Challenging EU constitutional law: The Italian Constitutional Court's new stance on direct effect and the preliminary reference procedure

This article seeks to examine the relationship between EU law and the Italian legal order in light of the recent Italian Constitutional Court (ICC)’s jurisprudence attempting to redefine EU core principles. When fundamental rights are at stake, three assumptions are challenged: the determination of direct effect shall be a prerogative of the ECJ; EU directly effective provisions entail the disapplication of conflicting national law; judges have the discretion to refer preliminary references to the ECJ where a clarification on EU law is needed. The contribution argues that the judicial search for a balance between sovereignty and supranationality is undermined by the ICC's new resistance to the well‐established EU jurisprudence. In that respect, the paper posits that the ICC's activism is the result of an unjustified ‘argumentative self‐restraint’ of the ECJ vis‐à‐vis the evolution of EU foundational principles.     

The Consequences of Kadi: Where the Divergence of Opinion between EU and International Lawyers Lies?

The divergence of opinion between EU and international lawyers as to the consequences of the Kadi/Al Barakaat judgment is likely to remain for the foreseeable future. While international lawyers focus their analysis on the constitutional role of the UN Charter in international law, EU lawyers seek to assert the autonomy and primacy of the EU treaties. The aim of this article is to analyse where the divergence between the two perspectives can be found. The judgment of the European Court of Justice cannot be interpreted as questioning the authority of the Security Council in discharging its duties for the maintenance of international peace and security. The consequences of the General Court's case‐law as regards the EU autonomous list of terrorists should be borne in mind when faced with the implications of Kadi/Al Barakaat. It is not justified that the level of protection to the individuals or entities affected by targeted sanctions should depend on the legal framework in which the restrictive measures have been adopted (UN or EU), or on the margin of discretion left to the EU Member States by the Security Council.     

Rediscovering the public/private divide in EU private law

This article explores the role of the public/private divide within EU private law. It shows that although EU private law cuts across the boundaries of public and private law, the conceptual distinction between these well‐established categories does matter within it and may lead to better law‐making in the EU more generally. The legal grammar of a particular EU harmonisation measure—which can be more “public” or “private”—may have important implications for the position of private parties at national level, for the CJEU's likely activism in this context, and ultimately for the measure's ability to realise its policy goals. Therefore, instead of ignoring the existing differences between public and private law, EU law should explicitly adopt the public/private law language in its discourse, without, however, introducing any sharp divide between these two areas.     

Horizontal Liability for Damages in EU Law—the Changing Relationship of EU and National Law

The article focuses on damages liability between private parties—referred to as horizontal liability—that is based on EU law. Generally, this kind of liability may be based on EU secondary legislation or be derived from substantive EU law and legal principles. The article seeks to analyse the latter: liability in an area of EU law where so‐called procedural autonomy still, at least apparently, prevails. Special attention is paid to the lively interface between EU law and national remedies and to the increasing EU law requirements for the enforcement of EU law in national courts. Recent case‐law on private liability for damages caused by competition infringements is discussed as part of a more general question concerning the ways in which the relationship of EU law and national enforcement frameworks is developing.     

Personality under EU Law: A Conceptual Answer towards the Pluralisation of the EU

Although the trend towards pluralisation within the institutional framework of the EU is somewhat reflected in theoretical efforts, legal scholarship's answer remains incomplete. Acknowledging that legal personality is always relative—ie related to a particular legal system—personality under EU Law should be recognised and developed as a distinct category. This allows for reconsideration and rearrangement of inter‐ and intrapersonal relations in EU Law: inter‐institutional agreements can gain firmer legal ground, the recognition of hierarchical structures within the EU executive branch can advance the maintenance of the rule of law, legal protection of the Union's citizens shall be advanced, and options as well as limits to privatising organisation at the EU level shall be formulated. On the whole, methodological self‐reflection along these lines is bound to lead to a valuable contribution of legal research in times of EU crisis.     

