Taiwan's Quest for International Space: Ma's Legacy,Tsai's Options,China's Choices,and U.S. Policy

Taiwan's “international space” has been a vital concern for the nation's leaders, and increasingly so as China has grown in power, influence, and ability to “squeeze” Taiwan's international space and thereby undermine the international stature that matters for Taiwan's security. President Tsai Ing-wen inherits a legacy of multi-pronged efforts and some successes, and will seek to build on them as she pursues her own distinctive approach. But she must do so in the face of continuing, and possibly increasing, resistance from Beijing and amid uncertainty about the policies of key states, including China and the United States.     

2016 Taiwan Elections: Significance and Implications

This year's Taiwan elections gave the Democratic Progressive Party a clear mandate to rule Taiwan again. Since 2014 Taiwanese millennials have played a decisive role in Taiwan's significant democratic change. The elections can be appreciated best in the context of the changing state-civil society relations of the preceding eight years of 2008-2015. The revival of civil society activism since 2008 and the explosive force of the Sunflower Movement in 2014 finally transmitted social activism into electoral politics. President Tsai responded to these changes in her inaugural address by placing cross-Strait relations in the context of regional peace and stability and making no mention of the“1992 Consensus.” Instead, she emphasized domestic development and reforms to safeguard Taiwan to be a democratic and free country.     

A question of sovereignty?

Taiwan's efforts to take part in international organisations (IOs) have received little backing from the international community owing to Taiwan's contested sovereignty. This article investigates under what circumstances and how the European Union (EU) supported Taiwan's participation in IOs and agreements by examining the role of the EU in three success stories: the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) and the World Health Organization (WHO). The analysis of six factors that shaped the EU's approach shows that a strong EU interest in Taiwan's IO participation was a precondition for its support and that once this precondition was met, applicable membership/participation criteria and opportunities for circumventing or neutralising China's opposition then gained in importance. A supportive United States (US) stance could function as a trigger for EU support. Two counterintuitive findings are that the radicalisation of Taiwan's own strategy fostered increased EU activity in brokering compromises between Taiwan and China and that the EU's decision-making mechanisms did not play a decisive role in the formulation of its support policies.     

A China Divided since the Turnover of Political Power in Taiwan

Since March 2000 the turnover of political power in Taiwan to the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and President Chen Shui-bian has been associated with a bitter clash between two visions for Taiwan's future: a vision of Taiwanese nationalism promoted by President Chen and the DPP versus one of engagement with mainland China that aims to create a special relationship while engaging the Western world, as promoted by the KMT and some of its allies. These conflicting visions will continue to interact and influence political life in significant ways.     

Taiwan and Japan in the Tsai Era

Under the administration of Taiwan's first woman president, Tsai Ing-wen, Taiwan-Japan relations are likely to deepen while relying, as far as possible, on non-governmental and quasi-governmental working relationships. This reflects the Japanese government's desire to avoid friction with China while endeavoring to protect its strategic and economic interests by partnering with Taiwan. Concern about these developments is already evident in the People's Republic of China.

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How Far Can Taiwan Go?

This article explores the possibility of Taiwan's moving away from the status quo by either seeking reunification with the mainland or pursuing de jure independence, and particularly focuses on the latter scenario. Clearly, immediate reunification is not a viable option, but a declaration of independence may be. However, given the public attitude on the national identity issue, which underpins Taiwan's party structure, it is very difficult for the independence forces to control a majority of seats in the parliament. Thus, as long as the ROC constitutional structure remains essentially parliamentary, the chances that Taiwan will declare independence are not that great. Moreover, China's threat to use force against Taiwan if Taiwan declares independence and the tremendous economic interests involved in doing business with China, coupled with the US insistence on peace and stability in the region, all keep Taiwan from taking drastic measures in pursuit of independence.     

Legacy Problems: China's Taiwan Dilemma

The particular difficulties that Taiwan's new administration faces are paradoxical, for their origin no longer has to do with ensuring the continuing existence of the state. That seems assured. Rather, the challenges arise because U.S. and China's diplomacy in the 1970s assumed that Taiwan was going to disappear, but it failed to do so. This fact created an embarrassing—and probably insoluble—long-term problem for China. To be sure, much commentary still suggests that if not on the verge, Taiwan and China are at least on a one-way road to unification, shadowed by the concern that China will not wait forever, ready to “impose” unity when it is finally fed up.     

