a key factor in determining the optimal economic loss rule is found in the relationship between pure economic loss and social loss. Economic loss should be compensable in torts only to the extent that it corresponds to a socially relevant loss. In this paper we undertake a comparative evaluation of the economic loss rule to verify whether modern legal systems, although not formally adopting the economic criterion, define the exclusionary rule in light of efficiency considerations. The comparative analysis reveals that the substantive applications of the economic loss rule in European jurisdictions are consistent with the predicates of economic analysis.     

美国产品责任中的纯粹经济损失规则探析——兼论我国相关法律制度的构建

在美国的侵权法上,因产品自身存在的缺陷而发生的产品本身价值的减损、修理更换发生的费用,以及因产品不能使用而发生的利润损失等被视为是一种纯粹经济损失。针对该类损失,美国的法院创造了责任排除规则,并且各州在对这一规则在运用时采用的是一种灵活且有弹性的实践方式。这样灵活的纯粹经济损失规则对于我国相关法律制度的构建非常有借鉴意义。     

Toward an integration of economic and sociological approaches?

This article answers the question whether sociology of law and law and economics can be unificd into one integrated science. First, it is argued that an integration process inside law and economics has taken place, integrating most schools and partial analyses into one mainstream law and economics. Second, it is argued that there are no natural barriers against an integration of sociology and economics. Purely economic theories cannot and do not exist. What is calledeconomic analysis of law is basically a mixture of, for instance, 70 percent economics, 10 percent sociology, 10 percent psychology, and 10 percent other sciences. In addition, there is no such a thing as a purely sociological concept; concepts are sociological only in the sense that they are invented by people who call themselves sociologists.Nevertheless one should not expect that such a richer social science will lead to fundamentally different predictions and policy recommendations than those derived from the current simplistic economic analysis of law. The aspects studied by sociologists but assumed away by legal economists to date have in most cases no influence on the determination of (optimal) legal rules or on the long-run effects of legal rules.     

The Scope of Criminal Law and Criminal Sanctions: An Economic View and Policy Implications

This paper considers why some harm-generating activities are controlled by criminal law and criminal sanctions while others are subject to some other mechanism such as civil law, administrative law, regulation or the tax system. It looks at the question from the perspective of the law and economics approach. We seek to identify the comparative benefits of using the criminal law relative to other enforcement mechanisms and – more broadly – why certain specific behaviours are criminalized. The paper argues that an economic approach emphasizing the relative merits of alternative legal instruments for bringing about harm reduction can provide an explanation for a number of recent legal developments. It argues also that the willingness of legislators to combine the use of sanctions traditionally used in one area of the law with sanctions from other areas is more readily explicable in economic terms than in other terms.     

论纯粹经济上损失的规范模式——我国侵权行为法对纯粹经济上损失的规范样式

对社会财富的等级观念使纯粹经济上损失被独立为一个问题,但具有独特规范价值的纯粹经济上损失应当限于直接引致的纯粹经济上损失。对纯粹经济上损失的保护,牵涉到侵权法与合同法的规范机能,尤其受制于特定的侵权行为规范模式。借鉴两大法系的经验,我国民法对纯粹经济上损失的保护,应采取严格限制的立法与司法策略。     

Legal Transplants and Legal Downloads

Online legal education has the potential to address a global audience. But little attention has been paid so far to the question of how teaching methods developed in one jurisdiction interact with the substantive law of another legal system. This paper challenges the assumption of the independence of substantive law and law teaching on the basis of a comparative evaluation of online law tutorials in Scotland and Germany. It concludes that the transplanting legal education, as transplanting substantive law, can have unpredictable consequences.     

Occupational Accidents from an EU Perspective: Is There a Place for the Principle of Freedom of Choice?

Abstract:  It is evident that one of the most crucial issues concerning the future of European integration is that between social rights and market freedoms. This article is aimed at investigating whether, within a EU law perspective, there exists a legal basis on which the introduction of the freedom of choice as a ruling principle could be founded within the highly sensitive sector of social protection and occupational accidents. In order to answer this question, this article will focus on two aspects of the subject matter. The first concerns the 'reality and myth' of the potential of EU competition law to interfere with Member States' competence in organising their social security systems, particularly as it relates to occupational accidents. The second, the question of health and safety, which at present appears to be an EU Commission priority, may provide a useful starting point in order to avoid a partisan answer to our question. The conclusion is that the potential of EU competition law to interfere is a reality, and not a myth, and the health and safety issue appears to be a crucial element in excluding a pure market model based on the freedom of choice.     

Was Austin Right After All? On the Role of Sanctions in a Theory of Law

In modern jurisprudence it is taken as axiomatic that John Austin's sanction-based account of law and legal obligation was demolished in H.L.A. Hart's The Concept of Law , but Hart's victory and the deficiencies of the Austinian account may not be so clear. Not only does the alleged linguistic distinction between being obliged and having an obligation fail to provide as much support for the idea of a sanction-independent legal obligation as is commonly thought, but the soundness of Hart's claims, as well as the claims of many legal theorists who have followed him, depend on a contested view of the nature of legal theory. If the task of a theory of law, as Joseph Raz and others have influentially argued, is to identify the essential features of the concept of law, then the theoretical possibility, if not the empirical reality, of a sanction-free legal system is what is most important. But if the task of a theory of law is to provide philosophical and theoretical illumination of law as it exists and as it is experienced, then a theory of law that fails to give a central place to law's coercive reality may for that reason be deficient as a theory of law. The question of the soundness of the Austinian account, therefore, may be a function of the answer to the question of what a theory of law is designed to accomplish.