Sameness and selfhood: The efficiency of constitutional identities in EU law

This article enquires into the formal dimension of constitutional identity by focusing not on what it consists of but on how it is expressed in the different discursive practices developed by constitutional courts. Contrasting constitutional identity as sameness and constitutional identity as selfhood shows that domestic courts can favour either a substantive determination of core constitutional features or a performative approach where the reflexive ability to define oneself prevails. Such a choice conditions the judicial strategies developed in the interactions with the Court of Justice, and their effectiveness. From this perspective, the accommodation in EU law, in light of the respect for Member States' national identity affirmed in Article 4(2) TEU, of these domestic identity claims rooted in the supremacy of the Constitution, depends less on what is asked for than on how it is asked for.     

Punishment and Rights in European Union Citizenship: Persons or Criminals?

While European Union (EU) citizenship has traditionally been key to limiting criminalisation at national level, over recent years crime has become a criterion to distinguish between the good and the bad citizen, and to allocate rights according to that distinction. This approach has been upheld by the EU Court of Justice (CJEU) in its case‐law, where crimes show the offender's disregard for the societal values of the host Member States, and deny his/her integration therein. This article argues that citizenship serves to legitimate criminal law. The Court outlines two—counterposing—types of human being: the law‐abiding citizen and the criminal. The article shows the legal unsoundness of the Court's approach. It does so by analysing and locating the case‐law over a crime–citizenship spectrum, marked at its opposing ends by Duff's communitarian approach to criminal law, on the one hand, and Jakobs' criminal law of the enemy, on the other.     

Levelling the EU participatory playing field: A legal and policy analysis of the Commission's public consultations in light of the principle of political equality

The EU Commission has a long tradition of consulting interested parties when formulating its policies. While the rationale, format and legal basis relied upon by the Commission when holding public consultations have changed over time, its systematic inability to make those consultations equally accessible to all affected parties has remained constant. This article discusses the extent to which such a consultation practice conflicts with the principle of political equality, as enshrined in Article 9 TEU. Given the Commission's unrestrained discretion regarding who, how and when to consult and the absence of corresponding participatory rights, it argues that the EU can no longer presume that all stakeholders—especially citizens and civil society groups—enjoy equal access to EU institutions. Rather, under a proposed substantive reading of the principle of political equality, it contends that EU institutions are procedurally required to ensure that everyone will effectively be given equal opportunities of access to the policy process. Only a series of structural, power‐shifting reforms—some of which are proposed in this article—may enable participation to become an autonomous form of legitimation of the Union.     

EU Climate Change Litigation,the Role of the European Courts,and the Importance of Legal Culture

The purpose of this article is to show it is only in light of legal culture that climate change jurisprudence in the European Union can be explained. Examining the case law concerning the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, this article demonstrates that climate change proceedings in the European Union raise questions that stand at the heart of the EU legal order; that is, they demand that the boundaries of the EU's regulatory competences are drawn. In effect, the EU courts focus on ensuring that EU climate change laws are in accord with the rule of law or, in the context of EU law, the borders of the EU's environmental regulatory powers. As such, this article shows that attention needs to be given to the interaction between climate change laws and the constitutional role of the EU judiciary. These interactions are considered here together with the contingency of EU climate change litigation on EU legal culture.     

The ECB's performance under the ESM treaty on a sliding scale of delegation

Two opposing theories explain the European Central Bank's (ECB) far‐reaching powers: principal‐agent and trusteeship. This article situates both theories on a sliding scale of delegation, with agents on one end of the spectrum, and trustees on the other. Applying this new perspective to the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) allows us to understand how the ECB, positioned on the agent side of the scale by the ESM Treaty, slides towards the trustee side in practice. This way, the article identifies two problems. Firstly, the ECB assumes a ‘zone of discretion’ that is not captured by the control mechanisms, thereby disregarding an essential feature of delegation. Secondly, the rationale of the Meroni doctrine, judicial review, is disregarded given the insufficient protection against the ECB's actions. These findings become increasingly important with the long‐term aim to incorporate the ESM in the EU legal order.     

Crawford v. Washington One Year Later: Its Practical Effects in Child Abuse and Domestic Violence Cases

A year after the United States Supreme Court decided Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), the maelstrom that many legal scholars anticipated has failed to materialize. Crawford's abrogation of Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), and its articulation of the new standard for determining when the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause applies to out‐of‐court statements, has had less effect than some predicted, regarding which statements are admissible and which are excluded. This article explores Crawford's practical effect as courts around the country have applied it, particularly in the context of child abuse and domestic violence cases.     