Lifting the 'No Haste,Be Patient' Policy: Implications for Cross-Strait Relations

Cross-Strait relations remain deadlocked following Chen Shui-bian's inauguration as Taiwan's president. Amid this political stalemate, Chen's administration decided to change the 'no haste, be patient' ( jie-ji yueng-ren ) policy while refusing to endorse the 'one China' principle. While this policy change is in response to domestic demands, Chen and his ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) are unlikely to reap any benefit from these actions without active cooperation from China's leaders. Beijing will continue to use its economic clout in an attempt to pull Taiwan into political union, as Taipei needs to nurture an environment favourable for domestic and foreign investment in Taiwan in order to maintain its competitive edge over China and thus preserve its de facto independence. Beijing's leaders will need to rethink their rigid stand on the 'one China' principle, since increased cross-Strait economic integration may not lead to the expected political union they desire.     

Integration without Reunification

The United States, the third actor in what is still too often perceived as a bilateral and 'internal' dispute, will likely continue to prevent the direst of scenarios from taking place in cross-Strait relations: Taiwan independence, Taiwan's forced absorption by China, or even war. This outside constraint as well as the rapid development of multiple relations across the Strait hopefully will narrow the options available to Beijing and Taipei in the future. Nevertheless, while economic integration and cultural affinities may ease the development of a form of political integration, a formal unification that would solve the sovereignty issue and result in the dissolution of the Republic of China seems unlikely, even after the People's Republic of China democratises. More likely, a particular formula recognising that Taiwan is part of China but not 'mainland China' may be worked out by the two governments when Beijing eventually finds it to be both an interest and politically acceptable to formalise the 'integration without reunification' situation.     

US anti‐terrorism policies: Lessons to be learned to meet an enduring and changing threat

The evolution of United States anti‐terrorism policies has been marked by inconsistency and the lack of a unity of action. The declaratory no ransom policy enunciated by President Nixon has been constantly violated. In addition, the absence of a consensus on the nature of terrorism has been exacerbated by bureaucratic turf battles. This debate has created negative administrative and operational impacts on the organizations that are responsible for meeting the terrorist threat. Bureaucratically, despite the attempt to coordinate action through the lead agency concept, Washington's anti‐terrorism mechanism remain unnecessarily complex. Furthermore, different operational approaches to combating terrorism have impeded the development of an integrated counter‐terrorism capability. The need for streamlining has become critical in the rapidly transforming international arena. The use of terrorism by governments who seek regional hegemony and the development of the ‘Gray Area Phenomenon’ where non‐state actors employ terrorism as a means of realizing their objectives will challenge Washington's resolve. The political leadership faces the task of reconciling the present budgetary constraints with the requirements to identify and effectively respond to future threats.     

Public Opinion,Foreign Policy,and the Security Balance in the Taiwan Strait

The delicate security balance in the Taiwan Strait is threatened on several fronts. In Taiwan, democratization has placed Taiwan independence as one of the most salient issues in its domestic politics, and the rise of the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party to power has created uncertainty regarding Taiwan's future policy on the Taiwan independence-unification issue. In this paper, we investigate whether external factors such as China's military threat and the United States' security commitment to Taiwan can affect the development of the Taiwan independence movement. An interesting finding from our analysis is approximately one-third of the people in Taiwan can agree simultaneously on two seemingly contradictory issues: to unite with China if China becomes democratic and to declare independence if China will not use force and peace can be maintained. Voters in Taiwan with conditional preferences create opportunities for China and the United States to formulate foreign policy that will restrain Taiwan's drive toward independence.     

Troubled Waters: China's Claims and the South China Sea

Among China's unresolved frontier questions, the South China Sea has become the most complex and troubled, and arguably the most significant and disconcerting. The economic and security stakes are high and the stake-holding states numerous and diverse. The claims that China (and others) make about the region reflect such interests but they are, ultimately, legal claims. Beijing's assertions of rights to the disputed areas have rested on three conceptually distinct grounds. Each presents a different mix of challenge and accommodation to international legal norms and the interests of other states, including China's neighbors, near-neighbors and the United States.while China's behavior (as well as that of other interested states) has been more and less assertive at various times, China's three basic arguments claiming rights to the region have been comparatively stable. Both China's pattern of multiple legal arguments and fluctuating actions and rhetoric do little to resolve the debate over whether a rising China will be deeply disruptive of the regional and international order or whether it can—with sufficient skill and tolerable adjustments—be accommodated and integrated. Although China's stance on rights in the South China Sea may be partly the accidental product of conflicting agendas and shifting assessments, Beijing's embrace of three distinct lines of legal argument arguably constitutes a strategy that serves China's interests given the factual, legal and strategic environment that China faces.     

国际金融危机对中国开放型经济的影响及中国的和平发展

2008年由美国次贷危机引发的全球金融危机使中国的外向型经济受到严峻考验。然而在危机中,中国开创了以开放促改革和发展的独特的经济增长道路,使对外经济关系上了一个新台阶,抓住了机遇,实现了新的发展。后金融危机时代中国面临着国内外经济环境的重大变化,开放型经济发展的难度增大。30年的改革开放,中国始终走的是和平发展的道路。今后,中国寻求的仍然是在竞争与合作中同世界共赢。     

Democratization and Civilian Control of the Military in Taiwan

Over the last 20 years, Taiwan has witnessed an impressive transition from authoritarian one-party rule to liberal democracy. This included considerable changes in the relations between the civilian political elites and the armed forces. While under the emergency laws of the authoritarian regime the military had been a powerful political force, during democratization the elected civilians have managed to curb military political power and have successively widened their influence over former exclusively military prerogatives. This article argues that the development of Taiwan's civil–military relations can be explained as the result of civilians using increasingly robust strategies to enhance their influence over the military. This was made possible by a highly beneficial combination of historical conditions and factors inside and outside the military that strengthened the political power of the civilian elites and weakened the military's bargaining power. The article finds that even though partisan exploitation of civilian control instruments could potentially arouse civil–military conflict in the future, civil–military relations in general will most likely remain supportive of the further consolidation of Taiwan's democracy.     

Dual engagement: France and the Persian Gulf

With the end of the Cold War international relations began anew without the bipolar constraints of two ideologically opposed superpowers. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 represented the first challenge to the nascent post‐Cold War Persian Gulf security environment. Within the region, France is once again increasingly active in the economic, political and military fields. The re‐evaluation of Washington's ability to remain engaged at its current levels within the Gulf may be attributed in large part to a growing sensitivity in Riyadh and other Arab capitals to the visible US presence coupled with an American foreign policy which is, at times, inconsistent. The net future effect of contemporary trends may be one in which the Gulf Sheikhdoms welcome French ascendancy and US decline. France has experienced its own foreign policy transformation marked by the leadership of President Chirac. Where President Mitterrand sought the role of power broker in regional affairs, President Chirac seeks increased influence and importance.     

Dynamics Without Drama: New Options and Old Compromises in Egypt's Foreign Policy

Western policymakers have come to take Egypt's foreign policy orientation for granted in recent decades. After President Anwar Sadat's dramatic split from the Soviet bloc and embrace of peace with Israel in the 1970s, Egypt became a reliable but rarely exciting diplomatic partner. Little appreciated has been the centrality of foreign policy to Egypt's internal interests as well as its external ones, and the extent to which changes in either the domestic or international environment could trigger the Egyptians to reassess their stance. The present article examines the interests that Egyptian foreign policy serves, and it analyses factors that could prompt a future Egyptian government to adopt different policies in order to serve those interests more effectively.     

Command,Strategic Contest,and Confidence-building in the South China Sea

Wealth and power have steered global prestige from East to West and back again. History's serial relocations of economic growth and corollary power changed the character of the South China Sea into a conflictual conduit for Eastern and then Western colonialism, a strategic sea space in world war, and now a cockpit of contest to maintain or revise the rules-based international order. For the first time in several centuries, a Chinese blue water navy is projecting power across the Indo-Pacific and prosecuting a national maritime security strategy to transform the South China Sea into China's sovereign territory. In large part, the winner of the Sino-American struggle for preponderance in the South China Sea will steer the course of the twenty-first century in the Indo-Pacific.     

War Powers and the Atlantic Divide

As within the United States debates have arisen over how much unilateral power the President has to deploy force, so too debates are being raised across Europe. Depending on each country's history, system of government, and economic status, various historic positions are shifting. Public, as well as elite, voices are shaping the debate. Another point of tension is NATO's changing role as countries develop autonomous war caveats. Extended analysis of how Great Britain and Germany are grappling with these concerns has great import for U.S. policy. Learning to skillfully persuade its European allies will gain the United States better cooperation from those who do not share the U.S. war powers model.     

China's Naval Rise and the South China Sea: An Operational Assessment

Over the last fifteen years, the steady rise of China's naval capabilities has received a level of attention unmatched since the Soviet navy's expansion following the Cuban Missile Crisis. Yet much of that attention has focused on what that rise has meant for Taiwan's security or a possible contest with the United States.¹ But Beijing's seaward territorial concerns also reach far into the South China Sea. And it is there that the military balance has most swiftly swung in China's favor as a result of its modernization program. This article will examine not only how the military balance has shifted, but also what Southeast Asian countries, particularly Vietnam and the Philippines, could do to best preserve their territorial interests in response to that shift.