The Evolving Judicial Politics of European Integration: The European Court of Justice and national courts revisited

This article analyzes how the judicial politics sparked by the European Union's (EU) legal development have evolved over time. Existing studies have traced how lower national courts began cooperating with the European Court of Justice (ECJ) to apply EU law because this empowered them to challenge government policies and the decisions of their domestic judicial superiors. We argue that the institutional dynamics identified by this ‘judicial empowerment thesis’ proved self‐eroding over time, incentivizing domestic high courts to reassert control over national judicial hierarchies and to influence the development EU law in ways that were also encouraged by the ECJ. We support our argument by combining an analysis of a dataset of cases referred to the ECJ with comparative case study and interview evidence. We conclude that while these evolving judicial politics signal the institutional maturation of the EU legal order, they also risk weakening the decentralized enforcement of European law.     

Lessons from Roman law: EU law in England and Wales after Brexit

ABSTRACT

The experience of Roman law in legal education in England and Wales may serve as a cautionary tale for EU law post-Brexit. Similarly, past debates as to the position of Roman law in the curriculum may also be instructive in the EU law context. After tracing the history of the teaching of Roman law in England and Wales, this article posits first that the factors that appear to have caused the decline of Roman law could apply equally in the context of EU law. Secondly, based on both pragmatic and liberal education arguments that have historically been proffered for the study of Roman law, it advances arguments for the retention of a compulsory stand-alone EU law module in England and Wales after Brexit. To this end, the paper contends that the arguments for the retention of EU law in legal education are more robust than those asserted traditionally in favour of Roman law.     

EU Citizenship without Duties

Many believe that duties should be at the essence of citizenship. This paper dismisses this view, using EU law as the main context of analysis, by making five interrelated claims. (1) There are no empirically observable duties of EU citizenship; (2) such duties would lack any legal‐theoretical foundation, if the contrary were true; (3) legal‐theoretical foundations of the duties of citizenship are lacking also at the Member State level; (4) EU law plays an important role in undermining the ability of the Member States where residual duties remain to enforce them; (5) this development is part of a greater EU input into the strengthening of democracy, the rule of law and human rights in the Member States and reflects a general trend of de‐dutification of citizenship around the democratic world. If these conclusions are correct, it is time to stop categorising EU citizenship duties among the desiderata of EU law.     

CLOUD act agreements from an EU perspective

For many years, transatlantic cooperation between the EU and the US in the area of personal data exchange has been a subject of special interest on the part of lawmakers, courts – including supranational ones – NGOs and the public. When implementing recent reform of data protection law, the European Union decided to further strengthen guarantees of the protection of privacy in cyberspace. At the same time, however, it faced the practical problem of how to ensure compliance with these principles in relation to third countries. The approach proposed in the GDPR, which is based on a newly-defined territorial scope of application, clearly indicates an attempt to apply EU rules extraterritorially in relation to data processors in third countries.Irrespective of EU activity, the United States has also introduced its own regulations addressing the same problem. An example is the federal law adopted in 2018, specifying how to execute national court orders for the transfer of electronic data. The CLOUD Act was established in response to legal doubts raised in the Microsoft v United States case regarding the transfer of electronic data stored in the cloud by US obliged entities to law enforcement authorities, as well as in cases where this data is physically located in another country and its transfer could result in violating the legal norms of a foreign jurisdiction. The CLOUD Act also facilitates bilateral international agreements that enable the cross-border transfer of e-evidence for the purposes of ongoing criminal proceedings. Both the content of the new regulations and the model proposed by the US legislature for future agreements concluded on the basis of the CLOUD Act can be seen as an alternative to regulations arising from EU law.The purpose of this paper is to analyse the CLOUD Act and CLOUD Act Agreements from the perspective of EU law and, in particular, attempt to answer the question as to whether this new legal mechanism brings the EU and the USA closer to finding common ground with regard to a coherent model of exchange and protection of personal data.     

Packer in Context: Formalism and Fairness in the Due Process Model

Herbert Packer's The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (1968) has spawned decades of commentary. This essay argues that Packer's two‐model conceptualization of the criminal process is best understood within his professional milieu of doctrinal legal scholarship and the political context of the Warren Court revolution. Within this context, the essay suggests a distinction between two due process visions: formalism and fairness. This distinction is useful for illuminating debates and decisions on criminal procedure matters in the Supreme Court such as Terry v. Ohio (1968) and Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) . I conclude by encouraging sensitivity to legal and historical context in future commentary on Packer's framework.     

The Right to Have What Rights? EU Citizenship in Need of Clarification

This paper provides a brief critical overview of the recent EU citizenship case‐law of the Court of Justice including Rottmann, Ruiz Zambrano, McCarthy and Dereci. While these cases open a number of new avenues of fundamental importance for the development of EU law, they also undermine legal certainty and send contradictory signals as to the essence of the EU citizenship status and the role it ought to play in the system of EU law. Most importantly, the Court's reluctance to specify what is meant by the ‘essence of rights’ of EU citizenship potentially has disastrous consequences following its own determination that such rights play a crucial role in moving particular factual constellations within the material scope of EU law. The substance and meaning of such rights is however left in suspense to harmful effects. An urgent clarification is needed.     

Soft Law in the European Union—The Changing Nature of EU Law

This article is based on the assumption that there is a continuum running from non‐legal positions to legally binding and judicially controlled commitments with, in between these two opposite types of norms, commitments that can be described as soft law. It aims at defining soft law in international relations in order to provide a mapping of EU law on the basis of the soft law/hard law divide. It helps categorise EU competences and public policies, and sees how they fit with the distinction between two kinds of processes: legalisation (transformation of non‐legal norms into soft or hard law) and delegalisation (transformation of hard law norms into soft law and evolution from hard to soft law).     

Still in Deficit: Rights,Regulation, and Democracy in the EU1

Abstract: Critics of the EU's democratic deficit standardly attribute the problem to either sociocultural reasons, principally the lack of a demos and public sphere, or institutional factors, notably the lack of electoral accountability because of the limited ability of the European Parliament to legislate and control the executive powers of the Commission and the Council of Ministers. Recently two groups of theorists have argued neither deficit need prove problematic. The first group adopts a rights‐based view of democracy and claims that a European consensus on rights, as represented by the Charter of Fundamental European Rights, can offer the basis of citizen allegiance to EU wide democracy, thereby overcoming the demos deficit. The second group adopts a public‐interest view of democracy and argues that so long as delegated authorities enact policies that are ‘for’ the people, then the absence of institutional forms that facilitate democracy ‘by’ the people are likewise unnecessary—indeed, in certain areas they may be positively harmful. This article argues that both views are normatively and empirically flawed. This is because there is no consensus on rights or the public interest apart from the majority view of a demos secured through parliamentary institutions. To the extent that these remain absent at the EU level, a democratic deficit continues to exist.     

Trade Secrecy Injunctions,Disclosure Risks,and eBay's Influence

Historically, intellectual property (IP) owners could rely on injunctive remedies to prevent continued infringement. The Supreme Court's eBay v. MercExchange decision changed this, however. After eBay, patent courts no longer apply presumptions that push the deliberative scales in favor of injunctions (or “property rule” protection). Instead, patent injunctions require a careful four‐factor analysis, where plaintiffs must demonstrate irreparable injury (i.e., that money damages cannot compensate). Without question, eBay has made it harder for patent plaintiffs to secure injunctions, and has led many district courts to consider innovation policy concerns (e.g., the strategic behavior of patent “troll” plaintiffs) in the injunction calculus. By and large, courts’ more deliberative approach to patent injunctions post‐eBay has been viewed as beneficial for the patent system. Over the past decade, eBay’s influence has migrated to other areas of IP. This article offers the first account of eBay’s impact on federal trade secrecy injunctions. Important differences between trade secret law and other areas of IP—for example, the hard‐to‐quantify risk that disclosure poses to trade secret owners—has lessened eBay’s influence on trade secrecy injunctions. This article argues that disclosure risks justify a bifurcated approach to trade secrecy injunctions. That is, in cases involving the dissemination of trade secrets, courts should presume irreparable injury in the injunction calculus. However, in cases involving the unauthorized use of a trade secret—that is, where a defendant builds upon a plaintiff's trade secret but does not disseminate it—courts should not presume irreparable harm and, instead, should apply the eBay framework. As part of this assessment, courts should consider policy concerns related to cumulative innovation and employee mobility.